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    Choose Your Weapon: International Trade Agreements and Exchange Rate Policy Choice

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    copelovitch2007-038.pdf (459.6Kb)
    Date
    2007
    Author
    Copelovitch, Mark S.
    Pevehouse, Jon C.
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    Abstract
    This paper examines the question of whether governments engage in "exchange rate protection" - that is, whether they actively manipulate the exchange rate and/or utilize exchange rate fluctuations as a lever to influence the terms of trade. Using data on 21 countries from 1975-1999, the paper identifies specific conditions under which governments use exchange rate policy as a substitute for trade protection.
    Permanent Link
    http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/36258
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    • La Follette Working Papers

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