THE SPECTER OF STATE DISCIPLINE: GREEN INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND LOW-CARBON DEVELOPMENT IN FRANCE

Abstract

Demands for decarbonization have triggered a renaissance of state intervention — or so we are told. Pointing to the rise of “green industrial policy,” social scientists now debate the return of economic planning in the name of low-carbon development. Drawing on the successes of twentieth century developmental states, I argue current theories of state-led decarbonization misapprehend its mechanics. Through an updated theory of what scholars of development term “state discipline,” I argue the efficacy of green industrial policy can be explained as (a) conditional incentives paired with (b) the exogenous coercion of firm participation. To illustrate, I apply this theory to the crucial case of the French state and its relation to the oil major TotalEnergies. Through process tracing of public records and in-depth interviews, I evaluate two of the country’s largest green investment subsidies — both designed to retrofit the energy mixes of industrial emitters. While I demonstrate these incentives include strong conditionalities, variability in enforcement indicates exogenous coercion is lacking, which in turn suggest limited state discipline. This research reveals the contradictions between the policy design and policy autonomy of the emerging green state. While there is clear evidence that “post-neoliberal” regimes are now defined by a renewal of economic planning, I suggest this planning remains subordinated to the interests of highly globalized firms. If states are to ensure the world’s top emitters divest from carbon-intensive operations, capital’s long-held structural power will need reversing.