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    Creaming-Skimming, Parking and Other Intended and Unintended Effects of Performance-Based Contracting in Social Welfare Services

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    heinrich2010-021.pdf (446.5Kb)
    Date
    2010-09
    Author
    Koning, Pierre
    Heinrich, Carolyn J.
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    Abstract
    The authors' analysis finds that government-contracted private providers of job placement services in the Netherlands tend to focus on helping clients who are the easiest to place, a practice known as cream-skimming, when the providers are engaged through fully performance-contingent contracts. In addition, making contract payments fully contingent on performance appears to increase job placements, but not job duration, for more readily employable workers.
    Permanent Link
    http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/46472
    Type
    Working Paper
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    • La Follette Working Papers

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