

Reds and Patriots: The Alliance of the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party

Christopher Gauger, author

Dr. Michael Rutz, History, faculty mentor

Christopher Gauger graduated from UW Oshkosh in spring 2017 with a bachelor of science degree in history and a minor in geography. He also conducted research and public history work for an internship with the Oshkosh World War I Commemoration Committee. His primary historical interests include the Cold War and military history from 1900 to the present. This article originated as a research paper for a seminar on apartheid in South Africa and evolved into a historiographical paper. Christopher is interested in continuing his studies through graduate school, with an eye toward a career in public history and writing literature about historical subjects.

Professor Michael Rutz graduated from the University of Michigan in 1992 and received an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, in 2002. Dr. Rutz has taught courses on modern world history, British and European history, and African history at UW Oshkosh for 15 years. He is the author of *The British Zion: Congregationalism, Politics, and Empire 1790–1850*, and several articles on the history of religion and politics in the British Empire. His second book, *King Leopold's Congo and the "Scramble for Africa": A Short History with Documents*, was published in early 2018.

Abstract

During the apartheid era in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) was allied with the South African Communist Party (SACP), presenting a united opposition to the white minority government. After apartheid was dismantled and multiracial democracy and equal rights were instituted, the ANC and the SACP maintained their alliance following their rise to power. To this day, the parties remain partners, although South Africa has not become a Communist state. Fears during the apartheid era that black majority rule would lead to Communism did not come to fruition. However, some contemporary scholars have argued that the SACP was the stronger party in the alliance, and that it wielded considerable influence over the ANC and its paramilitary wing, the Umkhonto we Sizwe. These scholars claim that the ANC was subservient to the international Communist movement, which verifies one of the apartheid regime's critiques of the ANC. In this paper, I argue that the ANC was the leading party in the anti-apartheid alliance and was not controlled by the Communists, and that the ANC and the SACP, despite having common interests and leftist orientations, were guided by different ideologies, interests, and long-term objectives. The ANC was primarily concerned with national self-determination for black Africans, while the SACP adhered to Marxism-Leninism and sought the creation of a socialist workers' state. Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders, including black Communists, were primarily dedicated to nationalist goals. This paper also debunks the notion that the Freedom Charter, the anti-apartheid movement's declaration of goals and principles, was a blueprint for a socialist state.

Introduction

The struggle to end apartheid in South Africa required a mass movement of diverse groups and individuals united by the desire to defeat a common enemy. A divided opposition would have been unable to topple the oppressive apartheid system. Necessity drove anti-apartheid organizations to work together, setting aside their differences to pursue their mutual interests. In South Africa, the anti-apartheid resistance was led by the African National Congress (ANC), a political party dedicated to African nationalism. Its most important ally during the apartheid era was the South African Communist Party (SACP), which, as its name implied, adhered to the Communist ideology espoused by Marx and Lenin. This alliance was powerful, and although it took decades for apartheid to finally be dismantled in the early 1990s, the efforts of the ANC-SACP alliance were monumental. The alliance achieved its shared goal of ending the apartheid regime and ushering in a truly democratic South Africa.

During the apartheid years, the South African government routinely accused the African National Congress of being a Communist-front organization. The government portrayed the party as merely a puppet of Communist forces attempting to establish a socialist regime. They claimed that such a regime would be the inevitable outcome of black-majority rule. Nelson Mandela claimed that the South African government accused the ANC of being Communists in order to demonize them and out of the belief that black Africans were incapable of thinking for themselves or fighting for their political rights without the help of white agitators.¹ An SACP pamphlet from 1989 exemplified this; it presented claims made by State President P. W. Botha. “Botha says the Communist Party are using the ANC as a Trojan Horse,” the pamphlet read, “that once liberation has been achieved the SACP will oust the leadership of the ANC and capture power for itself. Botha argues that the SACP wants to establish a communist dictatorship in South Africa and it is not interested in democracy.”² These accusations by the apartheid-era government proved to be unfounded. South Africa was not transformed into a Communist state after apartheid was dismantled and a government led by the ANC was voted into office.

Nevertheless, some contemporary scholars have argued that the SACP actually did exert significant influence over the ANC. One notable scholar, Stephen Ellis, claimed that the SACP exerted *de facto* control over the ANC by placing Communists into the ANC’s leadership structure. He further alleged that Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the paramilitary wing of the ANC, was created and controlled by the SACP.³ Since the SACP was in allegiance with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, this allegation implied that the ANC was controlled by the Soviets and the international Communist movement. Even today, there remains considerable debate over the extent of Communist influence on the ANC.

Giving weight to the arguments of these scholars is the revelation that Nelson Mandela had been a member of the South African Communist Party and had served on the party’s Central Committee. Both the ANC and the SACP revealed this information to the public upon Mandela’s death in 2013.⁴ During his lifetime, Mandela had denied being a member of the SACP, unwilling to lend credence to the arguments of the ANC’s critics. The SACP reported that Mandela remained a close friend of the Communists until his final days.

If the ANC was controlled by Communists, then one of the key arguments made by the defenders of apartheid—that the ANC was a Communist-front organization—has been verified. Perhaps the apartheid-era government of South Africa, along with its American and British benefactors, was correct regarding the true nature of the ANC. This revelation might be uncomfortable for some of the ANC’s supporters, who have steadfastly denied such claims. The evidence of Mandela’s closer ties to the SACP forces us to ask again if the Communists truly were “pulling the strings” of the ANC. How much influence did the SACP have over the ANC? Was the alliance between the two parties formed out of ideological brotherhood or for more practical reasons? Did ANC members consider building a socialist state their dominant goal, or were they concerned primarily with nationalist and racial interests?

Although the African National Congress and its leaders were influenced by left-wing ideology, they were always dedicated to African nationalism; their primary goal was the abolition of racial supremacy and the creation of a free and democratic South Africa. In this paper, I argue that the ANC was neither controlled by Communists nor dedicated to Communist ideology, and that it was the more powerful party in the anti-apartheid alliance. In addition, I explore the relationship between the ANC and the SACP, examining the objectives of these two parties and the interests they shared. Finally, I discuss the ideological and political devotions of Mandela and other ANC leaders. In this paper, I intend to develop a deeper understanding of the relationship between the ANC and the SACP.

Aside from addressing the historical allegations levied by the South African government during the apartheid era, as well as the arguments of recent scholars, there is another important reason to analyze the relationship between the African National Congress and South African Communist Party. The ANC has ruled South Africa since its victory in the country’s first post-apartheid general election in 1994. During its time in power, the ANC has embraced a social democratic path and has continued to maintain a capitalist economic system. Mandela, during his presidency, adhered to the economic liberalism of his white National Party predecessors. Despite the fears of some opponents of black-majority rule, South Africa has not become a socialist state. The ANC describes itself as a “disciplined force of the left,”⁵ but that does not imply that it is a socialist party. Indeed, the fact that South Africa continues to maintain capitalism leads one to wonder if the ANC was ever loyal to Communist ideology.

The Emergence of the ANC-SACP Alliance

The relationship between the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party originated with the founding of the latter in 1921. The SACP, like other Communist parties around the world, was loyal to the Soviet Union and took its ideological guidelines from the Kremlin.⁶ It initially supported the all-white South African Labour Party but terminated its ties when Labour entered into a coalition government with Afrikaner nationalists. The SACP then worked to recruit black Africans into its ranks. The party assisted Clements Kadalie, the first black leader of a national trade union in South Africa, in organizing his Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICWU). However, Kadalie eventually adopted more moderate strategies after traveling abroad and learning the practices of British trade unions. This alienated him and the ICWU from the Communists.⁷ The SACP turned its efforts to

developing a labor movement within the African National Congress. At the time, the Communists had little sway over members of the ANC, who continued to be influenced by the traditional chiefs of their tribal homelands.⁸ The Communists attracted support from black Africans because white Communists treated them as equals, a new experience for many ANC members who had only known racism from whites.⁹ The SACP intensified their recruitment efforts in the 1930s.¹⁰ Starting in 1940, after A. B. Xuma became the leader of the ANC, the Communists began working within the party to attract a following from the rapidly growing, urbanized African workforce.¹¹

As Communists proliferated within the ranks of the ANC, they faced opposition from some of the younger, more nationalistic members of the party. In particular, members of the ANC Youth League were extremely concerned about the growing Communist presence and influence within their party. They saw Communism as a foreign ideology that would corrupt the ANC's ideals.¹² They distrusted the SACP's predominately white policymakers, their emphasis on class conflict rather than racial conflict, and their hopes for an eventual socialist revolution.¹³ To the Youth Leaguers, Communist ideology was a cloak for white paternalism. The SACP's notion of class struggle did not appeal to black South Africans, who had been singled out for oppression along racial lines, not class ones.¹⁴ Anton Lembede, the founding president of the Youth League, felt that African self-confidence and initiative would be undermined if white Communists joined or worked with the ANC.¹⁵ Nelson Mandela, who had joined the ANC in 1944 and became a prominent member of the Youth League, was suspicious of white influence on the ANC. Although Mandela had befriended many white Communists, he had disapproved of cooperating with the SACP.¹⁶ He worried that the Communists were trying to take over the ANC under the guise of joint action. From his perspective, the Communists had superior education, experience, and training, and because of these strengths, they would end up dominating the ANC. Mandela viewed South African Indians in a similar light, and he opposed their influence on the party as well.¹⁷ "I believed that it was an undiluted African nationalism, not Marxism or multiracialism, that would liberate us," he later wrote in his autobiography.¹⁸ Mandela and other ANC members feared that if the ANC worked too closely with the white-dominated SACP, then whites would hijack the anti-apartheid movement and direct it according to their own ideologies and objectives. The ANC's goal of liberating black South Africans from racial oppression would be compromised if whites became its *de facto* leaders. For some of the more nationalistic ANC members, Communism was a Trojan horse that only benefited the interests of white opponents of apartheid.

However, Communism proved to be appealing to many black Africans. For years, white Communists had been the only political group in South Africa who were willing to treat black Africans as equals. White Communists were willing to interact with black Africans on a regular basis, to eat with them, speak with them, live with them, and work with them. They were the only whites who seemed willing to help blacks achieve political rights and a fair stake in society.¹⁹ Thus, it came as no surprise that black Africans tended to equate Communism with freedom and equality, and that encouraged them to sympathize with the ideology.

Mandela was one of the more rabid anti-Communists within the ANC during this time. He physically broke up SACP meetings by storming their stages, tearing up their

signs, and seizing control of their microphones.²⁰ At the ANC national conference in December 1949, Mandela, Oliver Tambo, and other Youth Leaguers introduced a resolution that would have expelled all Communist Party members from the ranks of the ANC. The resolution was soundly defeated.²¹ It failed because the ANC's general view at the time was that every adult was entitled to become a member of the party.²² Among those who voted against the resolution were some of the most conservative members of the party. They believed that the ANC was established to be a "Parliament of the African people," accommodating all individuals united by the common goal of national liberation, regardless of political differences.²³

Nevertheless, Mandela continued his campaign against Communist influence in the ANC. He notably interrupted a speech by veteran Communist leader J. B. Marks and stole the stage from him to launch a tirade of his own.²⁴ However, Mandela's opposition was faltering. The argument of the ANC's elders, that the party should welcome anyone who believed in its ultimate goal, was beginning to convince him that letting Communists into the party's ranks would be beneficial.²⁵ His personal turning point came in 1950. The Transvaal branches of the ANC, the SACP, and the South African Indian Congress held a convention in March. There, they passed a resolution calling for a one-day general strike on International Workers' Day (May Day) to demand the abolition of the pass laws and other discriminatory legislation. Although Mandela supported the objectives of the strike, he initially felt that the SACP, which had heavily lobbied for the strike, was trying to "steal the thunder" from the ANC's own plans for national protests.²⁶ However, the May Day strike attracted popular support, an achievement that impressed members of the ANC Youth League.²⁷ On May 1, 1950, Mandela and fellow ANC member Walter Sisulu witnessed the May Day protest in Orlando West, part of the Soweto township near Johannesburg. While observing from a distance, they watched in horror as white police officers opened fire on the predominately black crowds. Eighteen protesters were shot and killed. The violent suppression of this peaceful demonstration left a significant impression on Mandela.²⁸ He saw firsthand the dedication of African workers to organized labor, despite the risk of police violence. He praised the Communists for supporting the cause of African nationalism. Mandela already had a number of friends and acquaintances who were Communists, and he came to admire them for their devotion to their cause and their hardworking attitudes.²⁹ After this turning point, Mandela grew interested in an alliance with the Communists.

Shortly after the May Day protests, the South African government passed the Suppression of Communism Act, which formally banned the South African Communist Party. However, the bill was drafted in a broad manner that effectively criminalized any organizations that encouraged "political, industrial, social, or economic change" within South Africa through "the promotion of disturbance or disorder."³⁰ The act not only suppressed the SACP. It suppressed the ANC and other anti-apartheid organizations, effectively making support for racial equality synonymous with believing in Communism.³¹ This draconian act sparked the formation of an official alliance between the ANC and the SACP. The two parties realized they faced a common enemy in the South African government. It was time for them to join forces and create a united opposition movement. The ANC became increasingly active in promoting strikes in cooperation with the Communists.³² They began by organizing a National Day

of Protest on June 26, 1950, in order to condemn the May Day massacre and the Suppression of Communism Act.³³ This was the beginning of a united struggle against the apartheid regime.

The Nature of the ANC-SACP Alliance

The alliance between the ANC and the SACP changed the attitudes of the two parties toward each other. The SACP, which had seen the ANC as “irrelevant” and “petite bourgeoisie,” developed a more positive perception and brought multiracial and internationalist attitudes to the party.³⁴ The relationship that developed between the two parties was mutually binding. The Communists helped build up the ANC, and the growing ANC provided fertile recruiting grounds for the SACP. Thus, a significant overlap in membership between the two parties developed, with many Communists becoming local leaders in the ANC.³⁵ Despite their political differences, the ANC and the SACP were united by the common goal of national liberation in South Africa.³⁶ Both parties were dedicated to abolishing apartheid and ending white supremacy.³⁷ They both supported the Freedom Charter, the declaration of principles for a free, democratic, and nonracial South Africa. The SACP justified its alliance with the ANC by alluding to their shared goal of “national democracy,” which was envisioned as a transitional stage on the road to Communism. Capitalists would still exist during this stage, but their political and economic power would be restrained. Soviet ideological theorists during the 1950s had advocated collaboration between Communists and “national bourgeoisie” against imperialism in colonial and semi-colonial lands.³⁸

The ANC-SACP alliance emerged out of both ideological agreement as well as the existence of common interests and foes. “It is true that there has often been close co-operation between the ANC and the Communist Party,” Mandela said during the Rivonia Trial in 1964. “But co-operation is merely proof of a common goal—in this case the removal of white supremacy—and is not proof of a complete community of interests.”³⁹ Many years later, at the relaunching of the South African Communist Party in 1990, Mandela claimed that the ANC-SACP alliance was *not* just a “marriage of convenience.” “We talk of an alliance precisely because we are two independent organisations with political platforms and long-term goals that do not necessarily converge,” he said. But he observed that there was more that united the parties than divided them, for they were both dedicated to a “people-centered and people-driven programme of democratic transformation.”⁴⁰ Oliver Tambo, the longtime secretary general of the ANC, said the relationship between the parties was not “an accident of history,” nor was it “a natural and inevitable development.” It was not a “paper alliance” negotiated at conference tables, but a “living organism” that had grown out of mutual struggle. The ANC and the SACP had a common goal of abolishing apartheid, ending white-minority rule, and establishing the right to self-determination for all South Africans. They were mutually reinforcing, and they influenced each other in their own ways.⁴¹ Of course, the two parties also had enough differences to warrant a clear distinction between them. Their alliance may not have been entirely one of convenience, but it was not purely driven by ideological unity either.

During the Rivonia Trial, Nelson Mandela maintained that the alliance between the ANC and the SACP was forged for the sake of a common goal: the end of white supremacy in South Africa. He brought up the example of how the United States and

Britain had allied with the Soviet Union during World War II to defeat Hitler, but that alliance did not turn either of those two countries into Communist states, nor did it mean their leaders Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were Communists.⁴² Mandela highlighted further examples of Communists allying with national liberation movements. He mentioned the role that Communists played in the anti-Axis resistance movements during World War II. He noted their alliances with nationalists in anti-colonial struggles, such as in Algeria, Indonesia, and Malaysia.⁴³ He reminded the court that Chiang Kai-shek, a bitter enemy of Communism, had nevertheless sided with the Communists to free China from foreign oppression.⁴⁴ Just because nationalists allied themselves with Communists to fight against a common enemy did not make them Communists themselves—sometimes the enemy of one’s enemy must become one’s friend.

Racial tensions persisted during the early stages of the ANC-SACP alliance. Black members of the ANC were fearful that the SACP, a party largely controlled by whites, would seize control of the anti-apartheid movement. These tensions existed within the SACP itself. Moses Kotane, the secretary general of the SACP during the 1960s (and a black South African), blamed “white intellectuals” for the failure of the MK’s sabotage campaign and the arrest of Mandela and other ANC members at the Rivonia farmhouse in 1963.⁴⁵ These tensions would later lead to ANC and black SACP leaders “Africanizing” the guerrilla war in South Africa by transforming the MK into an organization dedicated to African nationalism. This prevented the MK from being used to advance the goals of the white-dominated SACP.

Stephen Ellis claimed that the 1969 ANC conference in Morogoro, Tanzania, was the moment when the SACP was finally able to consolidate its control over the ANC. The conference was assembled to resolve internal divisions within the ANC, which had erupted due to the lack of a true vanguard element in the party and disagreement over the party’s identity. The failures of MK guerrilla campaigns in neighboring Rhodesia in the late 1960s prompted the ANC to hold the meeting. At Morogoro, party leaders decided that “external ANC structures” (i.e. elements of the ANC in exile outside of South Africa) could recruit non-Africans into their ranks. For the ANC elements inside South Africa, only Africans were allowed to join their ranks or serve on the ANC’s National Executive Committee.⁴⁶ The SACP did not wrest control of the ANC at this conference. Instead, the ANC simply clarified who was allowed to represent the party inside and outside South Africa.

From the beginning, the ANC was the undisputed leader of the anti-apartheid alliance. Members of both the ANC and the SACP recognized the ANC’s leadership position. Nelson Mandela on numerous occasions described the relationship between the two parties as such. During his presidential term, when addressing a celebration of the 75th anniversary of the SACP, Mandela said that the ANC’s leadership was the result of the party being a “force that brings together all the strands, the classes, strata and groups that are the dynamo of liberation and social change.” In other words, the party served as a popular front for all South Africans, regardless of their social or ethnic group. “All these forces have found a home in the ANC because it represents the social and political base for real freedom, for the transformation of our society into a truly democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and united nation.”⁴⁷ Oliver Tambo, in a 1985 interview with the *Cape Times*, said that the SACP realized that the ANC was

leading the struggle against apartheid, and although the membership of the two parties sometimes overlapped, the individuals who were members of both recognized the distinctions between them.⁴⁸

Joe Slovo, a white Communist who led the SACP during the later years of apartheid, also recognized the ANC's leadership role. He rejected the notion of sinister motives in the ANC-SACP alliance. "The alliance between the Communist Party and the ANC has no secret clauses," he said. Slovo believed that the alliance was based on complete respect for each party's independence and the integrity of their internal democratic processes. This mutual respect was responsible for the lasting strength of the alliance.⁴⁹ In a 1988 pamphlet issued by the SACP, Slovo wrote, "The main core of the whole democratic struggle . . . is the ANC which stands at the head of the liberation alliance." The ANC, as "head of this alliance and prime representative of all the oppressed," welcomed people of all social classes into its ranks. The party was described as a "revolutionary nationalist organisation with popular roots," but it was not a populist party. Slovo wrote that the ANC recognized that the different social classes in South Africa each had their own long-term aspirations.⁵⁰ Slovo believed that it would be a mistake for the ANC to adopt a socialist platform, despite its bias toward the working class (which was because the majority of South Africans were working class). "If [the ANC] adopted such a platform," wrote Slovo, "it would destroy its character as the prime representative of all the classes among the oppressed black majority."⁵¹ Slovo believed that the ANC should remain a national liberation front with broad appeal to the masses.

A notable example of the ANC's leadership in the anti-apartheid alliance was its decision to engage in guerrilla warfare against the South African regime. Ellis claimed that the SACP initiated the armed struggle. However, as Paul S. Landau noted in his assessment of Communist influence on the ANC, the SACP stuck to a more orthodox approach to resistance, preferring sabotage and militant strike enforcement. Moses Kotane believed that any order to engage in violent resistance had to be issued by a proper central command. Conversely, the ANC faction led by Mandela desired to engage in guerrilla warfare to provoke a revolution against the apartheid regime.⁵² The "ambitious" plans for guerrilla war drawn up by the ANC sparked disagreement within the SACP. Some Communist leaders, such as Joe Slovo and Govan Mbeki, supported the schemes, while others, such as Kotane and Rusty Bernstein, were opposed, at least initially.⁵³ The ANC proved to be more flexible and more forward-thinking than the hesitant SACP on the matter of armed struggle.

The ANC also retained control over Umkhonto we Sizwe, or MK, its paramilitary arm. The high command of the MK, from its inception, answered only to the National Executive Committee of the ANC. SACP members who joined the MK high command were ordered to cease attending their party's meetings.⁵⁴ ANC leaders such as Tambo and Kotane (who also still led the SACP, but had gradually accepted the need for guerrilla warfare) banned independent political activities by SACP members in the MK. These measures were implemented to prevent the chain of command under the ANC from being disrupted and to deter the SACP from trying to exert influence or control over the MK.⁵⁵ Kotane, despite being a Communist himself, helped shape the MK into an African nationalist organization. The military struggle against apartheid came to be "Africanized" inside South Africa. The MK's membership eventually

consisted almost entirely of black Africans, a development that was sternly criticized by non-African SACP leaders such as Yusuf Dadoo, who protested the exclusion of Coloureds and Indians from the paramilitary's ranks.⁵⁶

As international opposition to apartheid increased, the ANC welcomed the support of the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement. The Communist Bloc vocally opposed colonialism and was sympathetic to national liberation movements. "Although there is a universal condemnation of apartheid, the communist bloc speaks out against it with a louder voice than most of the white world," Mandela stated during the Rivonia Trial.⁵⁷ The ANC turned to the Soviet Union and other Communist states for support because many Western nations, although condemning apartheid, were reluctant to help the leftist ANC due to the Cold War climate. Meanwhile, the Soviets and other Communist states were providing weapons and training to the ANC and the MK. The Communists had also "shown the way to triumphant revolution" in Cuba and Vietnam, which served as inspirations for the ANC.⁵⁸ After its banning by the South African government and its subsequent exile, the ANC found itself operating in closer proximity to the SACP and its international benefactors. SACP members continued to have a presence within the ranks of the ANC, ensuring that Marxist ideas would remain discussed in internal party debates. The ANC also became acquainted with African Marxist movements such as the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), both of which fought against Portuguese colonial rule and secured the independence of their nations.⁵⁹ By the late 1970s and early 1980s, many younger ANC members had become sympathetic to Marxism, inspired by the victory of Communist guerrillas in Angola and Mozambique and intriguing stories from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. They were also influenced by South African Communist heroes, regardless of their races. The "fascist" South African regime was seen as being in collusion with the capitalists, justifying the younger members' beliefs in revolutionary Marxism.⁶⁰ Oliver Tambo later praised the Soviet Union for its support of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and for anti-colonial and anti-imperialist causes in general.⁶¹

Although the Soviet Union and other Communist states provided crucial support for the ANC, they did not control the party. Their support for the ANC was limited to financial and material assistance, which helped keep the party alive. But at no point did international Communists control the ANC. Until the mid-1970s, Soviet leaders had little faith in the success of national liberation movements in sub-Saharan Africa. They never attempted to build an African military force that could seriously threaten the South African regime, even after the Soweto uprising of 1976. In reality, the MK simply requested piecemeal support from the Soviets, and the requests were usually granted.⁶² Furthermore, independent African countries (which vigorously opposed the apartheid regime) proved to be more critical to the ANC's survival, providing training for MK fighters and land for military bases.⁶³

The support of the Communist Bloc was appreciated by the ANC, but it was an obstacle to the end of apartheid. The leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, were not sympathetic to the ANC, which they viewed as a Communist party. The American and British governments thus supported the South African regime as a bulwark against Soviet influence in Africa.⁶⁴ Successful negotiations between the

South African government and the ANC only began after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the ending of the Cold War. South African President F. W. de Klerk believed that the ANC would be weaker—and less of a threat—without its Soviet benefactor. This was one of the factors that prompted de Klerk to begin the negotiations that led to the dismantling of apartheid.⁶⁵

The Freedom Charter

The Freedom Charter, the anti-apartheid movement's declaration of its core principles and its desire for a democratic and non-racial South Africa, was accused by critics, both South African and foreign, of being a Communist document. Supporters of the charter rejected claims that it was a blueprint for turning South Africa into a socialist state. They insisted it proclaimed principles instead of policies. Michael Harmel, the SACP's Marxist historian, claimed that the Freedom Charter stemmed from the tradition of human rights proclamations that included the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, as well as the more modern United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.⁶⁶ It could trace its origins to these earlier documents proclaiming the basic rights of the people. Nelson Mandela described the Freedom Charter as a revolutionary document that targeted the existing institutions of political and economic power in South Africa. Despite its revolutionary nature, it was "by no means a blueprint for a socialist state." It called for the transfer of political power not to one social class but to "all people of this country, be they workers, peasants, professionals men, or petty bourgeoisie."⁶⁷

Accusations that the charter was "Communist" centered on the fact that it advocated the nationalization of certain industries and the redistribution of resources to the masses. The document declared that "The People Shall Share in the Country's Wealth!" It advocated breaking up the financial, gold-mining, and agricultural monopolies in South Africa and "democratizing" such enterprises, redistributing their wealth in a fair manner.⁶⁸ These measures could be considered quasi-socialist, as some of the means of production would be placed under collective ownership. However, the primary intent was to enable the growth of a "non-European bourgeois class" that would for the first time have ownership of productive property in its name. Mandela said that "private enterprise" would "flourish as never before" under this new economic system.⁶⁹ In 1956, he wrote an article for *Liberation* magazine in which he claimed that the Freedom Charter would unleash an African-style capitalism when implemented.⁷⁰ Mandela believed the charter would create an economy where South Africans of all races could freely participate and enjoy prosperity.

During the Rivonia Trial, Mandela denied the claims that the Freedom Charter was a socialist blueprint. He acknowledged that the document advocated a nationalization of industrial monopolies, banks, and mines—which were controlled by white owners—in order to redistribute wealth to poor blacks. However, Mandela noted that the National Party, the ruling party of the white-minority government, had previously endorsed the nationalization of gold mines when they were controlled by foreign capital so that their wealth could be redistributed to Afrikaners. The Freedom Charter's economic goals would "open up fresh fields for a prosperous African population of all classes, including the middle class," according to Mandela.⁷¹ He further stated that the

ANC had never “advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist society.”⁷²

The idea for the Freedom Charter did not emanate from the Communists. Although one key figure in drafting the document, architect Rusty Bernstein, was a member of the SACP, the charter was conceived and revised by nationalists within the ANC.⁷³ It originated with one of the ANC’s elder statesmen, Z. K. Matthews. In August 1953, as president of the Cape ANC, he formally proposed the creation of a multiracial constitution for a future, democratic South Africa. He said, “I wonder whether the time has not come for the ANC to consider the question of convening a National Convention, a Congress of the People, representing all the people of this country irrespective of race or colour to draw up a Freedom Charter for the democratic South Africa of the future.”⁷⁴ Mandela viewed the charter as “a document born of the people.” It was a genuine expression of the South African people instead of being imposed by outside agitators as some of its anti-Communist critics had claimed.⁷⁵ The charter did not contain explicitly Communist content. Jack Simons, a member of the regrouped SACP from the University of Cape Town, described the charter as non-Communist, since it did not advocate for either the abolition of social classes or public ownership of the means of production. Simons said that the proposed nationalization of industries in the charter was closer to state capitalism than to Communism.⁷⁶

Nelson Mandela’s Ideology

Nelson Mandela’s views on Communism have been subject to much speculation. The posthumous revelation that he was a leading member of the SACP makes this issue more important to analyze. He was introduced to Communist ideology in the early 1940s while working as a clerk at the law firm Witkin, Sidelsky & Eidelman in Johannesburg. He befriended two Communists who worked there, Gaur Radebe and Nat Bregman. Through Bregman, Mandela began attending Communist Party meetings and multiracial social gatherings.⁷⁷ During this period Bregman introduced Mandela to Michael Harmel, one of the SACP’s most prominent thinkers, and Mandela spent much time in his company.⁷⁸ Despite befriending Communists, Mandela initially opposed their attempts to join or influence the ANC, not out of personal antipathy, but out of a desire to preserve the ANC’s core ideology of African nationalism.

After dropping his opposition to Communists within the ranks of the ANC, Mandela began conversing regularly with Moses Kotane, the general secretary of the SACP and a member of the executive council of the ANC. Seeking to enhance his understanding of Marxism, Mandela began reading Communist literature. He was attracted to the idea of a classless society, which, in his mind, was similar to the communal nature of traditional African cultures. He subscribed to Marx’s dictum: “From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs,” which he compared to the Golden Rule. Mandela became fascinated by dialectical materialism, which allowed him to better understand the racial and economic oppression that afflicted the African people. He was also delighted by Marxism’s call for revolutionary action.⁷⁹ He managed to reconcile his belief in African nationalism with the ideas he gathered from Marx.

During the Rivonia Trial, Mandela detailed his ideological views and inspirations. “I have always regarded myself, in the first place, as an African patriot,” he stated.⁸⁰ His motivation to fight against apartheid was inspired by the tales his tribal elders

in the Transkei had told him—tales of his people’s ancestors fighting to defend their fatherland. “I hoped then that life might offer me the opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble contribution to their freedom struggle,” he said.⁸¹ His decision to establish Umkhonto we Sizwe was inspired by the example of his ancestors;⁸² although in previous circumstances he had credited the Cuban Revolution as an inspiration for the MK’s armed campaign.⁸³ Mandela explained that although he had read Marxist literature and had been influenced by Marxism, he was not himself a Communist. Other nationalist leaders such as India’s Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser had also been swayed by Marx. “We all accept the need for some form of socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty,” Mandela observed. “But this does not mean we are Marxists.”⁸⁴

Mandela said that he was influenced by political ideas from throughout the world, from the West and the East. As an activist he strove to be impartial and objective, tying himself to no particular system other than some form of socialism, which he saw as necessary for elevating the African people’s economic situation. Mandela respected Western political treatises and institutions, and he spoke approvingly of the Magna Carta, the English Petition of Right, and the American Bill of Rights. He praised the British Parliament, which he considered the most democratic institution in the world, and he admired the independence and impartiality of the British judicial system. He also expressed praise for the American system of government, including the United States Congress, the doctrine of separation of powers, and the independence of the American judiciary.⁸⁵ The Western parliamentary systems that Mandela admired were considered reactionary and undemocratic by Communists. Despite the claims directed against him, Nelson Mandela did not fight to create a Communist state. He had Marxist influences, and he considered himself a socialist, but he was first and foremost an African nationalist, dedicated to liberating his people from racial oppression.

While Mandela did not subscribe to Communist ideology, other leaders of the ANC were more sympathetic. Govan Mbeki was fascinated by Communism after attending a course on Marxism-Leninism taught at Fort Hare University in the early 1930s. He also learned about dialectical materialism from Max Yergan, an African-American Communist.⁸⁶ By the early 1980s, some ANC leaders, such as Harry Gwala (a “real Stalinist” according to Walter Sisulu⁸⁷) and Mbeki, saw the Communists as the “dominant force” in the alliance between the ANC and the SACP. Gwala even suggested that the ANC adopt “The Internationale,” the song of international socialism, as its official anthem.⁸⁸ Mbeki believed that racial oppression was a result of class conflict. He did not believe that black Africans could benefit from capitalism, denying Mandela’s claim that African free enterprise would “flourish as never before” after the end of apartheid.⁸⁹ These men were a minority among the ANC’s leaders, however. The leadership of the party was firmly committed to nationalist interests and goals.

Mandela and several other ANC leaders joined the SACP by 1960, and some, like Mandela, served in leadership positions within the party. However, they did not join the party because they agreed with Communist ideology or wanted to establish a Communist state; Mandela and his brethren joined the SACP as a “strategic act” to foster cooperation between that party and the ANC.⁹⁰ Their desire was to maintain the

unity of the anti-apartheid alliance—to keep the disparate parties moving toward their common goals—despite ideological differences.

The Goals of the ANC and the SACP

The African National Congress advocated for African nationalism, which continues to be its driving ideology. It has always been that party's ideological creed, as Mandela mentioned in the Rivonia Trial.⁹¹ "It is not the concept of African Nationalism expressed in the cry, 'Drive the White man into the sea,'" he pointed out. "The African Nationalism for which the ANC stands is the concept of freedom and fulfillment for the African people in their own land."⁹² The ANC constitution dedicated the party to creating an egalitarian, democratic South Africa free from oppression and discrimination of any kind.⁹³ The party was open to anyone who agreed with its core principles, regardless of one's political views. "My own views on the subject had not altered in many years," Mandela wrote in his autobiography. "The ANC was a mass liberation movement that welcomed all those with the same objectives."⁹⁴ Thabo Mbeki, the son of Govan Mbeki (and later president of South Africa), stated that the ANC was not a Communist organization but a national liberation movement. He said that the ANC's primary goal during its existence was to get rid of the apartheid system. The SACP allied with the ANC because they had a common enemy in the South African government.⁹⁵ Whereas the SACP emphasized class conflict (as was typical with Communist parties), the ANC sought harmony between the social classes.⁹⁶ Despite its nationalist and non-Communist stance, the ANC was, and still is, a left-wing political party. A 2015 party conference declaration confirmed this status, stating that "the ANC is not and has never been a communist organisation," but noting that "the ANC has always been anti-imperialist in nature and pro-working class."⁹⁷ Still, the fact that a party is leftist does not automatically make it Communist or Marxist.

The South African Communist Party explicitly adhered to Marxism-Leninism, the ideology of Communist parties around the world. It sought to establish a workers' state. "Instead of apartheid—the Communist Party stands for the unity and friendship of all sections of the South African people, in a united, democratic non-racial South Africa; and end to segregation and Bantustans," read a pamphlet they issued in 1989.⁹⁸ "Instead of exploitation and profiteering by the bosses—the South African Communist Party stands for socialism: workers' ownership and control of means of production and distribution, an end to poverty and unemployment." Mandela described the differing ideological natures of the ANC and the SACP during his Rivonia Trial statement. "The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst the ANC seeks to harmonize them," he said. "This is a vital distinction."⁹⁹ After the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, the SACP transitioned to a form of democratic socialism. The Communists would serve as the parliamentary representatives of the working class in a pluralist non-racial South African democracy. They rejected the "self-perpetuating power" and "implications for corruption and dictatorship" that had defined Soviet-style Communist states.¹⁰⁰ The SACP reformed in the wake of Communism's international collapse, drifting away from orthodox Marxism-Leninism and toward democratic participation in the political process.

Many black SACP members who joined the ANC ended up pursuing the ANC's nationalist goals instead of Communist ones. Black SACP members serving on the

ANC National Executive Committee were committed to African nationalism first and Communism second because they were Africans themselves; thus, they had a greater stake in eradicating white supremacy. They placed their racial and ethnic interests ahead of their class interests.¹⁰¹ Moses Kotane, the SACP secretary general and a leading member of the ANC, helped transform the MK into an organization largely populated by black Africans who were committed to African nationalism. Joe Slovo, a leading white member of the SACP (and later the secretary general of the party), complained that the ANC, due to its autonomy in decision-making, was co-opting prominent SACP members like Kotane and convincing them to focus on the ANC's objectives at the expense of the SACP.¹⁰² Black Communists within the ANC developed more loyalty toward nationalism than Marxism-Leninism.

The ANC continued its alliance with the SACP after the fall of apartheid. Mandela believed that the alliance allowed the ANC to pay attention to the interests of the poor, the downtrodden, and the disadvantaged.¹⁰³ "The African National Congress seeks to build a better life for all South Africans, especially the poor," he said at the SACP's ninth party congress. "In this endeavour, we can only benefit from alliance and critical engagement with organisations which have put this objective high on their agenda. The SACP is one such foremost champion of the interests of the working class and the poor."¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

The struggle against apartheid in South Africa was long and brutal. It required cooperation on a national scale between parties whose views did not always align. Only a mass liberation movement could topple such an oppressive system and build a free country in its place. The African National Congress and the South African Communist Party were united by their common interests: the abolition of apartheid and the dismantling of white minority rule in favor of a non-racial democracy. However, the two parties had their own creeds, and despite influencing each other, they were independent entities. The ANC maintained the leadership position throughout the history of its alliance with the SACP. At no point was the ANC controlled or dominated by Communists, contrary to the claims of the apartheid-era South African government and its supporters or contemporary scholars who have kept the academic debate alive. The dynamic was the other way around. The ANC was the clear leader in its alliance with the SACP. Were the Communists the ones who were being dominated by their allies? As Nelson Mandela famously wrote in his autobiography: "The cynical have always suggested that the Communists were using us. But who is to say that we were not using them?"¹⁰⁵

Notes

1. R. Hunt Davis and Sheridan Johns, *Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948–1990: A Documentary Survey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 222–23.
2. South African Communist Party, "The Communist Party Fights for Freedom," *SACP.org.za*, accessed May 4, 2016, <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2637>.
3. Stephen Ellis, "Nelson Mandela, the South African Communist Party and the Origins of Umkhonto we Sizwe," *Cold War History* 16, no. 1 (October 29, 2015): 1–18, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2015.1078315>.

4. African National Congress, "The Passing of Cde Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela," *ANC.org.za*, accessed August 28, 2017, <http://www.anc.org.za/content/passing-cde-nelson-rolihlahla-mandela>; South African Communist Party, "SACP Statement on the Passing Away of Madiba," *Umsebenzi Online* 12, no. 43 (December 6, 2013), accessed August 28, 2017, <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=4151%20#redpen>.
5. African National Congress, "51st National Conference: Declaration," *ANC.org.za*, accessed May 11, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2498>.
6. Anthony Sampson, *Mandela: The Authorised Biography* (London: HarperCollins, 2000), 43.
7. Heidi Holland, *The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress* (New York: George Braziller, 1990), 45–46.
8. Sampson, 43.
9. Holland, 45–46.
10. Sampson, 43.
11. Tom Lodge, *Mandela* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 30–31.
12. Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1994), 87; Sampson, 44.
13. Holland, 64.
14. Lodge, 36.
15. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 87.
16. Nelson Mandela, "Nelson Mandela's Statement from the Dock at the Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial," *ANC.org.za*, accessed March 29, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3430&t=Famous%20Speeches>.
17. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 94.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 320; Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement; Davis and Johns, 128; Sampson, 43–44.
20. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 94.
21. *Ibid.*; Sampson, 44.
22. Davis and Johns, 70–71.
23. Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement.
24. Lodge, 44.
25. Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement; Davis and Johns, 127.
26. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 101.
27. Lodge, 44–45.
28. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 101–02; Lodge, 45; Sampson, 63–64.
29. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 104.
30. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 102.
31. *Ibid.*; Holland, 70–72; Lodge, 62.
32. Lodge, 63–64.
33. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 102.
34. Lodge, 64.
35. Simon Adams, *Comrade Minister: The South African Communist Party and the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), 33–34.

36. Adams, 39.
37. Davis and Johns, 126.
38. Lodge, 67.
39. Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement.
40. Nelson Mandela, "Speech by President Nelson Mandela at 9th Congress of the SACP," *ANC.org.za*, accessed March 29, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4121>.
41. Davis and Johns, 241–42.
42. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 320; Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement; Sampson, 192.
43. Davis and Johns, 126–27.
44. Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement.
45. Paul S. Landau, "Controlled by Communists? (Re)Assessing the ANC in its Exilic Decades," *South African Historical Journal* 67, no. 2 (July 6, 2015): 233, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02582473.2015.1031818>.
46. Landau, 236.
47. Nelson Mandela, "Address by President Nelson Mandela on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the South African Communist Party," *SACP.org.za*, accessed March 29, 2016, <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=248>.
48. Davis and Johns, 253–54.
49. Alfred Nzo and Joe Slovo, "Speeches by Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of the African National Congress, and Joe Slovo, Chairman of the South African Communist Party, at the 65th Anniversary Meeting of the South African Communist Party," *SACP.org.za*, accessed May 4, 2016, <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2631>.
50. Joe Slovo, "The South African Working Class and the National Democratic Revolution," *SACP.org.za*, accessed May 4, 2016, <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2633>.
51. Ibid.
52. Landau, 229–30.
53. Landau, 231–32.
54. Landau, 230.
55. Landau, 232–33.
56. Landau, 234–35.
57. Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement.
58. Sampson, 317–18.
59. Davis and Johns, 184–85.
60. Sampson, 284.
61. Oliver Tambo, "Speech by Oliver Tambo at the Meeting of Representatives of the Parties and Movements Participating in the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the 'Great October Socialist Revolution,'" *ANC.org.za*, accessed March 29, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4540>.
62. Landau, 237.
63. Ibid.
64. Sampson, 316.
65. Lodge, 165–66.

66. Sampson, 92.
67. Lodge, 66–67.
68. South African Congress Alliance, “The Freedom Charter,” *ANC.org.za*, accessed March 29, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=72>.
69. Lodge, 66–67.
70. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 469.
71. Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement.
72. Ibid; Holland, 125–26.
73. Sampson, 92.
74. Sampson, 88.
75. Sampson, 91.
76. Holland, 113–14.
77. Lodge, 22.
78. Lodge, 31–32.
79. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 104–05.
80. Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement.
81. Ibid.
82. Lodge, 112.
83. Lodge, 93–94.
84. Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement.
85. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 320–21; Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement.
86. Sampson, 28.
87. Sampson, 285.
88. Sampson, 286.
89. Sampson, 287.
90. Landau, 240.
91. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 319–20.
92. Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement.
93. African National Congress, “African National Congress Constitution,” *ANC.org.za*, accessed March 29, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10177>.
94. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 374.
95. Holland, 230.
96. Davis and Johns, 126.
97. African National Congress, “51st National Conference: Declaration.”
98. SACP, “The Communist Party Fights for Freedom.”
99. Mandela, Rivonia Trial Statement.
100. Adams, 106.
101. Landau, 235.
102. Landau, 233.
103. Mandela, SACP 75th Anniversary Speech.
104. Mandela, SACP 9th Congress Speech.
105. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 105.

Bibliography

Adams, Simon. *Comrade Minister: The South African Communist Party and the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2001.

African National Congress. "African National Congress Constitution." Current constitution, amended and adopted at 53rd ANC National Conference, Bloemfontein (Mangaung), South Africa, 2012. *ANC.org.za*. Accessed March 29, 2016. <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10177>.

_____. "The Passing of Cde Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela." Media statement, December 5, 2013. *ANC.org.za*. Accessed August 28, 2017. <http://www.anc.org.za/content/passing-cde-nelson-rolihlahla-mandela>.

_____. "51st National Conference: Declaration." Issued at 51st ANC National Conference, Stellenbosch, South Africa, 2002. *ANC.org.za*. Accessed May 11, 2016. <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2498>.

"The Communist Party Fights for Freedom." Published by South African Communist Party, 1989. *SACP.org.za*. Accessed May 4, 2016. <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2637>.

Ellis, Stephen. "Nelson Mandela, the South African Communist Party and the Origins of Umkhonto we Sizwe." *Cold War History* 16, no. 1 (October 29, 2015): 1–18. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2015.1078315>.

Holland, Heidi. *The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress*. New York: George Braziller, 1990.

Johns, Sheridan, and R. Hunt Davis. *Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948–1990: A Documentary Survey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Landau, Paul S. "Controlled by Communists? (Re)Assessing the ANC in its Exilic Decades." *South African Historical Journal* 67, no. 2 (July 6, 2015): 222–41. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02582473.2015.1031818>.

Lodge, Tom. *Mandela*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Mandela, Nelson. "Address by President Nelson Mandela on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the South African Communist Party." Speech, Cape Town, South Africa, July 28, 1996. *SACP.org.za*. Accessed March 29, 2016. <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=248>.

_____. *Long Walk to Freedom*. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1994.

_____. "Nelson Mandela's Statement from the Dock at the Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial." Speech, Pretoria, South Africa, April 20, 1964. *ANC.org.za*. Accessed March 29, 2016. <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3430&t=Famous%20Speeches>.

_____. "Speech by President Nelson Mandela at 9th Congress of the SACP." Speech, April 7, 1992. *ANC.org.za*. Accessed March 29, 2016. <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4121>.

Nzo, Alfred, and Joe Slovo. "Speeches by Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of the African National Congress, and Joe Slovo, Chairman of the South African Communist Party, at the 65th Anniversary Meeting of the South African Communist Party." Speech, London, England, July 30, 1986. *SACP.org.za*. Accessed May 4, 2016. <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2631>.

Sampson, Anthony. *Mandela: The Authorised Biography*. London: HarperCollins, 2000.

Slovo, Joe. "The South African Working Class and the National Democratic Revolution." Pamphlet, published by South African Communist Party, 1988. *SACP.org.za*. Accessed May 4, 2016. <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2633>.

South African Communist Party. "SACP Statement on the Passing Away of Madiba." *Umsebenzi Online* 12, no. 43 (December 6, 2013). Accessed August 28, 2017. <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=4151%20#redpen>.

South African Congress Alliance. "The Freedom Charter." Statement, Kliptown, South Africa, June 26, 1955. *ANC.org.za*. Accessed March 29, 2016. <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=72>.

Tambo, Oliver. "Speech by Oliver Tambo at the Meeting of Representatives of the Parties and Movements Participating in the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the 'Great October Socialist Revolution.'" Speech, Moscow, USSR, November 4–5, 1987. *ANC.org.za*. Accessed March 29, 2016. <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4540>.