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    Robust Incentives and the Design of a Climate Change Governance Regime

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    nemet2010-006.pdf (277.4Kb)
    Date
    2010-02
    Author
    Nemet, Gregory F.
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    Abstract
    A poorly coordinated international governance regime has the advantage of reducing the risk associated with a global policy failure. Beyond this case study, the importance of this positive effect depends on the probability of policy failures in each country, the correlations among them and the probability of a global policy failure.
    Permanent Link
    http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/38822
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    • La Follette Working Papers

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