A Critical Analysis and Study of Fusion Center Integration and Utilization In
Contemporary Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Operations

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“A journey is a person in itself; no two are alike. And all plans, safeguards, policing, and coercion are fruitless. We find that after years of struggle that we do not take a trip; a trip takes us.”

- John Steinbeck

That quote by Steinbeck is so short yet says so very much about how this journey has been for me. Although it has taken longer to complete than I had originally expected, that does not diminish the profound sense of fulfillment and satisfaction I feel for the many successes along the way. Having said that, there are several individuals whom I owe a debt of gratitude and thanks to for without their encouragement, guidance, and support, I am not certain that I could have completed the journey.

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Abstract

A Critical Analysis and Study of Fusion Center Integration and Utilization In Contemporary Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Operations

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Under the supervision of Dr. Susan Hilal

Statement of Problem

The tragedies of 9/11 exposed serious procedural and structural deficiencies with regard to the intelligence process and the information sharing architecture in place between the many thousands of jurisdictions across the country on the federal, state, and local levels. This disjointed and inadequate coordination of intelligence was a result of various factors, including operation centers working in silos, focusing only on their own efforts and resources (Rollins & Connors, 2007). The obvious shortcoming of such an operations methodology, however, is that there were too many participants working in isolation. As such, fusion centers were created with the intention of mitigating that problem through active collaboration, communication, and partnership.

Research Methods

This paper utilizes an assortment of data and information from a variety of secondary sources to include open-source government reports and public websites, peer-reviewed journals and other publications, major newspapers, academic databases, and non-government as well as public advocacy organizations. Through a review of applicable and relevant literature and materials, fusion center operations will be examined in a comprehensive manner that outlines their evolution and associated operations concerns and issues. Furthermore, operational considerations will be examined in
relation to four prominent theories of organizational effectiveness. Lastly, various recommendations will be examined and tendered for improving the effectiveness and performance of fusion centers with regard to homeland security and law enforcement operations.

**Summary of Results**

Congressional investigation and reporting, as well as evaluation research conducted by the GAO, suggest that although fusion centers are making measurable progress in improving their accountability, outputs, and performance, they have not yet reached their zenith in terms of broader integration, maximization, and overall organizational effectiveness. To assist policymakers and fusion center leaders in their efforts to attain greater organizational effectiveness, several recommendations are offered with regard to the individuals within the organization, the groups they comprise and form, and the broader organization as a whole.

The core strength of any successful organization is its personnel and staff. Fusion center leaders must be proactive and visionary with regard to training and the establishment of professional benchmarks and milestones. Members of the organization must have the encouragement, knowledge, and resources to succeed. Second, fusion centers, as complex organizations, require the clear identification of stakeholders, their interests, and the role(s) of partner organizations. Clear coordination will enable the process for a more cohesive, efficient, functional, and productive organization. Lastly, there must be clear definition in the federal-state relationship as it relates to fusion centers. The importance of clearly articulated and defined mission objectives and parameters for an effective and integrated fusion center schema cannot be overstated.
Table of Contents

TITLE PAGE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii

ABSTRACT iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS v

SECTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION 1
   A. Significance of the Research 1
   B. Purpose of the Research 2
   C. Research Methodology 3
   D. Limitations of the Research 4

II. LITERATURE REVIEW 5
   A. Introduction 5
   B. Evolution of the Fusion Center Concept and Model 6
      I. Pre-9/11 6
      II. Post-9/11 9
   C. Intelligence-Led Policing Philosophy and Fusion Centers 11
   D. Intelligence-Led Policing Practice and Fusion Centers 12
   E. Federal Role in Fusion Center Activities and Operations 14
   F. State and Local Fusion Center Expansion and Growth 16
      I. Texas 17
      II. Tennessee 18
      III. Wisconsin 19
G. Arguments and Claims of Effectiveness and Non-Effectiveness

I. United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Report

A. Lack of Basic Counterterrorism Capabilities

B. Lack of Fusion Center Performance Assessments

C. Recognition of Non-Existent Fusion Centers by DHS

D. Lack of Urgency in Prioritizing Counterterrorism Efforts

E. DHS “Success Stories” and Fusion Center Value

II. United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Report

III. United States Government Accountability Office Report on Fusion Centers

IV. Additional Observations Regarding Effectiveness and Non-Effectiveness

III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

A. The Goal Model

B. The Strategic-Constituency Model

C. The Process Model

D. The System-Resource Model
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED FUSION CENTER

EFFECTIVENESS AND CONCLUSION 44

A. Fusion Center Personnel and Staffing 45

B. Group-level Leadership and Management Recommendations 47

C. Organization-level Leadership and Management Recommendations 48

D. Conclusion 50

V. REFERENCES 53

APPENDIX Listing of Current DHS Primary and Recognized Fusion Centers 60
Section I: Introduction

Significance of the Research

The tragedies of 9/11 exposed serious procedural and structural deficiencies with regard to the intelligence process and the information sharing architecture in place between the many thousands of jurisdictions across the country on the federal, state, and local levels. This disjointed and inadequate coordination of intelligence was a result of various factors, including operation centers working in silos, focusing only on their own efforts and resources (Rollins & Connors, 2007). The obvious shortcoming of such an operations methodology, however, is that there were too many participants working in isolation. As such, fusion centers were created with the intention of mitigating that problem through active collaboration, communication, and partnership.

The concept of the fusion center has its basis in the larger paradigm of Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP). Whereas Community-Oriented Policing (COP) focuses on the role of community interaction and involvement in law enforcement, ILP focuses on the production and utilization of intelligence within the larger law enforcement leadership and management schema (Bureau of Justice Assistance [BJA], 2005). The fusion center, as a physical manifestation of that increased emphasis on collaboration and consolidation, eventually gained prominence and stature as the location where renewed focus on actionable intelligence and processed data occurs. From a control standpoint, fusion centers are owned and operated at the state and local levels. With that said however, the federal government, largely through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), yields considerable influence through direct material and personnel support, exercise support, training opportunities and resources, technical assistance, access to
federal infrastructure and systems, and the coordination necessary for the security clearance process (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2012). For that reason, the federal government has a demonstrated vested interest in how limited tax dollars and resources are being allocated and spent.

In 2012, the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs issued a highly critical report of fusion center activities and overall efficacy while also calling out an apparent lack of appropriate administrative oversight from DHS with regard to the allocation and use of financial resources (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). In addition, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2014) has noted in reporting to Congress that since 2004, various documentation and guidance outlining federal expectations and role delineation has been provided to operators of fusion centers on the state and local levels. In an attempt to better assess and measure contributions from fusion centers, DHS has put forth more than 40 measures and metrics to evaluate performance. In an effort to expand their focus beyond terrorism, state-level fusion centers have broadened their charter to include other crimes in addition to terrorism. For example, the Tennessee Fusion Center of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (2015) “…uses intelligence information with an ‘all crimes’ approach…and identifies emerging crime trends and gives assistance to law enforcement in criminal investigations” (p.1).

**Purpose of the Research**

The primary purpose of this research is to examine fusion center operations to explore whether optimal integration and maximization of their analytic and problem
solving capabilities are being achieved within the broader law enforcement architecture of the United States and if not, what factors may be responsible. Although some have embraced the expansion of the fusion center’s mission beyond terrorism, others have viewed that expansion of mission and associated power with reservation and wariness (German & Stanley, 2007). This research project will demonstrate that with appropriate leadership and performance metrics, ‘mission creep’ need not be a threat and could, in actuality, be an asset for the law enforcement community. A secondary purpose of this research is to provide readers with a comprehensive overview of not only fusion centers but also the intelligence process as a whole as it has evolved over time.

As technology evolves, it is reasonable to conclude that so too does the complexity of crime as the two are not mutually exclusive. Fusion centers offer a venue for the law enforcement community to collaborate, in a coordinated manner, on challenges and issues that often require complex and multifaceted analyses as well as problem solving skills and techniques. Although a considerable degree of criticism has been levied against fusion centers and their purported ineffectiveness, states nonetheless continue to allocate resources for their operation, suggesting to some degree an approval of their overall performance (Heaton, 2014).

Research Methodology

Data and information for this research project comes from the review of a variety of secondary sources. Federal involvement in fusion center activities is examined through a review of open-source, public domain materials from Congress, DHS, the GAO, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). State-level fusion center activities are examined through a review of public domain
materials from state government websites, reporting from professional journals or publications, major newspapers, and academic database sources such as LexisNexis. In addition, organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) are examined for appropriate and relevant data and information specific to the state and federal levels. Conceptual and more generalized research about the history of and relevant theory associated with fusion centers are presented from appropriate peer-reviewed academic and other scholarly literature.

**Limitations of the Research**

Carter and Carter (2009) note that because of the considerable diversity of needs and related environmental considerations that exert influence and weight on fusion center processes, products, and structure, there is no singular, across-the-board model of fusion center operations. For that reason, the applicability and relevance of the recommendations in this paper may vary considerably by individual fusion center. With that said, those local and/or regional considerations and needs must be viewed from a totality of circumstances perspective for the attainment of optimal integration and organizational effectiveness.
Section II: Review of the Literature

Introduction

This literature review provides an overview of what is intelligence, the evolution of fusion centers pre and post-9/11, the justifications for and the roots of ILP, the growth of fusion centers within the ILP paradigm, the role of the federal government in fusion center activities, and concludes with an examination of state and local fusion center expansion and growth as well as fusion center organizational effectiveness.

Intelligence and the Intelligence Cycle

In a broad, generalized sense, intelligence can be thought of as knowledge with assigned and identifiable utility and value of some sort. Relative to law enforcement, the FBI defines intelligence as “…information that has been analyzed and refined so that it is useful to policy makers in making decisions - specifically, decisions about potential threats to our national security” (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2012, p.1). There are important distinctions within that broad concept of intelligence that must be noted, including classification. Strategic intelligence is one type that tends to be broader in scope with a focus on the wider picture and issues such as planning and staffing. Tactical intelligence is another that focuses more narrowly on contributions to specific cases and investigations (BJA, 2005). Furthermore, intelligence can be categorized as either evidential or operational in nature. As the nomenclature suggests, evidential intelligence is comprised of information that may be instrumental and relevant in revealing the location of evidence whereas operational intelligence is information intended to provide investigatory support in cases that are long-term in nature and
systematically complex due to the presence of multiple considerations and issues (Taylor & Davis, 2010).

The methodical and systematic process that is ultimately responsible for the generation of those various types of intelligence products is known as the intelligence cycle. Within the broader contexts of law enforcement and ILP, the intelligence cycle encompasses the steps of planning, collection, analysis, dissemination, and reevaluation (Gaines & Kappeler, 2008). Similarly, the FBI (2015) identifies six steps, built around the central pillar of active collaboration, in the intelligence cycle: requirements, planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination. What is important to note and underscore here is that although the investigative and mission priorities of state and local fusion centers will differ from those of the FBI, those various steps of the intelligence cycle are nonetheless applicable across the board with regard to logic and utility.

**Evolution of the Fusion Center Concept and Model**

In order to better appreciate and understand the myriad operational complexities and workings of fusion centers, it is necessary to first review their history and the various influences and forces that have come to define their mission and purpose. To accomplish that, this discussion will focus on their history prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as well as afterwards given the profound impact those tragic events had on homeland security and law enforcement across the country.

**Pre-9/11**

Prior to 9/11, intelligence efforts and operations in the law enforcement community were much more spread out and both geographically and operationally
diverse. Rollins and Connors (2007) highlight that reality by noting that state leaders generally received information from multiple operations centers and facilities tasked with their own respective problem(s) for the direction and focus of their analytic capabilities and resources. With that said, those myriad operations centers generally provided various forms of support to other entities within state government (Rollins & Connors, 2007). The broad and loosely coordinated nature of those numerous efforts created significant operational challenges and complexities with regard to collaboration and cooperation for those participant organizations. Although 9/11 arguably hastened the development and growth of fusion centers, other considerations and factors had already set those changes into motion (Rollins, 2008).

More specifically, the increasing role of ILP in law enforcement, the belief that the HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area) Center organizational structure favorably enhanced cooperation, and increasing agreement among governments regarding the necessity of individual state fusion centers factored heavily into fusion center development and growth. Furthermore, overall support for homeland security and the President provided the impetus to actuate and set forth changes in how information, specifically intelligence, is addressed and handled (Rollins, 2008). Taylor and Davis (2010) note, for example, that the goal of HIDTA task forces was to facilitate and strengthen cooperation and the sharing of intelligence information between the local, state, and federal jurisdictions. With that said, the war against drugs proved to be instrumental in establishing some of the operations and systemic framework with regard to both intelligence culture and institutions prior to 9/11.
Carter and Carter (2009) note that prior to 9/11, what has come to embody the fusion center today was then referred to and thought of as a regional intelligence center lacking definitive structural form as well as clear guidance and objectives regarding mission and organization. From an evolutionary standpoint, those regional intelligence centers developed largely as a consequence of local initiatives created in response to identified problems specific to crime, the flow of drugs, and terrorist related activity (Carter & Carter, 2009). Taylor and Davis (2010) note that a key product of significant 1980s intelligence reforms was the Regional Information Sharing System, or RISS. More specifically, RISS was comprised of particular regional fusion centers with the dedicated mission of providing assistance to local and state agencies in matters pertaining to crime analysis and intelligence (Taylor & Davis, 2010). Along those lines, in the 1990s, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) implemented a number of new initiatives in response to increasing problems with gun violence. Specifically, the bureau established regional Crime Gun Centers that, at times, were co-located with HIDTA operation centers and worked in conjunction with HIDTA personnel to identify individuals trafficking drugs and the point(s) of origin of the guns and weapons they were using (Carter & Carter, 2009). Consequently, those bureau intelligence centers, as well as HIDTA intelligence centers, had considerable communication and interaction with a multitude of local, state, and tribal jurisdictions and that allowed for the integration of information across jurisdictional lines to better understand and provide further prevention efforts to crime problems that were increasingly complex and multijurisdictional in nature (Carter & Carter, 2009). With that said however, the enormity and magnitude of the events of 9/11 challenged that infrastructure in numerous ways.
Post-9/11

Unquestionably, the tragic events of 9/11 resulted in a massive reassessment of the nation’s intelligence infrastructure in the weeks and months that followed. The United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2012) noted in a majority and minority staff report that “a failure among government officials to share timely, relevant information on terrorist threats was widely credited with contributing to the broader failure to protect the United States from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by al Qaeda” (p.5). Carter and Carter (2009) note that the demonstrated successes of pre-9/11 regional intelligence centers had the effect of encouraging state and local entities to consider that operations model as they struggled with the complexities of information sharing in the execution of a counterintelligence mission. The new realities of the terrorism related threat environment made it imperative that the federal government partner with officials in homeland security and law enforcement across the state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) jurisdictional spectrum (Johnson, 2011). As such, given the demonstrated value of such initiatives and partnerships, the federal government provided increasing levels of funding support (Carter & Carter, 2009).

With that said, the fusion center management and operations model in the United States has its beginnings in New York City. The Real Time Crime Center (RTCC), developed under the leadership of Raymond Kelly, was built at a cost exceeding $11 million and leveraged the strengths of contemporary and sophisticated information technologies in executing the mission of terrorism prevention and the reduction of criminal activity (Taylor & Davis, 2010). Rollins and Connors (2007) note that the sheer
magnitude of what transpired on 9/11 resulted in a comprehensive and thorough
examination of information flow in a largely decentralized law enforcement network
comprised of many thousands of participants and stakeholders from all parts of the
country.

Recognizing the urgent need for better coordination and information flow,
Congress established, through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). As noted earlier, the federal government provided increasing
support to state and local governments for fusion center activities and DHS played a
major role in facilitating that relationship. More specifically, DHS provides a wide range
of resources to those many state and local organizations in the form of personnel,
exercise support, technical assistance, training opportunities, access to federal
infrastructure and systems, and essential coordination of the process for obtaining the
requisite security clearances (DHS, 2012). With that said, the implementation of the
fusion center in New York City, coupled with the creation of DHS as a Cabinet level
authority and entity, put in place the necessary impetus, initiative, and resources to
accelerate and expand fusion center growth and operations.

To put that growth following 9/11 into perspective, DHS (2015) notes that at the
present time, there are 78 fusion centers in operation across the United States, including
primary and recognized fusion centers. Primary signifies that each state, along with the
various territories beyond the continental United States (like Guam and Puerto Rico), has
a main fusion center. DHS also recognizes fusion centers created by local and state
governments so although there are a number of states that have only a primary fusion
center, there are others that also have recognized fusion centers, such as California and Texas (DHS, 2015).

An organizational goal of DHS has been to build and further strong relationships between law enforcement agencies on the federal level with those on the local and state levels through far-reaching and robust grant initiatives and programming (Taylor & Davis, 2010). To underscore the necessity and significance of that relationship, Miller and Hess (2008) note the reality that information appearing insignificant to one agency or organization may be the proverbial missing link or piece to resolving a case, preventing an attack of some sort, or shutting down a criminal enterprise.

**Intelligence-Led Policing Philosophy and Fusion Centers**

Guidetti and Martinelli (2009) note that from a structural standpoint, ILP is built around the central practices and principles of command and control, community policing, problem-solving policing, and data analysis. Furthermore, they note that the goal of ILP is to essentially forecast crime activity and trends while balancing proactive initiatives toward the creation of various prevention strategies against the preservation of citizens’ rights to privacy (Guidetti & Martinelli, 2009). The concept and philosophy of ILP has its roots in the United Kingdom and is premised around the belief that decision making and the distribution of resources are best achieved through the application of data and related analytical processes (Gibbs, McGarrell, & Sullivan, 2015). ILP focuses on specific criminal activities and once those issues are clearly identified and objectively measured through intelligence assessments, essential decisions can be made with regard to whom to target for investigatory action and potential prosecution (BJA, 2005). Furthermore, fusion centers have had a direct and tangible effect on ILP due to the
dissemination of essential information to participants and stakeholders across the multijurisdictional spectrum (BJA, 2005).

Although the central focus of this paper is the fusion center itself and not ILP, it should be noted that some questions and uncertainty exist over the full implementation and impact of ILP. For example, Gibbs et al. (2015) note that although current evidence suggests a positive relationship between the application of problem-solving strategies toward specific crimes and the reduction of crime and victimization, considerably less data and research exist with regard to the degree of implementation of ILP by law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, it has been noted that due to a variety of factors and influences, the adoption and application of ILP “…has been slow, uneven, and prone to organizational resistance and constantly shifting political and organizational priorities” (Gibbs et al., 2015, p. 245). Not to be lost in this discussion however is the highly interconnected relationship between fusion centers and ILP as it pertains to operations methodology and philosophy.

**Intelligence-Led Policing Practice and Fusion Centers**

Operating with a clear recognition of the necessity for two-way information flow directly between authorities on the federal level and state as well as local levels, a concerted effort by the intelligence community, DHS, the FBI, and fusion centers was put forth to develop fusion centers from a holistic perspective and standpoint (Carter & Carter, 2009). ILP, as it is applied in the United States, is inclusive of the myriad intelligence capabilities of multiple agencies (BJA, 2005). There is dual importance of fusion centers as “…they develop and disseminate products that assess local implications
of national-level information, and they share critical state and local intelligence and information with the federal government and each other” (Johnson, 2011, p.2).

Citing work by Masse and Rollins, Carter and Carter (2009) note that fusion centers are viewed as an integral component of the nation’s homeland security architecture and as such, rely on four presumptions: the essential role of intelligence and the intelligence process, the necessity of synthesizing a broad assortment of data and information into a comprehensive threat mosaic, the important role of authorities on the state, local, and tribal levels in contributing to that threat assessment process, and a recognition of the idea that fusion activities outside of the federal level can directly benefit states and localities with the potential for broader national benefit. With that said, the totality of those presumptions is consistent with the operational justifications for and philosophy of ILP. Furthermore, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) reinforced that framework by noting in November 2009 that fusion centers should play the lead role in facilitating communication between the numerous homeland security and public safety entities, leverage and maximize the broad base of knowledge of their constituents to resolve issues connected to the threat(s) and risk(s), and lead dissemination efforts in sharing information pertinent to law enforcement, homeland security, and other public safety issues (Guidetti, 2010).

Lastly, it is important to note that due to the great diversity of needs and assorted environmental considerations that impact and influence the processes, products, and structure of fusion centers, there is no single model of operation (Carter & Carter, 2009). As such, while ILP may comprise the operational and philosophical core and foundation
of all of those varied intelligence activities and operations, the form and structure it manifests itself in will vary considerably.

**Federal Role in Fusion Center Activities and Operations**

Although local and state governments operate fusion centers, the federal government plays a central and direct role in their operation through provided funding and other forms of expertise and resources. Support is provided, in large part, through the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) of DHS (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009). Taylor and Davis (2010) note that one of the major goals of DHS has been to be proactive in fostering lasting and sustained relationships between federal law enforcement agencies and those on the local and state levels through expansive grant provision programs. In addition to DHS, other federal participants in fusion center initiatives and programs include the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE), the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and the Department of Defense (DOD) (DHS, 2015).

Due to the presence of federal funding, fusion centers are generally required to report to not only state officials but federal officials as well (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009). Furthermore, as part of efforts to establish across the board basic standards for fusion centers, DHS worked in collaboration with DOJ to develop Fusion Center Guidelines (FCGs) that, while voluntary in nature, clarified the nature of the centers’ relationship with regard to the federal government as well as safeguard the civil liberties of individuals (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009).
The federal government’s role in fusion center activities and operations has not been without its share of controversies and criticisms. For example, the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2012) issued a sharply critical majority and minority staff report in October 2012 that raised profound and serious concerns about federal involvement with fusion centers. The investigation uncovered evidence that DHS assigned personnel in fusion centers forwarded intelligence information of inconsistent quality that, at times, was poorly done, untimely, close to infringing on citizens’ protections under the Privacy Act as well as civil liberties, taken from already existing public sources, and, at times, completely unrelated to terrorism. Furthermore, the Subcommittee investigation discovered inaccuracies in the claims that DHS officials were making to the public. For example, claims were made about fusion centers that, in actuality, did not exist, “success stories” touted by DHS officials were found to be embellished and overstated at times, and DHS officials were derelict, at times, in the acknowledgement and/or disclosure of non-public evaluations that brought attention to a variety of problems at not only fusion centers but also within DHS’s own internal operations.

With regard to accountability and assessment, the federal government, through DHS, has in place the Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP). Working in conjunction with other interagency partners, the directors of fusion centers, and other stakeholders with a vested interest in fusion center activities, DHS personnel utilize the FCPP to assess and evaluate the capability and performance of the National Network (DHS, 2015). More specifically, the major goal of the assessment process is to collect empirical data to objectively articulate the value and contribution of fusion centers, direct
attention to capability and performance development, and identify means by which the federal government can increase the effectiveness and quality of the support being provided to fusion centers (DHS, 2015).

That assessment process measures implementation within the National Network of the four identified Critical Operational Capabilities (COCs) that comprise the foundation of the fusion process and the four identified Enabling Capabilities (ECs) that are critical in enabling the fusion process (DHS, 2015). More specifically, DHS identifies those key COCs as Receive, Analyze, Disseminate, and Gather. In addition to those four COCs, the four identified ECs are Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) Protections, Sustainment Strategy, Communications and Outreach, and Security (DHS, 2015).

To summarize, the role of the federal government in fusion centers is largely one of active and direct support as well as assessment and metrics guidance for fusion center performance evaluation. In addition, the federal government plays a crucial role in building and furthering fusion center partnerships and relationships with FBI JTTFs, FBI Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs), HIDTAs, Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Centers, Emergency Operations Centers, Tribal entities, and the private sector (DHS, 2015).

**State and Local Fusion Center Expansion and Growth**

To better illustrate variations in fusion center operations and utilization, three states will be examined: Texas, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. These examples were selected in order to represent a state with multiple fusion centers (Texas), a state with
only one primary fusion center (Tennessee), and a state with one primary and one secondary fusion center (Wisconsin).

**Texas**

The primary fusion center in Texas, the Texas Joint Crime Information Center (JCIC), is located in Austin and is operated by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). Specifically, JCIC is comprised of several sections and units: the Real-Time Watch Center; Field Operations; Intelligence and Investigative Support; the Texas Top Ten; the Special Programs Unit; the Missing Persons Clearinghouse, Unidentified, and DNA section; the Texas Homeland Security Unit; the Infrastructure Protection section; the Financial Intelligence Team (FIT); the Border Security Operations Center; the Post Seizure Analysis Team (PSAT); and the Human Intelligence Team (HUMINT) (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2011). In November 2014, the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA) named the JCIC *Fusion Center of the Year* (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2014).

In addition to JCIC, the Department of Homeland Security (2012) recognizes five other fusion centers in Texas: the Austin Regional Intelligence Center, the Dallas Fusion Center, the Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center, the North Central Texas Fusion Center in McKinney, and the Southwest Texas Fusion Center in San Antonio. Factors driving the need for those multiple centers include Texas’ sheer size as well as significant diversity from the standpoints of culture, demographics, and geography (Texas Impact, 2010). With that said, there are many local jurisdictions working in conjunction with state authorities as well as personnel from multiple federal agencies in that vast intrastate intelligence network. For example, the North Central Texas Fusion
Center (NCTFC) in McKinney lists, as its operational stakeholders, law enforcement, emergency management, public health, transportation, fire and rescue, emergency operations centers, and private corporations (North Central Texas Fusion Center, 2015). Furthermore, identified benefiting and supporting stakeholders include the academic community, city and county government, state and federal agencies, information technology, and elected officials (North Central Texas Fusion Center, 2015). External entities and organizations that NCTFC directly communicates with include the state’s primary fusion center in Austin (the JCIC), the Dallas HIDTA, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Dallas FBI field office, and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas (North Central Texas Fusion Center, 2015). Based on the example of NCTFC, it would be both logical and reasonable to assume that the other four recognized regional fusion centers operate in much the same manner with comparable complexity in network interactions and structure.

Tennessee

Unlike Texas, Tennessee has only one fusion center, the Tennessee Fusion Center (TFC), located in the Nashville area. As part of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI), it is staffed by personnel from within TBI as well as personnel from agencies including the Tennessee Department of Corrections, the Tennessee Department of Homeland Security, the Board of Probation and Parole, the Tennessee Department of Safety, the National Guard, the Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC), the FBI, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) (Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, 2015). The TFC was established in May 2007 and in 2011, DHS named the TFC its Fusion Center of the Year based on “…its progress in
analyzing and sharing terrorism and criminal information among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies across Tennessee at both the tactical and strategic levels” (Greeneville Sun, 2011, p.1). Located within the Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU) of TBI, the TFC utilizes an ‘all crimes’ approach and deals with issues such as drug trafficking, gang activity, organized crime, fugitive location, and Medicaid fraud (Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, 2015).

It should also be noted that although it is not recognized as an intelligence fusion center, the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) of the Memphis Police Department employs methods, processes, and technologies much like those of primary and recognized fusion centers (The Washington Post, 2015). The RTCC plays an essential role for law enforcement agencies and personnel in Western Tennessee by acting as an information conduit for terrorism-related concerns and issues to the TFC (The Washington Post, 2015). With that said, although clearly not on the same scale as Texas, both the inputs and outputs of the TFC as well as the essential contributions of the RTCC are vital in both the homeland security and law enforcement missions of the State of Tennessee.

**Wisconsin**

Wisconsin has two active fusion centers: the Wisconsin Statewide Information Center (WSIC) and the Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center (STAC). The WSIC is the state’s primary fusion whereas the STAC is a DHS recognized fusion center (DHS, 2015). Operated by the Wisconsin DOJ - Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), the WSIC is located in Madison and is the lead agency for the dissemination and sharing of threat information with an array of entities to include: law enforcement across federal, state, local, and tribal jurisdictions, fire departments, emergency management,
public health authorities, the corrections system, military, and private sector partners (WiWatch, 2015). The WSIC identifies five key elements that are central to its mission: support to the law enforcement community in major cases, coordination of the intelligence process with the local, state, and national levels of government, the execution of critical services (The Clearinghouse for Missing and Exploited Children and Adults, the AMBER Alert program, the Wisconsin Crime Alert Network), outreach and training activities and initiatives, and the safeguarding of civil liberties and privacy rights in the intelligence process (WiWatch, 2015).

The STAC is a regionally focused fusion center responsible for those counties in and adjacent to the Milwaukee Metropolitan Statistical Area: Milwaukee, Racine, Washington, Waukesha, Ozaukee, Kenosha, Walworth, and Jefferson Counties (WiWatch, 2015). From an operational standpoint, STAC is collocated with the City of Milwaukee Police Department’s fusion center (WiWatch, 2015). In terms of mission foci and priorities, STAC is very much like the WSIC with the key distinction being their respective areas of responsibility (WiWatch, 2015). The STAC was established in 2006 and similar to the other fusion centers noted, has an all-crimes, all-hazards, and counterterrorism orientation (The Washington Post, 2015). It should be clarified here that the Milwaukee Police Department’s (MPD) fusion operations are independent of the STAC. After becoming Chief of MPD in 2008, Ed Flynn focused on creating an intelligence component tasked with understanding patterns of criminal behavior and sharing those findings and intelligence products with the STAC (Quadracci, 2013). With that said, although the two entities are technically distinct and separate, their operations are closely interconnected and highly collaborative in nature (Quadracci, 2013).
Lastly, it is significant to note that in 2009, the WSIC became the first fusion center in the United States to have the ability to deploy a Mobile Support Unit (MSU) that, due to an integrated satellite communications infrastructure, is able to provide analytic and intelligence support at any incident location within the State of Wisconsin (The Washington Post, 2015).

**Arguments and Claims of Effectiveness and Non-Effectiveness**

The following section will examine the concept of organizational effectiveness as it relates to fusion centers by addressing various concerns about non-effectiveness that have been raised by the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), and other critics and observers such academia and other non-governmental or public advocacy entities.

**The United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Report**

Between 2010 and 2012, the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2012), through its Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, conducted a comprehensive examination of federal government support of fusion centers as well as the various counterterrorism intelligence products that were generated by fusion centers during that time period. The Subcommittee interviewed numerous current and former officials from the local, state, and federal jurisdictions, methodically reviewed in excess of a year’s worth of reporting by fusion centers, surveyed fusion centers across the country, and carefully reviewed a significant assortment of financial
During the investigation, it was discovered that a 2010 assessment of local and state fusion centers requested by DHS uncovered significant deficiencies in the basic counterterrorism information-sharing capabilities of fusion centers and the findings in that report were neither conveyed to Congress nor the public. In fact, when a request was lodged by the Subcommittee for the assessment, DHS initially “…denied it existed, then disputed whether it could be shared with Congress, before ultimately providing a copy” (United States Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012, p.2). Furthermore, in an assessment conducted by DHS in 2011 that was less rigorous and thorough in nature, continued weaknesses persisted at fusion centers despite more positive findings (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012).

The Subcommittee report addressed several areas of concern and focus as they relate to the ability of fusion centers to meaningfully contribute to counterterrorism efforts on the federal level: the lack of basic counterterrorism capabilities, a lack of fusion center performance assessment by DHS, and recognition of fusion centers by DHS that did not exist. Furthermore, additional concerns include a lack of urgency in prioritizing counterterrorism efforts, and a lack of congruence between the “success stories” touted by DHS and fusion center value in counterterrorism efforts (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012).

**Lack of Basic Counterterrorism Capabilities**

In 2010, at the request of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) of DHS, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) took the lead
on conducting an assessment of local and state fusion centers nationwide (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). From a methodological standpoint, fusion centers were asked by the PM-ISE to complete a comprehensive 380-question self-assessment questionnaire. Eight baseline capabilities, identified by DHS, DOJ, and a panel comprised of fusion center experts, formed the basis for the questions and were deemed essential for meaningfully and substantially supporting federal counterterrorism mission requirements (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). The second component of the assessment process included teams of intelligence experts from the federal government dispatched across the country to visit fusion centers and validate as well as verify that those fusion centers actually had the capabilities they claimed to possess based on their self-assessment responses. In total, on-site visits were made to 68 fusion centers and the baseline capabilities delineated were deemed “…basic, minimum standards of functionality necessary to effective intelligence sharing” (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012, p.86).

At the conclusion of the assessment process, a number of deficiencies were identified with regard to fusion center capabilities and operations. First, roughly a third of the fusion centers assessed did not have clearly defined procedures in place for sharing information beyond the walls of their respective operations. Second, more than half of the fusion centers assessed did not have procedures in place for the receiving and sharing of threat information from DHS and other federal entities with partner agencies. Third, an unspecified number of fusion centers indicated to assessment personnel that their analytic and intelligence responsibilities were intended to assist with recovery and
response after a major situation rather than prevent a major situation. A fourth issue that became apparent from the 2010 assessment was the fact that a considerable number of fusion centers lacked not only the minimum capabilities for effective function but also detailed plans on how they would develop and advance those essential capabilities. Furthermore, approximately two-thirds of the assessed fusion centers did not have any means in place for assessing return on investment for taxpayers with regard to fusion center operations funding. Lastly, the 2010 assessment leveled considerable criticism at the federal government for not providing necessary clarity to fusion centers with regard to expected capabilities and support of federal missions as well as not having a budget in place with details on how those capabilities were going to be developed, deployed, and sustained over the long-term (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012).

In 2011, DHS conducted its own assessment of fusion centers nationwide after criticizing the 2010 assessment as being too tiring and of questionable relevance. DHS opted to utilize a much shorter list of assessment criteria (55 attributes) than the much longer 2010 assessment and similar to the 2010 assessment, asked directors of fusion centers to take part in an online self-assessment process and supply assessors with data about their respective center’s staffing, budget, and costs related to operations (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). Teams of personnel from DHS as well as other federal entities methodically and systematically analyzed the submitted data from the self-assessments for discrepancies, errors, inconsistencies, and other potential problems. The Subcommittee findings note that DHS acknowledged inconsistencies in the level of detail and specifics of the 2011 assessment from fusion
centers and incomplete responses were present as well in some cases (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012).

From a methodological standpoint, the 2011 DHS assessment varied considerably from the 2010 PM-ISE assessment in that DHS personnel did not actually visit the fusion center locations for follow-up validation but instead conducted that process through phone interviews with the leadership of the fusion centers. Once any issues and questions were addressed to the satisfaction of DHS, the preparation of individualized reports occurred in which fusion centers received a score based on and reflective of how many of those 55 attributes they possessed (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). Similar to the 2010 PM-ISE assessment, the 2011 DHS assessment identified various weaknesses at local and state fusion centers as well. For example, it is noted that more than half of the fusion centers did not have a strategic plan and an approximately equal number of fusion centers did not have a communications plan. In addition, roughly one-third of the assessed fusion center operations did not have an analytic production plan. Lastly, DHS noted that in order for the National Network to attain and maximize its potential as a participant in the broader National Information Sharing Environment, fusion centers would need to be much more proactive in addressing their capabilities as well as interconnectivity considerations (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012).

**Lack of Fusion Center Performance Center Assessments**

The Subcommittee noted in its report that although DHS had committed to the assessment of fusion centers in principle, it had not attempted to do so in practice. As part of efforts to focus greater attention on performance, DHS stated in an October 2011
presentation to oversight staff from Congress that it had been working diligently since September 2010 to create the Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP). Envisioned as an empirically based, integrated, and singular process, the FCPP was intended, in principle, to measure fusion center performance, the National Network, and the various forms of federal support that fusion centers were receiving. The Subcommittee noted that in early 2012, personnel from DHS stated in clear terms to staff from both the House of Representatives and Senate that implementation of the FCPP was moving forward. With that said however, the Subcommittee noted that when it sought more detailed and specific information about the FCPP, it learned from DHS authorities that the program did not even in fact yet exist (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012).

**Recognition of Non-Existent Fusion Centers by DHS**

A significant discrepancy between the 2010 PM-ISE assessment process and the 2011 DHS assessment process centered on the actual number of operational fusion centers. More specifically, the 2010 PM-ISE assessment identified four fusion centers from the 72 DHS recognized that were not operating at a minimum level to justify a site visit (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). The Subcommittee noted in its report that despite that discovery, DHS officials continued to be adamant in their insistence that 72 fusion centers across the United States were actively involved with DHS. When pressed for clarification, a DHS official (Undersecretary Wagner) suggested that the four fusion center locations being called into question operated in a virtual environment. After it was explained that the four centers in question were non-functional based on the 2010 PM-ISE assessment, Undersecretary
Wagner responded, “there was no intent to obfuscate. It just took some of them [fusion centers] longer than others to get there” (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012, p.91).

**Lack of Urgency in Prioritizing Counterterrorism Efforts**

Although Congress, DHS, and the White House have stressed fusion centers as being integral assets in the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of information to prevent terrorist related attacks, the Subcommittee found that among some fusion centers, terrorism is not a mission priority (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). For example, of the 62 fusion centers that responded to the Subcommittee’s 2010 survey, 25 made no mention of terrorism in their respective mission statements. Furthermore, the Subcommittee noted that five fusion centers revised their respective mission statements away from an emphasis on counterterrorism to statements oriented toward broader public safety and anti-crime activities and efforts (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012).

Broadly speaking, the Subcommittee noted that transition has been far reaching across the fusion center operational spectrum. To illustrate that pattern of change, the Subcommittee highlighted Michigan and Nevada and their transition to an ‘all-crimes’, ‘all-hazards’ approach for their respective fusion center operations. Lastly, the 2010 Baseline Capabilities Assessment (BCA) of fusion centers conducted by the PM-ISE also found a lower designation of terrorism as a fusion center priority. In fact, it was noted in the 2010 BCA that “most [fusion] centers focus on the priority mission of the law enforcement agency that owns/manages them; primarily analytical case support to drug,
gang, and violent crime investigations for the geographic area of responsibility” (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012, p.96).

DHS “Success Stories” and Fusion Center Value

The final point to note from the Subcommittee report pertains to a lack of congruence between the fusion center “success stories” DHS cites on its public website and their value to overall efforts in counterterrorism. More specifically, those DHS “success stories” tend to be reflective of fusion center activities and involvement outside of counterterrorism (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). The Subcommittee identifies that as a problem for three reasons: it is inconsistent with promises made to Congress and the public that taxpayer funds would be used to focus on terrorism, they do not advance the mission of counterterrorism as articulated by DHS, and it does “…not meet the expectations set by legislative and executive mandates which make clear both branches expected fusion centers to perform as conduits of terrorism information-sharing to and from the Federal Government” (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012, p.96). Lastly, the Subcommittee identified the production of erroneous intelligence information as a concern and, within its report, cited three specific examples of faulty intelligence and reporting that ultimately resulted in DHS misinforming decision makers and fusion centers having to issue clarifications and apologies (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012).
Between January 2012 and July 2013, the Committee on Homeland Security for the United States House of Representatives conducted a comprehensive study of the National Network of Fusion Centers in an effort to gain much greater perspective and understanding of the strengths as well as gaps present in the network and tender recommendations on how the network could be improved. As noted in the discussion of the United States Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report, ‘value’ is an essential component of any assessment process of fusion centers. With that said, the Committee views the National Network as a vital asset that attains its maximum potential in its role of helping to secure the United States. As part of its evaluation process, the Committee visited 32 fusion centers across the United States and site visits revealed that in addition to the considerable number of local and state partners represented, more than 20 different agencies and offices from the federal government had personnel assigned to and involved with those fusion centers (United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 2013).

Evident from the Committee’s report is its adherence to and belief in the notion that the strength of the National Network is the collective expertise and knowledge of individual fusion centers across the country (United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 2013). For that reason, the Committee noted that it would be inherently disadvantageous to formally standardize all aspects and related elements of the operations of fusion centers. DHS goals have been focused on building vital Critical Operational Capabilities (COCs) while also allowing for operational independence for fusion centers; the Committee notes that results have been positive in
improving consistency and standardization (United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 2013).

Although the Committee acknowledges and recognizes the necessity of active federal participation in fusion center development, there is also the recognition that local and state stakeholders, including fusion centers themselves, must take the lead in exercising ownership and moving forward with regard to development and growth. The Committee notes that the absence of a comprehensive local and state-driven National Strategy for Fusion Centers as well comparable Federal Strategy for Fusion Centers is impeding the ability of the National Network to reach its peak in terms of potential (United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 2013).

The Committee notes that a significant challenge for fusion centers with regard to attaining maximum optimization and potential involves appropriate performance metrics. This issue is especially problematic from the standpoint that stakeholders in fusion centers have considerable difficulty measuring success in a manner that is accurate, complete, and visible. Furthermore, the Committee report notes that processes are not currently in place to provide a comprehensive, empirical picture of how information produced by fusion centers affects criminal and terrorism cases as well as other homeland security mission areas on the federal level (United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 2013).

Lastly, other notable findings by the Committee include concerns that fusion centers should be taking more proactive efforts in contributing to national strategic counterterrorism efforts, that greater attention should be paid to collaboration and outreach activities and program growth, better assessment of federal funding for fusion
centers and its allocation/distribution occur, and greater focus on the future for the National Network as it relates to the National and Homeland Security Enterprises (United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 2013).

**United States Government Accountability Office Report on Fusion Centers**

In November 2014, the GAO issued a report to Congress regarding DHS, federal funding, and fusion centers. Given the significant role that the federal government plays in fusion center operations through its myriad financial, material, and personnel support programs, legitimate need and vested interest exist on the part of Congress to better understand how limited tax dollars are being accounted for. To accomplish that, the GAO addressed four essential considerations and issues: the extent to which DHS has been able to assist fusion centers in assessing capabilities and gaps, the extent to which the federal government has clearly articulated expectations for fusion centers and assessed their contributions toward national security, the extent to which personnel from federal agencies have deployed to fusion centers, and the extent to which grant reforms in DHS have improved the accountability process for funding from the federal government in fusion center operations (United States Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2014).

From a methodological standpoint, the GAO carefully and systematically reviewed results of fusion center assessments, relevant documentation on fusion center expectations, applicable and relevant guidance for the deployment of personnel, and the requirements for grant programs. Furthermore, personnel from GAO conducted interviews with officials from DHS and the FBI who work with fusion centers, and an assortment of personnel from 10 of the 78 fusion centers currently in operation (GAO,
Lastly, the GAO (2014) notes that fusion centers selected for the evaluation study were chosen based on location as well as other factors and also makes clear that although the interviews lack generalizability, they nonetheless provide insights and perspective on fusion center capabilities as well as the federal support provided.

The GAO notes in its report that the 2013 DHS annual assessment of fusion centers revealed an average score of nearly 92 out of 100. Generally speaking, that suggests that fusion centers, for the most part, have the necessary policies and procedures correctly situated for the implementation of essential information sharing activities. The GAO cautions however that the scores do not indicate whether those activities directly resulted in readily identifiable or specific homeland security impacts. Lastly, the GAO contacted the directors of 10 fusion centers and all indicated that they viewed the annual assessment as an appropriate and useful measurement instrument for the identification of capabilities and the monitoring of progress (GAO, 2014).

The GAO notes that the federal government, since 2004, has provided guidance and related documentation regarding the articulation and definition of expectations and essential roles for fusion centers. Furthermore, 45 performance measures have been developed by DHS to assist in the meaningful assessment of contributions from fusion centers and they include both outputs and outcomes. For example, the GAO identifies the number of intelligence products as an output whereas an example of a measured outcome would be how, and to what degree, those assorted intelligence products may have factored or weighed into the security decision-making process for important fusion center partners (GAO, 2014).
From a personnel standpoint, the GAO notes that 288 personnel from various federal agencies were deployed to fusion centers in 2013. More specifically, the largest percentage of those personnel came from the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) in DHS and the FBI. Furthermore, the GAO notes that DHS and the FBI have nationwide guidance in place to enable their respective organizations to make informed fusion center support decisions as well as clearly delineate and identify essential roles and responsibilities for fusion center assigned personnel. Lastly, it should be noted that United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), also component agencies of DHS, do not have such guidance in place and delegate deployment decision responsibilities to field-level management (GAO, 2014).

Lastly, the GAO addresses the issue of fiscal responsibility with regard to both DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The GAO notes that although Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) reforms by DHS are yielding some success in ensuring that grant funds designated for fusion centers are being properly applied to baseline capabilities, DHS has nonetheless had difficulty in providing an accurate accounting of funds. More specifically, in FY2011, FEMA, as the primary agency within DHS responsible for grant funding, began to stipulate that fusion center requests for grant funding clearly articulate and define the particular and specific capabilities that the projects being proposed by their respective organizations would address. An additional program stipulation by FEMA is that state grantees, on a biannual basis, report the specific amount of funding from the federal government expended on projects within their fusion centers. The GAO discovered, however, that due to incorrect
categorization by states, approximately $60 million was absent from that fiscal oversight in 2012 and thus prevented FEMA from providing a reliable accounting of the expenditure of grant program monies (GAO, 2014).

Additional Observations Regarding Effectiveness and Ineffectiveness

The reports from the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, and the GAO illustrate, in detail, the complexity and enormity of effectiveness as it relates to an organization as diverse as a fusion center. Ortmeier and Meese III (2010) note that “police agencies as organizations experience a great deal of difficulty when: members have no shared values, mission, or vision; they neglect planning; or they lack leadership competence” (p.206). Stojkovic et al. (2008) note that a common understanding that has evolved out of discussion in academia is the realization that effectiveness is not a singular phenomenon and the acknowledgement that organizational effectiveness can manifest itself in a plurality of forms and ways. Ritz, Giauque, Varone, and Anderfuhrren-Biget (2014) note, for example, that performance measurement is difficult, at best, due to the absence of broadly accepted measures. Optimal integration and operational maximization of fusion centers thus become elusive in the absence of clearly defined and widely embraced benchmarks and measures of organizational performance.

Lastly, although fusion centers have not been without their share of complaints and criticisms of ineffectiveness, what should not be lost in the discussion is that they, despite their perceived deficiencies and shortcomings, provide an improved medium for the exchange of national security data and information for entities and organizations within and outside of government (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). Furthermore, Monahan
and Palmer (2009) note that their operational model and structure grant considerable flexibility for local and state governments to adapt, as necessary, their resources available to address perceived needs or threats.
Section III: Theoretical Considerations and Perspectives

Introduction

The following section will examine several relevant theoretical considerations and perspectives that are applicable to fusion centers and a study of their organizational effectiveness. More specifically, four prominent theories of organizational effectiveness will be considered as they relate to fusion centers and their associated activities: the goal model, the strategic-constituency model, the process model, and the system-resource model.

The Goal Model

As the predominant theoretical perspective on organizational effectiveness, the goal model considers organizations as rational entities. Generally speaking, as an assessment metric of organizational effectiveness and performance, the goal model takes into consideration the achievement, or lack thereof, of an organization’s stated goals (Martz, 2013). The theory is built around the assumption that organizations have goals that can be easily articulated and identified, the belief that an intrinsic sense of motivation is present to attain those goals, and that appropriate and suitable metrics can be utilized to track organizational progress (Stojkovic et al., 2008). In a very generalized sense, McDavid, Huse, and Hawthorn (2013) identify goals as statements of desired outcome(s) that comprise the foundation for more focused and specific objectives within an organization. A key distinction must be noted however regarding goals and constraints. Martz (2013) notes the importance of this distinction and identifies decision rules, directives, and policy statements as intraorganizational forms and sources of constraint. Although the goal model appears to present itself as a suitable and valid explanatory
framework for an organizational entity as complex as a fusion center, deficiencies exist in the theoretical framework to challenge that assertion.

Stojkovic et al. (2008) note, for example, that numerous commentators and scholars have noted the inherent difficulty in articulating clear, unambiguous definitions of an organization’s goals due to the reality that organizations, as evolving entities, often possess myriad goals that likely conflict and overlap at various locations. Furthermore, given the unique people-centric nature and orientation of criminal justice and law enforcement, effectiveness, as a measure, becomes largely relative due to the variability in individual perceptions that ultimately impacts and shapes organizational goals (Stojkovic et al., 2008). The extrapolation and application of that logic to fusion centers suggests that those partners and stakeholders who benefit the most will have a much different perspective on that respective organization’s effectiveness than those who may not feel as if they are receiving direct benefit from its activities and operations. Consequently, that clear variability in perception injects subjective bias into any objective measurement of organizational effectiveness for the fusion center.

A second criticism that has been raised regarding the goal model is that it fails to adequately consider distinctions between official goals and operative goals. Official goals are those goals that are shared with the general public whereas operative goals are more focused and pointed statements of what an organizational entity seeks to accomplish (Stojkovic et al., 2008). With that said, although that differentiation may appear to be insignificant or trivial on the surface, it holds considerable importance when it is considered and weighed in totality against organizational effectiveness. Focusing solely on official goals creates the potential for embarking on a path of action that may be
impractical or altogether unrealistic whereas concentrating solely on operative goals negates the potential for interorganizational comparisons (Stojkovic et al., 2008). With regard to fusion centers, that logic implies that unless alignment and congruence exist between the official and operative goals of the organization, the goal model will lack the complete ability to measure organizational effectiveness in a manner that is both accurate and reflective of reality for that respective operations center.

A third criticism of the goal model centers on the model itself and how it impacts and influences the consequences of goal attainment measurement. Stojkovic et al. (2008) note that any behavior(s) within the organizational entity not directly related to the attainment of goals are not included in broader reviews of organizational effectiveness under the rationale of what the goal model postulates. Furthermore, assorted criteria chosen to evaluate organizational effectiveness may have the potential of reaching further than intended and as a result, unintentionally alter behavior(s) viewed as desirable that the measurement process fails to both acknowledge and recognize (Stojkovic et al., 2008). Within the context and environment of a fusion center, that criticism suggests that tasks and other work assignments not directly attributable to the articulated goals of the organization may go ignored and underrepresented with the consequence of skewing the actual measure of overall effectiveness for the organization.

Lastly, criticisms have been raised with regard to the relationship between the attainment of organizational goals and the resultant consequences within the broader goal model framework (Stojkovic et al., 2008). Essentially, what this particular criticism of the theory addresses is the notion that from the standpoint of goal attainment, desired organizational effectiveness and success may ultimately have the effect of creating
unforeseen and/or unintended problems, whether it be a negative outcome attributable to a positive action or a positive outcome attributable to a negative action (Stojkovic et al., 2008). Broadly speaking, that logic would suggest, for example, that a fusion center viewed as highly effective and successful would likely receive a larger infusion of government funding to the detriment of other programs dependent upon that same funding stream. Conversely, low organizational effectiveness could provide the impetus for an overhaul or restructuring of the fusion center’s leadership and management hierarchy or tier.

**The Strategic-Constituency Model**

Unlike the goal model, the strategic-constituency model, sometimes also referred to as the participant-satisfaction model, focuses on the interests, needs, and wants of key constituencies. For the purposes of clarity here, any group of individuals with a stake or vested interest in an organization would qualify as a strategic constituency (Martz, 2013). Furthermore, those myriad strategic constituencies can be more clearly delineated through careful examination of who has the legal authority to act on behalf of an organization and the identification of others who are completely external to the organization whose motivations are driven by self-interest (Martz, 2013). In sum, an organization crosses the threshold of effectiveness if it is able to maintain the contributions and support of the many constituencies it serves (Stojkovic et al., 2008).

With that said, the strategic-constituency model has several advantages and disadvantages. Advantages of the model include its ability to promote organizational legitimacy, distributive justice in relation to the larger organizational environment, acknowledgement of those myriad constituencies and their respective preferences, and
attention to the concerns of stakeholders who have the greatest impact or role to play in the long-term sustainment and viability of an organization (Martz, 2013). From the standpoints of disadvantages and limitations however, the model tends to favor the strongest coalitions within an organization to the potential detriment or exclusion of others. Furthermore, it advocates a view of high effectiveness that neglects to take into consideration competitive advantage, creates the potential for division or separation between strategic constituencies and the broader organizational environment, and struggles with constantly evolving and shifting preferences or priorities of the many constituents (Martz, 2013). The general logic of the theory, when applied to a fusion center, suggests that it would be considered effective if it is adequately fulfilling and satisfying the needs of its many partners and stakeholders (constituents). Due to the fact that fusion centers often have many partners and stakeholders involved either directly or indirectly in their respective operations, the applicability and suitability of this model may be limited by that very diversity. For example, a state that has only a primary fusion center will have as its constituents not only the executive and legislative branches it is legally accountable to but the sum total of residents (and, by extension, taxpayers) as well. Realistically, finding a mutually acceptable level of consensus among such an incredibly diverse and large group of entities and individuals would be impractical.

The Process Model

Unlike models of organizational effectiveness focused on constituencies or goals, the process model is developed around the premise that effectiveness, rather than being some sort of end state, is instead a process built of steps intended to flow sequentially (Stojkovic et al., 2008). Furthermore, three related components form the foundation for
the model: a systems perspective, goal optimization, and an emphasis on intraorganizational behavior. A systems perspective, quite simply, allows for an accounting for concerns for changes within the larger, macro-level organizational environment. Second, goal optimization essentially relates to the ability of an organization to multitask with regard to goals versus being singularly focused on the achievement of one goal in its entirety. Lastly, an emphasis and focus on intraorganizational behavior demonstrates an appreciation for individual personnel and staff and the possible contributions they can bring forward toward the broader goal of organizational effectiveness (Stojkovic et al., 2008).

In an examination of process, the emphasis, with regard to goals, is on optimization rather than achievement and optimization weighs desired goals in relation to organizational constraints (Martz, 2013). Furthermore, an element of the process model that clearly differentiates it from the other models is its consideration of the behavior of individuals and its relationship to organizational performance. The rationale for that argument is rooted in the belief that employee agreement with organizational objectives equates to greater effort toward and support for the attainment of those broader objectives (Martz, 2013). The process model, when considered in relation to fusion centers, arguably holds applicability and relevance given the fact that the concept and methodology which underlie fusion centers evolved from a philosophy (ILP) that, at its core, is built around a process (the intelligence cycle). With that said, it is reasonable to conclude that synergy is present between the process model in principle and the fusion center in actual practice.
The System Resource Model

The system resource model, developed by Yuchtman and Seashore in 1967, is built around the idea that organizational effectiveness is, for all intents and purposes, a measure of how much that organization can draw from its respective environment with regard to resources (Stojkovic et al., 2008). Under that rationale, an assumption exists that organizations lack goals and as a result, goal accomplishment becomes an irrelevant consideration. With that said, specific emphasis and focus in the model is more about what goes into an organization and less about what comes out of it (Stojkovic et al., 2008). Similar to the other models noted here, there are inherent advantages and disadvantages to this approach. A notable advantage of a systems model is the holistic approach it employs when evaluating the totality of activity within an organizational entity. Furthermore, a systems approach offers a second advantage in the assessment of organizational effectiveness by taking into consideration the impacts of various subsystems within the organization (Martz, 2013). With that said however, Martz (2013) notes that emphasis on subsystems may have the deleterious effect of affecting an organization’s ability to respond to change in an adverse manner. Furthermore, within the model, the potential exists for the neglect of key or primary beneficiaries and stakeholders if too much attention is directed towards subsystems within the organizational structure (Martz, 2013).

The logic of this model suggests a lack of alignment or congruence with fusion center objectives and operations. As public sector organizations funded by a finite amount of tax dollars, fusion centers are accountable to both the executive and legislative branches of government for how those allocated funds are spent. The idea or notion that
money (as well as other forms of resource support) can be channeled into a fusion center without comparable attention afforded to outputs and performance metrics is contrary, in every respect, to prudent fiscal responsibility and stewardship in governance. At a time when budgets across all levels of government are constrained due to revenue shortfalls or other factors and influences, the notion that the system resource model would adequately address the various concerns of accountability, oversight, and responsibility seems implausible and meritless. The idea or suggestion that a legislative body would sanction, for all intents and purposes, carte blanche authority or resources for a fusion center at a time when political polarity and discord over fiscal matters are peaking would appear, on the surface, to be both unrealistic and untenable.
Section IV: Recommendations for Increased Fusion Center Effectiveness and

Conclusion

What should be amply clear to this point is that although notable progress has been made in addressing and improving operational deficiencies in fusion centers in the years following 9/11, much work remains in building and developing dynamic, efficient, focused, and responsive fusion centers as evolving organizational entities. From an operations standpoint, fusion centers have proven to be a viable means for the facilitation and movement of information pertaining to terrorism and other assorted crimes between local and state authorities. Furthermore, research suggests that fusion centers are critical partners in intelligence capacity on the domestic level and that the potential exists for a more greatly expanded operational footprint in homeland security and law enforcement activities and operations (Chermak, Carter, Carter, McGarrell, & Drew, 2013). As such, the following section will focus on various recommendations that have been proffered for the empowerment of fusion centers in the attainment of their organizational goals as well as execution of their respective mission(s).

Griffin and Moorhead (2014) note that organizational effectiveness, as a whole, is the sum of individual-level outcomes, group-level outcomes, and organization-level outcomes. More specifically, individual-level outcomes include considerations such as performance, turnover, productivity, stress, and attitudes (Griffin & Moorhead, 2014). Accordingly, given the reality that personnel and staff comprise the operational core of an organization, attention will first focus on recommendations regarding fusion center personnel and staffing. Second, group-level outcomes identified by Griffin and Moorhead (2014) include cohesiveness, norms, performance, and productivity. As such,
recommendations will be explored that build upon the concepts of the group and team as they relate to an effective and successful fusion center operations environment. Lastly, organization-level outcomes identified by Griffin and Moorhead (2014) include stakeholder satisfaction, organizational survival, financial considerations or performance, productivity, and personnel considerations. With that said, the final set of recommendations will focus on the organization and its unique role in the broader ideal of optimum organizational effectiveness. The paper will conclude with a summary of essential and key points from the paper as well as briefly reflect on the role of fusion centers in a dynamic and constantly evolving homeland security and law enforcement landscape.

**Fusion Center Personnel and Staffing**

The United States Department of Justice (2006), through its Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, offers a number of assorted guidelines for fusion centers as an organizational blueprint for moving forward in their focus on information sharing and intelligence. One guideline addressed and emphasized in that document is the proper training of personnel. The United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security (2013) highlights personnel considerations by noting in its report that assistance from the federal government could be instrumental in the expansion of training opportunities for fusion center personnel and staff as well as provide guidance in the development of professional benchmarks and milestones structured around clearly articulated analytic competencies and skills. Furthermore, the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2012) addresses another aspect of personnel considerations
through its recommendation that any personnel from DHS actively involved in the reporting of intelligence within the United States be sufficiently trained and subsequently certified to prevent violations of DHS guidelines, policies, and regulations as well as relevant United States law.

Rollins and Connors (2007) stress the importance of quality over quantity with regard to fusion center personnel and staffing and note that “a center might look to have all the appropriate representatives when it accepts people with the wrong skills or who lack a solid record of achievement” (Step 6). With that said, Rollins and Connors (2007) note that such an organization building strategy could actually be counterproductive and have the net effect of reducing overall organizational capability rather than bolstering it. Equally important in an organization is the ability of the leadership to inspire and motivate the ranks. Ritz et al. (2014) stress the importance of that quality by noting that the effective motivation of public employees contributes to greater organizational performance by encouraging their engagement and participation from the organizational, psychological, and social contexts in such a manner that it acts as a catalyst for task activities and related processes. In sum, fusion center leaders must know how to effectively encourage and motivate their personnel and staff to aspire to higher levels of individual engagement, initiative, and performance in order for the fusion center to attain its desired optimum in terms of organizational effectiveness and utilization.

**Group-level Leadership and Management Recommendations**

A major challenge for the leadership and management of any organizational entity lies in the task of bringing together the myriad groups and subgroups within the organization in such a manner as to promote cohesion, norms, performance, and
productivity. There are clear advantages and benefits for organizations that actively seek to encourage collaboration through groups or teams. Ortmeier and Meese III (2010) note, for example, “teamwork tends to promote innovation and creative thinking, increase the speed with which tasks are accomplished, lower operating costs, and enhance the quality of services and products” (p.106). A concern that has been raised however as a result of interviews with leaders of fusion centers involves their ability (or lack thereof) to select personnel for assignment to their respective centers (Rollins, 2008). More specifically, Rollins (2008) notes that because of resource limitations within partner agencies, the leaders of fusion centers have expressed concerns that underperforming staff may be detailed out to fusion centers and that because of staffing needs, fusion centers may unknowingly take in detailed personnel with less than ideal or mismatched skill sets that do not support the fusion center’s mission.

The United States Department of Justice (2008), through its Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, recommends in its *Baseline Capabilities for State and Main Urban Area Fusion Centers* that fusion centers clearly identify their stakeholders (permanent and ad hoc), associated roles and responsibilities, and the steps necessary to facilitate a collaborative environment with those stakeholders (partners). Furthermore, it is very strongly recommended that fusion centers create and implement Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) or Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) that, in no uncertain terms, clearly articulate the details of the relationship between fusion centers and their partner agencies. Prior to signing those documents, it is essential that they be carefully and methodically reviewed to ensure that the details and terms are mutually acceptable (United States Department of Justice, 2008). The failure to do so may result in a less
than ideal arrangement that neither leverages the strengths of the fusion center and its partner agencies nor builds the cohesiveness, norms, and productivity for elevated performance and, by extension, optimal organizational effectiveness. It is imperative that the leaders of fusion centers, as those most acutely aware of the unique needs and strengths of their respective organizations, be granted the decisionmaking latitude to do what they feel is best for their organizations, within the bounds of legal limitations and established policies.

Organization-level Leadership and Management Recommendations

As noted earlier, organization-level outcomes include stakeholder satisfaction, survival, financial considerations or performance, productivity, and personnel considerations (Griffin & Moorhead, 2014). With regard to stakeholder satisfaction, the state-level examples of Texas, Tennessee, and Wisconsin examined in this paper illustrate quite clearly the fact that fusion centers have many stakeholders with a demonstrated vested interest in their operations and associated outcomes. For that reason, accountability becomes a paramount consideration and measures or procedures must be in place to accurately reflect contributions, efforts, and inputs applied towards the satisfaction of those myriad interests. As such, the United States Department of Justice (2006) recommends in its Fusion Center Guidelines that fusion centers clearly define expectations, implement appropriate performance metrics, and make an informed determination of their effectiveness. Performance metrics should be tailored to the fusion center’s central or core mission, stated goals, and organizational objectives. Furthermore, those performance metrics must be empirically based and demonstrated to be measurable, quantifiable, reliable, and valid.
In addition to empirically based assessment methods, a method of program evaluation must be employed that accurately assesses fusion center services from the standpoints of adequacy, appropriateness, and success (United States Department of Justice, 2006). Furthermore, it is the recommendation of the United States Department of Justice (2006) that the data and statistics generated from that assessment and evaluation process be utilized in decisionmaking processes as well as the allocation of resources. Lastly, those recommended performance measures should be employed to monitor organizational progress and ensure accountability to the many stakeholders with vested interests in fusion center outcomes and outputs. As part of that process, it is essential that personnel and staff be informed, on a regular basis, of fusion center performance and progress (United States Department of Justice, 2006).

As illustrated earlier through the reports of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security (2013) and the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2012), considerable concern and disagreement have been raised with regard to federal fusion center funding and its limitation to counterterrorism activities. For example, the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2012) recommends in its report that “DHS should strictly align fusion center grant funding to meet federal needs” (p.106). As noted earlier, the additional perceived micromanagement as well as oversight that come attached to federal funding are obstacles that some states would rather not deal with and that can be problematic from the standpoint of seamless threat coverage. Rollins (2008) recommends, as an option for altering the structure of the federal-state fusion center relationship, the possibility of expanding the role of FBI Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs)
to strategic analysis and assessment while refocusing state and regional fusion centers on the tactical analysis of criminal intelligence. An advantage of such a restructuring would be the federalization of strategic analysis, taking pressure off of state and regional fusion centers that may lack the resources to do such analysis due to the absence or lack of demand by fusion center stakeholders (Rollins, 2008). With that said, there must be clarity in both mission foci and priorities as well as certainty in funding in order for organization-level outcomes to be satisfied and the cumulative impact of those outcomes to be both actualized and realized with regard to optimal organizational effectiveness and fusion center integration and utilization.

**Conclusion**

Out of the tragedies of 9/11 arose consensus and realization that the information sharing mechanisms and processes in place for homeland security and law enforcement were inadequate for the next generation of challenges and threats facing the country. Given the complexity and gravity of those emerging challenges, issues, problems, and threats, a new means had to be discovered and implemented in the public sector that encourages active collaboration, communication, and partnership in the resolution of those myriad considerations. Accordingly, much greater value was ascribed to information as it relates to strategic and tactical intelligence in homeland security and policing applications as well as practices. As a consequence of those refocused and renewed efforts on treating knowledge as an asset and utilizing it as a weapon in the prevention, reduction, and resolution of criminal activity and other threats, the fusion center was born.
As part of efforts to consolidate and better coordinate intelligence efforts and guide the development and evolution of fusion centers, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the bureaucratic and legal framework for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Significant amounts of money as well as other forms of material, personnel, and technical support from the federal government through aggressive and robust grant and outreach programs have enabled states as well as major urban areas to greatly expand intelligence activities and initiatives on their respective levels of governance and jurisdiction. This paper illustrates the complex and interconnected nature of that relationship through the distinctly different examples of Texas, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. From that examination, it becomes amply evident that fusion centers, as complex organizational entities, are comprised of a rich diversity of partners and stakeholders, each with specific and unique self-interests. Inevitably, the expansion and growth of that fusion center footprint has resulted in new challenges and considerations for legislatures and the leadership of fusion centers alike.

The reports of the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, and the GAO reveal that although progress has been made in the accountability, integration, and performance of fusion centers, much work remains to sustain that momentum and enable fusion centers to attain their optimum level of organizational effectiveness and potential as essential partners in unified homeland security and law enforcement operations. With that said, this paper addressed four relevant theoretical models of organizational effectiveness that may prove valuable for the improvement of the fusion center operations model: the goal model, the strategic-constituency model, the
process model, and the system-resource model. Keeping in mind that there is no single model of fusion center operations (Carter & Carter, 2009), leaders of fusion centers must hybridize and synthesize the appropriate balance and combination of those varying characteristics and elements as they craft operations models inclusive of their respective mission needs and priorities and reflective of their unique analytic competencies and strengths. Provided that clarity in mission and certainty in funding and resources exist, the ideal of optimum fusion center integration and maximization in homeland security and law enforcement can be achieved provided leaders of those operations centers remain continually cognizant of the reality that the leadership and management of such diverse groups of individuals requires a multifaceted management approach tailored to those individuals (Eversole, Venneberg, & Crowder, 2012).
Section V: References


Regan, P.M., Monahan, T., & Craven, K. (2015). Constructing the suspicious: Data production, circulation, and interpretation by DHS fusion centers. *Administration & Society, 47*(6), 740-762. DOI: 10.1177/0095399713513141


Appendix

DHS Primary and Recognized Fusion Centers (July 2015)

Primary Fusion Centers

Alabama Fusion Center (Montgomery)
Alaska Information and Analysis Center (Anchorage)
Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (Phoenix)
Arkansas State Fusion Center (Little Rock)
California State Threat Assessment Center (Sacramento)
Colorado Information Analysis Center (Lakewood)
Connecticut Intelligence Center (Hartford)
Delaware Information and Analysis Center (Dover)
Florida Fusion Center (Tallahassee)
Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Atlanta)
Hawaii Fusion Center (Honolulu)
Idaho Criminal Intelligence Center (Meridian)
Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (Springfield)
Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (Indianapolis)
Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center (Des Moines)
Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center (Topeka)
Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center (Frankfort)
Louisiana State Analytical & Fusion Exchange (Baton Rouge)
Maine Information and Analysis Center (Augusta)
Mariana Regional Fusion Center [Guam] (Agana Heights)
Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (Woodlawn)
Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center (Maynard)
Michigan Intelligence Operations Center (Lansing)
Minnesota Fusion Center (St. Paul)
Mississippi Analysis and Information Center (Pearl)
Missouri Information Analysis Center (Jefferson City)
Montana Analysis & Technical Information Center (Helena)
Nebraska Information Analysis Center (Lincoln)
New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center (Concord)
New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (West Trenton)
New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (Santa Fe)
New York State Intelligence Center (East Greenbush)
North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Raleigh)
North Dakota State and Local Information Center (Bismarck)
Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center (Columbus)
Oklahoma Information Fusion Center (Oklahoma City)
Oregon Terrorism Information Threat Assessment Network (Salem)
Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center (Harrisburg)
Puerto Rico National Security State Information Center (Hato Rey)
Rhode Island State Fusion Center (Providence)
South Carolina Information and Intelligence Center (Columbia)
South Dakota Fusion Center (Sioux Falls)
Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center (Las Vegas)
Tennessee Fusion Center (Nashville)

Texas Joint Crime Information Center (Austin)

U.S. Virgin Islands Fusion Center (St. Thomas)

Utah Statewide Information and Analysis Center (Sandy)

Vermont Intelligence Center (Williston)

Virginia Fusion Center (North Chesterfield)

Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center (Washington D.C.)

Washington State Fusion Center (Seattle)

West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center (Charleston)

Wisconsin Statewide Information Center (Madison)

**Recognized Fusion Centers**

Austin Regional Intelligence Center (Texas)

Boston Regional Intelligence Center (Massachusetts)

Central California Intelligence Center (Sacramento)

Central Florida Intelligence Exchange (Orlando)

Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center (Illinois)

Cincinnati/Hamilton County Regional Terrorism Early Warning Group (Ohio)

Dallas Fusion Center (Texas)

Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

Detroit and Southeast Michigan Information and Intelligence Center (Detroit)

El Paso Multi-Agency Tactical Response Information eXchange [MATRIX]

(Texas)

Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center (Texas)
Kansas City Terrorism Early Warning Fusion Center (Missouri)

Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (California)

Nevada Threat Analysis Center (Carson City)

North Central Texas Fusion Center (McKinney)

Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center (Cleveland)

Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (San Francisco)

Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center (Fairfax)

Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (California)

San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center (California)

Southeast Florida Fusion Center (Miami)

Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center (Milwaukee)

Southwest Texas Fusion Center (San Antonio)

Southwestern PA Region 13 Fusion Center (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)

St. Louis Fusion Center (Missouri)

Sources: DHS, National Fusion Center Association

http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information

https://nfcausa.org/default.aspx/MenuItemID/117/MenuGroup/Public+Home.htm