The "Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict" is the annual journal of the Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, with its office at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, 900 Reserve Street, Stevens Point, WI 54481. Officers are Executive Director Deborah Buffton (University of Wisconsin-La Crosse), Associate Director Sarah Stillwell (University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point), and Administrative Director Kathryn Blakeman. The Institute is committed to a balanced review of diverse perspectives. Views of the authors are their own. The "Journal" is a refereed journal. To purchase a copy, send $15 to the Wisconsin Institute at the above address.

CALL FOR PAPERS: The 2009-2010 issue of the "Journal" will publish a variety of scholarly articles, essays, poetry, and book reviews on topics such as war, peace, global cooperation, domestic violence, and interpersonal conflict resolution; including questions of military and political security, the global economy, and global environmental issues. We wish to promote discussion of both strategic and ethical questions surrounding these issues. Our audience includes scholars with a wide range of interests within the academy and educated members of the general public. Contributors should avoid discussions accessible only to specialists in their field. Submissions are accepted on a continuing basis. Contributors should first contact the office at wirst@uwsp.edu for a brief style sheet.
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Editor’s Forward

The 2008-2009 issue of the Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict continues the interdisciplinary tradition of previous issues by including essays by scholars in a variety of disciplines on a broad range of topics related to peace and conflict. The first article, by librarian and historian Thomas Reich, examines a little known but important aspect of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War: the advisory mission led by Wisconsin State University—Stevens Point to reform the South Vietnamese system of higher education. His findings on the pitfalls of undertaking educational reform in a society destabilized by war are especially relevant today in light of current U.S. “nation-building” efforts in the Middle East.

The essays that follow all deal with issues of peacebuilding and peacekeeping, some focusing on particular areas of the world and some taking a more theoretical tack. Using perspectives from urban planning and international law, Rebecca Sutton carefully dissects the problems of governing the divided city of Jerusalem, offering potential methods to ease tensions between Palestinians and Israelis. Political scientist Spencer Meredith addresses the problems faced by Georgian “Internally Displaced Persons” fleeing the fighting in the Russian-occupied provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; he ably synthesizes research in conflict resolution theory and social network analysis with his own extensive interviewing in the region to call for a greater role for Georgian Orthodox priests in easing the refugees’ adjustment. In the next essay, Fonkem Achankeng, also a political scientist, examines a variety of international mediation efforts to argue for the inclusion of all the relevant parties, weak as well as strong, at the bargaining table, thereby preventing the manipulation of the process for the advantage of powerful outside actors.

Sociologist Lynne Woehrle follows with a cogent overview of the emerging field of “green jobs,” incorporating insights from peace culture theory, ecofeminism, and sustainable development, which highlights the complex issues of economic transformation and includes examples of experiments in green economics. In an especially innovative essay, Colonel Marcia Ledlow of the U.S. Air Force compares the Civil Rights movement in the southern United States to the current insurrection in Iraq, drawing parallels and contrasts between the two events in order to develop guidelines for American military peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East. The following two articles explore regional issues. Political scientist Ibaba Samuel Ibaba examines “horizontal inequalities”—regional economic, educational, and political disparities—among provinces in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, stressing the need to develop equality of opportunity and access to power for all in order to build a peaceful society. Finally, Sri Ganage surveys the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, finding its source in the unequal treatment of the Tamil minority, and assesses the prospects of a lasting peace in the wake of the recent military defeat of the Tamil Tigers. A short book review section completes the issue.

I would like to express my gratitude to the authors and contributors to this issue, to the referees who carefully reviewed and evaluated manuscripts, and especially to my co-editor, Kathryn Blakeman, who as always performed the major part of the correspondence, evaluation of submissions, editing, and formatting essential to the production of this issue.

William B. Skelton
Emeritus Professor of History, University of Wisconsin—Stevens Point
Reforming Higher Education in a Society at War:
Wisconsin State University–Stevens Point’s Advisory Mission
in South Vietnam, 1967-1974

Thomas C. Reich

This study explores an important but little known facet of America’s war in Vietnam: the United States effort to reform the South Vietnamese system of higher education as part of the broader “nation-building” process in the fledgling Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Specifically, it examines the interaction between Wisconsin State University–Stevens Point (WSU–SP), now the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Government of South Viet Nam (GVN), to implement educational change.¹ In 1966, USAID recruited President James H. Albertson of WSU–SP to head a group of educators, the original “Wisconsin Team,” to survey and report on colleges and universities in the RVN. Albertson and other members of the Wisconsin Team were killed in a plane crash near Da Nang in March 1967. Other WSU–SP personnel completed the survey, and later that year the university signed a contract umbrella with USAID and the South Vietnamese government to continue the collaboration. This contractual agreement launched a six-year program by which WSU–SP was the principal institutional adviser to the South Vietnamese system of higher education. Over time, some fifty different consultants worked under the banner of the Wisconsin Team, producing thirty-eight major reports and surveys.

Why Vietnam and the Other War?

United States assistance in Indochina began in the later stages of World War II with Office of Strategic Services (OSS) advisory teams supplying and instructing Vietminh resistance groups against the Japanese occupiers. The Soviet Union, with its subjugation of Eastern Europe, emerged from World War II as the most powerful nation in Europe and Asia. American strategists sought to build a balance of world power by supporting its European allies. France assumed a special importance in the new realm of power, and American skepticism about French policy in Indochina was outweighed by European security concerns as the United States

¹ Tom Reich is an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point University Library, serving as Collection Development Coordinator and Reference and Instruction Librarian. This article is based on his Master’s thesis, “Higher Education in Vietnam: United States Agency for International Development Contract in Education, Wisconsin State University–Stevens Point, and Republic of Vietnam” (UWSP History), which received the 2004 Param Gun Sand MAHS Thesis Award from the Midwestern Association of Graduate Schools as one of the three best Master’s theses in all disciplines completed at Midwestern universities and the Winn Rothman Award from the Portage County (WI) Historical Society for outstanding research and manuscript based on local history.

This study is based on extensive research using archival materials relating to the USAID education mission, several interviews with key Wisconsin Team participants, and a broad range of U.S. State Department and USAID documents. Key Archives/Manuscript Series Include: “Higher Education in Vietnam: Albertson, Vickerstaff, Eagon, Dreyfus Files,” Ca. 1956-1977, Series 17: 48 Boxes, 2 Figs., 8 vols., 5 Audiotapes, Photographs, held at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, Nels R. Kampaena University Archives, James H. Albertson Learning Resource Center, 900 Reserve St., Stevens Point, WI 54481; and “Albertson Biographical Data and News Clippings,” James H. Albertson Vertical File, Robert Russell La Follette Papers, News Clippings Files, held at: Ball State University Archives and Special Collections, Bracken Library, Muncie, IN.
committed itself to a policy of containment. The State Department’s Asian experts recognized the explosiveness of nationalism in Southeast Asia and urged putting pressure on France to adjust policy and come to terms with Vietnamese nationalism. However, their recommendations were overridden on both Vietnam and China by the department’s European experts who favored France. Charles de Gaulle had refused to accept the Marshall Plan unless the United States helped restore France’s colonial empire. For Vietnam, American paternalism replaced French colonialism, as containment and nation-building became fundamental tenets of U.S. foreign policy. The United States pushed for the economic and strategic reintegration of Japan and Southeast Asia into the Western sphere. With China having fallen to communism, the United States drew a line of defense for this region within the “great crescent” of containment, extending from India to Japan. The Soviet Union’s recognition of the Vietminh seemed to confirm perennial institutional beliefs about Ho Chi Minh’s allegiance. Secretary of State Dean Acheson held that this act “removed any illusions as to the ‘nationalistic’ nature of Ho Chi Minh’s aims and reveals Ho’s true colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina.”

Containment was rife with risks of conflict, risks thought to be lessened by nation-building. Foreign policy strategies associated with containment were deployed on two fronts, one military and the other developmental. With Vietnam, the developmental front became known as the “other war.” From a “nation-building” perspective, as former colonies emerged as independent nations, their immediate needs were interpreted as economic in nature, focusing on the expansion of industrial and agricultural output, an improved standard of living, and better health care and education. Education was seen as the primary means of assisting underdeveloped societies beyond economic programs. Education was a prerequisite to political development; it would develop both practical attitudes and the skills needed to build social unity. Education was a social leveler. Development experts felt that schooling could alleviate the social conflicts that characterized the pluralistic societies of underdeveloped nations and move them toward modernization.

As early as 1947 the American consulate in Saigon had forewarned that U.S. intervention was probably the “only possible solution” to problems looming in French Indochina and the best alternative to Vietnamese independence:

This is not to say...that the natives should not have more of an opportunity than they have had in the past. They should! But given the rank and file it is queried as to what would happen in Indochina if they were given independence with no measure of check and control... [T]here would be misgovernment and chaos and...a fine opportunity for a third party, be it Soviet or Chinese, to gain a foothold in this country.

After the Geneva Accords that ended the French war in Indochina, the United States created the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) to deal specifically with the problems of the newly established Government of South Vietnam. On 8 September 1954, the alliance took on new dimensions as South Vietnam pledged its own resources to the defensive strength of the "Free world," placing itself under the protection of the newly created Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol established a regional alliance promoting economic well-being and development, independence and self-government, and a formal sense of unity by all parties in the collective defense against any aggressor. The Protocol to the Treaty unanimously designated Cambodia, Laos, and the free territory of the State of Vietnam eligible in respect to the Treaty's economic measures. On 15 September 1954, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained the new U.S. commitment in an address to the nation on radio and television:

Our quest for peace took us last week to Manila... The United States was in a special position... because it was the only one of the signatories which did not have territorial interests in the treaty area. For others, the pact was not only an anti-Communist pact but also a regional pact... Any expansion of the Communist world would, indeed, be a danger to the United States... The protocol extends treaty benefits to Cambodia and Laos and the free territory of Viet-Nam. The Indochina armistice created obstacles to these three countries becoming actual parties... The treaty will, however, throw the mantle of protection over these young nations.  

From 1954 through 1958, the cumulative economic aid to Vietnam amounted to one billion dollars. By 1958, the USOM had developed 42 cooperative projects with the GVN: 11 in public works, 11 in agriculture and natural resources, 6 in education, 5 in public administration, 4 in industries and mining, and 2 in information. U.S. advisors directly hired by USOM expanded from 27 in 1955 to 164 in 1958. Most were agriculturists, educators, and medical personnel. Additional American specialists worked under specific USOM contracts.  

Over the period of a decade, American foreign aid lost much of its overtly propagandistic nature, as it focused more on the development of emerging nations directly through educational and economic efforts. Vietnam assumed an important position in this broader effort. On 1 June 1956, Senator John F. Kennedy summarized the growing U.S. commitment in a speech before the American Friends of Vietnam, an organization of which he was a member:

Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike... Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of

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little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we
gave assurances to its life, we have helped shape its future. As French influence
in the political, economic, and military spheres has declined in Vietnam,
American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring, we cannot abandon
it, we cannot ignore its needs.9

United States military and economic aid to South Vietnam increased after a Communist-
led insurrection broke out in 1959 and expanded during Kennedy’s administration. Under
Lyndon Baines Johnson, the United States entered the conflict fully, committing army and
marine ground forces and launching a bombing campaign against North Vietnam. In May 1965,
in an address entitled Viet-Nam: The Third Face of War, Johnson explained why engaging in the
Vietnam War was different from traditional wars and how education would continue to be
central to national development:

The war in Viet-Nam has many faces. There is the face of armed conflict... The
second face of war in Viet-Nam is the quest for a political solution... The third
face of war in Viet-Nam is, at once, the most tragic and most hopeful. It is the
face of human need... It is the most important battle of all... For a nation cannot
be built by armed power or by political agreement. It will rest on the
expectation...that their future will be better than their past... Education is the
keystone to future development... We have our own heroes who labor at the
works of peace in the midst of war...our [US]AID program.9

On 6-8 February 1966, the particulars of the “other war” materialized as the United
States and South Vietnam strengthened their alliance in Honolulu. President Lyndon Johnson
and his top advisers met with the leaders of South Vietnam to stress the critical nature of this
second war and pledge to intensify common efforts. With their joint Declaration of Honolulu,
the leaders pledged to defend “the hopes of all the people of South Vietnam.” The Republic of
Vietnam declared that, “In this interdependent world we shall need the help of others: to win
the war of independence” and build a nation. In turn, the United States pledged to stop
aggression and “to spread the light of education,” while providing advice and support to the
people of South Vietnam as they strove to construct a stable society.10

That same year, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and David Bell, Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development, testified before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on the U.S. commitment in Vietnam. They stressed that nation building
required struggling on two interlinked fronts, one of collective security in opposition to
Communist aggression, and “the other” of social and political construction. Secretary Rusk,
too, answered the question of: Why are we in Viet-Nam?

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9 U.S. Department of State, Lyndon B. Johnson, Viet-Nam: The Third Face of the War, (Department of State
9 U.S. Department of State, “The Pledge of Honolulu,” (Department of State Publication 8051, Far Eastern Series
145, March 1966), 1-6.
Certainly we are not there because we have power and like to use it... But we are in Viet-Nam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live.11

Quiet Warriors

As early as fiscal year 1955, the United States Congress appropriated $322.4 million in economic aid in an effort to assist the Government of Viet Nam (GVN) with its problems as a new state. By 1958, there were 48 technical assistance projects and 16 active institutional contractors in the Republic of Vietnam.12 The scope of the projects reflected the recognition that from the outset, the new state encountered an array of problems. The withdrawal of the French meant the immediate loss of the state’s major economic and administrative props. American foreign assistance went from a focus on shaping the country and hopes for peaceful development from 1954 through 1959, to a period in the 1960s increasingly marked by counterinsurgency and revised U.S. objectives. U.S. aid missions called for administrative and political reform, economic programs in rural areas, greater U.S. advisory capacities and supply efforts, and ultimately a more effective and larger Vietnamese Army. Administrative reforms and economic programs fell within the realm of the United States Operations Mission (USOM), and then under the auspices of the USAID.

From 1955 through the early 1960s, U.S. educational assistance initially concentrated on elementary and secondary levels of Vietnamese education, upgrading technical vocational training, and then ultimately reforming the republic’s system of higher education. Fundamentally, the goal was to move basic education in Vietnam away from its traditional theoretical nature and its colonial limitations. Throughout both the traditional and colonial periods, more than three-fourths of all Vietnamese school children terminated their formal education by age thirteen. The USOM and later the USAID undertook a wide range of programs designed to upgrade the total educational experience and steer education more directly in line with the needs of the developing republic, its institutions, and people.13

In 1961, President Kennedy established the USAID as a Department of State agency. The Agency, through contracts with American universities, stressed country-by-country planning and development with long-term objectives of “economic growth and democratic, political stability in the developing world to combat the perceived spread of ideological threats such as Communism.”14 By 1966, the U.S. State Department’s Office of Media Services was describing two wars in Vietnam: “the fighting war — the familiar war — [where] men kill and are killed. [And] the ‘other war... the quiet war,’ [where] the men who battle on our side do not kill, but they may be killed.” In 1966, as part of the USAID in Vietnam, there were some 1,200

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11 U.S. Department of State, "The Heart of the Problem... Secretary Rusk, General Taylor Review Viet-Nam Policy in Senate Hearings," (Department of State Publication 8054, Far Eastern Series 146, March 1966), 1, 3-5.
"quiet warriors" in South Vietnam. In 1968, a peak year, the USAID allocated $2.18 billion globally toward economic assistance; the largest portion, $1.04 billion, was in Development and Alliance for Progress Loans. In supporting assistance, $594 million FY 1968 funds were devoted to sustaining nations under military and economic threat. Of this, Vietnam received $400 million. In 1968, USAID reported “special progress” in supporting regional centers of higher education in Southeast Asia, specifically “resulting from concentration of AID effort and greater Vietnamese responsibility.” By 1968, the USAID had 1,396 contracts totaling $629 million for projects in 67 countries. About four-fifths of USAID-sponsored experts were from U.S. institutions of higher education.

USAID-university relations were complex. From the educational viewpoint, each contract represented a special Agency-university-host nation relationship having its own unique pattern. The setting of projects remained fundamentally important as legislative requirements were designed to make foreign aid an effective instrument of policy and to ensure that the taxpayers’ money was not squandered on unproductive projects. By law, the Agency was to correlate the recipient nation’s capacity for self-help with the availability of economic assistance from other foreign sources. Each situation was unique, politically, socially, culturally, and educationally. If the university was to assist the development of a nation, it needed to do more than offer material, professional, and technical assistance. In nation-building, higher education’s function was to prepare a people for their responsibilities and roles as citizens of a new nation and new social order. For South Vietnam, this would prove a very difficult task as the new nation looked outward, rather than inward, for assistance and validation.

Most of USAID’s university contracts were initiated for one or two years. However, many were renewed for a long-term basis with direct prolonged assistance programs partnering American universities with Vietnamese institutions. For nearly two decades, American universities held contracts in Vietnam. Direct university contractual involvement began in 1955, prior to the USAID, with Michigan State University’s technical assistance program, which had the distinction of being the largest technical assistance program of any American institution of higher education. The activities of the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group (MSUG) focused on police administration and occurred in close conjunction with the term of Ngo Dinh Diem. The MSUG contractual direction reflected the cycles of the Diem regime itself, with MSUG operating within a perimeter set by the practices and policies of the government in power. Local perimeters determined the range of success that MSUG and other American university groups who followed would be able to achieve. Ohio University and Southern Illinois University signed the longest contracts in the history of USIA/USAID assistance to the RVN, both running for some ten years. Ohio

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17 Ibid., 18.
18 Ibid., 174-178.
University aided faculties of pedagogy in developing programs for secondary teachers’ training.21 Southern Illinois University led programs for elementary teachers’ training.22 The University of Michigan held a contract to advance English language instructional and testing materials.23 The University of Florida consultants worked on agricultural training and development.24 A much smaller school, Wisconsin State University—Stevens Point, came to serve as the principal institutional adviser to the South Vietnamese Ministry of Education (MOE), recommending administrative and structural reforms in higher education.

Why Stevens Point?

On 1 July 1962, James H. Albertson, at the age of thirty-six, became the eighth and youngest president of Wisconsin State College—Stevens Point.25 Wisconsin State, along with American higher education as a whole, was experiencing unprecedented growth, both in enrollment and curriculum, as the baby boom generation entered college. New horizons in American higher education were opening at home, and American educators looked to extend their vision to other nations. Albertson shared this vision, and he worked quickly to implement a steady course of growth and change. Stevens Point evolved from a teachers college to a comprehensive state university, becoming WSU in 1964. Enrollment rose from 2,407 in the fall semester of 1962 to 5,907 in the fall of 1967, with annual estimates predicting 10,000 by 1970. Of special interest to Albertson was the campus’s international participation. He had a familiarity with USAID projects from his prior work as an administrative assistant at Ball State University, Indiana.26 He envisioned WSU-SP becoming a leader in innovative programming and global awareness, and a possible model of institutional development for newly developing nation-states. In 1964, the USAID and the American Association of Colleges of Teacher Education presented WSU-SP with a grant providing for an international intern to come to WSU-SP to study administrative procedures. A second, larger USAID grant came to WSU-SP in 1966, calling on Albertson to serve as chief-of-team for a group of American educators to go to South Vietnam to conduct a study of higher education and craft recommendations for reforms.27

In December 1966 and January 1967, the Wisconsin Contract PIOT, AID/fe-274 was negotiated and formalized between the USAID and WSU-SP Foundation, Inc. The original contract called for the WSU-SP to administer a survey of South Vietnamese universities, which would include: controls, facilities, finance, personnel, program, purpose, and objectives. Article I of the contract outlined the Operational Plan, calling on the Contractor to provide a team composed of approximately seven specialists (hereafter known as the Wisconsin Team) for a

22 USAID, Vietnam Office of Education Briefing Materials, 1969, Attachment B.
26 Ball State University Archives, Albertson Biographical Data and News Clippings, James H. Albertson Vertical File.
period of three to six months. The team was to consult with the USAID Mission to Vietnam, GVN officials, and Vietnamese educators, to attain and organize the necessary information. The makeup of the educational survey team was to be diverse, including specialists in administration, letters and sciences, behavioral sciences, foreign languages, business administration, law, and other areas. According to USAID contract objectives, the Wisconsin-led survey team was to:

1) Evaluate the current status of Vietnamese higher education and determine its needs;
2) Design a development program in stages to meet such needs;
3) Delineate an administrative structure and financial plan for higher education;
4) Project intermittent progress reviews.

In January 1967, Albertson, as chief-of-party, departed for Vietnam leading the seven-member Wisconsin Team that included: Harry F. Bangsberg, President of Bemidji State College in Minnesota; A. Donald Beattie, Dean of the School of Business and Economics, Wisconsin State University-Whitewater; Vincent F. Conroy, Director of Field Studies, Harvard University; Howard G. Johnshoy, Dean of Academic Affairs, Gustavus Adolphus College; Arthur D. Pickett, Director of Honors Programs, University of Illinois-Chicago; and Melvin L. Wall, Head of Plant and Earth Sciences, Wisconsin State University-River Falls. They were joined in Vietnam by Robert La Follette, USAID Higher Education Advisor in Saigon, a distant cousin of the Wisconsin La Follette political dynasty and former senior associate of Albertson's at Ball State. La Follette had served with the American Embassy in Vietnam since 1964.

Upon arrival, the Wisconsin Team participated in a Saigon briefing where USAID and Vietnamese officials discussed the "two fronts in Vietnam" on which the United States was waging war. Albertson's initial impressions were revealing of the dangers associated with reforming higher education in a society at war:

This morning [Jan. 11] I had a good example of these two fronts in operation, for as we sat and listened, and as I walked through the corridors and saw and had a chance to learn more about the program, in the distance were flying American planes dropping bombs on the Viet Cong. The ground shook and you could see puffs of smoke go up as the bombs and artillery shells were exploding some eight or nine miles to the east of us. In the daytime an on-going and viable instructional program is in progress. At night the VC move in and the Vietnamese have to move out. There are a few bullet holes in the windows and the Vietnamese have several of their troops billeted in the space that is reserved for the faculty pedagogy. It will be a long time before I forget what I saw and learned this morning.

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27 Ibid.
28 Ball State University Archives, Robert Russell La Follette Papers, Vertical File, News Clippings Files.
In February 1967, Albertson returned briefly to Stevens Point to hold administrative discussions on a USAID request for a second Wisconsin Team, a National Study Team. At his home in Park Ridge, Albertson tape-recorded a meeting of WSU-SP administrators, during which he explained why Stevens Point had received the USAID/RVN proposal to expand the Wisconsin Contract to AID/RVN-77 Vietnam. The USAID wanted a blueprint for reforming all levels of education in Vietnam. Albertson felt this was a golden opportunity, but nevertheless an almost impossible task, given the cultural and historic barriers. For any blueprint to be successfully accepted, it had to be a Vietnamese blueprint. That meant getting a team together of experienced American educators "willing to bend with the wind," willing to work with the country's educational system. Albertson explained: "you find yourself with a horse and no then another, and it may be that they will try to throw out the Americans. [Yet] in education, they like their music, they like their culture, they like their history"

Burdette Eagon, WSU-SP Dean of Educational Services and Innovative Programs, volunteered to lead the second Wisconsin Team, stating: "That is wonderful, that is what they have to build on. [However] what they are doing may not actually fit into the total picture of what they need"Albertson's and Eagon's comments proved prophetic.

By March 1967, back in Vietnam, Albertson and the team continued their tour of Vietnamese universities while working to modify their initial report based on responses from Vietnamese counterparts in Dalat, Saigon, Thu Duc, Hue, and Can Tho. On 21 March 1967, Albertson sent an optimistic message of progress to WSU-SP, noting hopes to construct a final draft and return home by early April. Two days later, on Good Friday, 23 March 1967, an early morning phone call from USAID Washington reached Stevens Point. On route to Hue from Saigon, bad weather the day before had forced the Air America twin-engine plane carrying the Wisconsin Team back to Da Nang to refuel. A second attempt to cross over the fog-draped mountains in extreme monsoon conditions ended in a disastrous crash. There were no survivors; the pilot, USAID advisor Robert R. La Follette, and all seven members of the Wisconsin-led survey team were killed.

Eugene McPhee, Executive Director of the Wisconsin State University System, summed up the anguish of the moment, extolling the "courage of those who gave their lives for a cause in which they believed deeply... [They were] front line soldiers in the long range war of ideas." The Stevens Point Journal depicted Albertson as an "inventive, bold, resourceful, articulate...model of personal integrity and individual high quality." Regent Mary Williams cited President Albertson’s capacity for hard work, his idealism,
his persuasive and enthusiastic personality." Front Lines, the USAID news digest, reported that the crash was the worst accident in the history of the USAID. 38

On 29 March 1967, USAID Washington forwarded a cable to Stevens Point from USAID Saigon asking Wisconsin State University–Stevens Point to send a representative "as soon as possible to assist in the wrap up" of the higher education survey. 39 Acting University President Gordon Haferbecker turned to Burdette Eagon, suggesting that he prepare to leave as soon as possible. Eagon arrived in Vietnam by mid-April, leading a new three-man survey team. Joining Eagon were T. C. Clark, education adviser for the USAID, and Russell Davis, assistant director of the Harvard University Center for Studies in Education and Development. By June, the new Wisconsin-led team had completed the original survey, Public Universities of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The report, published in both Vietnamese and English, was designed to serve as a long-term prospectus for reform. The survey was well received. The team then moved to the next contractual task, the National Study of Education. Eagon reported home that: "The South Vietnamese have great potential. They will need a great deal of government assistance – and much patience – in working out their problems in the years ahead." 40

On 2 July 1967, a ceremony was held at the University of Saigon posthumously awarding the Chuong My Vietnamese Medals of Merit First Class to James H. Albertson and the seven other educators killed in the plane crash. Eagon, representing the team members’ families, accepted the medals from Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Luu Vien. In attendance were the Vietnamese university rectors, Minister of Education Nguyen Van Tho, USAID Director Donald MacDonald, U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and numerous other U.S. and GVN officials. 41

The first Wisconsin Team report, Public Universities of the Republic of Viet-Nam, pointed out that in Vietnam change would depend upon a decentralization of functions, specifically those of the Ministry of Education. The report was historical by its very nature as the team noted that centralization of control in Vietnam, educationally and otherwise, had been the imposed doctrine of the French and had continued after their exit. The ruling class had objectives different from their subordinate administrators and the general population. When the Republic of Vietnam formed its national government, educational responsibility and authority increasingly became concentrated in the Ministry of Education’s top officials. These officials, in self-protection, focused on the processes of government, such as budgets, proposals, memos, and inter-ministerial rivalries, not educational ends. So higher education in Vietnam had an uncertain status, in part due to an absence of strong leadership and lack of effective coordination at the central governmental level. The burdens of responsibility needed

38 UWSF Archives, "Higher Education In Vietnam," Series 17, Folder 40, Box 5, Clippings (1967-1974), "Eight Educators Die in Viet Plane Crash...," Front Lines, S(March 30, 1967), Front Lines, the USAID news digest, had adopted its title from John Kennedy’s directive for the USAID to work on “the front lines of the long twilight struggle for freedom.”
39 ibid., Series 17, Box 26, Folder 1, Crash-Log of Events, Vickerstaff, "Log of March 29, 1967."
41 ibid., Series 17, Box 40, Folder 5, Clippings, “U.S. Professors Posthumously Awarded VN Order of Merit,” Saigon Post (July 3, 1967).
to be more widely shared.\textsuperscript{42} The second Wisconsin Team, in their National Study of Education, concurred: “If the Vietnamese government does not devote itself to the role of making sure that the people at all levels believe that their thoughts are considered worthy, it is doubtful that, in the long run, the government can hold the allegiance of those citizens except by force of arms. No unit of government functions effectively when overburdened, and the Ministry certainly appears to be overburdened.” The difficulty of the Vietnamese situation was that “the end of over-centralization is political control—and no nation has developed a quality educational system while that system was under strong political control.”\textsuperscript{43}

Burdette Eagon remained as the chief-of-party of the Wisconsin Contract until mid-1974, going to Vietnam seven times, leading and synchronizing efforts of university specialists from throughout the United States working under the umbrella clauses added to the Wisconsin Contract. Albertson’s successor, WSU-SP President Lee Sherman Dreyfus, and other Stevens Point administrators and faculty played key roles in the contract. Educators traveled to Vietnam to complete survey reports, while others coordinated on-campus seminars and led field observation tours in Wisconsin and across the United States. Team consultants contributed their specialized educational expertise in institutional growth to construct a model for the Vietnamese. From 1967 to 1974, Stevens Point hosted a series of workshops designed to offer the Vietnamese added understanding of the formulation and implementation of administrative policy and reform in higher education. Discussions focused on the state of institutional development and specific concerns of each Vietnamese university, as well as how WSU-SP modeled its institutional modernization and development. WSU-SP itself was maturing rapidly with its own expansion and growth in the early 1970s.

Overall the sheer magnitude of Wisconsin Team recommendations amounted to a total assault on the problems of higher education in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{44} The Wisconsin Team cited numerous developmental weaknesses in Vietnam:\textsuperscript{45}

1. There was an absence of a visibly stated and systematized National Policy for higher education.\textsuperscript{46}
2. There was great ambiguity in the term “university autonomy.”\textsuperscript{47}
3. There was a distinct lack of institutional unity.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{42} James H. Albertson and Burdette W. Eagon, Public Universities of the Republic of Viet Nam, (Stevens Point: WSU-SP Foundation, Inc., 1967).
\textsuperscript{45} Albertson and Eagon, Public Universities of the Republic of Viet Nam.
\textsuperscript{46} The Republic had not enacted a national universities charter or a national policy. Instead, the universities still operated under modified statutes, inherited from the University of Hanoi. The Wisconsin Team recommended the development of a charter for higher education and the formation of governing board to set the goals of higher education.
\textsuperscript{47} Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam stated that: “university education is autonomous,” but failed to define the concept.
4) Curricula were narrow in scope and theoretical in nature. Reforms called on institutions to inaugurate semester and credit systems in place of their traditional block and certificate systems, and allow transfer of school credits.59
5) Instructional methods in Vietnamese higher education were highly structured, carrying on a French tradition.60
6) Higher education allowed multiple registrations. Students often registered in two or more faculties and more than one university. Such multiple registrations only added to the problem of excessive enrollment in some faculties.51
7) All institutions had inadequate classrooms, laboratories, and library facilities.
8) Higher education in the Republic of Vietnam had too few university professors.51

In a continuing abridgment,23 the Wisconsin Team and their Vietnamese counterparts called for:
1) Additional regional and national studies and conferences;
2) Massive training programs and structural and functional reorganization; cooperative inter-ministry efforts;
3) The establishment of a national training center for leadership; the creation of new educational models offering break-through points at all barriers;
4) The allocation of twenty-five percent of the national budget for education;
5) Infusion of a technical emphasis at all levels through method and curriculum; initiation of a three year curriculum revision program;
6) Widespread participation in a plan for decentralization; and
7) The establishment of educational standards by professional committees, enforced by the Ministry of Education.

Lee Sherman Dreyfus

With the loss of Albertson, the Wisconsin Board of Regents appointed Lee Sherman Dreyfus, formerly professor of communication at UW–Madison, as the ninth president of WSU–SP on 2 October 1967. Brisk development continued at WSU–SP. President Dreyfus became

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49 The Wisconsin Team recommended a reduction in the duplication of some programs and the introduction of new programs in agriculture, engineering, and administration to meet national needs for specialization, and a general centralization of faculty and material resources.
50 Curricula were not practical. The Wisconsin Team recommended the development of a core program at each institution, which emphasized the interdisciplinary nature of higher education.
51 In some institutions lectures had become so standardized that students purchased copies from professors or the universities and were not required to attend class. The Wisconsin Team suggested instituting a continuous system of evaluation to alter the traditional year-end examination as the exclusive means of evaluation.
52 The Wisconsin Team recommended more coordination. There was no provision for central registration, so compiled data relative to enrollment was often erroneous. Duplicate enrollments were not identified, and student records were difficult to locate. The Team found that all faculties except Medicine, Dentistry, and Pedagogy had graduated less than five percent of their total enrollment.
53 "Suitcase professors" shifted from one institution (most likely Saigon) to another, often teaching an entire course in a brief visit to Hue or Can Tho. Professors' salaries were inadequate, so they supplemented their income by teaching at other universities and selling their lecture notes.
Chancellor Dreyfus of the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point (UWSP) four years later with the merger of the University of Wisconsin and Wisconsin State University systems. The campus underwent expansion, curricular growth, and system-wide alignment. New challenges included the reorganization of shared governance; faculty layoffs based on projected enrollment declines; regent-imposed guidelines barring excesses of student civil disobedience and unauthorized occupancy of university buildings; innovative programs; and establishment of an Army ROTC unit on campus. The Dreyfus era also marked the zenith of the Wisconsin Contract.2 In part, Dreyfus’s own quest to place WSU–SP on the road to educational preeminence represented an augmentation of the reforms and administrative themes Albertson and others had initiated. Dreyfus set new goals for the University, employing a strong emphasis on new technologies and international programs. WSU–SP was becoming a “twenty-first century campus.”5 In terms of Vietnam, Dreyfus benefited from the momentum that the Wisconsin Team had already achieved and Eagon’s talents as the new Team leader.

When interviewed, Dreyfus credited Albertson for the project’s originality and Eagon for the project’s longevity, noting that Eagon possessed the expertise necessary to carry the Wisconsin Team right to its culmination. Dreyfus rationalized: “My job in that contract was essentially political and promotional.6 Unlike Albertson, Dreyfus saw things through political lenses, viewing Vietnam as part of an important long-range war. Dreyfus admired Albertson and even credited the Albertson Wisconsin Team as the reason Dreyfus chose to come to Stevens Point. He explained that he did not want the early Team efforts to remain unfinished or their sacrifice to be forgotten. Yet, he saw his most effective role as opening doorways, through which Eagon and other educators could initiate real reform efforts. He felt “obligated” to carry out plans started by Albertson. He sensed that the Vietnamese educators and administrators had begun to see a different approach to higher education. The real issue wasn’t bringing an American system there, but making sure that they understood “our system” and how it could be adapted so as to provide a higher educational base that met a developing nation’s needs for self-government.7

In 1968, Dreyfus played such a door opening role when he led the Vietnamese university rectors, who had gathered for a working-seminar in Stevens Point, to a meeting in Washington, D.C., with USAID officials and President Lyndon B. Johnson. Dreyfus recalled that President Johnson asked him the question, “Why Stevens Point?” President Johnson queried if the lack of monetary reward was the reason an Ivy League university or Berkeley did not have the USAID contract. Dreyfus answered that great growth at WSU–SP had occurred in a short time, which now served as an easily understandable model for the Vietnamese. In a short time span, Stevens Point had established a contemporary modernization plan. Almost an entire campus had been constructed and fully staffed in the period since Albertson arrived. The University had developed visible layers of efficient administration, numerous service agencies, academic buildings, dorms, and athletic fields. WSU–SP had built a strong academic core, begun a

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2 Paul, The World is Ours, 111.
3 Ibid., 112.
4 Lee Sherman Dreyfus, interview by author, tape recording (August 2000).
graduate school, and instituted a modern system of registration and records. The Vietnamese
were impressed by the complexity of campus buildings, the fully equipped classrooms, the wide
range of instructional materials and library resources, sports facilities, student centers, and the
growing numbers of professors, a superior salary structure, and favorable professor to student
ratio. Within a week or two, visiting Vietnamese educators could understand how things
operated. In comparison, the UW–Madison, with its huge campus, was much more confusing
for Vietnamese educators who visited Wisconsin on a short-term basis. They made special
reference to American teaching styles centered on current textbooks versus the copied lecture
format and mimeographed texts used in Vietnam. The rectors were encouraged by the great
variety of other instructional possibilities, such as audio-visual equipment, television, and other
forms of telecommunications, with satellite linkage employed as part of distance education.\(^{59}\)
President Johnson could see that WSU–SP had gained the trust and respect of the
Vietnamese, noting that he himself had graduated from a former normal school, like WSU–SP,
Southwest Texas State Teachers College (now Texas State University–San Marcos). He
remarked, “That is so fucking smart, no one in Washington would have thought of that!”
Dreyfus recalled, “That is the way he talked. But he was sincere!”^\(^{60}\)
Dreyfus shuttled to Washington often during his tenure as chancellor. He led three field
surveys to Vietnam, one under the strict auspices of the Wisconsin Contract; one in conjunction
with his interests in ROTC; and a final trip funded by the U.S. Defense Department as he
traveled with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird looking at the possible conversion for
educational purposes of U.S. military installations.\(^{61}\) Just as Dreyfus benefited from the
administrative and institutional reforms President Albertson had initiated, he and Stevens Point
benefited internationally and contractually from the momentum that Albertson’s Wisconsin
Team had already achieved and the quick actions of Eagon as new team leader. Dreyfus
gained further dividends from his friendship with Laird and Secretary of the Army Robert
Froehlke, both residents of Central Wisconsin. It was Congressman Laird who set up the White
House meeting for the Wisconsin Team and the Vietnamese rectors. According to Dreyfus,
Laird and Froehlke also played fundamental roles in bypassing Ambassador Bunker’s objection
to Dreyfus meeting with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu at the Presidential
Palace in Saigon. Dreyfus explained:

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\text{I came out of there with two arêtes and three decrees—I had everything we}
\text{wanted. That they had been—USAID—had been trying to get through State}
\text{Department for over two years. That was my function. I was running}
\text{interference against the State Department. Having the Froehlke and Laird}
\text{backup turned out to be very important to this project, as well as toward the end}
\text{delivering things over the educational run. Once it was clear to the U.S. military}
\text{commanders that these educational things were growing, in Hue, in Can Tho and}
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\(^{59}\) Ibid., Series 17, Box 2, Folder 1, Nguyen Van Hai, “A Report on American Higher Education by the Delegation of
\(^{60}\) Dreyfus, Interview.
\(^{61}\) Paul, The World Is Ours, 112.
over in Dalat, that these things were important to the Pentagon, not just the State Department.\textsuperscript{51}

Through the use of news conferences and “in country” taped reports, Dreyfus made a public record of his vision of the Wisconsin contract and U.S. relations with South Vietnam. Dreyfus told Bill Meissner of The Stevens Point Journal that the USAID Contract was “possibly the most significant thing this institution can do within this decade. The key factor is the personal relationship; in the simplest terms, it’s human trust.” That and the prestige the University would gain by doing so: “Something of such national import that it puts us in the mainstream of national education.”\textsuperscript{52} In January of 1970, as Dreyfus was preparing to leave for Vietnam, he addressed a large gathering on the Stevens Point campus. In nation-building terminology, he spoke of “another war to fight” and why he felt the educational mission continued to serve long-term relations:

The problems of defense and party are obvious today. Somebody has got to be working in the long-range plan, and one big aspect of that would be the development of higher education and the leadership of that country to keep it stable... I think there is another war to fight. This is a most important long-range war. I feel quite obligated to do it, plus to carry out final plans of that which was started by my predecessor Jim Albertson... [Vietnamese university] presidents had come over here, the vice-presidents, the deans, they now see a different approach to higher education...this broad Jeffersonian tradition we have here in America, they accepted a good deal of this... So now the real issue isn’t bringing our system there, but to make sure that they understand our system and how it can be adapted. What can they take from us to help bring about the changes they need to provide a higher educational base that will meet their needs for a self-governed society\textsuperscript{53}

By 1972, Dreyfus’s military connections and special interest in Vietnamesization led him to undertake an educational visit to Vietnam to survey the possibilities for the conversion of U.S. military installations and apparatus into Vietnamese educational facilities. Dreyfus suggested that a decommissioned U.S. aircraft carrier be brought up the Saigon River and permanently docked in downtown Saigon to serve as a vocational technical institute. He hypothesized that the old diesel-stove carrier would have its own source of power and enough space for classrooms, dining halls, gymnasiums, housing, and more. He hoped that Wisconsin State University–Stout would join the plan with a program in vocational education. Naval engineers declared that the idea would not work, and Pentagon officials noted that the U.S. military pullout was moving too fast.

In his defense, Dreyfus noted:

\textsuperscript{51} Dreyfus, interview.


You know now some of the Pentagon types and a lot of the Madison [WI] types here, and some of them on this campus, thought this was another, you know [joking] -- Dreyfus is hitting the LSD again, but it really wasn't that wild of an idea. If we were still going full bore, if I had made the proposal a year earlier, and if that carrier had been available I am convinced it would be there today. Think what a marvelous symbol that would be of sitting there...as an absolute Buddhist symbol of an instrument of violence that through education becomes an instrument of peace!  

Dreyfus's final report did prove useful, as he worked with both the Defense Department and USAID, recommending that bases be specifically turned over to the Vietnamese Ministry of Education rather than the GVN or ARVN. Dreyfus succeeded in a large transference of equipment from two mobile surgical units to the Medical College and hospital group at Hue. The Frank Doezeema Compound was also turned over to the University of Hue. Numerous other U.S. installations served as sites for vocational-technical schools and junior colleges. The U.S. Army shifted warehouses, heavy equipment, maintenance equipment, radio communications gear, furniture, and laboratory equipment to the new agricultural center at Thu Duc and the National Technical Center in Saigon. Supplies were transferred to the National Center of Administration, University of Saigon, and University of Can Tho. Army Secretary Froehlke credited "Dreyfus' expertise and forethought...in shaping these important decisions," and for the transference of $1 million worth of equipment, surplus supplies, and installations to South Vietnam for education and cultural development.

Growing Uncertainties – the Ebbs and Flows of Reform and the War

Despite showing very little fear of the wartime conditions, Team members were conscious of the security risks, delays in the distribution of supplies, destruction of educational facilities, and limitations imposed on educational funds. During the period after the Communist Tet Offensive of 1968, unstable conditions in the Republic of Vietnam damaged reform efforts in Vietnamese higher education. Uncertainties intensified as Team members cabled home reports of bullet holes in classroom walls and troops billeted at the Thu Duc campus, extensive damage at the University of Hue, and even a misdirected U.S. airstrike causing collateral damage at Can Tho. In 1969, tensions over the war coincided with the assassination of two professors of the University of Saigon, Le Minh Tri, Minister of Education, and Tran Anh, Acting Rector of the University of Saigon. The entire Vietnamese educational ministry was stunned by the assassinations. Minister Tri, who received his doctorate in the United States, had been part of the Medical Faculty at the University of Saigon. Tri had participated in a Wisconsin Team coordinated tour of the United States for twelve days in December 1968, during which time he visited WSU–SP for consultations with team members, Dreyfus, and other administrators and

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64 Dreyfus, interview.
faculties. Tri's position as education minister was a difficult one, involving challenges in every direction. Like most South Vietnamese officials, he was in constant danger. On 17 January 1969, *Time* magazine reported the attack as "The Price of Honesty," citing the factional political scandals that had characterized the Ministry of Education. A year later, at a 9 March 1970 news conference, Dreyfus noted that Minister Tri had been committed to the reorganization of the University of Saigon. Dreyfus suggested that "certain elements of the faculty who didn't want change brought about" may have been involved in the incident. "It is a matter of the elite system, the old French elite class... two different worlds between most of the rest of Saigon and a place like that... still 600-700 teachers who still will teach only in French." Early on, WSU-SP consultants had reported that the University of Saigon was not a unified campus, geographically or politically. The University was housed in a variety of scattered buildings. Ministry officials and educators at the University of Saigon remained deeply entrenched in Franco-Vietnamese conventions. French education in Vietnam had functioned only to make the Vietnamese useful to France. The original Charter for the University of Hanoi remained the guiding statute for higher education, even in South Vietnam. Francophile faculty were entrenched. The French-imposed curriculum remained. The original report of the Wisconsin Team noted that growth in Vietnamese higher education would not be easy during an age of turmoil:

More than any other single requirement, implementation of this report will require leadership of the universities which will be able to convey to the public a clear statement of aims and purposes. Courage will be required, too, for implementation will necessitate a divorcement from self-interest and a countering of claims of many groups whose theories of higher education do not emphasize service to the people and nation.

For Vietnam, each year brought growing uncertainties about U.S. commitment, the outcome of the protracted war, and the credibility and stability of the GVN. Even with U.S. assistance, the reorganization of traditional curricula proved extremely difficult. Critically, American educational advisors also lacked training in and understanding of the Vietnamese language, history, and culture—a shortcoming the Wisconsin Team continued to note. The Vietnamese dependence on French and then English as languages of instruction, especially at the universities, proved to be a formidable barrier. Faculty members had been trained in such languages and preferred to teach in a like manner. Professors followed a totally lecture approach, with no demonstration and very few assignments. They sold their notes, rarely used books or outside readings, and had very limited library facilities. Eighty percent of college level texts were written in foreign languages, and there was always a shortage in qualified instructors trained in Vietnamese.

The Wisconsin Team’s work took on added importance with the cease-fire of 1973, and the growing disengagement by U.S. military and USAID programs. USAID staff reductions were severe; however, some hoped that the cease-fire would allow the GVN to address more recommendations for reform. In 1973, Eagon returned to Vietnam three times. He consulted with each of the public universities in Saigon, Thu Duc, and Can Tho, and with the new site of the Upper Delta Community College. His reports noted this as a time when societal institutions could benefit from the reallocation of resources, which had been needed for the war.20

In March 1973, Charles Green, USAID Saigon, wired USAID Washington, communicating that Eagon had become a historical asset to USAID. With his long-standing team leadership role, Eagon had developed a wide circle of Vietnamese contacts. Most other USAID staff members, both veterans and those newly assigned to USAID higher education, had no such array of connections. Both Green and Eagon had pressing concerns relating to the GVN and MOE. Green reported that Eagon had still observed a lack of overall awareness of higher education as a system and a real hesitation for action on higher education legislation. Eagon was also critical of the Vietnamese Senate for having failed to confirm community college presidents.21

Green’s career mirrored developments in American foreign aid programs in the decade from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s. Green served with American foreign assistance programs in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Vietnam, and then a second tour in Bogota. He started in the Foreign Service as Assistant Cultural Attaché in the United States Information Agency (USIA) in Colombia. In 1971, Green received an appeal from the USAID Mission in Vietnam asking him “to come to Vietnam because the program in higher education needed fixing.” He declined the invitation, but within a month was given the option of going to Vietnam or resigning. Green went to Vietnam. Many years later, Green recollected that during the first year of his service in Vietnam the universities had gone on for the most part as if there was no war. Then in 1972 the North Vietnamese offensive targeted Hue. At the University of Saigon, professors and others refused to move a few miles out of the city to the new location at Thu Duc. Green, himself, taught English classes at Thu Duc. Some educational progress was made in the urban areas, but education continued to be subjected to harsh conditions in the countryside.22

In 1973, Eagon still noticed a marked slowness on the part of the other universities to follow the registration and record keeping model of the University of Hue. Green and Eagon agreed that there was still duplication in teacher education programs and only a modest effort to improve instruction, with inferior programs in English at the university level.23 Eagon criticized the failure to upgrade faculty salary structure, while noting an overall lack of effort

22 Charles Green, two sets of correspondence and written responses to interview questionnaire, (February 2002).
and huge level of work looming for the understaffed MOE Higher Education Office.  

Eagon sensed a wait-and-see attitude among the Vietnamese university people, working in a transitional period hoping that peace might come. He also recognized a growing disengagement by the USAID, both in Vietnam and in its relationship with American higher education. USAID was increasingly turning to the private sector with its contracts in lesser-developed nations.

The objectives of the Wisconsin Contract expanded substantially during the more than six years of its existence, as the USAID mission moved from a general survey, to an action plan, to a “brick laying” operation. *Architectural Notes in Vietnam, 1974*, was the final field survey formally published under the Wisconsin Contract. The report offered sustaining designs for new campuses, which linked new and old cultural ideas drawn from Vietnam and its neighbors. New designs for the campuses at Can Tho and Thu Duc incorporated the use of native materials and environmental architecture. American advisory firms had typically constructed cement or steel buildings reliant on air-conditioning, which in turn were dependent on electricity, often in short supply in rural areas. Recognizing a growing world energy crisis, the final Team report sought to reinstate natural principles found in older Southeast Asian architecture in new and imaginative designs. To counter escalating costs of electricity, construction materials, and transportation, the report recommended constructing buildings from locally available materials, including bamboo, wood, and thatch. Construction emphasized the ancient Chinese art of Feng Shui, where: “Building location and design is based on the belief that at every place there are special topological and topographical features, either natural or artificial, which indicate or modify the cosmic energies there.” Vietnam’s natural riverside settings and forest backdrops were looked upon as assets rather than deterrents. Adjacent buildings on the new campuses were to be connected by tree-shaded pathways, while natural ventilation saved on electricity, and other shading devices were incorporated over large open windows that lined the structures. The maintenance of the campus environment would provide hands-on opportunities for students enrolled in agriculture and engineering. Preliminary sketches for Can Tho even included a large water wheel driven by the current of the Mekong River and an experimental wind tower—designed to stand as campus symbols representing Vietnamese hospitality and symmetry with nature.

Eagon completed his own final in-field report, “Some Current Observations,” suggesting that the work of the Wisconsin Team could continue elsewhere. With a “Preliminary Project Proposal: University Reforms in Developing Countries,” Eagon noted that to date there had not been an evaluation study of the wide-range of USAID projects engaged in upgrading institutions of higher education in developing countries. Eagon suggested amalgamating the “body of knowledge” from the hundreds of university educators in developing nations that had received assistance with those from developed nations who had served as consultants. Eagon recalled

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25 Burdette W. Eagon and Sarah Eagon, Interview by author, tape recording, four follow-up discussions and correspondence (September-October 2000).
27 Ibid., 14.
28 Ibid., ii.