A Normative Theory of Aesthetic Ineffability

Abstract

This paper examines aesthetic ineffability, the profound experience of being unable to put an aesthetic experience into words. Existing theories of aesthetic ineffability are primarily descriptive. They attempt to explain aesthetic ineffability through properties of aesthetic objects or the cognitive structures of subjects. I argue that, as such, these theories can only explain why an aesthetic experience would be inarticulable, not why it would also be meaningful (and so ineffable in the relevant sense). In response, I develop a normative theory of aesthetic ineffability – the fitting-appreciation view – which grounds ineffability in how a subject values an aesthetic object. Specifically, the subject takes the object to call for and merit a distinctive kind of appreciation, which views the object as resistant to final understanding. I then show how the fitting-appreciation view explains the appropriateness of certain responses (such as poetic expression and reverent silence), and the nature of disagreements about what is aesthetically ineffable.