Focused Deterrence, Special Investigations Units, and Violent Offenders: What Works

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ABSTRACT

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Dustin Pailing

Under the supervision of Dr. Cheryl Banachowski-Fuller

Abstract

This study sought to address recidivism among repeat violent offenders through the identification of successful and unsuccessful focused deterrence program characteristics and determine ideal program participant attributes. By targeting repeat violent offenders who have been shown to commit crimes at higher rates than other offender groups, Special Investigations Units (SIUs) and focused deterrence models have only inconsistently been shown to be effective in reducing recidivism. An extensive review of secondary sources was conducted to identify patterns and attributes among individual programs and selected participants to uncover which program and participant characteristics yield the greatest reduction in recidivism. Programs routinely select repeat violent offenders, but focused deterrence models have only inconsistently been effective in having the target impact of increased community safety.
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Section 1: Introduction

Background

Scholarly research has shown that a high percentage of the crimes committed in the United States (US) are committed by a small percentage of the offender population with conservative estimates of recidivism rates for violent offenders as high as 85 percent (Nally, Lockwood, Taiping & Knutson, 2014). Violent offenders pose a danger to the community and given recent data on the high rates at which post-release offenders will commit crimes again, there is a necessity to address and attempt to prevent repeated violent acts perpetrated by the same group of individuals. With modern policing methods, various proactive policing initiatives have emerged which have attempted to reduce recidivism among offenders. However, many of these new proactive initiatives have been shown to be ineffective (Telep & Weisburd, 2012). This ineffectiveness among previous programs has perpetuated a need to find alternative methods of crime deterrence for repeat criminal offenders. The problem of repeat violent recidivism among select offenders has been partially attributed to the fact that most individuals convicted of criminal offenses report an inability to secure employment (Nally et al., 2014), to become financially independent, and to find adequate housing, all of which are necessary to return to a normal, law-abiding life after release (Zhang & Zhang, 2005).

To address the high rates of recidivism among post-release offenders, many law enforcement agencies have turned to a proactive policing approach known as focused deterrence. The focused deterrence model aims to open dialog and maintain consistent communication between law enforcement and repeat violent offenders within the community (Kennedy, 2011). This direct communication between the police departments and repeat violent offenders allows for closer monitoring of program participants than many other current approaches take. This
increased monitoring and contact as a part of the focused deterrence approach aims to minimize harm caused to the community by addressing repeat offenders’ behavior accordingly. Police departments accomplish this by clearly outlining a deterrence model which rewards those who adhere to the program and similarly explicates gradually increasing penalties for those who continue to engage in crime (Kennedy, 2011).

Although the basic structure of most focused deterrence models is uniform across local law enforcement agencies variation in participant selection criteria, specific intervention approach, program rewards, and predictable graduated penalties make each deterrence initiative unique. In an effort to most effectively and succinctly implement the focused deterrence program and monitor its participants, law enforcement agencies organize observational and enforcement efforts into centralized work groups known as Specialized Investigation Units (SIUs). These specialized units are also tasked with selecting offenders for program participation, notifying participants of their selection, organizing community resources to reward adherence to the program, and seeking swift penalties for participants who continue to commit crimes. Most focused deterrence programs have formed an intervention approach, have identified available community resources, and have pre-determined sentencing guidelines prior to implementation; SIUs are used to realize program goals through the facilitation and supervision of the initiative rather than to design the specific program structure.

Participants are routinely selected based upon designated criteria which may be similar to that of other focused deterrence programs, yet unique to each individual department’s initiative. The targeted selection population for most focused deterrence programs and SIUs are individuals who are categorized as both repeat and violent offenders. Participants do not always fit these parameters, but in general, most offenders fit this profile. Accordingly, offenders who have only
committed one (and in many instances only committed a few) misdemeanor(s) are not selected to participate in focused deterrence programs. Additionally, research shows that between 60% and 82% of violent crimes are committed by offenders with a prior criminal history (Piper, 1985). By targeting repeat offenders, focused deterrence programs can more effectively address recurring instances of criminal activity in the community while directing appropriate intervention resources to the most suitable offender group. For example, if four crimes are committed in the same neighborhood by two different suspects and one repeat offender has committed three of the crimes with the other individual committing the fourth offense, a concentration on the repeat offenders’ behavior will more effectively utilize available program resources and will reduce the harm caused to the community.

The selection of only violent offenders for focused deterrence models is based upon the harm caused to the community by repeated violent criminal acts; among all offenders, repeat violent offenders are more likely to commit serious offenses which inflict significantly more physical and emotional injury onto members of the community than non-violent offenders (Piper, 1985). Traditionally, effective focused deterrence programs that monitor violent offenders and address continued criminal behavior have been shown to reduce recidivism rates and reduce the amount of harm being caused to the community. Eligible participants have routinely been chosen for focused deterrence programs based on selection criteria which include multiple criminal convictions, at least one of which was violent, and at least one of which was a felony.

While repeated, violent acts tend to have a negative effect on the community, research also suggests that the community can be effected differently depending upon the severity of each offense. McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple, and Bynum (2010) state the fear caused by serious violent
felony offenses greatly outweighs the fear caused by many misdemeanor and non-violent offenses. This fear can lead to a perception of the community being unsafe. For example, if a theft is committed on a specific block within a neighborhood many community members may not perceive the single act as a great threat to their safety or to the community being unsafe. Inversely, if a homicide takes place on this same specific block within a neighborhood many community members will likely perceive the single act as a threat to their safety, which may also lead to a feeling of the community being unsafe.

Although offenders are generally categorized into conceptually dichotic classes of violent or non-violent offenders, empirical research shows that a high percentage of property crimes are being committed by individuals who are also engaging in violent criminal activity. This lack of clear categorical separation is reflected in the difference in recidivism rates between violent and non-violent first offenses. Piper (1985) states that offenders whose first crime was categorized as violent re-offended 85% of the time while only 45% of non-violent first time offenders committed a second or subsequent criminal offense. Further illustrating this point, Nally, Lockwood, Taiping, and Knutsonn (2014) found both violent and non-violent offenders released from prison had high rates of recidivism (nearly 50%), but state that only violent post-release offenders tended to commit both violent and non-violent crimes. As mentioned above, by specifically targeting the violent offender group that is more likely to re-engage in criminal activity, the fundamental goals of the focused deterrence crime prevention model can be accomplished while allocating program resources and ensuring both effectiveness and efficiency. This fundamental goal includes both reducing recidivism among program participants and making the community a safer place, both of which are interrelated.
Although program characteristics vary by initiative some components have been found more effective at reducing recidivism than others. Effective program characteristics include: models which specifically target one type of offense (Corsaro, Hunt, Hipple, & McGarrell, 2012), programs which have a high level of continuous participant-resource interaction (Papachristos, Wallace, Meares & Fagan, 2013), models which are able to target gang involved offenders (Bonner, Worden & McLean, 2008), initiatives which had a high degree of stakeholder involvement (Tita, Riley & Ridgeway, 2003), and programs with an educational component (Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane & Ransford, 2013). While initiatives containing one effective program characteristic have been found to be moderately successful, focused deterrence models that use two or more effective program characteristics have been found to be very successful. A combination of both quality program components as well as a higher number of quality program components tended to be determinate of the success of the program.

Many police departments around the country are utilizing this focused deterrence model as a basis for the formation of Special Investigations Units (SIUs) through offender outreach and by providing the opportunity for education, employment, housing, counseling and other resources. These specialized investigative units use proactive enforcement action by organizing community resources, selecting offenders for participation based on eligible criteria that varies by program, closely monitoring those selected offenders, reward participants who are successful in the program, coordinate charging decisions, and increasing penalties for repeat offenders who continue to commit crimes after enrolling in the program (Zhang & Zhang, 2005). Accentuated by partnerships formed between local law enforcement and other agencies (such as social services, Joining Forces for Families, the district attorney’s office, probation and parole, and other federal agencies), these specialized units both ensure that selected offenders are provided
with the necessary support system to achieve social and self-improvement and closely monitor and respond to those who continue to engage in criminal activity (Woodmansee, 2011). Several police departments around the US have formulated and implemented SIUs, including: Madison, WI; High Point, NC; St. Petersburg, FL; Reno, NV; San Antonio, TX; and Phoenix, AZ.

Statement of the problem

Prior research has indicated that the use of some focused deterrence programs and SIUs present a viable option to addressing recidivism rates among offenders through monitoring and enforcement, and have improved program participants’ social environments by providing additional resources (housing, employment, education, alcohol and other drug counseling, child care, and parenting classes) to help offenders stay out of trouble with the law. Although some programs have been successful, other comparable programs have been shown to less effective; still others have failed to provide clarity as to which specific offender characteristics are best suited for the focused deterrence model.

Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study was to identify and describe the attributes of successful and unsuccessful focused deterrence programs through a review of extant literature and comprehensive analysis. A review of program effectiveness was conducted by determining whether fundamental program goals had been met and whether recidivism had decreased among selected participants. After the various focused deterrence programs were presented and reviewed, critical analysis highlighted which programs may be more effective than others as well as which specific program characteristics proved to be more effective than others. Successfulness of existing programs was evaluated on the specific characteristics of the focused
deterrence program as well as the individual attributes of the offenders who have been selected to participate.

**Overview of Methodology**

An in depth meta-analysis of 32 studies was undertaken to delineate patterns of characteristics of successful programs and the attributes of successful program participants. The data gathering methods used in this research project consisted of an extensive search of scholarly and peer-reviewed journals to find articles relating to focused deterrence, SIUs, characteristics of successful program participants and programs, and associated measures of program success. Information gathered from empirical research was supplemented with additional textbook and police department website resources regarding these same topics. Analysis of characteristics of selected participating offenders were simultaneously considered and evaluated for interactions with program characteristics to assess the variance in success that exists from program to program.

**Summary**

Overall, the purpose of this research is to look at how program characteristic and participant attributes may influence the successfulness of focused deterrence programs and SIUs throughout the country. The main argument of this study is that programs with a higher number of integrated program components such as education, a narrow focus, and community involvement will be more successful than focus deterrence programs that have less program components. Additionally, by examining specific characteristics of participants selected for each focused deterrence initiative it can be determined which offenders are most suitable for these types of programs. These arguments are supported by an extensive review of existing scholarly
research with an analysis that concentrated on comparing and contrasting the three major focused
deterrence program types; law enforcement intervention approaches, drug market intervention
approaches, and community outreach approaches. Finally, results of the analysis have led to
recommendations for what an ideal focused deterrence program would look like and which
offenders should be selected for this ideal program.
Section 2: Literature Review

Although focused deterrence programs first emerged in police departments around the US during the late 1980’s, it was not until the late 1990’s that scholarly research began to critically evaluate overall program effectiveness and individual participant recidivism. As the number of focused deterrence programs grew, so too did the number of evaluative studies that attempted to distill what specific program characteristics and which individual participant attributes were best suited for this policing approach. An exploration of this existing research base clearly shows that some focused deterrence programs are more effective than others and that individual program and participant characteristics strongly determine the success of each proactive policing initiative. It is also evident in the existing literature that most of the programs appear to fit into one of three general categories based on the focused deterrence approach taken, either a law enforcement, drug market, or community outreach approach. The extant literature, organized in terms of which approach the program takes, will be critically analyzed, highlighting which programs and their characteristics may be more effective than others as well as which specific program participant characteristics may contribute to more favorable program outcomes than others.
Law enforcement intervention approaches

Overview

Many focused deterrence initiatives have taken an approach which focuses on law enforcement intervention and these programs are highly concentrated on increased enforcement as well as predictable and graduated penalties for participants who continue to commit crimes after beginning the program. Local law enforcement has typically utilized community resources including educational opportunities, employment opportunities, job training, and housing to accomplish fundamental program goals (Tillyer, Engels, & Lovins, 2012). In addition to the local police departments that originally implemented the initiative, most programs also have partnerships with other enforcement agencies such as the district attorney’s office, the US attorney’s office, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and state probation and parole (McGarrell & Chermak, 2003). Law enforcement intervention approaches tend to concentrate on selected offenders’ continued violent offenses.

Just as specific program characteristics set law enforcement interventions apart from other focused deterrence approaches, selected participant attributes routinely vary by intervention approach as well. Historically, selected program participants for law enforcement approaches have had a tendency to be youthful, violent, and involved with gangs (Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane & Ransford, 2013). These selected participants are then monitored by partnering local and federal law enforcement agencies. If participants continue to commit crimes, graduated penalties are imparted through a collaborative effort engaged in by the district attorney, the US attorney, and the probation and parole office. Although some similarities are
shared between the law enforcement intervention approach and other focused deterrence approaches, with the law enforcement intervention approach police departments focus on specific gun crimes, increased monitoring and enforcement of select offenders, and specific program participant attributes, which set it apart from other initiatives (Telep & Weisburd, 2012).

Boston’s Operation Ceasefire

One of the earliest law enforcement intervention approaches was Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, which began in 1996. Driven by the need to address increasing gun violence and firearm homicide among youth, the Boston Police Department, in partnership with various community stakeholders, began this program to reduce recidivism among inner city youth and to protect members of the community that were being victimized by gun violence (Braga & Winship, 2009). After a group of offenders for the program was chosen, selected participants were notified of their participation and were extended educational, social, and housing assistance through the use of specific community outreach programs. Through the program, local and federal law enforcement agencies closely monitored selected offender behavior and if participants continued to commit violent crimes, the resulting consequence would be graduated penalties (Telep & Weisburd, 2012).

For example, consider an offender who is chosen for participation in a law enforcement intervention program based upon pre-determined selection criteria. After the participant has been selected for the initiative they are contacted in person by a member of the police department and briefly explained the tenets of the program, advised of the formal notification meeting both verbally and in a written letter, offered transportation to the meeting, and told their participation
in the program is not voluntary nor is it dependent upon their attendance at the meeting. During this contact, the participant is told that the meeting will include further details about the focused deterrence model, will include an explanation of how their behavior will be closely monitored from that point forward, and will feature educational, employment, and housing resources available to them through various community resources that will also be present at the meeting. Should the participant choose not to attend the meeting, a member of the police department would attempt to re-contact the participant to extend an invite to a future meeting, but explain once more that their participation in the program is not voluntary and they will be subject to increased monitoring from that point forward.

At the notification meeting, participants meet with members of the police department, individuals from the district and US attorney’s offices, and community organizations available to provide educational, employment, and housing resources. After the meeting has concluded, participants leave the meeting location and their behavior is continuously monitored through a collaborative law enforcement effort. If the participant does not commit another criminal offense, or if the first offense after the notification meeting is a non-violent offense, the community resources will remain available to the participant and the police department will continue to provide assistance to the selected offender. If the participant commits another violent crime or more than one non-violent offense after being chosen to participate in the program, they will be subjected to increased penalties and charged to the fullest extent possible by the district or US attorney’s office. This kind of hardline law enforcement intervention approach to focused deterrence similar to that explained here, was used in Boston’s Operation Ceasefire in an attempt to reduce recidivism among selected offenders and increase safety within the community.
**Early results from Boston**

Just over one year into the Boston initiative, a positive reduction in both youth gun violence and homicide were seen in inner city areas where Operation Ceasefire was employed (Kennedy, 1997). Kennedy (1997) reported that after the implementation of Ceasefire, both youth homicide and youth gun violence rates fell by nearly two thirds in areas where the program was being used; no similar reduction was seen in locations throughout the city where the program was not used. These early findings were later supported by Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane, and Ransford (2013) who cited a 60% decrease in youth homicide over the first five years of the initiative. These positive results from Operation Ceasefire provided ample encouragement to many other cities to develop their own law enforcement intervention approach to reduce violent crime.

**Effectiveness of LE intervention approaches participant characteristics**

Although many other police departments structured their law enforcement intervention approach to mirror that of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, it was soon realized that program effectiveness was not the same across initiatives. With each law enforcement intervention approach being structured around the same basic components, questions arose as to which specific program characteristics led to the variation in success. Scholarly research began to critically analyze a number of law enforcement focused deterrence programs, including Operation Ceasefire in Boston, in an attempt to understand which program characteristics may be influencing program effectiveness. Similarly, variation among program participant characters was also considered as a possible reason for differing success across similar law enforcement intervention initiatives.
Age

Many ceasefire initiatives tend to select participants that are more youthful, often times concentrating on offenders who are in their late teens to mid-twenties (Tillyer, Engel, & Lovins, 2012). Although age has been used as an independent characteristic for selection, age may also affect program success. Kennedy (1997) found large reductions in recidivism in Boston participants aged 14 to 24, however, Kennedy also noted that no control group existed to measure program success across older age groups. The discovery that selected youthful offenders could be successful within a law enforcement intervention approach led to questions of how older violent offenders may fair in the same program.

Contrary to the early program success seen among youthful offenders, later studies found no statistically significant difference between the successfulness of older offenders compared to younger offenders in law enforcement intervention programs. Tillyer, Engel and Lovins (2012) compared a law enforcement intervention approach’s ability to reduce recidivism among four age groups of offenders within the Cincinnati Intervention to Reduce Violence. These four offender groups consisted of 1) a younger group of selected program participants with an average age of 27.1 years, 2) a younger control group of non-program participants with an average age of 27.1 years, 3) an older group of selected program participants with an average age of 32.6 years, and 4) an older control group of non-program participants with an average age of 32.6 years. Tillyer, Engel, and Lovins (2012) found that among the younger participant and non-participant groups there was a significantly larger decrease in re-offending among the program participants as compared to the non-participant control group: However, among program
participants in the older groups, there was no significant difference in recidivism between the participant group and the control group.

The authors have attributed the variation in program effectiveness to the average age of the participants stating that there is a process of “aging out” (Tillyer, Engel, & Lovins, 2012, p. 989). They continue that the larger decrease in recidivism within the younger group of program participants as compared to those of the younger control group of non-program participants shows that a law enforcement intervention approach can be effective in youthful offenders. Additionally, they state that the absence of a significant difference in re-offending among older groups of both program participants and non-program participants shows that this same focused deterrence approach may not be suitable for offenders as they get older. Tillyer, Engel, and Lovins (2012) conclude that age is a determinant factor in program success with regards to selected participant characteristics.

Gangs

One of the officially listed selection criteria for Boston’s Operation Ceasefire was youthful repeat violent offenders, yet Bonner, Worden and McLean (2008) found that nearly all of the participants were also gang affiliated. A similar evaluative study of the Cincinnati Intervention to Reduce Violence found that the majority of selected violent youthful offenders were affiliated with a gang (Engel, Tillyer, & Corsaro, 2013).

Also noteworthy is that the discussion on gang affiliation is a characteristic that is not exclusive to the participants of focused deterrence initiatives that take a law enforcement approach. Many drug intervention approaches, including in High Point, North Carolina, have noted that affiliation to a gang is not a specific selection criteria for program participation
(Kennedy & Wong, 2009). Inversely, in several community outreach approaches including Project Safe Neighborhoods, whether program participants were known gang affiliates or not was cited as one of the determinants for selection (Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane & Ransford, 2013). Despite this fact, it is evident that most youthful offenders within the law enforcement intervention approach, drug market intervention approach, and community outreach approach has some degree of gang involvement including gang membership or affiliation (Braga & Weisburd, 2015).

Many of the existing studies on focused deterrence do not clearly delineate the difference between “gang membership” and “gang affiliation”. It is important to distinguish between these two terms as being a member of a gang is not the same as being affiliated with a gang. Rosenfeld, Bray, and Egley (1991) describe an individual who is a member in a gang as being part of a group that is bound by unwritten rules, social norms, and individual responsibilities that is also involved in criminal activity. They further state that individuals who are affiliated with a gang may still adhere to the norms and practices of the group, and may also be involved in criminal activity, but may not official declare themselves as a member or may not have yet have been accepted into the group by members in positions of power. Noteworthy is the fact that although there is an obvious distinction between gang membership and gang affiliation, both gang members and affiliates are routinely involved in illegal activities.

Although the presence of participant gang involvement as a selection criterion has varied among each stylistic approach, the discussion on the impact of gang membership and affiliation on overall participant success has occurred in the evaluation of all three approaches. Within the law enforcement intervention approach, both Bonner et al. (2008) and Engel et al. (2013) found gang membership or gang affiliation to be a characteristic of almost all of the program
participants. Furthermore, Piehl, Kennedy, and Braga (2000) found there was an overall reduction in gang violence in areas where Boston’s Operation Ceasefire was employed as compared to areas where the initiative was not. It is important to note that not only has gang membership and affiliation been identified as select program participant characteristic, but Piehl et al (2000) has also found the selection of these gang involved offenders for law enforcement intervention approaches to be effective in reducing overall gang violence.

Guns

The discussion of gangs and violent offenses would be remiss without properly acknowledging the use of firearms during violent offenses. Although not all violent offenses are perpetrated through the use of a firearm, the severity of a violent offense and potential injury to the victim is often increased when a gun is involved due to the dangerousness of the instrument being used or displayed (Braga & Weisburd, 2015). Additionally, many of the studies that have evaluated the success of the law enforcement intervention approach have also specifically measured the reduction of violent offenses involving a firearm. Furthermore, the percentage of violent crimes in which a gun was used is higher among offenders with gang involvement than that of other violent offenses committed by non-gang affiliates (Tita, Riley & Ridgeway, 2003).

Braga (2008) found that over the last 20 years, nearly 33% of the firearm related homicides in Chicago, 50% of the gun homicides in the Los Angeles area, and 60% of the firearm related homicides in Boston were committed by known gang members; rates of violent gun crimes perpetrated by these same individuals, in these same areas, were also similarly proportioned. In addition to the high rates at which gang members commit violent crimes, Engel, Tillyer, and Corsaro (2013) state that gang membership is directly associated with higher
rates of violent acts and that youth who are gang affiliated are at a much higher risk for committing violent offenses with guns than those who are not.

The association between youth, gangs, violent offenses, and firearms is illustrated further through the results of various law enforcement intervention approaches. After the first four years of Operation Ceasefire, Boston saw a significant reduction in gun related in areas where the initiative was implemented; areas that were not targeted by this focused deterrence approach saw either an increase or no change in firearm offenses over this same period of time (Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, Bond, & Cronin, 2008). Similar positive results were also seen in Chicago over the first five years of their version of the Ceasefire initiative (Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane & Ransford, 2013). The short-term reduction in gun related violence among youthful, gang affiliated offenders showed promise that a law enforcement intervention approach could effectively make the community safer while reducing recidivism among select program participants. Additionally, these positive results appeared to strengthen the argument that age, gang affiliation, and gun violence may all be contributing factors to participant success within a focused deterrence program.

**Effectiveness of LE intervention through stakeholder involvement**

When discussing stakeholders, it is important to note that a number of different parties could be identified as such and, for the purposes of this analysis, they can roughly be divided into four groups: 1) the selected participants themselves, 2) law enforcement resources, 3) prosecutorial resources and 4) community resources. Selected participants consist of those who were chosen to take part in the program and law enforcement resources refer to any physical or monetary programmatic support provided by local police department, state, or federal agencies.
with the purpose of organizing the focused deterrence initiative, selecting and informing offenders, monitoring selected participant behavior, and/or making arrests when necessary. Prosecutorial resources are those that are used to criminally prosecute offenders who have continued to commit crimes after being selected into the program. Lastly, community resources are used throughout the life of the intervention program to assist selected participants, including educational opportunities, employment opportunities, child care, housing, counseling, and other similar social services.

*Stakeholder involvement outside of Boston*

The vast majority of the stakeholders involved in Operation Ceasefire in Boston became heavily involved at the start of the initiative and remained involved throughout the life of the program. This stakeholder involvement included continuous participation from selected program participants, law enforcement agencies, prosecutorial agencies and community resources (Piehl, Kennedy, & Braga, 2000). Although Piehl et al. acknowledged the importance of stakeholder involved in Boston, there was no basis for comparison within the initiative itself to say whether a lack of involvement among stakeholders would negatively influence program effectiveness. In a later study, Tillyer, Engel, and Lovins (2012) compared both program components and recidivism results in Boston to a similarly structured law enforcement intervention approach initiative in Cincinnati, Ohio. Tillyer et al. found that the Cincinnati program was far less successful than its Boston predecessor and that stakeholder involvement deteriorated during the life of the initiative. This nexus between program effectiveness and stakeholder involvement accentuated the importance of continued partnership and participation among participants, law enforcement, prosecutorial agencies, and community resources.
Since stakeholder involvement and collaboration was associated with a high degree of success during Operation Ceasefire, and program effectiveness in some other locations such as Cincinnati did not mirror that of Boston, scholars continued to examine how this program component may influence program success. Another focused deterrence initiative with a law enforcement approach that did not yield the same positive results in terms of violent gun crime reduction and reduced recidivism among program participants was the Los Angeles Ceasefire Program. Due to the well-publicized successes of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, the LAPD began their ceasefire initiative using the same program structure, selecting participants based on the same selection criteria as in Boston, and attempting to use similar local law enforcement, prosecutorial, and community-based stakeholders (Tita, Riley & Ridgeway, 2003). The fact that the Los Angeles model was structured and implemented practically identical to the Boston model lead to similar positive results including an initial reduction of gun violence by nearly 25% during the first 4 months of the program (Tita, Riley & Ridgeway, 2003). Despite the initiative’s early success, serious problems began to emerge among stakeholders which eventually lead to the program disbanding less than one year after it was implemented.

An evaluation of what went wrong in Los Angeles’ Ceasefire model soon revealed that the lack of dedication and “buy in” to the initiative from multiple stakeholders may have been the cause of its shortcomings. Tita, Riley and Ridgeway (2003) state that all stakeholders, including the police department, involved in collaborative proactive policing measures must remain cooperative, accountable and dedicated in order for fundamental program goals to be met. Riley, Ridgeway, and Greenwood (2005) found that the Los Angeles Police Department did not remain involved in selected program participant monitoring or increased enforcement after the first 4 months of the program, attributing this to a philosophical shift among department
leaders accompanied by a shift in both attention and resource allocation away from focused
deterrence and towards other policing initiatives. Similarly, Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane, and
Ransford (2013), in their evaluation of Boston’s Ceasefire initiative, were also quick to point out
that leadership successions within a department that is dedicated to focused deterrence and
appropriate resource allocation for the focused deterrence approach, are paramount to program
success.

In Los Angeles, it was not only the law enforcement resources that were failing to adhere
to the constructs of the focused deterrence model. As the Los Angeles police department’s
dedication and available resources for Operation Ceasefire began to wane, so too did the
dedication of the prosecuting agencies and community resources (Tita, Riley & Ridgeway,
2003). Tita et al. believe that once the Los Angeles police department failed to subscribe to the
ideals of the law enforcement intervention approach, the credibility of the initiative was lost and
there was no accountability for any of the other involved agencies to continue with the focused
deterrence effort. These extreme declines in stakeholder involvement not only led to the
eventual elimination of the Los Angeles Ceasefire program, but also lead to violent crimes
returning to the same rate they were previously in target areas after the program had ended (Tita,
Riley, & Ridgeway, 2003).

In the case of Los Angeles’ Operation Ceasefire, the lack of consistency and continuity
within the police department and the lack of accountability and cooperation among other external
agencies led to the ineffectiveness of the program. Since law enforcement approaches to focused
deterrence rely heavily on increased enforcement, interagency cooperation, and stakeholder
involvement, programs in which police departments do not remain dedicated to the deterrence
initiative are less likely to succeed. Similarly, law enforcement agencies rely on prosecutorial and community stakeholders to play their part in the focused deterrence approach through inter-agency collaboration and dedication to the program. When one or more of these stakeholders does not remain true to the fundamental goals of the program, the initiative tends to be less successful.

Another focused deterrence program that took a law enforcement approach was Operation Ceasefire in Rochester, NY, beginning in 2003. This program, in accordance with its Boston counterpart, sought to reduce recidivism, homicide, and associated violent gun crime among intercity youth through the use of a law enforcement approach to focused deterrence. Delaney (2006) states that Rochester reported nearly double the number of homicides as Boston between 1995 and 1999, nearly 9.42 per 100,000 residents in Rochester as compared to 4.9 per 100,000 residents in Boston. These abnormally high homicide and gun violence rates in Rochester, coupled with the successes being seen in Boston’s Operation Ceasefire initiative, led to Rochester Police Department’s effort to coordinate and implement a ceasefire program in their city.

First, program participants were chosen based upon pre-determined selection criteria which, similar to Boston, resulted in a pool of offenders who were youthful (between 15 and 30 years of age) males, who were known gang members, who had previously committed violent offenses (Delaney, 2006). The resulting group of program participants were notified of their selection and extended numerous community outreach resources including education, job training, and psychological counseling. Additionally, selected participants were advised that continued violent criminality would not be tolerated, that they were being closely monitored by
law enforcement resources, and that if they continued to commit crimes prosecutorial resources would be used to impose graduated penalties.

Although the Rochester initiative mirrored its Boston predecessor in terms of program structure, fundamental goals, and targeted participant population, long term success in Rochester, New York did not seem to coincide with results seen in Boston. However, in the short term, there did appear to be a statistically significant decrease in homicide rates, gun assaults, and gun robberies among youth in the target areas in Rochester. Delaney (2006) compared the rates of each of these three crimes between a three-year pre-implementation period and a 1 year post-implementation period, and found that homicide had fallen 41%, gun assaults were down 8%, and gun robberies were reduced by 14% after implementation. Despite these preliminary successes, the long-term vitality of the Rochester’s Ceasefire program soon came into question as success began to falter.

Delany (2006) reports that 2004 is the year that saw a 41% decrease in youth homicides in Rochester, the most statistically significant reduction among the 3 gun related crimes being studied in the ceasefire initiative. The following year, 2005, saw a dramatic increase in these homicide rates which in addition to exceeding the number of homicides seen during 2004, also exceeded the average number of youth homicides between 2000 and 2004 by 3 homicides (Delaney, 2006). The author hypothesized that the increase in Rochester homicides could be due to statistical anomaly, but also acknowledges changes which took place within the ceasefire program and among stakeholders which may have also caused the initiative to become less effective.
Delaney (2006) suggested that the mixed longitudinal results seen during the Rochester Operation Ceasefire initiative could be partially attributed to issues that emerged during the life of the program within both the police department and the prosecutor’s office. Delaney points out that the deterrent impact of increased arrests and highly aggressive criminal prosecution were evident near the beginning of the program between 2003 and 2004, but later dwindled as both the police department and the district attorney’s office were unable to maintain the same level of collaboration and increased participant penalization throughout the initiative. Namely, this included the inter-agency communication and cooperation between the Rochester Police Department and the district attorney’s office.

In order for graduated penalties to be imposed on selected program participants who continue to commit violent crimes, law enforcement stakeholders must do their part to monitor offenders and arrest those who break the law. Similarly, the prosecutorial stakeholders must do their part to prosecute repeat violent offenders and seek graduated penalties for those who have been notified that their continued illegal behavior will not be tolerated. Delaney (2006) states that in the case of Rochester’s ceasefire, the district attorney’s office was initially cooperative and collaborative in efforts to implement and pursue repeat violent offenders who had been selected for the focused deterrence initiative. However, by early 2005, the district attorney’s office became unwilling to dedicate the necessary resources to increase prosecution specifically designed for the program. This change in mentality in the district attorney’s office prevented the ceasefire initiative from continuing as planned and may have contributed to the sharp increase in youth homicides, in 2005, in Rochester (Delaney, 2006). It appeared that once again, cooperation, accountability, and dedication to the focused deterrence model by all stakeholders,
including law enforcement resources, prosecutorial resources, and community resources, were paramount to program success.

Importance of a quality educational component

With the evidence base for other ceasefire programs’ success increasing, scholars began identifying specific program characteristics and select participant attributes that were involved in contributing to the overall success of the ceasefire initiatives, similarly, ceasefire programs in other US cities that were struggling were also evaluated to find which program characteristics and participant attributes may affect program success. With components, such as age, gang membership, and stakeholder involvement already appearing to impact whether a program would be successful or not, a look at the influence an educational component had on initiative success revealed it was also vitally important.

Education is not a component of all focused deterrence programs, nor is it a component found in every law enforcement intervention approach. One barrier to the inclusion of an education component within any given focused deterrence model is cost. Although it could be argued that every program component is cost prohibitive to some degree as it is costing someone time and/or money to be made available, the cost of employing educators, purchasing course materials, and coordinating other educational resources to provide free education can greatly exceed that of other social services such as connecting offenders with employers (Engel, Baker, Tillyer, Eck, & Dunham, 2008). With education being offered in some focused deterrence models and not in others questions arose as to what affect the presence of an education component had on the success of program participants.
The success of an educational component within Boston’s Operation Ceasefire initiative is well documented. As focused deterrence programs are implemented, and offenders are selected, community resources are extended to program participant to assist them in leading a law-abiding life. Tillyer, Engel, and Lovins (2012) state that one of the cornerstones of the community outreach and social services aspect of Boston’s Ceasefire initiative was extending educational opportunities to selected participants shortly after acceptance into the program. Furthermore, they attribute much of the individual participant success in Boston to the presence of this educational component.

Similar educational opportunities were attempted in other focused deterrence programs that used a law enforcement approach including Cincinnati’s Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV). During the CIRV, tenets of the original initiative included a desire for funding that would include a comprehensive educational component (Engel, Baker, Tillyer, Eck, & Dunham, 2008). Although these requests for educational funding were met during the implementation of the initiative, financial resources for this program component soon dissipated. Engel et al. (2008) state that the preliminary successes of the CIRV seen while the educational element was intact were no longer as successful after funding for this component ended. In a similar study, Felbab-Brown (2013) also found that the ineffectiveness, and in many cases absence, of a fundamental educational component appeared to have a direct negative impact on program and participant success. The effectiveness that some law enforcement intervention programs experienced while maintaining an educational component, coupled with the lack of effectiveness seen during initiatives where the educational component was either underfunded or absent, shows the importance of this specific program characteristics with regards to program success.
Conclusion

As praise for Boston’s Operation Ceasefire continued and similar initiatives arose in different areas around US, concerns over whether program success could be sustained over an extended period of time and whether results could be generalized to other physical locations outside of Boston also continued (Sherman, Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter & Bushway, 1997). In Boston, more than a decade after the initiative was implemented, neighborhoods where Ceasefire was being used continued to see a reduction in youth gun violence, recidivism, and homicide (Braga & Winship, 2009). By 2000, Boston youth homicide rates had fallen 41% since the implementation of Ceasefire in 1996; the national average for these same crimes rose by 5% over this same time period (Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, Bond, & Cronin, 2008). Accordingly, Boston was experiencing a significant decrease in gun-related youth violence, other New England and US cities of similar size were experiencing an increase of these same offenses perpetrated by youth (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001).

The sustained success seen in Boston, and to varying extents in other areas of the country, provide an evidence base that the law enforcement intervention approach to focused deterrence can be effective. Nonetheless questions still remained as to whether other stylistics approaches to focused deterrence could also reduce recidivism while making the community safer. Additionally, it was still uncertain whether participant attributes and program characteristics would be determinant of program success for other intervention approaches the same way it had been for the law enforcement intervention approach.
**Drug market intervention approach**

*Overview*

Inconclusive success that arose during the duration of several different programs focused on a law enforcement intervention led to questions of whether other intervention strategies may be more effective in reducing participant recidivism and making the community safer. Furthermore, the discussion surrounding intervention approaches also necessitated an exploration into which program characteristics and participant attributes could be generalized across initiatives and physical locations to best monitor and address participant behavior while attempting to accomplish fundamental program goals. While keeping the basic tenets of the focus deterrence model intact many law enforcement agencies attempted a different intervention strategy which shifted the focus of the initiative from a hardline law enforcement approach to a concentration on open-air drug markets. This second focused deterrence strategy which more effectively sought to reduce participant recidivism and make the community safer was the drug market intervention approach.

The drug market intervention approach which, in many ways, was similar to the law enforcement intervention approach attempted to increase enforcement action for targeted offenses while extending community resources to program participants and imposed graduated penalties for selected offenders who continue to engage in crimes (Kennedy, 1997). The drug market approach shared some legalistic similarities with the law enforcement approach, but differed by focusing police resources and intervention efforts on individuals involved in the illegal drug and narcotics trade. Unlike other focused deterrence approaches, drug market intervention approaches have both program characteristics and selected participants’ attributes
that reflect an overall concentration on street-level drug markets. Due to the narrow scope of both the crimes being investigated and the physical locations where the initiative was taking place this intervention strategy has also been referred to as situational crime prevention (Tillyer & Kennedy, 2008).

Selection criteria for the drug market intervention approach included identifying offenders who were involved in the open-air drug trade (Kennedy & Wong, 2009). Offenders routinely selected for this type of focused deterrence program tended to have more than one previous drug offense and often participants had a history of committing violent offenses as well. Although some offenders had a history of committing violent offenses, participants tended to be selected based upon active participation in the sale and distribution of narcotics in a certain target area with a previous criminal conviction for a drug offense (Corsaro, 2013). The narrow focus that reflected an involvement in drug and narcotics markets made the drug market approach distinctly different than other stylistic approaches, yet similar to the law enforcement intervention approach drug market intervention was characterized by the use of specific program characteristics and specific participant attributes. It is also important to note that many of the offenders who were revolved in repeated criminal acts within the open-air drug market also had drug addiction or dependency issues themselves which was typically recognized, and addressed, within the format of the drug market intervention initiative (Corsaro, 2013).

After offenders have been selected and notified of their participation in a drug market intervention approach they are monitored by law enforcement resources which include police departments, federal agencies, and probation and parole (Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane, & Ransford, 2013). In addition to this intensive monitoring and similar to what is offered by law
enforcement intervention approaches, selected participants are extended various community and social resources to assist them in leading a law-abiding life. Some of these resources mirror those of the law enforcement approach including job opportunities and education; yet unique to drug market intervention is the opportunity for select drug-addicted offenders to partake in alcohol and other drug counseling (Braga & Weisburd, 2012). For example, if a selected and monitored program participant is drug-addicted and commits a criminal offense to support their drug habit, a traditional enforcement approach would be to charge the offender for breaking the law. In this focused deterrence model, those offenders who are involved in the open-air drug market and are also drug dependent themselves are provided the opportunity to seek drug and alcohol counseling, receive treatment to help become drug and alcohol free, and given a chance to cease their engagement in the drug trade prior to be subject to graduated penalties for repeated criminal acts.

Focus

The specific focus of the drug market intervention approach differs greatly from the focus of law enforcement intervention and community outreach intervention approaches. As the name would suggest drug market intervention specifically targets areas where illegal open air narcotics sales are taking place and individuals that are involved in the sale of drugs in these locations (Corsaro, 2013). This approach also has an underlying goal of reducing violent crime in open air drug markets assuming that deterrence that is focused on specific offenders in this area will also lead to lower violent crime rates (Braga, 2012). This assumption may have arisen, at least in part, from existing empirical research that concluded drug market areas routinely experience a higher number of violent offenses than locations that do not have overt drug markets (Corsaro,
Hunt, Hipple, & McGarrell, 2012). Although there is a proven connection between open air drug markets and violent crime, there is no evidence that eliminating these drug markets will have any measurable effect on violent crime.

The High Point drug market intervention

One of the earliest drug market intervention initiatives was started in High Point, North Carolina. Four High Point neighborhoods (West End, Daniel Brooks, Southside, and East Central) were selected as target locations based on the presence of open air drug markets (Kennedy & Wong, 2009). After the target locations had been determined local and federal law enforcement agencies identified offenders within the neighborhood who were actively and repeatedly involved in the sale of illegal narcotics in open air drug markets in these locations (Corsaro, 2013). Norris (2014) states that the process of determining a suitable location, followed by selection of offenders who are actively involved in the drug market at that location, is a technique used by many drug market intervention programs to identify which offenders will participate in the focused deterrence initiative. The High Point intervention initiative has used this process of selecting program participants as have several other similar programs that also focus on a drug market intervention approach. The structure, function, and operation of many drug market intervention approaches mirror that of the High Point, NC program largely due to the success the initiative.

Results from High Point

After the offender group was selected in High Point, participants were notified of their selection into the program at a notification meeting, the parameters and expectations of the focused deterrence program were clearly explained to each offender, and offenders were given
the opportunity to utilized numerous resources available to them (Romero, 2013). These resources included educational opportunities, employment opportunities, affordable child care, alcohol and other drug counseling and other social services. In the months and years following the notification meeting, intensive monitoring of each selected participant occurred with those who were adhering to the deterrence model being rewarded by various elements of the program and with increased penalties for those who continued to engage in crime (Kennedy, 2011). Kennedy and Wong (2009) report five years after implementation, open air drug markets had been nearly eliminated in the four target areas, violent crime fell 57% in the West End neighborhood, and there was a 20% decrease in overall violent crime within the four target location.

Braga (2012) states that although a drug market intervention focus has tended to show a reduction in drug and property crimes, rates of violent crimes has remained largely the same in areas where the initiative has been implemented. In fact, Corsaro, Hunt, Hipple, and McGarrell (2012) report that violent crime rates actually increased over the five-year evaluation period in High Point both inside and outside of the four target neighborhoods, further noting that the increased violent crime rate in areas employing the initiative were proportional to that of the rest of the city. As previously discussed, law enforcement intervention approaches have reported a statistically significant reduction in violent crime rates when gun violence has been the focus of the initiative. However, focused deterrence initiative focused on open air drug markets as well as their offenders have shown no such similar ability to reduce violent crimes in the target areas, despite the evidence that supports a decrease in open air narcotics sales.
Age

Age of the participant tended to be a consideration within the drug market intervention approach as the majority of program participants were 25 years old or younger (Kennedy & Wong, 2009). Used as an independent criterion, the selection of youthful offenders for participation in this stylistic approach was very similar to the age group used by many law enforcement intervention approaches that tended to select offenders who were in their late teens to mid-twenties (Tillyer, Engel, & Lovins, 2012). An additional similarity across intervention approaches is also evident when considering that although the majority of program participants were within the age range of late teens to mid-twenties, there were also a number of participants that exceeded 25 years of age. Although both law enforcement intervention and drug market intervention similarly selected a high percentage of youthful participants with some outliers, an evaluation of whether or not age would impact program success was not the same among the dichotomy of focused deterrence strategies.

A discussion on age was particularly relevant within the context of a law enforcement intervention approach as scholars such as Tillyer et al. (2012) found older selected program participants to reoffend at higher rates than the younger participants of the same program. Within the context of drug market intervention strategies, the recidivism of selected offenders was routinely investigated; whether or not age had a determinant effect on overall program success was not. Due to this fact, it cannot be definitively stated whether age specifically influences program success within the drug market intervention framework, however it can be stated that younger offenders under the age of 25 can be successful using this intervention approach. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that most drug market intervention participants
were youthful and empirical evidence indicating program participants re-offend at a lower rate than non-program participants (Kennedy & Wong, 2009).

**Gangs**

A discernible difference between law enforcement intervention initiatives and drug market initiatives is a concentration on gang membership among selected participants. This is not to say that many of the participants selected for drug models are not gang involved, but rather that participants being selected to drug market intervention programs are chosen based on open air narcotics sales which does not necessarily include gang membership. Both drug market and law enforcement focused deterrence models have an underlying goal which includes reduction of violent crime, yet statistically significant violent crime reduction has not been reported in both initiatives. In the case of Rockford, Illinois’ drug market intervention, there was a significant decrease in drug and property crimes following implementation, yet violent crime rates were not affected (Corsaro, Brunson, & McGarrell, 2013).

Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell (2013) state that in stark contrast to many law enforcement intervention approaches which were able to target and reduce gang related gun violence, results from many drug market intervention models did not see violent crime rates fall, despite the many close similarities between the two focused deterrence strategies. The authors acknowledge that one reason for this difference in successful and unsuccessful violent crime reduction among the two intervention approaches is due to selected program participants possible gang involvement. Research suggests that since law enforcement intervention approaches routinely select gang affiliated offenders and drug market intervention approaches do not specifically select gang involved offenders, the participant attribute of gang affiliation may

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influence how effectively violent crime can be reduced in each model. Further evidence of this was reported in the Nashville, TN drug market intervention program which similarly saw a reduction in drug and property crime five years after the program was implemented, but did not find any statistically significant data that violent crime had decreased (Corsaro & McGarrell, 2009).

In the case of both the Rockford, Illinois drug market intervention (Corsaro, Brunson & McGarrell, 2013) and the Nashville, TN drug market intervention (Corsaro & McGarrell, 2009) selected program participants’ attributes were extremely similar to those of attributes considered by most law enforcement intervention strategies. The obvious difference in selection criteria between these two drug market initiatives and most law enforcement initiatives is whether or not the offender was gang affiliated. Since effectively reducing violent crime varied between stylistic approaches and because the characteristics of drug market strategies closely mirrored those of law enforcement strategies the participant trait that did routinely differ, gang involvement, had a significant impact and on whether or not violent crime would be reduced in the area where the focused deterrence program was implemented (Corsaro, Brunson, & McGarrell, 2013).

Community awareness and support

Fundamental to any focused deterrence model is a high level of community and external stakeholder involvement and awareness. The successes of the High Point drug market intervention model lead to attempted replication of the strategy in Peoria, Illinois in 2009 (Corsaro & Brunson, 2013). Although the drug market program in Peoria was an attempt to structure, implement, maintain and evaluate a focused deterrence model almost identical to its
predecessor in High Point, results of the initiative were not the same. Corsaro and Brunson (2013) report that no significant crime reduction, property or violent, was statistically evident following their post-implementation evaluation. The authors, hoping to account for the differing results across venues, conducted a follow-up survey of residents, media outlets, and community social service providers in the targeted drug market areas.

Corsaro and Brunson (2013) found only 31% of all residents, media outlets, and community social service providers surveyed in overt drug market locations where drug market intervention had taken place were aware of its existence. This lack of community awareness is in stark contrast to that of the High Point model where, although no formalized survey was conducted, Kennedy and Wong (2009) reported a high degree of both community awareness and social service involvement throughout the life of the focused deterrence initiative. Corsaro and Brunson partially attribute the less effective crime reduction in Peoria to lack of community, media, and social service provider awareness and involvement. Other scholars have also argued that the awareness and involvement of all stakeholders is paramount to program success.

Rivers, Norris, and McGarrell (2012) evaluated the success of the High Point drug market intervention model in terms of certain stakeholder awareness, understanding, and involvement in the program. The stakeholders that Rivers et al. identified included members of the police department, members of the media, community members, and other social service employees. Through interviews with these stakeholders, the authors found that higher levels of awareness and understanding among interview participants was directly correlated with both areas that showed a significant reduction in crime as well as areas in which stakeholders were continuously involved in the drug market intervention operations (Rivers, Norris & McGarrell,
Corsaro and Brunson, and Rivers et al., show that the level of awareness, understanding and involvement are a determinate of the success of drug market initiatives.

The need for a quality educational component

The number of offenders that were selected and then targeted within the drug market intervention approach appeared to have an effect on program success, partially due to the need to providing services to a higher number of offenders. Kennedy and Wong (2009) found a statistically significant decrease in both drug and violent offenses within the four High Point, North Carolina neighborhoods where the drug market initiative was implemented within the first three years of the program. Although the generalized results of this study showed promise with regards to crime reduction in drug markets, Corsaro (2013) further analyzed program success independently across each of the four target neighborhoods. He found that although very positive results including crime reduction were seen in two of High Point drug market locations, crime reduction in the other two markets was not statistically significant (Corsaro, 2013).

One possible explanation for the mixed success among target locations is the number of offenders that were selected from each drug market and how educational resources were equally divided among physical locations, but due to the differing number of selected offenders receiving assistance in each of these locations the quality of the service for each offender was not equal. Corsaro (2013) states that the number of selected offenders for the West End (16) and Daniel Brooks (13) neighborhoods were significantly lower than the number of selected offenders from Southside (26) and East Central (28). The author also points out that statistically significant violent and drug crime reduction occurred in the West End and Daniel Brooks locations after starting the drug market intervention initiative, while no significant crime reduction was seen in
the Southside and East Central areas. Corsaro (2013) suggests that the two areas with the higher numbers of selected offenders, which had similar allocations of available educational resources as the other two neighborhoods with lower numbers of selected offenders, may not have had the same quality of educational assistance due to the increased number of program participants.

In a similar study conducted in Nashville, TN, several hardline approaches were previously attempted to reduce crime in a specific open-air drug market with minimal success (Corsaro & McGarrell, 2009). Many of these hardline approaches took a pro-arrest stance to drug related crimes in the target area and did not extend any sort of assistance to repeat offenders like most focused deterrence approaches do; more specifically, none of the early crime initiatives in Nashville included any educational component. Corsaro and McGarrell (2009) state that the first program that successfully reduced recidivism among repeat offenders was the drug market intervention initiative. Additionally, they attribute a great deal of the initiative’s success to the assistance program administrators provided to selected program participants including formal education. Other proactive policing initiatives that did not have any educational component were ineffective in reducing crime, yet the addition of educational assistance through the drug market intervention focused deterrence approach showed a significant reduction in participant recidivism.

In both the case of both High Point, NC and Nashville, TN the ability for the program to be effective was impacted, in part, by whether or not the initiative could implement a quality educational assistance. The presence or absence of educational component has also been determinant of success within other focused deterrence approaches as well, including law enforcement intervention (Felbab-Brown, 2013). Furthermore, the quality of this crucial
program characteristic can also effect the intervention strategies’ ability to accomplish fundamental initiative goals. Although the attributes of individual educational components may vary across programs and stylistic approaches, having quality educational assistance for selected offenders has historically lead positive program results regardless of which intervention approach is being implemented.

Conclusion

As praise for the High Point, NC drug market intervention model grew, so too did the number of drug market intervention approaches in other US cities. With sustained success in high point, and similar effective programs operating in other areas, then scholarly research base continued to strengthen which supported the existing statistically significant evidence that drug market strategy could effectively reduce drug-crime recidivism, but was overall inconsistent in controlling the rate of violent crime in target areas. Further analysis revealed that similar to the findings from many law enforcement intervention approaches, specific participant attributes and select program characteristics could be determinant of program success.

Despite relative similarities in success between law enforcement intervention and drug market intervention approaches, and despite the initial finding that certain participant attributes and program characteristics could impact the effectiveness of the program, it remained unclear if it was the individual stylistic approach that was leading to positive results or if it was the focused deterrence model itself that made the programs successful. Additionally, several program components and participant features had been identified as being integral to program success, but it was still uncertain how these qualities might translate to other focused deterrence initiatives. Many of the questions would be answered after a third category of initiatives, community
outreach intervention approaches, were implemented, study, evaluated, and subject to analysis as compared to the other two strategic approaches.
Community outreach intervention approach

Overview

Although some success continued within various approaches focused on a law enforcement intervention and a drug market intervention, it was still uncertain as to which program characteristics and participant attributes were best suited for other focused deterrence models. Similarly, the inconsistent effectiveness of each intervention approach raised questions as to whether these two models where the only two viable approaches that could be effective in accomplishing fundamental program goals. A third approach to focused deterrence soon emerged, community outreach intervention, which sought to reduced selected offender recidivism and make the community safer by providing increased participant assistance.

Similar to law enforcement intervention, community outreach approaches are often concentrated on reducing gun violence within the community by targeting selected offenders (Bonner, Worden, & McLean, 2008). Although both law enforcement intervention and community outreach intervention approaches have a similar focus in terms of violent gun crime reduction, how each model attempts to do this differs. While many law enforcement models immediately seek graduated penalties for those selected offenders who continue to commit crimes, community outreach programs tend to extend additional resources to selected program participants who are struggling within the program (McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple, & Bynum, 2010). This is not to say that graduated penalties are not pursued for any offenders within the model, but rather that increased penalties are normally only pursued after all outreach resources have been exhausted. This is also not to say that most law enforcement intervention and drug market intervention approaches do not use some degree of participant assistance, but rather that the focus of community outreach programs is more concentrated on providing the selected
offender helpful resources than it is on graduated punishment should the participant reoffend. These program distinctions, characterized by a more community-oriented and offender-assisted approach, is what sets community outreach intervention apart from law enforcement and drug market intervention approaches to focused deterrence.

*Focus*

As the focus of community outreach intervention is centered on a reduction in violent gun crime, offenders are routinely selected based upon their previous involvement violent crime. Furthermore, Bonner, Worden, and McLean (2008) state that empirical research has consistently shown that a large number of violent crimes are perpetrated by the same small sub-group of offenders within a given location. With this in mind, community outreach programs have often chosen program participants by selecting offenders who have been previously convicted of one or more violent crimes in a specific geographic area with the hope that targeted selection, monitoring, assistance, and enforcement of a small repeat violent offender sub-group will reduce violent crime within the community (Weisburd & Eck, 2004).

Similar to the concentrated scope of law enforcement intervention approaches, community outreach intervention models are focused on reducing violent gun crime in target locations. Although a concentration on violent crime within community outreach initiatives does not separate it from law enforcement approaches in terms of program focus, it does highlight a fundamental difference between community outreach models and drug market intervention models. Since the focus of most community outreach interventions is on providing selected offenders with the necessary resources to become law abiding, the use of community partnership, access to social services, access to educational resources, and constant communication among
stakeholders are of the utmost importance (Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2007). There are a number of focused deterrence programs that have adopted a community outreach intervention approach, the most notable of which was Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, IL.

*Project Safe Neighborhoods*

One of the most prominent community outreach intervention initiatives was Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods. This focused deterrence program differs fundamentally from other models as it was organized and funded and implemented by the federal government and implemented on a local level within cities, and more specifically neighborhoods, with high rates of violent gun crimes (Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane, & Ransford, 2013). Although law enforcement intervention approaches, such as Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, and drug market intervention approaches, such as the High Point, NC initiative, relied on interdepartmental collaboration between local and federal agencies, most non-community outreach models have typically begun at the local level and existing resources were later accentuated with additional federal resources and funding. Bynum et al. (2013) state in the case of Project Safe Neighborhoods, the formation and proposed structure of the program was quite opposite with the federal agency initially funding and forming the program and then later assisting with the implementation of the program at the municipal level. Furthermore, after this initiative’s foundation had been established by the federal government it was implemented and maintained through the collaborative efforts of municipal police departments, local stakeholders, regional prosecutors’ offices, and other community resources.

The origins of Project Safe Neighborhoods can be traced back to 2001 when the US Department of Justice and the newly formed Project Safe Neighborhoods Task Force sought to
reduce gun violence in target locations throughout Chicago (McDevitt, Decker, Hipple, McGarrell, Klofas, & Bynum, 2006). Members of this task force partnered directly with local law enforcement and other community-based resources to implement a focused deterrence framework that was concentrated on violent gun crime reduction through a community outreach intervention approach. Program participants were notified of their selection into the Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative and were provided various resources including educational opportunities, employment opportunities, job training, child care, legal assistance, and other social services (McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple, & Bynum, 2010). While talking part in the program, selected offenders were closely monitored by local and federal law enforcement and participants who were struggling to adapt to a law-abiding life were provided additional social services to change their behavior; those who continued to struggle within the program parameters or who committed serious violent offenses (such as homicide or attempted homicide) after selection where prosecuted using graduated penalties (Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2007). The precept of the community outreach approach was that selected program participants would be given all the resources needed to be successful and that arrest, and graduated penalties, were only to be used as a last resort for selected offenders who were repeatedly unable to adhere to the programs guidelines.

*Results from Project Safe Neighborhoods*

Results on the effectiveness in Project Safe Neighborhoods in various locations throughout the US were mixed. Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007) report that Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhood saw a 35% decrease in homicide rates between 1999 and 2004 in areas where the initiative was employed; other areas where the program was not used saw only a
slight reduction in homicide rates over the same period of time. Although some scholars have cited specific homicide reduction with the use of Project Safe Neighborhoods initiatives, more general and global evaluations of the program’s effect on violent crime may tell a different story.

McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple, and Bynum (2010) found only a modest decrease in violent gun crimes in areas where Project Safe Neighborhoods was implemented; adding that overall violent crime rates in control cities also fell during the same period of time. Varied success across locations and overall reduction in violent crime in areas where Project Safe Neighborhoods was not used indicates there may be a different explanation for the reduction of violent gun crime that was not associated with the initiative. Additionally, McGarrell et al. (2010) suggest that since Project Safe Neighborhoods was a federal initiative that was implemented at a local level, individual differences among local program characteristics, selected participants, involved stakeholders, intra-agency communication and variation across physical locations all may have significantly affected program success. In addition to overall deficiencies that arose from differences in individual programs, and as seen in both law enforcement intervention and drug market intervention approaches, specific participant attributes and program components appeared to impact the effectiveness of many community outreach initiatives like Project Safe Neighborhoods.

Age

Both law enforcement intervention and drug market intervention approaches have acknowledged participant age as a factor in both initial selection criterion and as a possible determinant to overall program success. Similar to both the law enforcement and drug market intervention approaches, selected participants for community outreach models tended to be more
youthful with most being 30 years old or younger (McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple, & Bynum, 2010). However, unlike the other two stylistic approaches to focused deterrence, community outreach intervention strategies did not routinely list age as an independent variable for participant selection (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). One reason age may not have been used as an officially listed selection characteristic is because many community outreach approaches, such as Project Safe Neighborhoods, were designed and organized at the federal level, but were then implemented in local jurisdictions. Despite participant age not being listed as a predetermined characteristic for program selection, the question remained as to whether or not participant age had an effect on program success.

Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane and Ransford (2013) state that the selection guidelines formed at the federal level for Project Safe Neighborhoods did not use age as a variable; furthermore, a great deal of discretion was left to individual municipalities to create a participant selection process independently which was still in conformity with the basic concepts of the federal community outreach program. With the extreme variability in which offenders were being selected for each community outreach approach at the local level, it became difficult to discern whether participant age was a determinant factor in program success (McDevitt, Decker, Hipple, McGarrell, Klofas, & Bynum, 2006). In addition to inconsistencies in the selection process among similar community outreach programs, the lack of conclusive evidence that the strategy could be effective in reducing violent crime (McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple & Bynum, 2010) also proved to be a challenge in finding a nexus between age and program success. Due to dissimilarities in selection criterion across programs and inconclusive results among initiatives, the evaluation of participant age and how it may have influenced success within the community outreach intervention approach was also inconclusive.
Gangs

Just as age was not used as a specific criterion for selection in most community outreach intervention programs, gang affiliation was not expressly listed as a preferred characteristic for selection either. Although gang affiliation was not originally established as a criterion for program participation, many local agencies implementing Project Safe Neighborhoods and other community outreach initiatives soon found that a high percentage of the violent crime being committed in target neighborhoods was being committed by the same set of gang involved offenders (McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple, & Bynum, 2010). This revelation led many initiatives to select offenders for their program based upon their involvement or affiliation with local gangs with the hope that a concentration on gang affiliated violence and recidivism would lead to an overall reduction of violence crimes in the target area.

The shift to a concentration on gang affiliated offenders within the community outreach intervention approach mirrored the shift seen in many law enforcement intervention approaches that were also focused on reducing violent crime in target areas (Bonner, Worden and McLean, 2008). This, of course, differs fundamentally from selected participant attributes within the drug market intervention model which was more heavily concentrated on offenders involved in the open-air drug market as opposed to being gang affiliated; however, it is pertinent to acknowledge that there is undoubtedly a number of selected offenders who are both involved in the open-air drug market and are also gang affiliated. Despite this fact, the important distinction between the different focused deterrence approaches is that most law enforcement intervention and community outreach intervention strategies tended to select and target gang affiliated offenders
while most drug market intervention strategies tended to select and target offenders involved in the open-air drug trade.

In addition to similarities in the selection of gang affiliated offenders among both law enforcement intervention and community outreach intervention approaches, the resultant effect on violent crime reduction also proved to be similar among stylistics approaches. As previously discussed, homicide and violent crime were reduced significantly in many areas where a law enforcement intervention approach was used (Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane & Ransford, 2013). Similarly, Papachristos, Wallace, Meares and Fagan (2013) found that overall homicide and violent crime rates were significantly reduced, with homicide falling nearly 37%, over their one year evaluation period in a target area of Chicago where Project Safe Neighborhoods was being employed. During this same evaluative time period, there was only a slight, much less pronounced reduction in homicide and violent crime city-wide in areas where the initiative was not implemented. Furthermore, Papachristos et al. state that the reduction in violent crime appeared to drop at a significantly higher rate as the program matured as compared to when the initiative was in its infancy. The authors attribute some of this increased crime reduction to the incorporation of specific offender attributes as a screening tool during participant selection, including the characteristics of gang affiliation.

Just as many law enforcement intervention strategies had found gang affiliation to be determinate of program effectiveness, community outreach intervention approaches were also finding this same select participant attribute to be influential with regards to program success. Within the community outreach intervention model, selection criteria and program attributes continued to be evaluated as initiatives operated in various cities around the US. As selection
criteria progressed to include participants who were gang affiliated, program success and a reduction in violent crime also increased. Papachristos, Wallace, Meares and Fagan (2013) report that the most drastic change in program efficiency and reduction of violent crime in target areas occurred when gang affiliation began to be used as a criterion for participant selection. The connection between gang affiliation and violent crime had been previously acknowledged, but Papachristos et al. were able to show through evaluative research that community outreach intervention approaches can reduce violent crime if gang affiliation is used as a selection criteria.

Community awareness and support

The failure of some community outreach intervention approaches, and specifically some Project Safe Neighborhood initiatives, led scholars to evaluate these less successful programs in order to find which program components may differ and therefore may be accounting for mixed results across each of these community outreach intervention approaches. McDevitt, Decker, Hipple, McGarrell, Klofas, and Bynum (2006) found that the Project Safe Neighborhood programs that included higher degrees of community outreach, awareness and support tended to be more effective than programs which had lesser community collaboration. McDevitt et al. directly associate community awareness and support with financial support, a community emphasis on resource allocation to the program, an increase in available intervention options (educational opportunities, employment, child care, etc.), and outward community support of graduated penalties for those program participants that continue to reoffend; all of which were determinant of participant and program success. They further found that community outreach intervention initiatives that effectively engaged in community outreach and awareness were more
likely to receive the moral and financial support necessary to help the programs and participants succeed.

Just as community awareness and support tended to influence program effectiveness in the drug market intervention model, this same program characteristic appeared to be determinate of success in the community outreach intervention approach. In a similar way, the importance of continuous stakeholder involvement was apparent when many law enforcement intervention approaches were evaluated. McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple and Bynum (2010) state that the effectiveness of the focused deterrence model as compared to other crime prevention models was partially attributed to the community collaboration and continuous stakeholder involvement that were at the foundation of the crime prevention strategy; furthermore, they state that many of the less successful crime prevention models have been less effective, in part, due to lack of community and stakeholder support. The presence and strength of community and stakeholder outreach, awareness, and support within the focused deterrence model, including within the community outreach intervention approach, appeared to have a direct influence on program success.

The need for a quality educational component

Both law enforcement intervention and drug market intervention approaches have been associated with a high measure of success when a quality educational component was used to assist select program participants. Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007) found the same to be true within the community outreach intervention approach finding that specific community outreach initiatives that incorporated a quality educational component were more effective than programs that did not. Papachristos et al. also note that although the mere presence of an
educational component may increase the chances of program effectiveness, the quality of the educational component including the time, effort, financial support, and stakeholder support that this program characteristics receives is also determinate of overall success. The quantitative and qualitative importance of educational assistance within community outreach approach is evident by its influence on program effectiveness.

Similarly, Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane and Ransford (2013) also identified training and education to be “core component” of the community outreach intervention approach in their study of Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago. Bynum et al. continue that the use of strong core program components, such as education and training, used to organize and implement Project Safe Neighborhood in Chicago allowed this initiative to be successful as compared to areas where other less effective crime prevention techniques were being utilized. At the conclusion of their study, they found violent crime had fallen nearly 20% in areas where Project Safe Neighborhoods was being used compared to only a slight decrease in these same violent offenses in comparable areas where community outreach intervention approaches and educational components were not being used. This statistically significant decrease in violent crime further suggests that the incorporation of a quality educational component into the focused deterrence model can be determinant of program success.

Conclusion

Following the evaluation of several community outreach intervention initiatives, it was evident that many of the program components and participant attributes that were successful in reducing violent crime and recidivism in law enforcement intervention and drug market intervention approaches were also effective in accomplishing these same fundamental goals.
using a community outreach intervention strategy. Additionally, it became clear that the quality of each influential program characteristic was also determinate of program success. Lastly, the higher the number of quality program components that were combined within each stylistic approach appeared to directly influence how effective each specific program would be. Existing scholarly research clearly showed which program characteristics and participant attributes were indicative of a successful focused deterrence program, yet continually absent was a comprehensive look at how these components and attributes could be compared and contrasted across stylistic approaches and then generalized to form the ideal focused deterrence program.
Section 3: Analysis

A review of extant literature on the focused deterrence model has been presented in terms of three general categories: a law enforcement approach, a drug market intervention approach, and a community outreach approach. Although not all focused deterrence programs fit into these categories, most do. Many similarities exist between each of these intervention approaches, yet specific program characteristics and criteria for participant selection vary. Each of the three intervention approaches has been shown to be inconsistently effective in reducing participant recidivism and increasing community safety. Furthermore, some program components have been shown to be more effective than others. With the underlying goals of the focused deterrence model in mind, an evaluative review was undertaken so that a recommendation could be made as to what an ideal program should look like.

A comprehensive review of 32 existing studies on focused deterrence models has been presented. Both program components and participant attributes have been identified and the information was synthesized to see which program characteristics and which participant attributes have been found to be very effective, somewhat effective, or not effective in achieving the fundamental program goals of reduced participant recidivism and increased community safety. In order to extensively evaluate the literature that was reviewed, a meta-analysis was conducted. Meta-analyses routinely use numerous conceptually similar studies to find commonalities among the existing research base and to account for individual error among independent studies (American Psychological Association, 2001). In the case of the law enforcement, drug market, and community outreach intervention approaches, commonalities among effective and ineffective program components and participant attributes were identified.
through the meta-analysis to provide an empirical basis for the most successful focused deterrence models.

An evaluation of the law enforcement intervention approach model found there are five characteristics which are common to most programs and which appear to be determinate of initiative effectiveness. First, the age of selected program participants was predictive of program success. Youthful offenders tended to have lower rates of recidivism than older offenders who were selected for the same program. Second, the majority of the participants were gang affiliated offenders; gang affiliation was also determinant of participant success within the law enforcement intervention model. In addition to these two participant attributes that were used during the selection process, there were also three program components that consistently influenced the effectiveness of the initiative for this approach.

First, most law enforcement intervention approaches focused specifically on gun violence. Programs that concentrated on these specific offenses, within this model, were shown to be successful in reducing gun-related crimes. Next, continuous stakeholder involvement throughout the initiative was determinant of initial and continued program success; programs that had a high degree of stakeholder involvement were more successful than programs with a lower degree of stakeholder involvement. Lastly, the presence of a quality educational component was closely associated with program effectiveness within the law enforcement intervention approach.

Similar to the evaluation of law enforcement intervention programs, a review of existing drug market intervention approaches revealed five participant attributes and program components that are common to most drug-based initiatives. Once again, the age of the participant was influential and youthful offenders tended to be more successful than participants
who were older. Additionally, the gang affiliation of selected offenders was determinant of participant success and contributed to the overall effectiveness of the program. These influential participant attributes were common across both law enforcement intervention and drug market intervention approaches, yet many of the influential program characteristics varied slightly across intervention approaches.

First, the drug market intervention approach focused specifically on the open-air drug market in target areas. Furthermore, it was only inconsistently shown to be successful in reducing recidivism among selected offenders and reducing overall drug offenses; this was dissimilar from the evaluation of the law enforcement intervention model in terms of both intervention focus and overall results. Despite the inconsistent drug market intervention results, program success was still dependent upon the presence of an educational component. Additionally, similar to the need for continuous stakeholder involvement, drug market intervention approaches that had a high degree of community awareness and support for the program were more successful than programs that had a lesser degree of community awareness and support.

Analysis of the third focused deterrence approach, community outreach intervention, found many of the same attributes and characteristics influenced program success. Like each of the other two intervention strategies, participant age was significant factor in both participant and program success with younger offenders faring far better than older offenders. Once more, gang affiliation also influenced program success, the same effect observed in both law enforcement intervention and drug market intervention approaches. Participant age and gang affiliation were very closely associated with program success within all three stylistic approaches and evaluation
of effective community outreach intervention program components also showed similar congruencies.

Community outreach intervention approaches, which focused on reducing violent crime, did see a significant reduction in violent offenses within the target areas after implementation of the program. A concentration on violent crime within this intervention strategy proved to be effective in reducing violent crime rates during initiatives when the program focused on that specific disorder. This was similar to the effect seen in both the law enforcement intervention and drug market intervention approaches which were, to varying degree, successful in reducing the specific crimes they were targeting. Also, similar to other intervention approaches, community outreach programs characterized by increased community awareness and support were more successful than similar programs that did not receive the same amount of community support. Lastly, incorporation of an educational component was determinate of program success within the community outreach framework, which was comparable to results from other strategic intervention approaches that found a close association between an educational component and overall program success.

A comparison of all three intervention approaches revealed common participant attributes and program components across initiatives. Although the focus of each initiative differed, the specific concentration of each approach whether it was violent gun crime, open-air drug market, or violent crime appeared to have an effect on reducing that specific disorder, to varying degrees. Independently, each focused deterrence approach found the participant attributes of age and gang affiliation to be determinant of program and participant success. Similarly, each intervention approach found stakeholder involvement or community awareness and support to influence
program effectiveness as well. Lastly, the use of an educational component greatly increased the likelihood of program effectiveness compared to programs that did not have an educational component. Although the mere presence of each of these participant attributes and program components was determinate of program success individually, both the quality and quantity of these characteristics also appeared to influence the ability for each initiative to be effective.

Regardless of which of the three intervention approaches was used, initiatives with quality program components were more effective than initiatives that either had components that were lacking or components that could not be funded and maintained throughout the life of the program. In addition to the quality of each component, programs that successfully incorporated multiple quality components and participant attributes simultaneously were shown to be more effective than programs that only had one influential attribute or quality program component. Programs that had the highest degree of success were routinely characterized as having both quality program components and participant attributes, as well as a greater number of each of these individual components and attributes. The quality and quantity of these influential factors was determinate of program effectiveness as well as program sustainability.

A meta-analysis has revealed that some program components are more effective than others and that specific participant attributes also tend to determine program success. In addition to the need for quality program characteristics and participant attributes, this analysis also supported the notion that using multiple quality program components simultaneously can make one initiative more success than another. These principles discovered through a meta-analysis have formed a basis for what an ideal focused deterrence model may look like. Using characteristics from initiatives presented in the literature review and accentuating with most
effective program components identified in the meta-analysis I have constructed a focused deterrence model that will optimize participant success and increase community safety. This ideal focused deterrence program recommendation, as well as conclusions that are based upon my examination of the extent literature on this topic, will be discussed in the next section.
Section 4: Recommendations and Conclusions

Based upon a review of the existing literature on various focused deterrence programs, and coupled with a meta-analysis of this existing research that has identified which participant attributes and program components are most successful, an ideal focused deterrence program should be formed and implemented in accordance with what has already been shown to work. The first factor to consider when designing a program is which intervention approach will be used. In order to do this, a decision must be made regarding which specific disorder the initiative will address; violent gun crime, open-air drug markets, or violent crime in general. Given the successful results seen in Boston, and in other similar programs implemented throughout the country, a narrow focus on preventing violent crime perpetrated through the use of a firearm should be the focus. Although other approaches may also be effective in reducing crime and recidivism, a properly designed, implemented and maintained law enforcement intervention approach would likely provide the best opportunity for both violent crime reduction and individual participant success.

Within this law enforcement intervention strategy, individual offender attributes must be considered during participant selection. Although this could include a number of different individual characteristics, it is imperative that participant age and gang affiliation be considered based upon their influence on participant and program success. Ideal candidates would be both youthful, between the ages of 14 and 24, and be affiliated with a gang. As previously discussed, not all offenders who are affiliated with a gang are also gang members, but association with a gang as a selection criteria has been shown to directly influence program effectiveness. Once the
ideal group of program participants have been selected, it is important that the most effective program characteristics are also being implemented and maintained.

Each of the three intervention approaches found either stakeholder involvement or community awareness and support to be determinate of program success. An ideal focused deterrence initiative would also use this fundamental component and would ensure that community outreach, community awareness, and community and stakeholder involvement is maintained as the program matures. The failure of many focused deterrence initiatives occurred when community and stakeholder involvement deteriorated and therefore continuously sustaining this community engagement is of the utmost importance. In addition to using stakeholder and community involvement to increase the chances of success, an ideal program would also incorporate a quality educational component.

Another commonality among all three stylistic approaches was the need for educational component; furthermore, the quality of the educational opportunities available to program participants also impacted the successfulness of the initiative. An ideal focused deterrence program would use a high degree of participant engagement in these educational opportunities including formal education, skills training, job shadowing, parenting classes and other associated measures. Each of these educational opportunities would be characterized by both an increased number of available classes and ensuring that each of these opportunities is of the highest quality. Each of the individual participant attributes and program components are important to the program, yet the quality of each component and the fact that they are being incorporated simultaneously is equally as important.
A discussion of an ideal focused deterrence program would be remiss without acknowledging the need for further program evaluation. Just as synthesizing the existing scholarly research has led to recommendations for which participant attributes and program characteristics are best suited for the focused deterrence model, an evaluation of an ideal program, after it has been implemented, may lead to further insight into which factors are most effective in reducing recidivism and associated crime. This evaluation should include continued scholarly research into programs no longer in existence, programs that are still operational, and proposed programs. A comprehensive evaluation of all programs, as well as their program participants and components, will provide the clearest picture as to which specific factors influence program success. Although this research paper has identified a number of characteristics which impact program success, continued research will strengthen the evidence base of what works within the focused deterrence framework.
Section 5: References


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