

THE DEBATE OVER "SCIENTIFIC" THEOLOGY IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY:

FRANCIS OF MARCHIA AND GREGORY OF RIMINI

BY

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PREFACE

This study began originally as an examination of Gregory of Rimini's treatment of the question whether or not theology is a science. Gregory is an excellent figure to examine for several reasons: 1) he is one of the outstanding scholastic theologians of the 14th century; 2) an early authentic printed edition of his Commentary on the Sentences is readily available; 3) since he names his opponents in the margins of his Commentary it is possible to see, through his eyes, some of the larger dimensions of the intellectual controversies which were being waged in the 14th century. As my investigations progressed, it became apparent that as helpful as Gregory's insight into this particular question might be, the issues could be illuminated even more if the writings of his unpublished opponents could also be examined directly. This paper is an effort to uncover the views of one such opponent, Francis of Marchia.

A direct examination of Francis' manuscript yields a number of significant benefits. For one thing, it makes possible some insight into the nature of 14th century Scotism. In the secondary literature Francis is portrayed as a faithful follower of Duns Scotus. Assuming this characterization is correct, an investigation into his actual writings should yield valuable information on the manner in which a Scotistic orientation of thought dealt with important theological and philosophical questions of the 14th century. A second benefit accruing from a study of Francis of Marchia is a check on Gregory's fidelity in reproducing the arguments of his opponents. The secondary literature on Gregory accents the strong historical interest which drove him back

into the sources as he fashioned his arguments and defences. He has a strong reputation for careful documentation. A comparison of Gregory's representation of an opponent and the opponent's own statement puts this description of Gregory's scholarship to the test. Finally, an examination of his opponents gives us a larger perspective of any particular issue than would be possible by examining Gregory's arguments alone. An understanding of any issue is enriched by considering as many opinions as possible. It is especially important to do this for fourteenth century thought since to date such a small portion of the potential literature of the period has been read and studied. Any insight gained as a result of reading heretofore unexamined sources will be a welcome contribution to the continuing modifications of interpretation in fourteenth century thought.

After Anselm had summed up the essence of the theologian's task in the classic phrase, fides quaerens intellectum, it was not long before scholars were inquiring in careful, systematic ways about the nature of theology, itself. Is it belief? Is it knowledge in the strict Aristotelian sense of demonstratio? Is it knowledge in some other sense? Is it opinion? By the beginning of the 13th century, the question was being posed in just such self-conscious ways. According to M.-D. Chenu in his interesting study of 13th century theology, it was William of Auxerre (writing sometime before 1220) who first gave the matter its specific formulation.¹ In so doing he took the question of theology's character out of the context of rhetoric and grammar and put the content of theology itself under the bright light of dialectical examination.

Throughout most of the previous Medieval period theology consisted of the exegesis of the statements of Scripture in the manner of the Fathers, using as a basic tool all the resources of Latin grammar and rhetoric. Major attention was focused upon drawing out the essential meaning of the sacra pagina for practical application to the Christian life. As dialectic began to become the normative preoccupation of university scholars, however, this low-keyed, patient unfolding of the meaning of the Scriptures page by page gave way to a methodology which concentrated on isolated theological problems rather than the ongoing explanation of a text. One of these problems is the nature of theology

¹ M.-D. Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIII^e siècle (Paris, 1969).

itself. So fundamental is the question that most theologians deal with it in the Prologue of their Sentences commentaries, thereby setting the context within which they will deal with subsequent problems.

The question, utrum theologia sit scientia, is one of the most important questions of the theological enterprise of late Medieval thought. M.-D. Chenu's book is an examination of the ways major scholars dealt with this question up to the time of St. Thomas. What we propose to do in this paper is to continue the examination of this important issue into the 14th century, focusing especially on two theologians with opposing views, Francis of Marchia and Gregory of Rimini.

Theologians dealing with this issue fall into two major camps: 1) those who think theology is a science (scientia); 2) those who think it is wisdom (sapientia).² The formulation of William of Auxerre (d. 1231) and Eudes de Rigaud (d. 1275) put them in the latter camp, although the terminology of their arguments relies heavily on the categories of science understood in its strict sense. St. Thomas gave the question a basic formulation in the opening section of the Summa Theologiae and placed himself among those who think theology is a science. Although his idea of theology as a subalternate science was quickly rejected by most subsequent scholars, nonetheless Thomas' clear presentation of the matter was a factor to be reckoned with in any subsequent discussion of the issue.

It is important to remember that the question of the nature of

² The categories for this classification of theology are borrowed from Greek philosophical terminology. In the form in which the later scholastics used them, they reflect the explanations of science and wisdom found in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and Nicomachean Ethics. The content of these terms is discussed in detail in Chapter one.

theology did not exist in isolation from other major problems of 13th and 14th century philosophy and theology. Two parallel factors were of great importance as stimuli to defining the nature of theology: 1) the need to develop an apologetic theology to use in confrontation with the proponents of Islam; 2) the need to give theology a stature of the magnitude of Aristotelian science, because of the fascination of university students of the time for the subtleties of Greek dialectic. Theology in order to survive as the preeminent discipline of Medieval education had to compete with this new emphasis in learning.

This period was also dominated by discussions of epistemology and questions related to the manner in which man makes judgments about truth and falsity. Almost every treatment of the question of the scientific nature of theology also reflects an author's position on important epistemological issues. For example, discussion of the nature of theology was the context within which William of Ockham advanced his remarkable new ideas on the character of the knowing process. His attempts to recover a pure understanding of Aristotle's perspectives on the nature of syllogistic arguments can be considered one of the major factors in forcing the strong early 14th century point of view that theology is not, in the strict Aristotelian sense of the word, a science.

The methodology used in this paper reflects a current interest among some scholars in getting behind problems as formulated by major intellectual figures and examining directly the arguments of their opponents.³ If we are guided in our understanding of theological

³ This method of interpretation is now being utilized by members of the commission preparing a critical edition of the works of William of Ockham. A good idea of the mechanics of this process can be

problems only by the statement of those problems by the leading intellectual figures, we will be getting less than the full picture. Only by going behind the primary figures of a given period and examining firsthand the source documents of secondary figures who were their opponents can we begin to see the wider context in which arguments were being deliberated. For 13th and 14th century theology, this methodology is handicapped by the fact that most theologians do not identify their opponents by name. Gregory of Rimini, however, is one happy exception, which has made it possible to adopt the methodology in this paper. As more critical editions of major intellectual figures appear, however, this task will become considerably easier.

In this study we shall compare the opposing views of Francis of Marchia and Gregory of Rimini on the question of the nature of theology. By way of introduction we shall also look at three earlier formulations of the question, utrum theologia sit scientia. The ideas of St. Thomas set the tone and format for the discussion as well as provide a position with which all later writers had to deal. Duns Scotus is a transitional figure who, while holding himself within the framework of traditional Thomistic-Aristotelian epistemology, points in some new directions as far as the question of theological knowing is concerned. William of Ockham forges important new clarifications of the process of knowing in general, with the result that a radical epistemological shift occurs. He rejects without qualification the idea of theology as a strict science. Francis of Marchia is a peculiar figure, retaining dimensions

gathered from a reading of several articles dealing with opponents of Ockham whose arguments appear in the early sections of the latter's Ordinatio. See Stephen Brown, "Sources for Ockham's Prologue to the Sentences," Franciscan Studies, XXVI (1966), 36-65; XXVII (1967), 39-107.

of the Thomistic methodology in treating the question of theology's scientific nature while at the same time adding unusual interpretations of basic terminology, e.g., per se nota and necessitas.⁴ Finally, Gregory of Rimini is considered both as critic of Francis and as exponent of the strong Biblical-exegetical position on the nature of theology, typical of the Augustinianism he represented, which foreshadows a point of view that was to play a significant role in theological disputation even to the time of Luther and the German Reformation. All of these writers present strong and complicated arguments for their positions inviting an intense interest on the part of their readers, while at the same time communicating the lively importance of the issue under consideration.

⁴ See below, pp. 54-67, 74-85.

CHAPTER I

Thomas, Scotus, and Ockham: Is Theology Science or Wisdom?

The discovery of new Aristotelian writings, unknown in the Latin West before the twelfth century, played a major role in shaping scholastic theology. This is not to suggest that scholasticism would have been impossible without the new writings from the East. Developments were already underway in the West which, both in form and content, anticipated later developments in the high scholastic period.¹ Expanded knowledge of Aristotle's works, however, provided dimensions which otherwise would have been neglected.

The early Medieval period had some knowledge of Plato and Aristotle, but that knowledge was limited. Through the efforts of men like Boethius and Chalcidius some writings were kept alive in the West. However, the Timaeus, Meno and Phaedo were all that represented the man who had depicted Socrates in the masterful role of gadfly for the human race. As for Aristotle, the Organon was all that penetrated to the West in the early period, and that sometimes not even in its entirety. Only De Interpretatione and the Categories were well known. They formed what was referred to later as the "Old Logic" of early Medieval education.

In the earlier period scholars made no clear distinction between philosophy and theology. Whereas theologians such as Augustine and John Scotus Erigena drew heavily on Platonic ideas, there was no

¹ A helpful introduction to the questions relating to transmission of Greek philosophic and scientific manuscripts from East to West is provided by C. H. Haskins in his The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, 1927), pp. 278-367.

conscious attempt to separate "philosophical questions" from "theological questions." Until the time of Anselm, major interest and study in monastic and cathedral schools had been invested in Biblical exegesis,² drawing out the practical meaning of the Scriptures so that it could be applied to the Christian life.

By the twelfth century this state of things was changing. More and more scholars were coming into contact with Greek writings that were previously unavailable. These new manuscripts were coming from two sources: 1) Arab manuscripts which originated in Syriac Christian communities of former Byzantine provinces; 2) Greek manuscripts brought to Southern Italy, Spain and Sicily as a result of commerce and crusading. The Arabic texts had the double disadvantage of being translated through several tongues (Syriac, Persian, Arabic, sometimes Spanish, finally into Latin) and of being purveyed by an alien religious culture. These translations, along with their Arab commentaries, aroused considerable interest as well as opposition in the West, even to the point that the study of Aristotle was prohibited (without much effect) at the University of Paris in 1210.

The appearance of the "New Logic" (Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics, Elenchi) and the Aristotelian Metaphysics especially as interpreted through the Arab scholar, Averroes, posed a threat to basic Christian beliefs. The Aristotelian view of the world cast doubt upon the notion of the radical contingency of the created order, raised questions about the free and spontaneous nature of God, and challenged the

² This exegetical interest is dealt with in some detail in Beryl Smalley's, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (New York, 1952). See also, M.-D. Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIII^e siècle (Paris, 1969), pp. 9-52.

idea of personal immortality by denying the reality of an individual active intellect in man. It would be unfair to imply, however, that tension over the implications of Aristotle's thought was due only to the fact that he was inadequately interpreted through Arabic eyes. Even when translations of the Stagirite came directly from the Greek (as in the case of the translations of William of Moerbeke upon which Thomas Aquinas relied), there were problems. The Aristotelian idea that the world was eternal was a continuing source of trouble for those Christian scholars who were otherwise attracted to the Stagirite's all-embracing system of thought. Of course, the fact that Aristotle had not been a Christian and could, nevertheless, give a comprehensive view of reality was a source of some perplexity.

For the study of theology, the appearance of Aristotle's entire corpus had two major effects: 1) it undermined the prestige of the theological discipline; 2) as indicated above, it raised serious doubts about basic Christian teachings. Scholars were so captivated by the methodology and epistemological presuppositions of the Stagirite's teaching that the "New Logic" soon overshadowed the other elements of the Medieval curriculum.³ Students preferred the intricacies of the syllogism to the polish of Ciceronian rhetoric. A subtle argument haltingly delivered was admired more than a smooth, persuasive oration. The traditional seven liberal arts gave way to one and Aristotle became exemplar.

³ The struggle between dialectic and grammar for primacy in the liberal arts is celebrated in a mid-thirteenth century poem, The Battle of the Seven Arts, by Henri d'Andeli. For a discussion of the decline of grammar and rhetoric in the wake of interest in Aristotle and dialectic, see the classic study by L. J. Paetow, "The Arts Course at Medieval Universities," University Studies, 3 (Champaign, 1910), 497-624.

As a result of the popularity of Aristotle's doctrines in the schools it was necessary for the Masters and Doctors to study them carefully and consider ways in which these ancient Greek teachings could be reconciled with accepted doctrines of the Christian church. One way in which theologians could meet this growing competition was to define theology itself as a science. Not everyone was agreeable to this solution, nor did all who spoke of theology as a science mean the term in its strictest sense. However, Aristotle's epistemological approach to reality set the norm and all discussions of theology as science had to be considered against that norm.

Among those who found the Stagirite's teaching stimulating and positive (while at the same time retaining a critical attitude) were Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. It is our purpose in this chapter to treat the thought of each of these persons in relation to the question whether theology is a science. We shall use their evaluations of this issue as background for considering the same question by Francis of Marchia. Francis' position will be taken up in Chapter two.

Part 1: Aristotle's Concept of Scientia

First, it is necessary to consider the term, "science," since it carried a meaning in scholastic theology far different from what is meant by the term today. Scientia in its strictest sense was the knowledge attained as the result of a logical demonstration. In the manner of most exercises in scholastic methodology the rules of demonstration were well defined. The notion of demonstration and the rules that guided it were drawn from the writings of Aristotle. According to the

Stagirite, knowledge in its highest sense, demonstratio, was possible only if an argument met four basic conditions: (1) the principles upon which the entire argument rests must be self-evident; (2) the argument's propositions must have necessary objects; (3) what is to be known must be caused by evident causes; (4) the conclusion must be reached through flawless syllogistic reasoning. We should now look at each of these pre-conditions in a little more detail.

Demonstration presupposes a kind of knowledge which is accessible to all. This means that its first principles, those basic propositions which form the foundation for an argument, cannot be information shared by only an elite group, as if given by some special revelation of the truth. A self-evident principle by its actual nature must be so obvious and compelling that anyone who has the mental capabilities to grasp the terms in which it is expressed will see immediately that the principle is true.⁴ A frequent illustration of such a principle is the statement, "every triangle has three sides." The truth of such an observation is apparent to anyone who seeks the meaning of the terms. In itself, it is a definition incapable of demonstration and so, to be useful in logical arguments, must be presupposed.⁵

⁴ Renford Bambrough, ed., "Posterior Analytics," The Philosophy of Aristotle (New York: Mentor Books, 1963), p. 173: "By 'principles' in a class of things I mean those premises of which it cannot be demonstrated that they are the case. We make assumptions about the meaning of ultimate terms and about the premises formed from them. We must assume too that the principles are the case, but everything else (i.e., conclusions) must be demonstrated. That is, we assume the meaning of unit, straight, and triangle; we assume, too, that there are such things as unit and magnitude; but everything else is demonstrated." All the Aristotelian quotes in this chapter are from this translation.

⁵ Ibid., p. 164: "Not all knowledge is demonstrative; knowledge of immediate premises is non-demonstrative. (This is clearly essential:

Self-evident first principles must be carefully distinguished from commonly accepted opinions which, although shared by even the greater mass of people, are nonetheless not self-evident. An opinion, even if 99 % of the people share it, is still an opinion. As long as there is the possibility that one legitimate doubt can be raised about the truth and necessity of a proposition, it cannot qualify as the first principle for a scientific demonstratio.⁶ This does not mean, however, that commonly accepted opinions cannot be used as propositions in a syllogism. A discursive argument in syllogistic form is possible even with propositions stemming from opinions. Such arguments, however, do not yield demonstration, but rather only probable truth.⁷ Correct form does not guarantee the compelling truth of a conclusion reached through a syllogism, but correct form united with commonly agreed upon propositions can result in useful knowledge and even truth of a certain kind.

The second major criterion for a demonstration is that the propo-

if it is necessary to know what is prior--the elements of the demonstration--and there is no infinite regress but a stop at immediate terms, these must be nondemonstrable.) That is our case; and we say not only that there is knowledge but also that there is a starting point to knowledge, whereby we recognize definitions."

⁶ Ibid., p. 169: "There is a further indication that demonstration proceeds from necessary premises; when we make an objection to people who think they are proving something, we say 'it is not necessary,' if we think it possible for the case to be different, or that it may be so as far as the particular argument is concerned. It is clear from this that people are foolish to suppose their principles are valid if they take a received opinion or a truism, as sophists do when they say that knowing is having knowledge. Received opinion is not our starting point; we take the first element in the class of things of which the demonstration is made. Not all truth is of the same family tree."

⁷ Ibid.: "From truths you can make a syllogism without actually making a demonstration; but the only syllogism you can make from necessary truths is by way of demonstrating. This is the function of demonstration."

sitions used must be necessary.⁸ They must express a circumstance or a set of conditions which cannot possibly be otherwise than what is predicated. What is more, the predication must be true in all circumstances.⁹ This severely limits those things about which necessary predication is possible. Individuals within a class or species are excluded from consideration in necessary propositions, since, according to Aristotle, what man knows intelligibly is universal and not particular. The object of our knowledge is always "man" in contrast to "this man" or "that man".

Universal predication also excludes concentration on accidental qualities.¹⁰ While it is true that a brass, isosceles triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, "three angles equal to two right angles" is predicated in a primary sense of triangle alone and not of triangle with the added accidental characteristics of brass and isosceles. Accidental qualities have no place in demonstrative argu-

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 165: "The object of absolute knowledge cannot be otherwise than it is. Therefore, the object of demonstrative knowledge must be necessary. (Demonstrative knowledge is the knowledge we have as the result of having demonstration.) Demonstration, therefore, is by syllogism from necessary premises.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 200: "We mean by universal that which is always and everywhere the case. Since demonstrations are universal, and universals cannot be perceived, it is clear that scientific knowledge cannot be obtained by perceiving. And, clearly, if we could perceive that triangles have angles equal to two right angles, we would still look for proof. We would not have knowledge, though some people say so. Perception must be perception of particular things, but knowledge is getting to know the universal."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-172: "It is clear that if the premises of a syllogism are universal, the conclusions of demonstration, in the strict sense, must also be eternal. Demonstration, or knowledge in the strict sense, does not apply to temporal or perishable things, knowledge of which can be only accidental; the attribute shown is not universal to the subject, but is only true at some times and in some ways."

ments, since any statement made about an accidental quality will be true only so long as the accident, itself, takes the form, shape, and character that is predicated about it. Since such accidental qualities are not eternal, they cannot be used in necessary propositions. The same objections apply to individuals of a species. Individual men are born, change while they live, and then die, but the universal "man" endures as an eternal, necessary object capable of study and argument. "Man" as a universal object of knowledge can be regarded as eternal and necessary in Aristotle's scheme of thought because he treated all genera and species as eternal. This is an essential corollary of his belief that what Christians regard as the "created order" is in actuality an eternal and necessary order. As we will see later in this chapter, this aspect of Aristotle's epistemology caused major problems for Christian theologians.¹¹

A third important condition of demonstration is that it produce knowledge through knowing the causes for things. In fact, to know something is to know its cause. Causes have two characteristics which are essential to the production of knowledge and for understanding them in relation to their effects: they must be prior to the effect and they must be better known.¹² Otherwise an effect would be in the unlikely

¹¹ Since (according to Christian presuppositions) all created things are contingent and dependent upon God who is the only necessary being, it appears that only God could be the object of demonstrative knowledge. This, of course, is impossible since God cannot be known in his essence by any creature. What knowledge of God and the world is possible for man by natural means comes through God's effects, i.e., through contingencies. The Christian notion of the created order makes the application of demonstrative argument very difficult.

¹² Ibid., p. 162: "They [the facts] must also be causes, better known, and also prior: causes because we know when we know the cause;

position of being superior to its cause, which is impossible, and coming before what produces it, which is likewise so.¹³ A syllogism productive of knowledge will consist of propositions which are necessary and which are framed in such a way that they will not only yield a conclusion but also show the reason why the conclusion must be the way it is.¹⁴ In so doing it reveals the cause and thus produces real knowledge,

and if they are causes, they must therefore be prior; and known already, not merely through understanding them but also through knowing that such is the case."

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 163: "Therefore, since we know and believe through the first, or ultimate, principles, we know them better and believe in them more, since it is only through them that we know what is posterior to them . . . If a man neither knows something nor is in a better state than if he did know, it is impossible for him to have more conviction about it than about what he does know. Yet, this occurs if we are convinced by demonstration, but do not know the causes beforehand; then, it is necessary to be more convinced of the starting points (either all or some) than of the conclusion. Complete demonstrative knowledge requires not only that we have better knowledge of the starting points and more conviction about them than about the conclusion, but also that none of the propositions opposed to the starting points (from which propositions there follows the opposite, or false conclusion) must be more certain or better known than the starting points. This is because true, absolute knowledge cannot be shaken."

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 170: "When the conclusion is necessary, there is nothing to keep the middle term of the demonstration from being not necessary. It is possible to reach a necessary conclusion from premises that are not necessary, just as a true conclusion can be drawn from untrue premises. But when the middle term is necessary, so, too, is the conclusion, just as true premises always lead to true conclusions. If A is necessarily true of B and B of C, A must necessarily be true of C. But when the conclusion is not necessary, it is not possible for the middle term to be necessary either. Suppose that A is true of C, but not necessarily true; suppose, too, that A is necessarily true of B and B of C; then A will be necessarily true of C; but this was not what we started with . . . For demonstrative knowledge, there must be necessary facts. Clearly, then, the middle term of the demonstration must be necessary too. If not, we will not know why something is the case, or that something is the case, or that something must necessarily be the case. Either we will think we know when in fact we do not, if we suppose that something is necessary when it is not; or else we will not even think we know, whether we 'know' the fact through middle terms or 'know' the reason why through immediate premises."

or scientia. In the following classical syllogism the middle term functions as the cause and shows the reason for the conclusion which follows necessarily from the premises. "All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal." The middle term "man" functions as the link which binds together the other two principal terms of the syllogism, "Socrates" and "mortal." Because we know self-evidently through an explanation of the terms that Socrates is a man and that every man is mortal, it necessarily follows that the fact that Socrates is a man is the cause of his being a mortal. In Aristotelian terms, to perceive this causal relation is to have knowledge, and to do so in the framework of an affirmative syllogism whose premises are self-evident, whose middle term forms the subject of the first premise and the predicate of the second, is to make a demonstration. Knowledge understood as demonstration (demonstratio) is what medieval scholastics meant by scientia, knowledge understood in its strict sense.

The last condition for the creation of knowledge in its strict sense has already been alluded to a number of times in the above discussion. Demonstration involves a syllogism which produces knowledge.¹⁵ A syllogism consists of two premises, one major, the other minor, whose truth, as we have noted, must be evident to the perceiver upon an explanation of their terms. Both of these premises must deal with objects which are necessary, not contingent, and the two premises must lead the mind of the perceiver to the conclusion with such compelling

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 161-162: " . . . I say here and now that we do know by demonstration. By 'demonstration' I mean a scientific syllogism, and by 'scientific' I mean a syllogism such that we know by grasping it."

necessity that when the conclusion is examined in light of the premises it cannot be doubted. When all these conditions are met the result is demonstration and the highest form of knowledge possible for man.¹⁶

Of course, Aristotle does not deny that other kinds of knowledge are possible. For example, a man can infer a consequent from a previously known premise, an inference which follows from that premise with the greatest force. The conclusion in this case even may be true and necessary, but does not constitute a demonstration, because it fails for lack of the basic syllogistic form, two premises and a conclusion. It is also possible to know something through an immediate rational intuition of the mind, without recourse to any sort of reasoning process.¹⁷ Such rational intuition can legitimately be called knowledge, although not demonstratio. Demonstration requires a discursive process; lacking that, knowledge may be possible, but not knowledge in the strict sense.

To summarize then: if a syllogism is made up of two premises based upon self-evident principles; if a conclusion follows necessarily from

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 162: "If knowing is as we said, scientific knowledge must be derived from true, ultimate, and immediate propositions, which are better known than, prior to, and the cause of the conclusion. In this way, the principles too will be proper to what is being demonstrated . . . Without the above conditions, a syllogism is possible, but not a demonstration, since knowledge will not be produced. The facts, therefore, must be true, since it is impossible to know what is not true: you cannot talk of knowing that $\sqrt{2}$ is a rational number. They must be ultimate and undemonstrable, since otherwise, if you have no demonstrative proof of them, you will not know; and to know (except accidentally) what can be proved is to have proof."

¹⁷ D. Webering, Theory of Demonstration according to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure: New York, 1953), p. 7: "Besides sensation and opinion the Stagirite speaks of 'rational intuition' which is 'an origina-tive source of scientific knowledge.' Rational intuition seems to be an immediate grasp of evident and necessary truth without any reason-ing process, and is, therefore distinct from science which is syllogis-tic, and also distinct from sensation and opinion which do not consider necessary truth."

these premises; if the mind of the perceiver sees the necessity of and the reasons for the progression of argument from premises to conclusion; then a demonstration has been produced and knowledge in its strict sense is secured. For the remainder of this study, when the term demonstratio is used, it will be meant in this sense. All the scholastic theologians considered the question of theologia qua scientia with this basic, strict definition of scientia in mind. They were, of course, forced from time to time to modify some aspects of this strict understanding of knowledge to meet special problems raised by Christian theological presuppositions.

Part 2: St. Thomas on Whether Theology is Scientia

It was St. Thomas' contention that theology is primarily a speculative discipline, dealing principally with God as its object. Theology deals with creatures only secondarily, in so far as they are comprehended in the essential being of God, himself. Since the viator cannot know God in his essence and man's natural knowledge comes only through the senses, the viator is severely limited as to his knowledge of God. ^{Some natural knowledge of God,} however, is possible. As such it is limited by the source of human knowledge, sense experience. A major presupposition of Thomas is that God as primary cause leaves evidence of his causation just as any cause leaves traces of itself in its effect. Thus, knowing God naturally involves perceiving his effects and reasoning back from them to some sort of understanding of his nature. This process constitutes a genus of theology which falls under the aegis of metaphysics.¹⁸ It

¹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Ottawa, 1941), Part I, q. 1, art. 1: "Dicendum quod diversa ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem scientiarum inducit Unde nihil prohibet de eisdem rebus, de quibus

involves a kind of speculation which is valuable for apologetic purposes as a first step in the dialogue with systems of thought that do not share the presuppositions of Christianity and Judaism. However, such knowledge is not adequate for salvation. For this reason theology must include other dimensions of knowledge which will guarantee man's eternal beatitude.

Theology, for Thomas, must also involve the study of the articles of faith as preserved in the Scriptures and taught by the church. Only through a faithful exposition of the doctrines contained in these basic sources can the Christian be assured that the admixture of perversity and error pervading all forms of natural theology will be overcome. This knowledge alone, rooted in Scripture and Tradition, is adequate for salvation.¹⁹ But, is this knowledge, scientia? This is the question we must now examine.

Thomas deals with this matter in part I, question 1, article 2 of the Summa Theologiae. He maintains that sacra doctrina is scientia, with an important distinction observed as to the nature of scientia. The genus, scientia, is to be understood on two levels.²⁰ In a major

philosophicae disciplinae tractant secundum quod sunt cognoscibilia lumine naturalis rationis, et aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine divinae revelationis. Unde theologia quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinet, differt secundum genus ab illa theologia quae pars philosophiae ponitur."

¹⁹ Ibid.: "Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratione humana investigari possunt, necessarium fuit hominem instrui revelatione divina. Quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum homini proveniret; a cuius tamen veritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo est. Ut igitur salus hominibus et convenientius et certius proveniat, necessarium fuit quod de divinis per divinam revelationem instruantur."

²⁰ Ibid., q. 1, art. 2: "Sed sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine

sense it embraces those ways of knowing illustrated by the disciplines of mathematics or geometry. These systems are built upon self-evident principles accessible to all, leading to conclusions that cannot be doubted. On a secondary level are those sciences which do not stem from self-evident premises directly, but which receive their first premises from the conclusions of the higher sciences which are built upon self-evident premises. Therefore, it can be maintained that the second level of knowledge does have its roots in self-evident principles, although not directly. In this way second level knowledge is still able to fulfill one of the basic requirements of scientia, foundation in self-evident principles. According to Thomas, music stands to arithmetic, and perspective to geometry, in just such a relationship. The second level of knowing is "subalternated" to the primary level.

By analogy, Thomas holds that theology, as a derived science, stands in the same relation to a higher science as music to arithmetic and perspective to geometry.²¹ That higher science is the knowledge or scientia of God and the Blessed. God's knowledge of himself is self-evident to himself and clear and direct to those that surround him. As such it has the same character as the first principles of mathematics. When some of that knowledge is revealed to the viator, it takes the

naturali intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geometriam, et musica ex principiis per arithmetica notis."

²¹ Ibid.: "Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo."

form of the articles of faith as recorded in the Scriptures. These articles make up the first propositions of theological discourse. Though not self-evident on their own they are nonetheless grounded in self-evident principles in a secondary way, forming the basis for a subalternated form of knowledge.²² Therefore, knowledge revealed by God forms the foundation for syllogistic arguments which make up the discipline of theology.

Thomas develops this understanding of theology to meet a major objection leveled against theology by its opponents: its principles are not known per se. If this objection is true then, of course, theology cannot qualify as science understood in its strict sense according to the Aristotelian model. Failing this primary test, conclusions drawn from premises grounded in the articles of faith will be probable at best. This outcome is unacceptable to Thomas who shares with all Christian theologians the conviction that theological conclusions are certain. Thus some structure must be devised which puts theological premises in the same category as the self-evident premises of the primary sciences, if only by analogy.

To summarize then: the knowledge God has of himself and the vision of God shared by the Blessed correspond to the self-evident principles of scientia as defined by the Aristotelian notion of demonstratio. The articles of faith which are deduced from the revelation of this primary vision are the first principles in the subalternated discipline known

²² Ibid.: "Omnis enim scientia procedit ex principiis per se notis. Sed sacra doctrina procedit ex articulis fidei, qui non sunt per se noti, cum non ab omnibus concedantur, 'non enim omnium est fides,' ut dicitur II Thess. III. Non igitur sacra doctrina est scientia."

as theology, or sacra doctrina. Once the articles of faith are established, the procedures of argument through syllogism apply as rigorously as if the discursive content were ratios or angles. The outcome of this process is scientia, or knowledge in its strict sense.

Thomas is of course interested in enhancing the status of theology to meet the competition threatened by rising student interest in the study of Aristotle. Equally important for Thomas is the need to strengthen the role of theology as an apologetic instrument against those outside the faith. Theology also needs to be as compelling as possible to serve as an argumentative instrument against wayward thinkers within the church. To this end he offers several other observations on the nature of theology.

Of all the sciences, theology is the most noble on three counts: (1) as a speculative discipline; (2) as a practical one; (3) and as sapientia. As a speculative discipline it is highest for two reasons, first because of the certitude it gives, secondly because of the nature of its subject matter. Human knowledge even though capable of producing demonstratio is necessarily on a lower level than theology because it depends on man's reason which is capable of error.²³ Theology, on the other hand, is derived from the light of divine knowledge which by its nature cannot be in error. Consequently, the certitude which theology gives is "more certain" than the certitude given by natural knowledge. A science can also be ranked according to the object which it examines. According to this scale of value the higher the dignity of

²³ Summa Theologiae, q. 1, art. 5: "Secundum certitudinem quidem, quia aliae scientiae certitudinem habent ex naturali lumine rationis humanae, quae potest errare; haec autem certitudinem habet ex lumine divinae scientiae, quae decipi non potest."

the object the higher the dignity of the science, itself. Since theology treats those matters which are beyond the capacity of human reason and since God as its object is the most worthwhile of all objects, it must also rank as the most noble science as far as dignity is concerned.²⁴

Even though Thomas maintains that theology is principally a speculative discipline, he nonetheless holds that it surpasses all practical sciences, even on their own terms.²⁵ Practical sciences derive their importance from the fact that they concentrate upon understanding the means to some end, e.g., medicine is studied as a means to human health, etc. The ends toward which the practical sciences point are all for the purpose of enhancing the quality of human life. Theology, since it is concerned with man's ultimate end (eternal beatitude), is the most practical science of all. It embraces in an ultimate way that good of man to which all practical sciences point in their own incomplete way.

Finally, theology is regarded by Thomas as wisdom, the man who pursues it as wise. It is wisdom because it judges all other ways of knowing, putting every other type of rational endeavor to the test of divine truth.²⁶ The man who pursues theology is the wisest of men,

²⁴ *Ibid.*: "Secundum dignitatem vero materiae, quia ista scientia est principaliter de his quae sua altitudine rationem transcendunt; aliae vero scientiae considerant ea tantum quae rationi subduntur."

²⁵ *Ibid.*: "Practicarum vero scientiarum illa dignior est, quae ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur, sicut civilis militari, nam bonum exercitus ad bonum civitatis ordinatur. Finis autem huius doctrinae inquantum est practica, est beatitudo aeterna, ad quam sicut ad ultimum finem ordinantur omnes alii fines scientiarum practicarum. Unde manifestum est secundum omnem modum eam digniorem esse aliis."

²⁶ *Summa Theologiae*, q. 1, art. 6: "Et ideo non pertinet ad eam probare principia aliarum scientiarum, sed solum iudicare de eis; quidquid enim in aliis scientiis invenitur veritati huius scientiae

because to be wise is to treat the highest cause in the genus in which wisdom lies.²⁷ Since sacra doctrina treats God primarily, and since God is the highest cause in the universe, those who pursue the knowledge found in theology are the wisest men.

Thomas' position on this matter created some problems. It is undoubtedly true, for example, that the knowledge of God and the Blessed is self-evident to God and the Blessed. It may also be true that some hint of the vision, along with an affirmation of its self-evident reality can be passed on to the viator. But is this demonstration? It is not so in the strict Aristotelian sense. The classical formulation assumes that the same knower knows both self-evident premises and the logically necessary consequences that follow from them. Thomas' treatment forces the existential question, how can the self-evident knowledge of another be knowledge for me? It is true, as Thomas points out, that lower sciences receive their principles from higher sciences almost as matters of faith. But it always remains the case in respect to the sciences used in Thomas' examples that the musician could look into the principles of arithmetic and find out for himself whether or not they are self-evident; an architect could examine the principles

repugnans, totum condemnatur ut falsum; unde dicitur II Cor. X:4: 'Consilia destruentes, et omnem altitudinem extollentem se adversus scientiam Dei.'

²⁷ Ibid.: "Ille igitur qui considerat simpliciter altissimam causam totius universi, quae Deus est, maxime sapiens dicitur: unde et sapientia dicitur esse divinorum cognitio, ut patet per Augustinum XII de Trin. Sacra autem doctrina propriissime determinat de Deo secundum quod est altissima causa: quia non solum quantum ad illud quod est per creaturas cognoscibile, quod philosophi cognoverunt, ut dicitur Rom. 1:19: 'Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis'; sed etiam quantum ad id quod notum est sibi soli de seipso, et aliis per revelationem communicatum. Unde sacra doctrina maxime dicitur sapientia."

of geometry and discover for himself whether or not they are self-evident. Such empirical investigation is not open to the Christian in regard to the articles of faith. It appears that Thomas in his initial formulation has already departed from the strict notion of scientia as demonstratio.²⁸ We shall see that this particular understanding of self-evident principles was an object of attack by Thomas' critics.

Even though Thomas uses the term scientia in referring to the nature of sacra doctrina it is difficult to tell whether or not he intends the word in its strict sense in Part I, question 1 of the Summa Theologiae. Sometimes he uses the term, probatio, to describe the results of discursive activity; at other times the term is, demonstratio. For example, if a theologian is arguing with an adversary and that opponent shares some mutual presuppositions, it should be possible to "prove" the articles of faith by giving reasons.²⁹ If no mutual presuppositions are shared, no proof is possible. Objections to the faith in this case can only be met by counter-explanations.

²⁸ John of Naples (read the Sentences ca. 1315) was one of those who pointed out that Thomas' use of the idea of subalternation is not consistent with Aristotle's use of the term. But unlike the criticism of Scotus and Ockham which concentrates on the psychology of knowing, John's criticism focuses on the object of knowledge. According to John, the Aristotelian idea of subalternation presupposes a different object of knowledge on each level of knowing, while Thomas' description of subalternation presupposes the same object on both levels. See J. Beumer, "Die Kritik des Johannes von Neapel O.P., an der Subalternationslehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin," Gregorianum, XXXVII (1956), 261-270.

²⁹ Summa Theologiae, q. 1, art. 8: "Unde Sacra Scriptura, cum non habeat superiorem, disputat cum negante sua principia; argumentando quidem, si adversarius aliquid concedat eorum quae per divinam revelationem habentur; sicut per auctoritates sacrae doctrinae disputamus contra haereticos, et per unum articulum contra negantes alium. Si vero adversarius nihil credat eorum quae divinitus revelantur, non remanet amplius via ad probandum articulos fidei per rationes, sed ad solvendum rationes, si quas inducit, contra fidem."

When the term "demonstration" is introduced into the argument of this quaestio, its use is decidedly negative. If the contrary of the articles of faith could be demonstrated by the opponents of the Christian faith, then of course the doctrines would be false.³⁰ Thomas, as a Christian theologian, presupposes that the articles of faith are infallibly true. Demonstration of the falsity of the articles of faith is impossible because it is not possible to demonstrate the contrary of what is true. The inability of opponents to demonstrate their falsity is a guarantee of their already accepted truth.

It appears, however, that the Christian is in no better position than his adversary because he also cannot demonstrate their truth. As was indicated above, the viator can only "prove" the truth of the articles of faith, and that only to one who already shares his presuppositions.³¹ The best, it appears, that Thomas can do is to affirm the

³⁰ Ibid.: "Cum enim fides infallibili veritati innitatur, impossibile autem sit de vero demonstrari contrarium, manifestum est probationes quae contra fidem inducuntur, non esse demonstrationes, sed solubilia argumenta."

³¹ Some interpretations of Thomas give the impression that he felt positive demonstration of theological truth was possible. Anton Pegis' translation of a section of question 1, article 8 is a case in point. The text states: "Sed tamen sacra doctrina huiusmodi auctoritatibus utitur quasi extraneis argumentis, et probabilibus. Auctoritatibus autem canonicae Scripturae utitur proprie, ex necessitate argumentando." It is translated: "Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments, but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as a necessary demonstration" Anton Pegis, Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1948), p. 15.

From this translation it appears that Thomas is making an unequivocal statement affirming the Scriptures as the basis for demonstratio. A careful look at the Latin text, however, will not bear this out.

What the text says is that, "it [sacra doctrina] uses the authorities of canonical Scripture properly, arguing from necessity." It was pointed out in the discussion above that demonstration was possible

necessity of the principles upon which theology builds, a necessity that is guaranteed by the fact that the principles are derived ultimately from the revelation of God. But as we have seen above, establishing the necessity of the terms is not enough to insure a demonstration. The principles must also be self-evident to the knower, a point that Thomas cannot allow for the theology of the viator.

Whereas it is problematic whether or not Thomas intends demonstratio to apply to the arguments of sacra doctrina, there is no question as to its application in the arguments for the existence of God. He maintains that it is possible to demonstrate God's existence, if a two-fold understanding of demonstratio is allowed. The first sense of demonstratio is propter quid, or demonstration from the essence of something (what it is) to some conclusion about it. The second sense is demonstration quia, a demonstration that something is, through an examination of its effects.³² Propter quid demonstration presupposes an absolute a priori relation in the order of being, while quia demonstration presupposes priority only in regard to the perceiver. Thus, it is impossible to have a priori propter quid knowledge of God's

only if all four of its elements were present. To say that the canons of Scripture are necessary does not imply that they have the least thing to do with demonstration. For scientia in its strict sense to apply, the principles also have to be per se nota; as we have already observed it is seriously questionable whether Thomas' formulation of the problem meets this basic criteria. Pegis' translation makes Thomas take a stronger stand than the text merits.

³² Summa Theologiae, q. 2, art. 2: "Respondeo. Dicendum quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per effectum et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae sunt priora quoad nos; cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae."

existence since God is absolutely prior to man in the order of being. God's existence, moreover, is identical with his essence which makes the former unknowable to man in its fulness. It can be said that God's existence a priori propter quid is self-evident, but this is true only for God himself. Therefore, the only avenue open to the viator is to inquire through his effects whether or not God exists.³³ This is possible logically through using the effect in place of the name of God as the middle term in the demonstration; the argument from proportionality is handled by admitting that a demonstratio quia can only show that God exists, not what it is that exists.³⁴ Perfect knowledge of God as cause of his effects is not possible, because of the disproportion between infinite cause (God) and his effects (creation).³⁵

It appears from Thomas' argument that demonstration of God's existence is possible through the natural capabilities of men's minds. It is a form of argument open to all men, believer and unbeliever, alike.

³³ Ibid.: "Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam causam eius esse, si tamen eius effectus sint magis noti quoad nos; quia, cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu necesse est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos."

³⁴ Ibid.: "Ad Secundum. Dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti effectu loco definitionis causae ad probandum causam esse, et hoc maxime contingit in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen, non autem quod quid est, quia quaestio quid est, sequitur ad quaestionem an est. Nomina autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendatur: unde, demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio quid significet hoc nomen Deus."

³⁵ Ibid.: "Dicendum quod per effectus non proportionatos causae, non potest perfecta cognitio de causa haberi, sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est. Et sic ex effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse, licet per eos non perfecte possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam."

The argument for God's existence fulfills the conditions for demonstratio according to the Aristotelian model. Does this mean that in his argument for God's existence Thomas establishes the basis for an understanding of sacra doctrina as scientia? Not really. What Thomas establishes here is the foundation for theology as it is pursued in metaphysics. As such its conclusions function as a preamble to faith for those with the sophistication to understand the arguments;³⁶ for those who simply believe through faith what the church teaches, the argument for God's existence is inconsequential.

A comparison of questions 1 and 2 in Part I of the Summa Theologiae suggests that there is a difference between the methodology employed in understanding the truths of sacra doctrina (q. 1, art. 2) and that employed in demonstrating the existence of God (q. 2, art. 3). The principles of sacra doctrina are per se nota to God and the Blessed and revealed to the viator to be used as first principles of argumentation in the scientia of sacra doctrina. In this case theology is a subalternate science. When the existence of God is argued as a problem in metaphysics, however, the per se nota nature of the first principles a priori propter quid are known only to God, himself, but a demonstration is nonetheless possible on the basis of per se knowledge of God's effects, the created world (especially the self-evident notion of change, upon which the manifestior via argument for the existence of

³⁶ Ibid.: "Dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. 1:19, non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos; sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam et ut perfectio perfectibile. Nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui demonstrationem non capit."

God is based). But in this latter instance, while the fruit of the argument is demonstratio, it is of no particular help as far as man's salvation is concerned. Thus, the argument for God's existence in question 2, Part I of the Summa Theologiae must not be considered a model for Thomas' conception of the scientific nature of sacra doctrina. Sacra doctrina is fundamentally a subalternate science whose methodology is quite different from the methodology of the Thomistic metaphysics.

Part 3: Duns Scotus on the Nature of Theology

Duns Scotus rejected Thomas' basic position that theology (sacra doctrina) is a subalternated science. In so doing he was forced to consider the Thomistic arguments, which he answered, and then went on to reformulate the problem in a way that forged a new direction for understanding utrum theologia sit scientia.

In his treatment of the question, Scotus clarifies two points which are present in Thomas' writings, although not specifically elaborated. There is first a careful explanation of terms, i.e., how scientia in its strict sense will be understood.³⁷ The conditions outlined are those of the Aristotelian model. Secondly, a careful distinction is made between God as he is known to himself (or to an intellect proportionate to grasping the divine essence) and God as he is known to the viator.

³⁷ P. Carolo Balić, ed., Opera Omnia Ioannis Duns Scoti (Vatican City, 1950), vol. 1, Prol. , pt. 4, q. 1, p. 141: "Ad primam quaestionem dico quod scientia stricte sumpta quattuor includit, videlicet: quod sit cognitio certa, absque deceptione et dubitatione; secundo, quod sit de cognito necessario; tertio, quod sit causata a causa evidente intellectui; quarto, quod sit applicata ad cognitum per syllogismum vel discursum syllogisticum."

The former is known as theologia in se;³⁸ the latter, theologia nobis.³⁹

The former treats of God as he is in his essence and as he is known by the beatus; the latter treats what can be known of God through divine revelation with a view to bringing man to his ultimate end, the vision of the Blessed. It can be seen immediately that these are not notions which distinguish Scotus from Thomas; they both held these fundamental distinctions, with perhaps the exception that Thomas put more emphasis upon the speculative and contemplative experience of the Blessed, while Scotus stressed the importance of the will in loving God. Scotus, in the section of his Sentences commentary under consideration, simply makes the distinctions clearer.

Furthermore, he makes a distinction (not found in Thomas) between the nature of the knowledge God has of himself, and the knowledge the beatus has of him. According to Scotus, God's knowledge of himself satisfies all the conditions for scientia strictly understood, except the last one on Scotus' list, discursiveness.⁴⁰ God's knowledge of

³⁸ Ibid., pt. 3, q. 3, p. 135: "Ideo dico aliter, quod theologia divina est de omnibus cognoscibilibus, quia obiectum primum theologiae suae facit omnia alia actu cognita in intellectu eius, ita quod si in primo signo naturae est essentia sua primo cognita intellectui suo, et in secundo signo naturae quiditates continentes virtualiter veritates proprias, in tertio signo sunt istae veritates, virtualiter contentae in illis quiditatibus, sibi notae"

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 137-138: "De theologia nostra dico quod ipsa non est actualiter omnium, quia sicut theologia beatorum habet terminum, ita et nostra, ex voluntate Dei revelantis. Terminus autem praefixus a voluntate divina, quantum ad revelationem generalem, est illorum quae sunt in Scriptura divina, quia--sicut habetur in Apocalypsi cap. ultimo--qui apposuerit ad haec, apponet ei Deus plagas quae apponuntur in libro isto. Igitur theologia nostra de facto non est nisi de his quae continentur in Scriptura, et de his quae possunt elici ex eis."

⁴⁰ Ibid., pt. 4, q. 1, pp. 141-142: "Haec apparent ex definitione 'scire' I Posteriorum. Ultimum, videlicet causatio scientiae per discursum a causa ad scitum, includit imperfectionem, et etiam potentia-

himself and of his creatures is immediate; he does not need the syllogistic process to know himself. It is different, however, with the beatus. He has discursive knowledge of God because of the habit of knowing he has already learned as a viator; thus, his knowledge can be understood as scientia in the strict sense (demonstratio).⁴¹ In the article where he asserts that the first principles of theology are the per se knowledge of God and the Blessed, Thomas makes no distinction in quality between the scientia of the Blessed and the scientia of God.

The distinction which Scotus makes between the knowledge of the beatus and the knowledge of God is a minor difference between the two theologians, however, when we consider Scotus' understanding of the nature of the theological knowledge appropriated by the viator. Scotus rejects the idea that the higher knowledge which God and the Blessed possess serves as the first principles in the science of theology.⁴² Scotus rejects altogether the idea of subalternation. Theologia in se and theologia nobis, though related, do not exist in a hierarchical relationship in which the former serves as the epistemological guarantee

litatem intellectus recipientis. Ergo theologia in se non est scientia quantum ad ultimam condicionem scientiae; sed quantum ad alias tres condiciones est scientia in se et in intellectu divino."

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 143: "Sed omnis veritas causata in intellectu nostro per aliquid prius naturaliter notum causatur per discursum, quia discursus non requirit successionem temporis nec ordinem ipsius, sed ordinem naturae, videlicet quod principium discursus sit prius naturaliter notum, et ut sic sit causativum alterius extremi discursus.

Hoc potest concedi, videlicet quod beatus vere potest habere scientiam theologiam quantum ad omnes condiciones scientiae, quia omnes condiciones scientiae vere concurrunt in cognitione eius."

⁴² Ibid., pt. 4, q. 2, p. 146: "Ad secundam quaestionem dico quod haec scientia nulli subalternatur, quia licet subiectum eius esset aliquo modo sub subiecto metaphysicae, nulla tamen principia accipit a metaphysica"

for the scientia of the latter.

Theologia in se is for all practical purposes closed to the viator. Man on his earthly pilgrimage can have no knowledge of God as he is in himself. It is true that the question of God can be treated under the discipline of metaphysics by utilizing as a common point of reflection the univocal concept of being. As an object of study in metaphysics some things can aliquo modo be understood about God. But what is possible in metaphysics is clearly separate from the sort of knowledge Scotus intends by his understanding of theologia in se. Whatever man is capable of discovering through the exercise of reason in metaphysics can never be construed as approaching the knowledge God has of himself, nor the knowledge he reveals to the viator. No principles of theology either in se or nobis are derived from metaphysics. "Nulla passio theologica demonstrabilis est in ea per principia entis vel per rationem sumptam ex ratione entis."⁴³

As for theologia nobis, it must be understood within a framework consistent with the nature of God's revelation and with the ability of man to receive that revelation. To help put his understanding of theologia nobis in perspective, Scotus raises four major objections against what he considers mistaken notions of the nature of that theology:⁴⁴

(1) Those who say that theology is subalternate also say that scientia cannot stand with faith; the same persons say that because it is subalternate, it can stand with faith. Scientia, therefore, both can and cannot stand with faith; the argument is contradictory; (2) The scientia

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 148-149.

of God can only be one, as proved by Thomas himself; (3) Scientia depends upon subject or object or light, according to the reason of cause. As far as the understanding of the viator is concerned, the beatus has no reason of cause. Therefore, the beatus cannot be the source of any knowledge for the viator; (4) Where the higher knowledge ends, the lower knowledge begins, and there is no common principle between the two. What is usually meant by the term "subalternating principles" is universal principles from which conclusions are deducted; subalternated knowledge, popularly understood, has its roots in sense experience. Since the beatus does not function by sense and the viator does not see the vision clearly, there can be no communication between the two realms giving demonstratio, i.e., scientia in the strict sense.⁴⁵ This does not mean, however, that the viator is left without any knowledge of God, nor does it mean that because what knowledge he has is not scientia, it is uncertain. Herein lies the force of Scotus' reinterpretation of the term, scientia.

The term "knowledge" can be variously defined. It received a number of different formulations in Aristotle himself. The one we have been considering (scientia as demonstratio) appears in Book I of the

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 149: "Praeterea, scientia subalternans non est primo de eisdem veritatibus vel praedicatis scitis, quia ibi incipit subalterna ubi desinit subalternans; sed haec potest esse de eisdem de quibus est scientia beatorum; igitur etc.--Praeterea, habens scientiam subalternatam potest habere subalternantem; in proposito utrumque est impossibile; ergo etc. Maior patet quoad utrumque: primo, quia habens principia de conclusione potest scire conclusionem; similiter patet secundum, quia principia subalternantis sunt universaliora, et sic ordine cognitionis intellectualis prius nota, quia ibi secundum huiusmodi non proceditur a magis notis sed a sensu. Minor etiam patet quoad utrumque membrum: sicut viator non potest clare videre, sic beatus non potest habere sensum."

Posterior Analytics.⁴⁶ Aristotle considered some additional possibilities in Book VI of the Ethics.⁴⁷ It is one of these alternate definitions which Scotus chooses as a more adequate expression of the content of the term, scientia, when applied to theologia nobis. The term is sapientia, wisdom. For Aristotle, sapientia means knowledge about the highest things. It is the wisdom characteristic of the philosophers who concern themselves with the highest good of man, rather than with matters of practical interest. Scotus found this definition congenial for at least two reasons: (1) it provided an understanding of scientia more acceptable to his convictions about the proper end of man; (2) by allowing for a departure from the strict notion of demonstration, it provided a place for the concept of contingency, an essential element in the Christian view of the universe.

Theology is sapientia because it is practical. It deals with man's deliberative nature as he faces moral decisions with a view to ultimately disposing the will to love God completely. Consequently, the emphasis in Scotus is much less on speculative considerations than was true of Thomas. Man's true end for Scotus involves loving God as well as knowing him.

⁴⁶ Posterior Analytics, pp. 161-162: "We shall say later whether there is another way of knowing. I say here and now that we do know by demonstration. By 'demonstration' I mean a scientific syllogism, and by 'scientific' I mean a syllogism such that we know by grasping it."

⁴⁷ Bambrough, op. cit., Book VI, Ethics, p. 346: "Let us start at the beginning and discuss them again. The means through which the soul comes to the truth, whether in affirmations or in denials, are five in number. They are the following: technique, science, practical sense, wisdom, and intelligence. (In the case of supposition and opinion, it is possible to go wrong)."

Aristotle, as was noted above, held that the world is eternal and that knowledge involves grasping the meaning of universals, concepts which stand for the eternal realities, genus, species, etc. These eternal realities endure even though the individuals which make awareness of the universal possible change or die. Concentrating as he did on these eternal aspects of what otherwise appears as constantly changing reality, Aristotle did not have to concern himself with the problem of contingency. Christian theology, however, deals with contingents. God is the only necessary being and all things depend upon him. What he does he does freely, without the constraint of necessity. Since everything except God is contingent and since Christian history catalogues a stream of contingent historical events which are reputed to be essential to man's salvation, how can any knowledge, either God's or the viator's, be considered scientia? Scientia in its strictest sense involves necessary knowledge. But how can there be necessary knowledge of contingents?⁴⁸ The notion is contradictory.

Scotus solves this problem by admitting the contradiction and saying that God does not have necessary knowledge of contingents; nor does the viator through any revelation from God. Therefore, scientia in its strict sense is excluded from application to either theologia in se or theologia nobis. However, God does have true and certain knowledge of

⁴⁸ Balić, op. cit., Prol., pt. 4, q. 1, p. 144: "Sed dubium aliud est in ista quaestione, quia ad theologiam pertinent contingentia sicut et necessaria. Quod patet de theologia nostra, quia omnes articuli de incarnatione sunt de contingentibus, in theologia etiam beatorum, quia omnia cognoscibilia de Deo in respectu ad creaturas extra sunt de contingentibus. De contingentibus autem non videtur posse esse scientia, patet ex definitione scientiae; igitur videtur quod theologia tota ut extendit se ad omnia illa contenta non possit habere rationem scientiae, sive cum discursu sive non."

contingents and he sees the events in himself as contingent.⁴⁹ The element of necessity still remains, but Scotus transfers it from the object of knowledge to the knower.⁵⁰ Instead of saying "God knows (scientia) contingent events as necessary," the proper way of putting Scotus' formulation would be to say, "God, as a necessary being, knows contingents as contingent." The transfer of meaning from scientia to sapientia saves the freedom of God and man at the same time it preserves the certainty of the knowledge in question. The Scotistic structuring of the question simply moves the matter of necessity from the realm of demonstration to the realm of perception, from the object to the eternal mind that perceives the object.

In summary, we can say that Scotus' contribution to the basic question is two-fold: (1) his rejection of theology as subalternated science, making it impossible for demonstratio in any sense to be a part of the theological enterprise; (2) his reformulation of the notion of theology as sapientia, with its accompanying benefits for Christian thinking: a) preservation of the idea of contingency; b) restructuring of the idea of necessity; c) emphasis upon the practical dimensions of the faith.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 145: "Hoc patet, quia omnia contingentia theologica nata sunt videri in primo obiecto theologico, et in eodem nata est videri coniunctio illarum veritatum contingentium. Visio autem extremorum veritatis contingentis et unionis eorum necessario causat evidentem certitudinem de tali veritate evidente."

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*: "Si igitur aliqua alia cognitio est certa et evidens, et, quantum est de se, perpetua, ipsa videtur in se formaliter perfectior quam scientia quae requirit necessitatem obiecti. Sed contingentia ut pertinent ad theologiam nata sunt habere cognitionem certam et evidentem et, quantum est ex parte evidentiae, perpetuam."

Part 4: The Nature of Theology According to William of Ockham

William of Ockham must also be numbered among those who rejected the idea that theology is a strict science. While it is true that he did admit the possibility, de potentia Dei absoluta, that theology could be scientia, this observation must be considered in the light of his wish to protect in every way the idea of God's omnipotence, rather than to provide a norm for conceiving theology as it must normally be pursued by the viator.⁵¹ For the Christian, bound as he is to sense experience as the basis for his natural knowledge, human existence puts natural limitations on what he can know about God, making him dependent upon God's revelation for those elements necessary for salvation, namely infused faith and the ability to believe. Since the appropriation of these elements of the Christian faith is only possible de potentia Dei ordinata through the channels of grace which God has provided they cannot be regarded as foundation for a system of knowledge leading to scientia. Why theology de communi lege is excluded from knowledge as scientia will become clearer as we examine Ockham's objections to those who consider theology as science.

Ockham accepted the basic Aristotelian idea that scientia involves demonstratio.⁵² He did, however, make several modifications in the idea

⁵¹ G. Gál and S. Brown, eds., Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio Guillelmi de Ockham (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1967), Prol., q. 7, p. 187; "Contra conclusionem principalem in qua omnes istae opiniones concordant arguo: primo, quod quantumcumque de potentia Dei absoluta posset esse scientia proprie dicta de veritatibus theologicis, et forte in aliquibus ita sit de facto quantum ad aliquas veritates, tamen quod non sit secundum communem cursum"

⁵² Quoted in D. Webering, op. cit., p. 3: "Oportet autem in principio scire, quod secundum doctrinam Aristotelis demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Ista enim definitio: 'Syllogismus faciens

of demonstration which were departures from the way it was understood by scholastics up to that time. His two major contributions involved a modification / of the idea of necessity and a redefinition of the object of knowledge. We have already seen how the Christian notion of the contingency of the created order caused problems regarding the use of contingent terms in a syllogism. Scotus solved the problem by considering all contingents as they are perceived by a necessary being, God, thus making it possible to consider them within the framework of certain and true knowledge, although not strictly within the framework of scientia. Ockham, on the other hand, treated the matter as a problem in the logic of propositions. His solution was to make a necessary proposition out of a contingent one by putting it in the form of a conditional statement. Such statements, asserted as possibilities, fulfilled one of the major conditions for a scientific syllogism: it made the statements logically necessary. For example, the statement "every man is mortal" is not a necessary statement because, from a Christian point of view, the creation of man is not a necessary assumption. It is not necessary that man exist at all; and should man cease to exist the statement "every man is mortal" would cease to be true. Any statement that has the potentiality of ceasing to be true with a change of circumstances cannot be a necessary statement. But if the statement is expressed conditionally, as a possibility, it ceases

scire,' est definitio exprimens quid nominis istius termini 'demonstratio.' Et ideo sicut in omni disputatione et veritatis inquisitione oportet significata vocabulorum supponere, ideo volenti tradere notitiam demonstrationis et partium suarum oportet praemittere, quod per hunc terminum 'demonstratio' importatur, quod non est aliud quam definitionem exprimentem quid (nominis) declarare."

to be contingent and can function as a logically necessary proposition. Thus the statement, "every man is mortal" becomes "if there is a man, he is mortal." Utilizing this logical device it is possible to have scientific knowledge about the world without admitting the Aristotelian presupposition concerning the world's eternity.

The second major contribution Ockham made to the field of epistemology was his observation that what we know is not the essence of a thing, but rather propositions which signify something about an object. He thereby rejected the Aristotelian idea of abstraction and opened the way for concentration upon the individual existing object as the primary object of cognition. Intuitively man knows basic objects; out of these perceptions he forms concepts and organizes them into propositions which are the real focus of knowing. This point of view represents a tremendous shift in perspective in the field of epistemology which was to have far reaching effects in the discipline of logic.

For our purposes, however, his solution to the problem of necessity in scientific arguments is more important. Does his approach to the problem mean that it is possible to make demonstrations of theological arguments? Having met the objections to the Aristotelian model raised by the Christian presupposition of contingency, can theological propositions be argued to conclusions which have the force of scientia? Ockham does not think so, because even if an argument can meet the criterion of necessity, no theological premise can meet the other important criterion of scientific argument, per se knowability.

Ockham uses a very common argument against the per se nota character of theological propositions. If theological premises were self-evident, that would mean that anyone, whether Christian or not, could

see that they were true and necessary. That being the case, the infidel would be in as ready a position for believing the principles of theology as any devout believer. But if anything is self-evident it is the fact that the infidel does not accept the principles of theology as self-evident. Therefore, these principles cannot be known per se.

According to Ockham there are three basic sources of knowledge. Man knows things (1) per se; (2) per 'per se'; (3) or through experience. All three ways are reliable sources of information for all men. This means that the infidel can know as well through these means as any faithful Christian.⁵³ Since, therefore, the infidel obviously does not share the same convictions in regard to theological conclusions as the faithful Christian, the principles of theology cannot be per se nota or per 'per se nota'. Within the range of normal human experience, any intuition which is possible for the faithful is possible for the infidel. If the normal channels of human experience provide the viator with knowledge of God adequate for salvation, the same must hold true for the infidel. Since the infidel obviously does not share the knowledge of God necessary for salvation its source must be through a

⁵³ Gál and Brown, op. cit., Prol., q. 7, pp. 187-188: " . . . arguo primo sic: omne quod est evidenter notum, aut est per se notum; aut notificatum per per se nota; aut per experientiam mediante notitia intuitiva, et hoc mediate vel immediate. Sed nullo istorum modorum possunt ista credibilia esse nota. Quia non sunt per se nota, manifestum est; tunc enim essent nota infidelibus. Nec notificantur per per se nota, quia tunc quicumque infidelis ordinate interrogatus de eis assentiret, secundum beatum Augustinum I Retractationum, cap. 8. Nec sunt nota per experientiam notitia intuitiva mediante, quia omnem notitiam intuitivam quam habet fidelis habet infidelis; et per consequens quidquid potest fidelis scire evidenter mediante notitia intuitiva et infidelis, et ita infidelis posset evidenter scire ista credibilia."

body of experience or information not mutually shared. Consequently, theological principles are not rooted in either knowledge per se nor common human experience.

The Venerable Inceptor offers another argument against the per se nota character of theological principles. If they were known per se, there would be a compelling character about them which would prevent their denial by a simple decision of the will. But it in fact happens that basic theological principles can be denied by a mere act of the will, even by theologians.⁵⁴ From this it must be concluded that the basic principles of Christian theology are not per se nota.

Were the habit of theology based upon principles known per se, two consequences would follow which are unacceptable to classical Christian formulations. The first is that faith would be unnecessary. Anything which can be known self-evidently does not need the habit of faith to confirm its reality. Knowledge in its strict sense, i.e., scientia, excludes the necessity of believing. The second consequence following on the per se nature of theological principles is that the infidel would be able to argue, fight for, and defend the Christian faith as well as any Christian theologian, provided he were simply raised properly in the faith. If he acquired the same historical and

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 192: "Praeterea, quicumque scit evidenter aliquod complexum, non potest dissentire illi complexo solo imperio voluntatis, sed oportet quod persuadeatur per rationem fortius moventem intellectum suum ad dissentiendum, vel oportet quod obliviscatur alicuius evidenter noti. Sed theologus quantumcumque studuerit in theologia, solo imperio voluntatis potest dissentire credibilibus etiam sine ratione fortius movente; quia nulla ratio ex falsis potest fortius movere quam ratio ex veris evidenter notis; nec oportet quod obliviscatur alicuius ad hoc quod dissentiat. Ergo non habet notitiam evidentem respectu alicuius talis."

didactic information to which all Christians are exposed, he should be able to do everything required to serve as an apologist for the faith. Of course, neither of these consequences reflects accurately the real nature of Christian theological presuppositions. Ockham holds that the infidel is able to do anything the Christian theologian can do regarding the habit of theology, short of actually believing.⁵⁵ All the aspects of Christian learning which make up acquired faith are theoretically open to the non-believer, which means that he could go through the formalities of theological argument. But he would never believe the articles of faith, i.e., have infused faith, merely on the strength of being exposed to and learning well the fundamental principles of Christian theology. Belief is not a function of grasping the principles of theology as self-evident truth; belief is a matter of God's grace.

Ockham also rejected St. Thomas' conception of theology as subalternated science. It is impossible, Ockham maintains, for the conclusions of an argument to yield more firm knowledge than the principles on which it is based.⁵⁶ Yet, it was Thomas' position that the

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 194: "Primum probatur: quia nullus habitus ponendus est in nobis nisi qui potest convinci ex aliquo actu nobis manifesto vel ex auctoritate Scripturae; sed nec per aliquem actum nobis manifestum nec per auctoritatem Scripturae potest convinci talis habitus; igitur etc. Prima pars minoris patet, quia omnem actum, praeter actum credendi, quem habet fidelis potest habere infidelis, si esset nutritus inter christianos vel exercitatus in theologia. Patet inductive. Secunda pars patet, quia non invenitur in Scriptura quod respectu credibilium sit nisi fides. Ideo dico quod omnem notitiam actualem tam complexam quam incomplexam, praeter solam fidem, quam potest habere fidelis potest etiam habere infidelis."

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190: "Primo sic: habitus principiorum est notior et evidentior habitu conclusionum, ergo impossibile est quod principia tantum credantur et conclusiones sciantur. Antecedens patet: quia unumquodque propter quod aliud scitur, magis scitur, hoc est evidentius cognoscitur; igitur praemissae semper evidentius cognoscuntur quam conclusiones."

principles of theology are believed by the viator, although they are known per se by God and the Blessed. Theological principles are second-hand information for the viator, but evident knowledge for the Blessed. According to Thomas, these believed principles lead to certain knowledge. Following the Aristotelian model, per se propositions lead to scientia, bearing in mind of course that the first principles of theology are based upon a revelation of the per se knowledge of God and the angels. In a demonstration, however, knowledge is on a higher level than belief; progression in demonstrative arguments is always from higher to lower. Thomas' formulation results in a reversal of this normal order. Hence, Ockham concludes that the subalternation analogy of St. Thomas is incorrect.

For Ockham, another difficulty with the concept of subalternation is that it does not mean in Christian theology what it means when used by Aristotle. It is impossible that one being should know evidently and another conclude from that knowledge demonstratively.⁵⁷ What Thomas sees as holding together logically from the standpoint of relations of systems of knowledge does not hold together when it comes

Praeterea, sicut se habet opinio principiorum ad opinionem conclusionum, ita se habet notitia evidens principiorum ad notitiam evidentem conclusionum. Sed impossibile est aliquem opinari conclusionem propter praemissas nisi opinetur praemissas. Igitur impossibile est quod aliquis sciat evidenter conclusiones propter principia nisi sciat, hoc est evidenter cognoscat, principia.

Praeterea, quicumque scit evidenter aliquam conclusionem propter principia, scit evidenter eam sequi ex necessariis; igitur scit evidenter illa principia esse necessaria; ergo evidenter scit illa principia."

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 199: "Unde nihil est dicere quod ego scio conclusiones aliquas, quia tu scis principia quibus ego credo, quia tu dicis ea. Et eodem modo puerile est dicere quod ego scio conclusiones theologiae, quia Deus scit principia quibus ego credo, quia ipse revelat ea."

to the psychology of the knower himself. If the knower does not have within himself the ability to apprehend principles evidently, then it is impossible for him to make a demonstration. (Although theoretically it might be possible for a demonstration to be made, if only systems are considered. Thus, a person would not have to understand the self-evident principles of mathematics to be a practitioner of music. Yet, as was pointed out above, the self-evident nature of mathematical principles are always accessible to the musician who "believes" them. But if a demonstration exists and there is no one to perceive it as a demonstration, what good would it be?) Ockham rejects as existentially impossible and naive the situation in which one person knows per se and another arrives at a demonstrative conclusion on the basis of "belief" in that knowledge.

Thomas, it will be recalled, stressed the dignity of theology which stems from the fact of its certitude. Ockham also agrees that theology has the greatest degree of dignity because of its certitude, but maintains that it is not the certitude of scientia that makes theology so praiseworthy. Certitude can be understood according to two aspects: (1) pro adhaesione; and (2) pro evidentia.⁵⁸ The former involves the certitude characteristic of conviction, when one clings to something because of his commitment to it. In this sense of certitude, theology clearly excels. The second kind of certitude is the sort that follows

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 200: "Et quando dicitur quod excedit alias et secundum dignitatem materiae et secundum certitudinem, dico quod istud argumentum aequaliter probat quod principia sciuntur evidenter, quia illa excedunt et secundum certitudinem--quia non subduntur rationi humanae--et secundum dignitatem materiae ita bene sicut conclusiones. Ideo dico quod certitudo accipitur vel pro adhaesione vel pro evidentia. Primo modo excedunt, non secundo modo; ideo etc."

upon the grasp of self-evident truth, as in mathematics or logic.

Theology is not concerned with this kind of certainty.

Whenever a theologian is making a case for the nature of theology he quotes the Fathers of the church. The early theologians, especially Augustine, sometimes referred to theology as science (although without meaning it in its strict sense as demonstration). Scholastic theologians anxious to give theology as much prestige as possible eagerly seized upon these references to strengthen their case.⁵⁹ Ockham acknowledges that it is true that the Fathers called theology by this name. However, he maintains that it is because they actually misused the term and extended its meaning.⁶⁰ They did not intend by so doing to imply that theological argument results in demonstration.

In summary then, Ockham redefined the idea of necessity so that it could apply to contingent objects; maintained that the object of knowledge is a proposition, not the essence of a thing; rejected the idea that theology is subalternated science; rejected the notion that the principles of theology are known per se.

We can conclude this chapter by looking at some of the ways in which Thomas, Scotus and Ockham resemble one another on their views of theology and some of the ways in which they differ. All three of them

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 183: "Tertio sic: I ad Cor. 12:8: Alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae etc. Sed ista scientia, cum sit donum supernaturale, non potest esse nisi respectu veritatum theologicarum necessariarum; ergo etc."

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 206: "Ad tertium: quod Apostolus extendit nomen sapientiae et nomen scientiae ad habitus quibus scitur quomodo Scriptura debet exponi, defendi, roborari etc." Ibid., p. 200: "Ad aliud, quod omnes Sancti vocant eam scientiam extendendo nomen scientiae ad notitiam certam et habitum apprehensivum illorum quorum--quantum est ex se--nata est esse scientia et sapientia."

had a generous commitment to theology as a discipline of the schools. As such, they were interested in theology as an academic enterprise, more than as a tool for preaching to the faithful. To that end they all labored to portray theology as an activity enjoying the highest dignity of any endeavor within the capabilities of man. All three were caught up in the many-faceted debates which arose as a result of having to come to terms with Aristotle: Thomas as synthesizer of Christian thought and Aristotelian philosophy, Scotus as a transitional figure, Ockham as critic of Islamic accretions to Aristotle's epistemology. Each in their own way accepted what they felt they could of the Stagirite's thought and then modified the Greek inheritance to fit the framework of Christian presuppositions to which all were committed. In this latter regard, nothing was stronger than the acceptance of the necessity of revelation for salvation and of the indispensability of the Scriptures as the source for Christian apologetics. Finally, it should be noted that all three made a basic distinction between theology as an enterprise undertaken by the Christian believer in a state of faith and philosophy which could be undertaken by anyone (which through metaphysics could even embrace a dimension of theology, although it lacked the saving character of the theology of the Christian believer).

As we dealt with the way each treated the question of the scientific nature of theology, several important differences emerged which give each author his own special character. There is a major division between those who treat theology as a discipline on a par with science understood in the strict sense and those who understand theology as scientia on a secondary level of knowledge.

Thomas stands as the supreme representative of those who insist on the scientific nature of theology in its proper and strictest sense. Faced with the overwhelming presence of Aristotelian ideas in the university communities of Europe he attempted not only the task of synthesis of Aristotelian and Christian ideas but also tried to make a case for theology which would put it on an equal footing with Aristotelian methodology, even on the latter's terms. His theory of theology as a subalternate science is an attempt to hold theology within the framework of the most prestigious level of knowledge accepted by the scholars of his day. As we shall see in the next chapter, Francis of Marchia was still carrying on this tradition almost fifty years after Thomas' death, although with important variations that also make his actual position distinctively different from Thomas'.

The second major group, represented by Scotus and Ockham, still find the knowledge classifications of Aristotle helpful for categorizing Christian theology, but they reject the characterization of theology as knowledge in the strict sense (demonstratio). It is a credit both to the ingenuity of these scholastics and the broad flexibility of Aristotle's thinking that Christian theologians were able to find within Aristotle's writings a category of knowing which met the conditions of a respectable epistemological standard while at the same time allowing for the peculiar character of the Christian revelation of God and the world. In both Scotus and Ockham there is a movement toward greater precision in the use of terms along with a conscious effort to define the terms used in their discipline. Both these figures manage to shift the basic framework of the entire discussion of theologia qua scientia so as to preserve the competitive advantage of

Christian theological ideas in the face of an attractive but alien point of view.

CHAPTER II

Francis of Marchia: Theology as Science and Wisdom

Francis of Marchia was an academic contemporary of William of Ockham who read the Sentences at the University of Paris ca. 1320.¹ There is not a great deal of information available on Francis. What secondary materials do exist treat him very briefly, often in ways that do not contribute to a clear understanding of his thought. Major exceptions to this statement are the writings of A. Maier and M. Clagett which deal with Francis' contributions to the theory of mechanics.²

¹ The exact date is not known certainly. F. Stegmüller gives 1319/20 in his Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi (Würzburg, 1947), I, p. 105. C. Michalski says 1320. A. Lang and Am. Teetaert, on the basis of the Explicit of MS. VII, C 27 (B. N., Naples), put Francis' reading of the Sentences before 1320. The text of the Naples manuscript reads: "Explicit fratris Francisci de Marchia super primum Sententiarum secundum reportationem factam sub eo tempore, quo legit Sententias Parisius anno Domini 1320." A correct dating of Francis' lectures depends upon the punctuation between the words "Parisius" and "anno" in this text. If there is a full stop after "Parisius," that would suggest that the date given is the publication date of the manuscript rather than the date of the termination of the lectures. A direct examination of the manuscript will be necessary to make a decision on this point. If C. Michalski is correct in his judgment that MS. VII, C 27 (B. N., Naples) has been revised and expanded by Francis himself and if the date mentioned above refers to the publication date of the manuscript, then a date earlier than 1320 would have to be chosen. How much earlier would depend upon whether Francis revised Book I immediately or waited until he had finished Book II.

² A. Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome, 1951); M. Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, 1959). Clagett includes a translation from two articles of Book IV of the Sentences which sets forth Francis' understanding of the theory of violent motion. Francis rejects Aristotle's theory that motion can be explained by the activity of the medium through which an object moves. Instead, Francis accounts for motion by a force imparted to the object by the original mover. The theory has some similarities to the impetus theory of Jean Buridan. C. Michalski ("La physique nouvelle et les différents courants philosophiques au XIV^e siècle." Bulletin international de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences

In respect to his theological positions, however, there is very little solid information.

Francis goes by many names in the sources. He is variously from Marchia, Pignano, Apiniano, Ascoli (Esculo, Asculanus), and Rossi (Rubei). All of these place names suggest the diocese of Ascoli-Piceno in the March of Ancona (the area between Rimini and Ascoli on the east coast of Italy). According to Am. Teetaert, Francis was actually from Appignano. Some scholars, understandably confused by this array of names, have thought they referred to several different people rather than to one man.

History has given Francis the title, Doctor Succinctus. He appears to have exerted some influence (mostly negative) on a number of scholars, among them the Augustinians Alphonso Vargas and Gregory of Rimini; the Carmelites Henry of Oyta, John Brammart and Paul of Perougia; John of Basel, John of Rodington, and the anonymous author

et des Lettres (Cracovia, 1929), pp. 140-141) has drawn just such a connection between the two men. However, Clagett denies that Francis is explicating impetus theory according to Buridan's meaning, since Francis holds that the force imparted to a moving object is not permanent. Instead, it is a virtus derelicta. Francis also allows that the medium through which an object is traveling may have some effect on the object's motion. In this regard he still retains a vestige of the Aristotelian theory. On this issue Francis appears to be a transitional figure between the Aristotelian idea of violent motion and the impetus theory of Buridan.

The discussion of violent motion occurs while Francis is considering the question, Utrum in sacramentis sit aliqua virtus supernaturalis insistens sive eis formaliter inhaerens. It is an indicator of the wide range of interest of scholastic theologians that a set of theological lectures is the locus for a major theory of physics. This suggests the need to put such theological writings into as large a social and intellectual context as possible so that the interaction of social, theological and philosophical ideas can be seen in its fullest clarity.

of the manuscript, Vat. lat. 1113.³ Scholars reported to be more receptive to Francis' ideas were John of Reading, Walter Chatton and William of Rubione. The latter is known to have been a student of Francis. One of the editions of Francis' Sentences commentary carries William's name, clearly identifying the latter as author of a reportatio of Francis' commentary.⁴

Francis was a Franciscan who became deeply involved in the conflict over apostolic poverty which was disturbing the church in the early fourteenth century. He signed a statement while at Avignon in 1328 protesting the position of John XXII on this issue and eventually had to flee for safety to the court of Louis of Bavaria at Pisa.⁵ There

³ All these opponents, except Paul of Perugia, are mentioned briefly by A. Lang, "Die Wege der Glaubensbegründung bei den Scholastikern des 14. Jahrhunderts," Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Münster, 1930), XXX, 98-100. Gilson in his History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1955) states that Francis of Marchia had an influence upon John of Rodington in regard to the questions of the certainty of knowledge and divine illumination, but Gilson does not say whether that influence was positive or negative.

⁴ For a discussion of the various manuscripts, see Stegmüller, op. cit., pp. 106-7; Am. Teetaert, "François de Pignano," Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (Paris, 1909-1950), cols. 2106-2108; F. K. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia (Münster, 1925), pp. 253-259; A. Lang, op. cit., 89-90; Michalski, op. cit., 94-95. Michalski divides the manuscripts into two major classifications based upon the number of questions found in Book I of the several manuscripts he examined. One group contains considerably more questions than the other leading him to speculate that the longer manuscripts represent a revision of a reportatio by Francis himself. Am. Teetaert has pointed out that while there is great variation among the manuscripts in regard to Books I and II, Books III and IV show greater consistency. This has led him to surmise that there has been a double redaction of Books I and II, one by William of Rubione, Francis' student; the other by Francis himself.

⁵ Francis supported the position that Christ and his followers had no private or common property and that the Franciscan Order should follow the same practice. Since this point of view had been proclaimed

he joined Ockham, Bonagratia and Cesena in the struggle of Louis against the pope. When pressures mounted against Louis in Italy and his court moved to Munich, Francis went along with it. From this northern retreat Francis wrote his own protest against John XXII, entitled Improbatio contra libellum Domini Johannis, que incipit "Quia vir reprobus."⁶ In 1341 Francis fell into the hands of the Inquisition, duely confessed, and was reconciled with the church and his order. L. Wadding provides us with his confession, dated 1344.⁷ The year of Francis' death is not known.

Francis' treatment of the major question of this paper, whether theology is scientia, appears in the Prologue of his Sentences commentary. In this paper we have utilized B. N. lat. 15,852 as the major manuscript source.⁸ The treatment of major issues will follow the general format of Francis' manuscript. To that end the main argument will be divided into three sub-headings: 1) the nature of theological principles; 2) basic epistemological considerations, i.e., the nature of knowledge, categories of knowing; 3) Francis' under-

a heresy in 1323, its expression resulted in Francis' excommunication by Pope John XXII, along with Bonagratia, William of Ockham, and Michael Cesena.

⁶ The Incipit and Explicit of this treatise in 46 articles has been printed in an article by A. Heyse, "Descriptio Codicis Bibliothecae Laurentianae Florentinae" (S. CRUCIS, PLUT. 31 SIN., Cod. 3), Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, vol. xi (1918), 254-255.

⁷ L. Wadding, Annales Minorum, VII (Quaracchi, 1932), pp. 371-372.

⁸ All quotations are from my own transcription of Francis of Marchia, Sent. I, Prol., quaestio 3 (B. N., lat. 15,852, folios 6^r-8^r). Words and phrases in parentheses are marginal insertions into the text. Brackets are reserved for my own readings, additions and questions.

standing of the character of necessary propositions.⁹ His conception of the nature of theological principles is important for understanding the degree to which he sees theology as a rational activity of the human mind and the degree to which he understands it as rooted in Biblical revelation. The section on epistemology will give some hints as to his relation to the dramatic epistemological shift that was underway at that time, especially as represented by Ockhamism. As we shall see, Francis' treatment of the idea of necessity injects a new dimension into that concept which we have not encountered in previous discussions.

The way in which Francis treats the nature of theology reflects some limitations and distinctions which have already been encountered in our discussion of the writings of Scotus. Like Scotus, he makes a distinction between theologia nobis revelata and theologia in se. At this point in his Sentences commentary Francis' is dealing with theologia nobis revelata to the exclusion of other possibilities. Consequently, discussion of theology as metaphysics is excluded, along with its ever-present question as to whether or not the infidel can share the same knowledge with the viator. Also excluded is theologia in se, God's knowledge of himself and the knowledge he bestows upon the Blessed. Francis is here concerned directly with whether the theology revealed to the viator is a scientific habit within him.¹⁰

⁹ An examination of these sub-questions will help us determine where Francis should be placed in the spectrum of opinion already considered in the above discussion of Thomas, Scotus and Ockham. In the following chapter we will add the viewpoint of Gregory of Rimini.

¹⁰ Francis of Marchia, Liber Primus Sententiarum, q. 3 (B. N. lat. 15,852, f. 6^{va}): "Ad quaestionem principalem respondeo quod (et dico

Part 1: The Nature of Theological Principles

Theology, like every other area of human investigation, has certain basic starting points without which the discipline would be impossible. Such starting points are truths formulated into propositions which in turn provide the basis for discursive activity. Principles are the essential kernels of an argument. In any consideration of theologia nobis the source for theological principles is the revelation from God, i.e., the Sacred Scriptures. All Medieval theologians were in agreement that theological principles stemmed from this source, although there was sometimes disagreement as to whether the principles should be restricted to the statements of Scripture or should also include propositions that could reasonably be deduced from the Scriptural statements. In orthodox theology generally the latter view prevailed. The statements, "God is three and one" and "God ought to be worshiped" are examples of theological principles. They are the fundamental building units of theological discourse.

It is now necessary to examine Francis' understanding of the nature of theological principles. He first suggests two possible positions: 1) theological principles rely entirely upon authority for their truth and are therefore simply believed by the viator; 2) theological principles are per se nota, accepted as true by the mind through the immediate act of apprehending the terms of the theological proposition which ex-

quomodo) non quaerit de theologia viae acquisita vel possibilem acquiri per intellectum humanum, quia talem habitum posset acquirere unus infidelis. Sed quaerit praecise de theologia nobis revelata; nec de theologia revelata in se, sed quantum ad nos, utrum scilicet theologia nobis revelata sit habitus scientificus in nobis."

presses them. It is Francis' contention that theological principles are both. They are believed by the faithful Christian on the authority of the revelation from God, and they are also known per se through grasping the meaning of the terms of the statement expressing such principles. How Francis comes to this outlook will be more clear as we consider his treatment of several opposing views.

The two alternative poles which Francis is comparing here are the Thomistic position of theology as subalternate science and the Biblical-exegetical position of theology as belief.¹¹ The subalternate view holds that theological principles are per se nota to God and the Blessed,¹² while the Biblical-exegetical view holds that the principles of theology are simply believed on the divine authority of revelation, and as such are not per se nota either to the understanding or the senses.¹³

¹¹ Ibid.: "Ad primam quaestionem dicitur quod principia theologiae viae non sunt per se nota in lumine proprio sed tantum sunt per se nota in lumine patriae et credita in lumine viae; (dicit) ideo est scientia subalternata. Alius, quod principia eius non sunt per se nota in lumine proprie viae sed tantum credita. Sed propter hoc non est scientia subalternata."

¹² Ibid.: "Prima opinio est quod theologia viae nobis revelata est scientia proprie dicta, non simpliciter sed est scientia subalternata scientiae dei et beatorum; et ideo est secundum istam opinionem quia scientia simpliciter procedit ex principiis per se notis in lumine proprio. Theologia autem viae non procedit ex principiis nobis per se notis sed tantum creditis nobis et per se notis in scientia dei et beatorum. Ideo non est scientia simpliciter sed subalternata."

¹³ Ibid.: "Alia est opinio quod theologia viae non est subalternata nec scientia simpliciter sed tantum est quidam habitus creditus. Ratio est quia omnis scientia procedit ex principiis per se notis [ad] intellectum sicut in scientia subalternante vel [ad] sensum sicut in scientia subalternata. Theologia autem viae procedit non ex principiis per se notis nobis ad intellectum nec ad sensum quia non cadit sub sensu. Ideo non est scientia simpliciter nec subalternata."

These two positions are not entirely antithetical, however, since they agree on the manner in which the viator grasps theological principles. Even though the principles are per se nota to God and the Blessed, the viator still grasps them through the act of believing.¹⁴ Thus, the subalternate view and the Biblical-exegetical view come to the same pass as far as the role of the viator in appropriating theological principles is concerned.

For Francis, these two views of the nature of theological principles and the process by which they are appropriated have serious drawbacks. While he agrees that the principles of theology are indeed believed by the viator, he contends that these same principles are also affirmed as self-evident.¹⁵ His criticism of both St. Thomas and those of the Biblical-exegetical school is not that they are totally wrong as far as the nature of theological principles is concerned, but that they are not completely right. Theological principles are not only believed, but are also self-evident. We must now look at the reasons Francis offers for his position.

Francis marshalls six arguments to support his contention that theological principles are per se nota. It will be seen as the arguments are described that they all share the same fundamental methodology. They begin with a basic presupposition about the certitude of

¹⁴ Ibid.: "Iste duae opiniones concordant in hoc, quod principia theologiae pro statu isto sunt nobis tantum credita et non per se intenta [intellecta?]. Quia si essent per se nobis intenta [intellecta?] non indigemus fide ad tenendum ea; quamdiu autem sumus in via indigemus fide."

¹⁵ Ibid.: "Et arguo quod tantum catholicus non credat articulos fidei sed etiam intelligat veritatem ipsorum."

the viator's theological knowledge and then reason back from there to discover the nature of the principles necessary to produce that result. For example, Francis maintains that every Christian believes indubitanter.¹⁶ It is an accepted characteristic of Christian theology that the viator grasps the principles of the faith without doubt. To do otherwise is to sin, for doubt is equal to sin. In the framework of Francis' epistemology, nothing can be held without doubt unless it is known per se. Consequently, the principles of theology which are held indubitanter must be self-evident.

It is readily apparent that this argument reasons from effect to cause. Francis does not consider the content of a proposition on its own merits and deal with the question of whether or not it would stand the test of self-evidentness according to Aristotle's understanding of the term (i.e., be evident to the knower upon an appropriation of the meaning of the terms). Instead he treats propositions in a functional way, considering how they are used rather than what they contain. He seems to give a higher priority to how they are used in argument and preaching than to what they might mean in isolation to any random perceiver, either pagan or Christian. This represents the introduction into theological discourse of a very peculiar understanding of the idea of self-evident knowledge. For the moment we will hold any speculation as to the implications of this point of view and go on to

¹⁶ Ibid.: "Sic nullus tenetur indubitanter credere quod non est per se notum nec sibi deductum ex aliquo per se noto. Sed quilibet catholicus tenetur (indubitanter) credere articulos fidei. Ergo sunt sibi per se noti vel deducti evidenter ex aliquo per se noto. Sed omnis notitia deducta evidenter ex per se notis est scientia proprie dicta. Igitur theologia viae est scientia proprie dicta."

some further considerations of Francis' discussion. What is most important to bear in mind at this point is that Francis' argument for the self-evident nature of theological principles proceeds from the nature of belief (effect) to the nature of the principles which cause it. The remaining arguments for this point of view will bear this out.

Our author points out that it is an accepted rule of argumentation that the certitude of the knowledge one has of the conclusion of an argument cannot exceed the certitude of the knowledge of the premises upon which it is based.¹⁷ The conclusions of theology are infallibly certain. Within the genus of knowledge the only knowledge that could produce infallibly certain conclusions is that which is known per se. Therefore the principles of theology must be known per se.

Furthermore, he observes, no one believes anything unless he establishes it for himself as authoritatively deserving belief. If an article of faith is in question it is not established for the believer merely because he wants to believe it. Rather, the truth of the article is established because of some higher principle which overwhelms the mind and makes it impossible not to believe.¹⁸ According to Francis,

¹⁷ Ibid., q. 3, (f. 6^{va-b}): "Nullus tenetur firmitus adhaerere conclusioni quam sit certitudo notitiae propter quam adhaeret conclusioni. Pater quia conclusio non debet excedere certitudinem principii. Sed omnis qui assentit alicui conclusioni totaliter assentit sibi propter aliquam notitiam quam habet de illa conclusione; aliter autem frustra assentiret illi conclusioni plus quam conclusioni oppositae. Igitur non tenetur firmitus assentire conclusioni quam sit certitudo notitiae propter quam assentit. Sed nulla notitia circa conclusionem non per se notam vel deductam ex per se notam est certa infallibiliter in genere notitiae. Ergo nullus tenetur credere indubitanter illud quod non est per se notum nec deductum ex per se noto. Licet teneatur credere probabiliter; catholicus autem tenetur non tantum probabiliter sed et indubitanter, quia qui dubitat (in fide) infidelis est"

¹⁸ Ibid., q. 3, (f. 6^{vb}): "Confirmatur, quia nullus credit aliquid

this is a more fitting way to believe because the truth is arrived at in an authoritative manner, rather than from the simple wish to believe. But there remains the possibility that knowledge arrived at in this fashion could be said to be more certain than faith itself. However, it is a presupposition of Francis' theology that no knowledge, except what is known per se, is more certain than faith. Consequently, the knowledge to which faith responds must be known per se.

The two remaining arguments are very similar. One of them is an observation on the relation between a cause and its effect; the other a comment on the consequence of a thing in relation to the thing itself. An effect can never be greater than the cause which produces it. Since the assent of faith is the effect of the knowledge concerning the thing to which it assents, that to which it assents must be at least as firm as faith itself.¹⁹ Francis had established in a previous argument that nothing was more firm than faith, except a self-evident proposition. If faith in this instance is the effect, then its cause has to be of a higher order. Consequently, the principles (cause) upon which the assent of faith (effect) rests must be per se nota. Further, the con-

nisi quia constat sibi illud et non e contrario. Non ideo constat sibi quia credit, sed e contrario; ideo credit quia sibi constat ex hoc articulo propter unumquodque tale et illud magis. Sed quicumque credit ideo credit convenienter quia constat sibi auctoritater. Igitur notitia qua constat sibi (antecedenter) debet esse certior ipsa fide. Sed nulla notitia est certior ipsa (fide) nisi notitia scientifica. Ideo nullus tenetur credere indubitanter illud quod non constat sibi pro certo nec (est) per se notum vel ab eo deductum. Igitur, et caetera."

¹⁹ Ibid.: "Confirmatur, quia effectus non debet excedere causam. Sed assensus fidei est quidam effectus notitiae de re cui assentitur. Igitur assensus non debet esse firmior notitiae praeambulae [?]."

sequence of a thing cannot be more perfect than the thing itself.²⁰ 60

The assent of faith is a consequence of the knowledge which inclines the mind to assent. This consequence cannot be more certain than that knowledge on which it is based. Since the certainty of the assent of faith is the outcome and since only self-evident knowledge is on a higher order than faith, that which produces assent must be per se nota.

It is a curious thing that Francis, throughout the above arguments, insists on using the phrase, per se nota, even though strictly speaking the propositions he is describing are not self-evident in the usually accepted meaning of the term. He seems to be concerned primarily with a prevailing quality of certainty characteristic of the belief of the viator, which he feels can only be expressed by using the terminology of demonstrative logic even though the process under consideration is not demonstratio in the strict sense of the term. Francis appears to be doing the same thing Thomas was attempting: to give theological argument a prestigious boost by suggesting that it has qualities comparable to demonstratio, although not strictly meeting its criteria in every sense. While rejecting Thomas' particular arguments for theologia qua scientia, Francis nevertheless used his methodology.

Francis turns next to the character of propositions themselves and the ways in which they are presented to the understanding. He says that as far as anything pertaining to faith is concerned, it can be presented to the understanding in one of three ways: 1) per se notum in falsitate; 2) per se notum in veritate; 3) modo medio, neither true

²⁰ Ibid.: "Confirmatur, item quia sequaela rei non debet esse perfectior ipsa re. Sed assensus fidei est quaedam sequaela notitiae inclinantis ad assensum. Igitur non debet esse certior notitia."

nor false. An example of the first instance is the statement, "God is not." The statement, "God is," illustrates the second. That God may exist or that he may not is the sort of statement which falls into the category, modo medio. From the standpoint of the apprehension of the believer, anything proposed to his intellect per se notum in falsitate is disbelieved without doubt; anything proposed per se notum in veritate is believed without doubt; whatever is proposed modo medio can only be received as probable. It is a presupposition of the Christian faith that whatever is proposed to us in the Sacred Scriptures is not proposed as probable.²¹ What is contained in the Scriptures certainly is not per se notum in falsitate;²² therefore, the articles of faith which are proposed in the Scriptures must be per se notum in veritate. They are proposed to the intellect in this extreme mode and held "indubitanter without the scruple of hesitation."²³

²¹ The word "probable" carries several different meanings in scholastic theology. It can mean simply opinion, i.e., a notion someone has about something, one's own particular point of view. It can also refer to truth arrived at by proof other than demonstration. Although Aristotle was used as the ideal criterion for questions related to knowability, it was assumed that it was also possible to know things and be certain of things that could not be demonstrated. Usually when the term "probable" is used among scholastics, it means "capable of proof, but not capable of demonstration." D. Webering, *op. cit.*, p. 177: "Besides the demonstrative syllogism Ockham admits the sylogismus probabilis in which a 'probable' conclusion is deduced from 'probable' premises. But 'probable' has in Ockham's works not the modern meaning of uncertain as too many historians have concluded. To be probable a proposition for Ockham must be neither a first principle nor a conclusion of a demonstration but it must be necessary and true. Hence it excludes falsity and error and produces certain and necessary, though not evident, knowledge."

²² An article of faith, however, could be enclosed in a statement which is per se nota in falsitate, the sentence, for example, "the statement 'God is three and one' is false."

²³ *Ibid.*: "Ex hoc articulo quilibet tenetur indubitanter non credere

Having presented his arguments for the per se nota characteristic of theological principles 1) on the basis of arguments from effect to cause, and 2) on the basis of the way in which matters pertaining to faith are presented to the intellect, Francis then turns to a consideration of the nature of the habit of faith itself. He offers several alternative views as to the nature of this habit to give additional weight to his initial contention, that the principles of theology are per se nota.

It is possible to conceive of faith as a habit ex se determined neither to truth or falsity, unless it would be directed to either truth or falsity by some other mediating habit. Of course, it is also possible that a habit of this sort, undetermined, could be directed to truth or falsity by chance. Taking into consideration, however, that the faith of the viator by definition must be determined to truth, and considering further that faith to be classified as a virtue cannot be subject to whim and chance, Francis concludes that faith must be determined through another habit which reflects the truth.²⁴ It is

illud quod proponitur sibi per se notum in falsitate, quia quilibet tenetur indubitanter non credere quod deus non est. Igitur similiter quilibet tenetur indubitanter credere illud quod proponitur sibi tamquam per se notum in veritate, quia quilibet tenetur indubitanter credere quod deus est. Igitur quilibet tenetur similiter credere modo medio quod proponitur sibi modo medio, quia sicut extremum ad extremum et medium ad medium. Sed illa quae proponuntur nobis in sacra scriptura (nos) non tenemur credere modo medio tantum scilicet probabiliter, sed tenemur credere ea modo extremo, scilicet indubitanter sine scrupulo hesitationis. Igitur illa non proponuntur nobis modo medio sicut probabilia sed modo extremo sicut per se notum vel a per se noto in veritate."

²⁴ Ibid.: "Sed fides quaecumque quantum est ex se et ex formali ratione sua est neutrum ad verum et falsum, sicut et opinio. Quia fides quantum est ex se potest esse falsa sicut vera. Igitur fides non determinatur praecise ad verum nisi per alium habitum determinate respi-

already apparent from what we have seen of Francis' argumentation that opinion does not adequately reflect truth. What is called for then is a scientific habit determining the habit of faith and reflecting the truth. That such a habit is at the root of faith makes faith, itself, a scientific habit in the proper sense.

There were some theologians, however, who did not regard the habit of faith in any of the above senses, i.e., 1) as per se, 2) indetermined ex se, or 3) determined by a true scientific habit. Rather, they thought of faith as being determined to truth ab extrinsico from a first truth that is neither able to deceive nor be deceived. Francis is willing to grant that the habit of faith can be conceived in this way, i.e., that the articles of faith are revealed from a first truth which is outside and above the articles themselves. But, then, in keeping with the general tenor of his argument on this point, he inquires about the nature of the knowledge gained. Is the assertion, that the articles of faith are revealed from a first truth, itself per se nota? If so, his initial hypothesis is saved and theology must be considered as scientia in the proper sense.²⁵ Otherwise, the viator is placed in the

cientem verum nisi a casu. Sed fides nostra praecipue determinatur ad verum et sibi non potest ibidem esse falsum; et non a casu quia tunc non esset virtus, cum virtus non debeat a casu. Igitur determinatur praecise ad verum per alium habitum determinate respicientem verum. Talis autem habitus non est opinio, quia opinio non respicit determinate verum. Igitur talis habitus est scientia proprie dicta."

²⁵ Ibid., q. 3, (f. 6^{vb}-f. 7^{ra}): "Contra, tu incidis in illud quod vis vitare aut concedendes propositum quia quaero a te aut articulos fidei esse revelatos a prima veritate est aliquid in se notum seu deductum a per se noto aut non est per se notum nec deductum ex per se noto. Si primo modo, igitur illa theologia procedit ex per se notis et omnis conclusio deducta ex per se notis est scientia. Igitur ista theologia est scientia proprie dicta."

position to which St. Thomas consigned him, receiving a revelation of a proposition that is self-evident to someone else. This revelation is definitely not per se nota nor would any proposition deducted from it be so either. Since the viator in Thomas' scheme of things is left with no first form of knowledge that is known per se, the best that can be said is that he believes, although not without doubt. Francis again affirms that to believe without doubt presupposes first principles known per se. Lacking that, knowledge without doubt is impossible. In like manner, if the habit of faith is not grounded in principles known per se then it will not be possible for the viator to hold the truth of the articles of faith without doubt.

Francis clings to his original assertion that if faith is to be determined to truth it must be grounded in principles which are known per se.²⁶ The further reason at this point is that it is not possible for the intellect to know that it is determined to truth if the revelation from the first truth comes without additional knowledge about its nature. The focus here seems to be on satisfying the human intellect that what it affirms through faith is indeed determined to truth and not to falsity. That what is revealed to the intellect is true depends upon this important connection between what is revealed and the first truth. If we assume, as Francis does, that the outcome is true, then according to the principle that the conclusion cannot be more certain than the medium, what is revealed from the first truth

²⁶ Ibid., q. 3 (f. 7^{ra}): "Igitur fides non determinatur ad verum a prima veritate revelante nisi hoc esse revelatum a prima veritate sit per se notum."

must be per se nota.²⁷ By now the progression of the argumentation should be familiar. In fact, Francis himself notes that all his stated reasons for affirming the per se nota character of theological principles come to this: no one is held to adhere more firmly to the conclusion than to the medium through which one arrives at the conclusion.²⁸ The viator does not believe that what is revealed comes from God unless he comes to that knowledge through some other medium. It is not possible to believe the conclusions more firmly than one believes the first principles. The conclusions, of course, are believed without doubting. Since the conclusions are infallible and certain in the genus of knowledge there is no way that they could be produced except by principles known per se.

Two companion arguments further support this position. No one can be expected to believe that something is revealed from God unless that fact establishes itself through some other knowledge.²⁹ Such knowledge,

²⁷ Ibid.: "Confirmatur, quia maior et minor extremitas non magis uniuntur [?] inter se quam causa media. Sed quod hoc revelatum sit verum apud intellectum dependet ex connexione illius ad primam veritatem. Igitur quod sit verum non potest esse certius quam [quod] sit certum quod hoc sit revelatum a prima veritate. Sed illud ultimum quod est revelatum a prima veritate non est per se notum nec deductum ex per se noto per te. Igitur nihil est hic determinatum et certum per quod deberet determinari fides praecise ad verum."

²⁸ Ibid.: "Item omnes rationes stant quod nullus tenetur firmitus adhaerere conclusioni quam medio, sed tu non credis quod sit revelatum a deo nisi propter aliam notitiam quam habes de hoc. Igitur non teneris firmitus credere hoc [quin ?] quod sit illa notitia per quam credis. Sed hoc teneris credere indubitanter. Igitur ista notitia est certa et infallibilis. Sed nulla notitia citra notitiam per se notam vel deductam ex per se noto est certa et infallibilis in genere notitiae. Igitur illud est per se notum vel deductum ex per se noto."

²⁹ Ibid.: "Item alia ratio stat quia propter unumquodque tale et illud magis, sed nullus tenetur credere quod haec sit revelata a deo nisi constat sibi per aliquam notitiam quod haec est revelata a deo."

since it is prior, must be more certain than the faith by which the viator affirms the truth of what is revealed. But a major presupposition of Christian theology is that no knowledge is more certain than faith, unless it be what is known per se. Therefore the knowledge that something is revealed from God is per se. Secondly, Francis reasserts that the viator holds his conviction concerning what is revealed from God through an extreme mode, not a middle mode. It will be recalled that the modo medio yields opinion while the modo extremo yields knowledge per se, either false or true. According to Francis, the conviction that what is revealed comes from God is held per se notum in veritate. Consequently, theology must involve a scientific habit and be scientia proprie dicta.³⁰

The final argument for the per se nota position rests on the familiar scholastic appeal to the impossibility of a regressus ad infinitum. For Francis, it is not possible to proceed to infinity through an endless succession of belief-objects. The movement backward through a chain of hierarchical principles must have an end (although he leaves open the question whether the primum creditum is one or many).³¹ As-

Igitur illa notitia propter quam credo [?] erit certior fide. Sed nulla notitia est certior fide nisi notitia per se nota vel ex alio deducta ex per se nota. Igitur quod hoc sit revelatum a deo est per se notum vel deductum ex per se noto."

³⁰ Ibid., q. 3, (f. 7^{ra-b}): "Item tertia ratio stat quia quod proponitur solum per se notum in falsitate debemus indubitanter discredere. Similiter illud quod proponitur solum per se notum in veritate tenemur indubitanter credere. Igitur illud quod proponitur medio modo tenemur medio modo credere. Sed quod hoc sit revelatum a deo tenemur credere modo extremo et non modo medio. Igitur proponitur nobis modo extremo et non modo medio."

³¹ In so doing he seems to be aligning himself with the position of Ockham, who held that whereas it is possible to demonstrate the

suming the existence of the primum creditum, he then inquires about the way in which it is assented by the viator. The options are two: either per se or on account of another per se, on the basis that no object of an inferior order can cause assent to an object of a superior order.³² The primum creditum is assented propter se, which is the manner in which objects known per se are assented. If the primum creditum were not propter se it would involve the contradiction of moving the human intellect to assent to a higher plane than its own nature, which is impossible. As a result, the primum creditum is known per se.

We can, therefore, summarize this section by saying that Francis: 1) held that theological principles are per se nota; 2) maintained that the principles are not simply believed, but also known in a scientific way; 3) argued against theology as subalternate science; 4) based his argument for the self-evident nature of theological principles on a posteriori arguments from effect to cause.

existence of a conserver of the world, it is doubtful whether it can be demonstrated whether it is one or many.

³² Ibid., q. 3, (f. 7^{rb}): ". . . nullum obiectum inferioris ordinis potest causare proprium assensum obiecti superioris eo modo quo obiectum causat assensum aliquem. Sed obiectum quodcumque per se notum est superioris ordinis in genere cognoscibilium [?] obiecto non per se noto. Igitur obiectum non per se notum non potest causare proprium assensum obiecti per se noti. Sed assentire alicui propter se est proprius modus assentiendi obiecto per se noto, quia obiectum per se notum non habet alium modum assentiendi proprium quam quod assentitur sibi propter se; unde sicut obiecto noto per aliud assentitur propter aliud, ita obiecto noto propter se assentitur propter se. Igitur obiectum non propter se notum non potest movere intellectum ad assentiendum sibi propter se quia tunc moveret ad sensum perfectiorem suo assensu proprio."

Part 2: Epistemology

In the short discussion of epistemological matters that occurs in the middle portion of this quaestio, Francis makes a fundamental distinction between knowing objects and knowing propositions about objects. He appears to put the discussion within the context of scientia by using the term, demonstrare, to express the logical process he has in mind although his choice of the term here may be accidental. Francis points out that it is one thing to demonstrate some passio concerning an object;³³ it is quite another to demonstrate the truth of a proposition affirming the inherence of the aforementioned passio in its subject.³⁴ If the secondary human attribute of 'risibility' is taken as an example, it is one thing to affirm the existence of a capacity in man for laughter; it is another matter to affirm the truth of a proposition which states that man is capable of laughter. Francis appears to be making a distinction between the truth or falsity of an attribute as a natural concept and the truth or falsity of an attribute as a proposition which expresses a natural concept.

This is a distinction we have already encountered in Chapter One's discussion of the epistemology of William of Ockham.³⁵ Ockham made a

³³ A "passio" is a proper attribute of a subject. By "proper" is meant that it does not have an accidental relation to the subject about which it is predicated, such as "whiteness" would have to "chair." A proper attribute is one that can be predicated of a subject universally, as "risibility" is of "man."

³⁴ Ibid.: ". . . aliud est demonstra[re] passionem aliquam de subiecto. Aliud est demonstrare veritatem propositionis de ipsa propositione in qua passio probatur de subiecto, quia sicut subiectum est aliud a propositione et passio subiecti est alia a passione propositionis, ita aliud est concludere propriam passionem de aliquo subiecto; aliud est concludere passionem propositionis de ipsa propositione in

significant contribution to the theory of knowing when he denied that the human intellect knows the essence of a thing and instead considered knowledge as apprehension and judgment of propositions about things. It is strange, however, that Francis would use the term demonstrare to refer to the process of affirming or denying a natural concept. Apprehension of an object (and assigning a term to it) is only the first step in the process of scientia and demonstration in Ockham. Intuitive cognition of a single object or attribute (in this case a man laughing) is only one of the building blocks of propositions and not something demonstrable in itself. Francis appears to make the fundamental Ockhamist distinction between an apprehension of the real relation between things and the affirmation or denial of statements made about those relations. But he does not use the term demonstrare in the way we would expect of a follower of Ockham, in light of the discussion in Chapter I of Ockham's understanding of scientia. Unfortunately, there is so little material on this problem in Francis' discussion of this question, that it is difficult to make a judgment of the extent to which he is actually reflecting Ockham's theory of knowledge. Some firm conclusions on this matter may be forthcoming when a thorough study of Francis' epistemology can be made.

Francis distinguishes four levels of knowing. The first is knowledge which makes an a priori conclusion concerning the passio of a

qua affirmatur passio de subiecto; verbi gratia, aliud est concludere quod homo sit risibilis, aliud est concludere quod ista propositio 'omnis homo est risibilis' sit vera quia in prima deductione concluditur risibilitas de homine quae est passio eius."

³⁵ See above, Chapter I, p. 39.

subject, and then on the basis of that makes an a priori conclusion concerning the truth of a proposition concerning the passio of the subject.³⁶ He gives no example to illustrate this category. What he seems to be talking about, however, is the knowledge characteristic of the higher sciences such as mathematics or geometry.³⁷

The second level is knowledge which concludes a passio concerning a subject a posteriori but concludes the truth of the proposition concerning the subject a priori. This involves coming to knowledge first through effects or signs, i.e., through experience, and then using this base for the formation of logical arguments which produce demonstrative knowledge.³⁸ In some respects this category seems to be very similar to the one developed by Ockham in which, as a result of reasoning on the basis of a limited, contingent experience, one can express the outcome in a conditional, potential statement that can be used as a necessary premise in a demonstrative syllogism.

The knowledge which the beatus has is an illustration of the third basic level of knowing. Since he knows per se that every revelation

³⁶ Ibid.: ". . . enim est scientia quae concludit a priori et propter quid passionem de subiecto et concludit ex consequenti a priori veritatem conclusionis in qua probatur propria passio de subiecto conclusionis, sicut sunt communiter scientiae subalternantes quia utraque concludunt a priori et passionem de subiecto et veritatem conclusionis de conclusione sed unum immediate, aliud mediate."

³⁷ Sent. I, Prol., q. 1, art. 4, (f. 50). This is the interpretation which Gregory of Rimini makes regarding this level of knowledge in his recital of Francis' basic argument. "Nam quaedam scientia immediate et a priori concludit passionem de subiecto et mediate etiam a priori concludit propositionem enuntiantem illam passionem de subiecto esse veram, sicut geometria concludit a priori et immediate quod anguli trianguli equivalent duobus rectis. Deinde ex hoc tanquam ex causa et per consequens a priori concludit quod illa propositio est vera et tales communiter sunt scientiae subalternantes."

from God is true, he concludes a priori the truth of any proposition reflecting that revelation. Then, a posteriori from that accepted effect he mediately concludes the passio concerning the actual subject in question. If God should reveal that the general judgment will be in seven years, the beatus concludes a priori the truth of that proposition, since he knows that everything that is revealed from God is true. Whereupon, having grasped this propositional knowledge, he reasons from effect to cause and grasps the necessary connection between the world and its general judgment seven years hence. ³⁹

The fourth level of knowledge is the type most important for the major issue of this study: the theological knowledge of the viator. According to this pattern of apprehension, the viator concludes immediately a posteriori the truth concerning some principle of theological knowledge, for example, that God is three and one. In this respect the viator is in the same position as the beatus and acts accordingly, for he also accepts the principle that every revelation

³⁸ Francis of Marchia, Sent. I, Prol., q. 3, (f. 7^{rb-va}): "Secundum genus scientiae est quae concludit passionem de subiecto a posteriori quia sed concludit veritatem conclusionis de conclusione propter quid a priori sicut sunt communiter scientiae subalternantae quae concludunt passionem de subiecto a posteriori per signum vel per effectum et per ipsam passionem conclusam a posteriori concludunt a priori veritatem conclusionis de conclusione."

³⁹ Ibid., q. 3, (f. 7^{va}): "Tertium genus scientiae est quae concludit primo et immediate veritatem propositionis de propositione a priori et concludit mediate passionem de subiecto a posteriori, sicut est aliqua scientia beatorum; nam beatus videns deum clare videt a priori quod omne revelatum a deo est verum et potest sibi a priori esse per se notum quod aliquid est sibi revelatum a deo; puta, quoniam deus revelat aliquid immediate alicui angelo beato; puta quod iudicium futurum erit ad septem annos; tunc concludit a priori veritatem de illa cogitatione revelata et mediate veritate conclusa de conclusione concludit [a posteriori] praedicatum subiecti de aliquo subiecto."

from God is true.⁴⁰ If every revelation from God is true and one of his revelations is that he is three and one, then reasoning from effect to cause on the basis of the evident truth of the proposition, the viator concludes that the subject, God, and the passiones, three and one are true.⁴¹ Francis' presupposition is that what holds true for the relation of subject and predicate in a proposition also has a true relation in respect to the things which the terms of the proposition actually signify. Man's finiteness and consequent limitation on the power of knowing prevents him from seeing a priori the inherence of God's passiones in God, himself. In Thomistic and classical Christian terms this amounts to saying that no viator ever sees God in his essence.

At this point, the Doctor Succinctus raises some serious questions which bring us to the third portion of this section: the matter of the viator's theological certainty. This problem is centered on the question of the connection between an evidently true proposition and the reality to which it points. According to Francis, when one reaches a conclusion as the result of reasoning from the first principles of theology, it is possible to have "evidence of the truth of

⁴⁰ There is a difference, of course, between the knowing process of the beatus and the viator. The former knows a priori that every revelation from God is true while the latter knows the same thing per se through the habit of faith. Francis' description of the knowledge of the beatus is very similar to that of Scotus described in Chapter I, p. 31.

⁴¹ Ibid.: "Quartum genus scientiae quae concludit utraque a posteriori, sicut est theologia viae, quae concludit immediate a posteriori veritatem de ista conclusione quod deus est trinus et unus per hoc, quod est revelatum a deo et omne revelatum a deo est verum, (et) mediate veritate conclusa de isto articulo concludit praedicatum de subiecto, scilicet esse trinum et unum de deo."

the conclusion concerning the conclusion itself."⁴² The viator, however, is not in a position to have a priori evidence as to whether or not the passio in question really does inhere in the subject under consideration. Consequently, he is in the position of knowing the truth of a proposition evidently, while being uncertain of the real inherence of the predicate in the subject. Even though there is a logical certainty as far as the argument is concerned, that certainty is called into question by virtue of the inability of the viator through his own reasoning processes to make the appropriate connections between statement and reality. The doubt that infects the latter process affects the former, with the result that the truth of both proposition and connection are called into doubt.⁴³ Given this troublesome situation, there must be something that can effectively alleviate the doubt and account for the kind of certainty which is a presupposition of Christian theology. That something is faith.⁴⁴

But how can faith function to make certain what was first certain by itself and then uncertain because of a basic incapacity in man? We must first examine the idea of necessity as it is understood by Francis. Then it will be possible to explain in more detail the role of faith in guaranteeing certainty of knowledge for the Christian. Such considerations will be taken up in the following section.

⁴² Ibid.: "Et intellectus posset habere evidentiam de veritate conclusionis de ipsa conclusione, non habendo evidentiam a priori de inherencia passionis (de subiecto)."

⁴³ Ibid.: "Et propter inevidentiam praedicationis de subiecto revocatur in dubium veritas conclusionis; de conclusione quia infirmitas unius revocat in dubium certitudinem alterius."

⁴⁴ Ibid.: "Et ita fides est necessaria propter inevidentiam praedicati de subiecto quamvis veritas conclusionis sit evidens de conclusione."

Part 3: The Idea of "Necessity" in Francis of Marchia

As a theologian, Francis is convinced that Christian belief is based upon a necessary medium. That medium can be expressed by the statement, "every revelation comes from God and every such revelation is true."⁴⁵ Any vehicle, therefore, which conveys the truth of Christian theology will reflect this medium and, like this medium, will be necessary. Francis reasons that this must be so on three counts: 1) since the viator has no a priori knowledge of God, he must depend upon natural signs and effects to give him the information he needs for his own salvation. It is commonly accepted, however, that natural signs yield only natural knowledge.⁴⁶ But faith by definition has the character of certainty, even though the faith of the viator depends upon these natural signs. Therefore, in opposition to commonly held opinion and at least within the framework of theological knowing, Francis asserts that the signs which the Christian utilizes must be necessary, not probable;⁴⁷ 2) it is axiomatic in logic that no conclusion can exceed the certitude of its medium. Therefore, it is impossible for the

⁴⁵ See footnotes 39 and 41 above.

⁴⁶ Ibid.: "Quod autem hoc sit revelatum a deo concluditur per effectus supernaturales et signa supernaturalia ad huius atestationem exhibita et monstrata quia sicut signa naturalia concludunt causam naturalem, ita signa supernaturalia concludunt causam supernaturalem. Ista autem signa supernaturalia non solum videntur signa probabilia immo [?] videntur signa necessaria quod patet articulus 1 [?]; id est quia signa probabilia non faciunt nisi fidem probabilem non fidem necessariam, quia unumquodque signum facit fidem secundum gradum suae certitudinis."

⁴⁷ Ibid.: "Sed ista signa faciunt fidem necessariam et inconcussam non fidem probabilem tantum quia (non est) dubitare de articulis fidei quacumque demonstratione, sicut ait Richardus [de Sancto Victore], primo De Trinitate, capitulo secundo. Igitur illa signa sunt necessaria et non probabilia tantum."

viator's faith to be more certain than the signs which convey it.

Since it is already known that faith is certain, the signs upon which it depends must be certain;⁴⁸ 3) it is commonly held that natural

signs, because they are probable, lead to probable conclusions.⁴⁹

If this supposition is applied to faith it would mean that the natural signs upon which the viator depends would eventuate in probable conclusions. But that would mean that the Christian would not believe without doubt, for it is impossible to hold an undoubting conviction about a probable conclusion. Such a consequence would make faith opinion, which goes against firmly established tradition in the church.⁵⁰

Once again, Francis' argumentation moves inductively from effect to cause. As was the case with Ockham, Francis is confronted with the problem of showing how propositions dealing with contingents can be necessary. But, unlike Ockham he does not ground the necessity in the fact that a proposition concerning contingents can be expressed condi-

⁴⁸ Ibid.: "Item nulla conclusio excedit certitudinem sui medii. Sed ista signa supernaturalia comparantur ad fidem nostram sicut medium ad conclusionem. Igitur fides non est certior istis signis. Sed fides nostra est certa non probabilis tantum, quia nihil firmitus tenetur quam quod fide apprehenditur, ut ait Richardus, ibidem. Igitur signa debent esse certa et non probabilia."

⁴⁹ Ibid.: "Item sicut se habent signa naturalia ad causam naturalem, ita signa supernaturalia [se habent] ad causam supernaturalem. Sed signa naturalia probabilia arguunt fidem tantum probabilem de causa naturali. Igitur similiter signa supernaturalia probabilia arguunt tantum fidem de causa supernaturali et non fidem certam; et ita catholicus non tenetur credere articulis fidei indubitanter sed tantum probabiliter."

⁵⁰ Ibid.: "Et sic fides nostra non videtur esse nisi quaedam opinio, quod est contra Augustinum, libro De Sacra Scriptura, parte x, capitulo secundo, quod fides est super opinionem et infra sapientiam vel scientiam constitutam."

tionally and de possibili; instead he assumes necessity from his belief in an already presupposed certainty that all true theological conclusions must have. With this argument now almost completely unfolded, Francis pauses to consider three dubia that could be raised against his position.

The first objection holds that if the conclusion of an argument is certain, faith is not necessary. Any argument that meets the requirement of dependence upon a necessary medium will produce evident knowledge in its conclusions. Although this does not mean that the possibility of having faith is excluded, at least the necessity for faith is eliminated.⁵¹ Of course, this position goes against the witness of Scripture, especially the apostle Paul writing to the church in Rome.⁵² As a result, the viator is forced to choose between the necessity of faith on the one hand and the possibility of scientific knowledge on the other. This argument concludes that the viator cannot have certain knowledge of his own faith.⁵³

Francis' insistence that faith rests upon a necessary medium raises a second doubt about his interpretation of the nature of theology. If a medium is necessary, it must appear so to everyone. This would mean that the basic presuppositions of Christian belief are available to all

⁵¹ Ibid., q. 4, (f. 7^{vb}): "Primum est ex quo, theologia innitit medio necessario et medium necessarium facit evidentiam de conclusione. Sed evidentia conclusionis excludit necessitatem fidei, licet non excludat possibilitatem. Igitur videtur quod fides non sit necessaria pro statu isto; quod est contra apostolum, ubi supra, dum peregrinamur a deo per fidem ambulemus."

⁵² Ibid.: "Confirmatur, quia habens notitiam certam de aliqua conclusione non indiget fide; sed quilibet viator indiget fide, quia iustus ex fide vivit, Rom. 1."

⁵³ Ibid.: "Igitur nullus viator habet notitiam certam de fide sua."

who can simply understand the doctrinal formulations. This being the case, the Moslem would be in as good a position as the Christian to grasp the compelling truth of the Christian mysteries. A medium which is necessary should lead everyone to the same conclusions no matter what his spiritual state or religion. It is obvious, however, that the infidel does not believe, even though some have studied the Christian doctrines very thoroughly. One can only conclude then that the medium, failing to move all equally in the same compelling direction, is not necessary.⁵⁴

The final objection deals with the awareness that anyone should have who possesses a particular habit. That anyone could have a scientific habit and not know it is inconceivable. It is all the more so, considering that theology is the most noble of all habits. Experience shows the obvious fact that a Christian does not have such a habit, because if he did possess it he would not deny it. Indeed, he would openly admit it. Since this is not the case, the only possible conclusion is that faith does not rest upon a necessary medium, nor is Christian belief based upon principles known per se.⁵⁵

Francis does not answer these dubia directly. However, in the

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*: "Secundum dubium (secundum dubium) est quod ex quo, medium cui theologia innititur est necessarium. Cum medium necessarium deberet facere fidem equalem tam fideli quam infideli, quia medium necessarium concludit equaliter cuilibet habenti. Sed hoc non videmus quia infidelis propter illud medium non credit. Igitur non est necessarium."

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*: "Tertium dubium est quia quod aliquis habeat habitum scientificum et non possit scire se habere videtur inconveniens. Quia habere habitus nobilissimos et facere nos latentes videtur inconveniens, secundo *Posteriorum*. Sed catholicus nescit se habere talem habitum, quia si sciret eum habere non negaret. Igitur non habet aliquod medium necessarium neque tenet in fide aliquid per se notum."

next chapter we will see how one of Francis' fourteenth century critics makes use of two of these very arguments against him. Nonetheless, Francis does speak to the issues raised by these doubts by making an important distinction which is crucial to understanding his idea of necessity and the necessary medium of theology.

Necessity, according to Francis, can be understood on two levels. The first level is exemplified by mathematics. Here the necessary medium is appropriately based upon the principles of the subject. The principles of this discipline are self-evident to all who study it, so that it becomes necessary for those engaged in mathematics to assent to the conclusions entailed by its principles.⁵⁶ Having evident knowledge of the conclusions, the mathematician has scientia.⁵⁷ Consequently, mathematics is knowledge in the strict sense. As such it is open to all men without restriction. It is the sort of knowledge that is possible for faithful Christian and infidel alike.⁵⁸

Necessity on the second level is another matter, however. The medium is still necessary, but Francis emphasizes that it is mortal and natural. A proposition which illustrates such principles is the state-

⁵⁶ Ibid.: " . . . quodam est medium in primo gradu certitudinis sicut est medium mathematicum cum intellectus non habet aliquid unde deberet sibi resistere"

⁵⁷ Ibid.: ". . . quodam est medium necessarium proprie acceptum ex principiis subiecti, et tale medium necessarium facit duo; quia est necessarium facit necessario assentire conclusioni; quia vero est proprium facit conclusionem evidentem; et talis notitia habita de conclusione per tale medium est proprie scientia."

⁵⁸ Ibid.: "Et habens talem notitiam non indiget fide. Tale medium contingit equaliter fideli et infideli. Et habens ipsum scit se scire seu habere (scientiam) propter evidentiam ipsius."

ment, "God ought to be worshiped."⁵⁹ Here, unlike first-level necessarium, it is possible for the intellect to doubt both principles and conclusions. Furthermore, the necessary medium is extraneous to the object of knowledge and to the principles upon which the argumentation is based. Even though the necessary medium comes from outside the framework of the argumentation, it nonetheless compels the intellect to assent necessarily to the conclusion toward which it points. But because the medium is not a proper medium (understanding proprium medium as necessary medium understood according to the first level of necessitas) the evidence which it gives concerning the conclusion is not adequate. As a result there appear doubts which concentrate upon apparent contradictions between the conclusion and the reality to which it points.⁶⁰ For this reason some habit is necessary which can relieve the doubt and resolve the contradictions. That habit is faith.⁶¹

Francis reminds his readers that the Christian comes to his know-

⁵⁹ Ibid.: ". . . quodam est medium necessarium in secundo gradu certitudinis sicut est medium mortale et medium naturale, puta quod deus est adhorandus [sic] et huiusmodi; ibi intellectus habet aliquid unde sibi resistat."

⁶⁰ Ibid.: ". . . quodam vero est medium extraneum necessarium non propositum (nec) acceptum ab objecto vel a principiis subiecti sed est acceptum ab aliquo extraneo. Et tale medium quia necessarium ex se facit necessario assentire conclusioni. Sed quia non est medium proprium non facit evidentiam sufficientem de conclusione. Et quia non facit evidentiam de conclusione et apparentia videtur esse repugnantia conclusioni, ideo propter repugnantiam apparentem et propter inevidentiam concomitantem eius certitudo a[d]hesionis revocatur in dubium."

⁶¹ Ibid.: "Ideo non (facit) evidentiam de conclusione credita sed tantum facit assensum necessarium verum quia conclusioni creditae videntur multa repugnantia. Et conclusio credita non est evidens per illud medium. Ideo nisi adsit habitus aliquis determinans intellectum, certitudo medii revocatur in dubium. Ideo necessaria est fides."

ledge of God a posteriori, dependent upon natural signs and effects for drawing the conclusions which provide the viator adequate knowledge for salvation. This makes theology a part of the fourth mode of scientia which was discussed in Part 2 of this chapter.⁶² Because he cannot confirm the connection between statement and reality in an a priori manner, the viator is left with logical validity, but also with serious questions about the absolute truth of his conclusions. For this reason faith functions to remove whatever doubt experience or appearance might raise about the truth of theological conclusions. Since the infidel does not have faith he is not able to conclude from theological principles with the same level of certainty as the viator. Without faith there is no necessary medium in Christian theology, for it is faith which makes the Christian aware that the medium of theology is indeed necessary.⁶³ Further, the Christian does not know that he has such a medium except through faith. Because he has the habit of faith the necessary medium is seen as necessary in itself and adequate for securing true and certain conclusions in argumentation.⁶⁴ Necessity

⁶² See above, p. 71.

⁶³ Ibid.: "Et quia infidelis non habet fidem, ideo non contingit sibi illud medium. Et quia assensus necessarius istius medii propter inevidentiam eius et apparentem repugnantiam revocatur in dubium, ideo ad excludendum dubium fides requiritur."

⁶⁴ Ibid., q. 3, (f. 7^{vb}-8^{ra}): "Ideo catholicus nescit se habere tale medium necessario nisi per fidem, quia necessarius eius effectus non apparet sine fide, tum medium oportet quod sit necessarium in se et quomodo ad nos. Aliter non teneremur indubitanter assentire propter illud medium unde negans medium fidei necessarium, sed [secundum?] se et quomodo ad nos viderit et inveniat qualiter tenemur indubitanter credere conclusioni, credere [conclusioni] creditae aut per medium sibi necessarium aut per medium sibi probabile; non per medium sibi probabile quia per medium probabile tenemur assentire non; similiter igitur per medium sibi necessarium; aliter fides nostra non habet aliquam certitudinem quam opinio, et caetera."

for Francis involves a certain disposition on the part of the knower as well as a universally apprehendable quality in the thing known.

Having explained the way in which theological propositions are conceived as necessary, Francis still has to deal with a basic problematic characteristic of all theological propositions: their singularity and contingency. How can theological propositions dealing as they do with singular events and persons be the basis for scientia in its strict sense? The difficulty is again solved by making a distinction which reflects the same kind of differentiation Francis made between the first and fourth modes of scientia, and the first and second levels of necessitas. If one considers knowledge that is possible to man naturally, scientia is possible within the framework of the rules for knowing that are accepted in regard to the demonstrative syllogism.⁶⁵ If there are principles which are known per se naturally and there follows in the argument employing them a necessary connection of the terms involved, then knowledge in the strict sense is possible for man naturally. But to say that per se nota principles plus a necessary connection of the terms equals necessary conclusions and scientia does not imply that the absence of a necessary connection of terms makes scientia impossible.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Ibid., q. 3, (f. 8^{ra}): "Sed sufficiter ad hoc, quod notitia sit scientifica quod deducatur ex principiis vel ex aliquo principio evidenter determinato et immediato, quia quod necessitas habeat concurrere in propositionibus quantum ad connexionem terminorum. Hoc pertinet ad scientiam quae in nobis acquiritur quia certitudo in nobis non potest acquiri naturaliter nisi per discursum sillogisticum demonstratum qui includit necessitatem in propositionibus et dici per se"

⁶⁶ Ibid.: "Concedatur etiam minor quia principia huius scientiae non sunt necessaria quantum ad connexionem. Igitur non causant notitiam scientificam; non videlicet quia licet ubicumque est necessaria connexio terminorum possit esse evidentia per se sicut in principio vel sicut ex alio deducto ex evidente sicut in conclusione. Non sequitur

If there is a necessary connection of terms naturally the first level of necessity is reached in the conclusion. Francis does not illustrate his point, but it can be safely assumed that he is referring to the kind of conclusions possible in mathematics. On the other hand, where natural knowledge is not the issue (as would be the case in theology), there still remains a necessary condition characteristic of the terms.

Necessity arises not from the truth of the terms as such, but from some outside cause which guarantees their necessity.⁶⁷ Although this necessity is not perceived out of the same frame of reference as necessity which would be arrived at from the natural resources of the mind, nonetheless it shares the same compelling character of necessity defined as that whose opposite is impossible. Necessity according to the mode appropriate to theology is not defined as something whose opposite is impossible, but as something which is impossible not to be. Necessity understood on the first level (e.g., mathematics) reflects the way things are, given the order of creation as it exists and is

tum quod ubicumque sit evidens notitia scientifica ibi sit necessaria connexio terminorum sufficiter enim quod sit evidens de se et certa et determinata vel deducta ex determinato certo et evidente quantum ad inesse."

⁶⁷ Ibid.: "Ideo aliter dico quod habere aliquam propositionem necessitatem potest intelligi dupliciter: 1] uno modo ex ratione terminorum in se cuius oppositum est impossibile aliter se habere et necessitas talis propositionis consurgit ex necessaria habitudine terminorum includentium [concludentium?] modos dicendi per se, et talis propositio est aptitudine et actu quoniam termini sunt necessarii actu; 2] alio modo dicitur [quod] propositio [est] necessaria non quod ex veritate terminorum consurgat necessitas propositionis sed quia ex aliqua causa extrinseca termini copulantur ex necessitate quantum ad inesse; ita quod impossibile est quod non insit; immo est necessariae inesse et talis necessitas non (est) impossibilis aliter se habere, licet sit impossibilis non esse."

intelligible to the human mind. The implication remains, however, (and is a presupposition of Christian theology) that the intelligible order of things is contingent, i.e., it would not have had to be created the way it was and it could cease to be. Necessity, however, which characterizes "what is impossible not to be" is the necessity describing God. It is also the necessity characteristic of theological statements made on the basis of revelation from this necessary being.⁶⁸ I take Francis' reference to a causa extrinsica in this context to refer to the revelatory activity of the necessary being, God. When Francis, therefore, says that a theological conclusion is necessary he is not speaking of the first mode of knowledge (although Francis' opponents chose to understand him in this way), but rather of the fourth.⁶⁹ Thus the medium, "every revelation from God is true," is self-evident (to anyone having the habit of faith) and necessary according to the fourth mode, not the first.⁷⁰ This means that its

⁶⁸ Ibid., q. 3, (f. 8^{ra-b}): "Cum igitur dicitur, omne principium aut est necessarium aut est contingens, dico quod si necessarium servatur secundum quod consurgit ex necessaria habitudine terminorum concludentium modos dicendi per se, dico quod verum est, quia nec ista includit istum modum secundum se nisi forte quartum; ista enim propositio est per se in quarto modo, omne revelatum a prima veritate est verum. Ista scientia non est ex necessariis (primo modo) quia principia possunt [possent?] aliter se habere.

Si autem necessarium servatur pro ea necessitate quae aliquid est in actu, sic dico quod principia huius scientiae sunt necessaria. Talis autem necessitas vocatur de inesse non de impossibili aliter se habere et eo modo quo habet necessitatem potest esse principium vel conclusio scientiae."

⁶⁹ Ibid., q. 3, (f. 8^{rb}): "Ad oppositum, quoniam dicitur quod principium aut est contingens aut necessarium dico quod si accipiatur necessarium primo modo quod propositio non est necessaria nisi ut necessarium est idem quod hoc quod est impossibile aliter se habere."

⁷⁰ Ibid.: "Sed accipiendo necessarium secundo modo, falsa est minor; ad probationem quoniam dicitur et sic procedetur in ista scientia ex

self-evident nature is determined by an a posteriori process of reasoning and that necessity is a characteristic given to it from outside through the habit of faith.

Francis' treatment of theology reduces to these two basic points: 1) theological principles are self-evident; 2) theological principles are necessary. If we set aside all the supporting arguments and descriptions, his whole argument on the scientific nature of theology revolves around these two factors. What makes Francis interesting is the unusual way in which he uses the terms per se nota and necessitas. As we have seen above, both of these elements are essential for a logical argument which eventuates in demonstrative knowledge. Therefore, from a purely formal perspective Francis appears to be making a case for a demonstrative understanding of knowledge, scientia in the strict sense. However, he does not use the terms per se nota and necessitas in the way they are meant by Aristotle, nor does he accommodate their meaning to the special needs of a Christian theological perspective as did Scotus and Ockham in regard to the term necessitas. As a result, Francis ends by bending the basic definitions of per se nota and necessitas to fit his presuppositions about the nature of theology. He insists upon a logical adherence to the canons of scientia even though,

non necessariis (quarto modo) nec ex contingentibus quae se habent ad utrumque (sed ex propositionibus). De inesse per se evidentibus et necessariis in veritate vel ex talibus deductis vel ex istis esse revelatum a prima veritate est verum; tunc sic sed omnia revelata in sacra scriptura sunt revelata a prima veritate; igitur et caetera. Quoniam vero deducitur ultra quod de contingentibus non est scientia et per consequens principia contingentia non causant scientiam, falsum est. Quia notitia certa dei est certa et tum deus habet certam notitiam de contingentibus, licet aliud sit de futuris contingentibus."

strictly speaking, theological conclusions are true without meeting the accepted criteria of demonstratio. The over-all effect is that Francis obscures the whole issue more than he clarifies it. In the next chapter we shall see how one of Francis' contemporaries challenged this unusual point of view.

Theology as Belief: a Critique of Francis by Gregory of Rimini

Francis' position on the nature of theology did not go unchallenged. His unusual view of theological principles was criticized by Gregory of Rimini, a contemporary who would eventually emerge as one of the outstanding intellects of the fourteenth century. Gregory's critique of Francis appears in the Prologue of his own Sentences commentary, delivered to the Augustinian community at Paris sometime shortly before 1344.¹ More than twenty years had passed since Francis had advanced his arguments affirming the self-evident nature of theological principles. Whereas it is not certain whether or not Ockham directly criticized Francis' position on this issue,² there can be no doubt that in question 1, article 4 of his Prologue to the Sentences, Gregory is taking Francis to task.³ It will be our purpose in this

¹ F. Stegmüller sets the date for Gregory's reading of the Sentences at 1343-1344. G. Leff suggests 1344, on the basis of the Explicit in the Bibliothèque Mazarine 913 MS. A detailed analysis of the problems entailed in determining the date of Gregory's writings is contained in an article by D. Trapp, "Gregory of Rimini: Manuscripts, Editions and Additions," Augustiniana, VIII (1958), 425-443. Trapp favors a date earlier than 1344. His contention is that the reference to 1344 appearing in the best manuscripts is a publication date, not a reference to the delivery date of the lectures.

² See below, footnote 23.

³ That Francis is the focus of his criticism is confirmed on two points: 1) the marginal reference in the 1522 edition of the Sentences attributes the argument to Francis of Marchia (for the arguments in support of the dependability of these references, see D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century," Augustiniana, VI (1956), 199-205); 2) the argument repeated by Gregory and attributed to Francis (to the degree that Gregory reports that argument) is an almost verbatim copy of the question as it appears in MS. 15,852 Latin, Bibliothèque Nationale, the manuscript used as the basis for Chapter II of this paper.

chapter to examine Gregory's critique of Francis on the question, utrum theologia sit scientia. First, however, a few general remarks are in order about Gregory, himself.

Gregory's origins are obscure. Some scholars have suggested he was an academic contemporary of Duns Scotus (1265-1308). If this were the case, however, he would have been pursuing his academic studies at an age considerably older than normal. Assuming an academic career closer to the normal pattern, he was probably born about 1300 (he received his Baccalaureate degree from the University of Paris in 1329, after six years study there). From Paris he went to his native Italy where, for the next eleven years, he taught in Bologna, Padua, and Perugia. In 1341 he was back in Paris lecturing on the Sentences. When he became a Master in 1345, he secured a teaching position in the University, in part through the efforts of Clement VI.⁴ Gregory returned to his home in Rimini in 1351 where he taught for six years as Regens Studii before being raised to Vicar-General and then Prior-General of the Augustinian Order. His leadership of the Augustinian Order lasted only one and one-half years. Gregory died in 1358 while on a visit to Vienna. In recognition for his remarkable scholarly ability Gregory was known as the Doctor Authenticus.⁵

⁴ This letter is used by G. Leff to argue against a birth date which would make Gregory an academic contemporary of Scotus. It does not provide conclusive proof for Leff's position, but gives enough information about Gregory's career to make a birth date prior to 1300 seem unlikely. See G. Leff, Gregory of Rimini (Manchester, 1961), pp. 3-4. For a copy of this letter, see Denifle and Chatalain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (Paris, 1891), II, 1, 1097, p. 557.

⁵ "Impugnat si quid, non est defendere tutum, Si quid defendat, quis nocuisse potest?" Quoted by Trapp, "Gregory of Rimini: Manuscripts, Editions and Additions," 435.

It is difficult to categorize Gregory in relation to fourteenth century thought. He was definitely an example of the recently revitalized interest in St. Augustine, whose writings Gregory had read with careful attention to scholarly detail.⁶ He reflected Augustine's outlook in his strong emphasis upon double predestination, God's completely free and absolute power, and the utter inability of man to initiate the process of his own salvation. Gregory was so strong on these views that, for his theses on the pain suffered by infants who die before baptism, he earned from his enemies the title, Tortor Infantium.⁷ Like many who were reacting to the scientific understanding of theology of the previous century, Gregory regarded theology as it had been viewed in the time of the Church Fathers: primarily as Biblical exegesis, affective in nature, born of revelation for the nurture and support of belief, employing the tools of reason only to clarify the basic message of the Bible and Tradition.

On the other hand, Gregory was a follower of Ockham, especially in regard to epistemology. He accepted the idea that sense experience is the foundation for human knowledge and that direct simple cognition of particulars is possible. To this extent he shared in the radical epistemological shift regarding the object of knowledge that is usually associated with the name of Ockham.⁸ In two respects, however, he di-

⁶ In Trapp's words, he "breathed the breath of St. Augustine." One edition of Gregory's Commentary refers to him as a "Second Augustine."

⁷ D. Trapp maintains that such a charge is unjust, reflecting the failure of Gregory's opponents (and even some contemporary scholars) to consider the full range of his arguments on this question. See Trapp, "New Approaches to Gregory of Rimini," Augustinianum, II (1962), 115-116.

⁸ See above, Chapter I, p. 39.

verged from Ockham's position: 1) he held on to the notion of an intelligible species to explain the phenomenon of memory; 2) he maintained that Ockham had too limited an understanding of the object of knowledge. On this latter point, Gregory developed the idea of the adequate signifier, the view that knowledge is not simply an apprehension of the meaning of the conclusion of a syllogism, but also assent to the reality of the connection between the terms of the concluding proposition and those things signified by the terms.⁹ He was also unsympathetic with the extreme interpretations of Ockham's epistemology as represented by John of Mirecourt and Nicholas of Autrecourt. From the writings of Peter Ceffons it appears that Gregory was one of the "three old witches" who were responsible in 1347 for the condemnation directed at extreme left-wing interpretations of Ockham.¹⁰

⁹ The question of the totale significatum has been treated in its historical dimensions by H. Elie, Le Complexe Significabile (Paris, 1936). He traces its origin to Gregory of Rimini and then outlines its developments in the thought of subsequent major scholastic figures. As a philosophical problem in 14th century thought, the idea of a totale significatum is an attempt to meet doubts raised by the specter that the sounds of human speech as well as written symbols may not have referents in reality. It is a rejection of the notion that grasping the meaning of the terms of a proposition (even one which is the conclusion of a syllogism) is synonymous with knowledge. Knowledge must also entail assent to the existence of something to which the proposition refers if it is affirmative, or dissent from the existence of something to which the proposition refers if it is negative. Such a distinction is made to meet the doubts raised by those who think that knowledge of a proposition is no more than understanding the logical connection of words put together in a grammatically intelligible way. The affirmation that something is so must be allied with the perception that something is so and assent must be secured for the connection between the two. Otherwise one only has a nominal understanding of terms, and such understanding is not knowledge.

¹⁰ D. Trapp, "Peter Ceffons of Clairvaux," Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, XXIV (1957), 101-154.

Gregory has been variously represented as antesignanus Nominalistarum, standard-bearer of the Nominalists, and antagonist of the Nominalists (as illustrated by the 1347 proceedings).¹¹ Oberman places him in the right wing of the Nominalist school.¹² The problem of his placement in the broader aspects of fourteenth century thought will not be solved until more research is undertaken into his writings and those of his opponents. For our purposes, however, it will not be necessary to resolve this particular question.

Gregory's major and only extant work is his Commentary on the first two books of the Sentences.¹³ There exists also a manuscript purporting

¹¹ According to Trapp, the main issue of the 1347 proceedings was concern over too great a departure from common sense and the position of the Fathers in treating such matters as the nature of God's intervention into the natural patterns of causation. The 1347 condemnations were directed against subtilitas, an abuse of the doctrine of divine intervention which threatened to overthrow the idea of the dependability of the created order. Trapp's treatment of the interpretive problems involved in this complicated question is important for the way in which he avoids terminology usually employed when discussing this period. In place of the term "nominalist" he describes fourteenth century Augustinian thought as a reflection of two basic attitudes, one historical-critical, the other logico-critical. The historical-critical attitude represents the desire to get back to the sources when carrying on disputes so that arguments of predecessors will be accurately quoted. The logico-critical attitude represents the important fourteenth century epistemological shift from the theory of cognitio universalis to the affirmation of universal knowledge through cognitio rei particularis. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century," 150-152, 187.

¹² H. Oberman, "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with attention to its Relation to the Renaissance," Harvard Theological Review, LIII (1960), 47-76. See also the major section on Gregory of Rimini in Oberman's, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 196-206.

¹³ According to both Leff and Trapp, the best available text for studying Gregory is the printed edition published in Venice in 1522. This edition has been reprinted by St. Bonaventure's of New York State. See, Gregorius Ariminensis, Super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955). Quotes in this paper are from this edition.

to be Gregory's Commentary on books three and four of the Sentences, but these writings, although carrying his name, are generally considered inauthentic.¹⁴

We shall now look more closely at Gregory's treatment of Francis of Marchia's position on the question of theology as science. Section one will deal with Gregory's statement of Francis' argument; section two will outline the critique proper; section three will evaluate Gregory's critique.

Part 1: Gregory's Statement of Francis' Argument

In the tradition of scholastic debate, Gregory first presents Francis' arguments concerning theologia qua scientia. He divides the case into three major points: 1) the articles of faith are believed as well as known; 2) theology is scientia in its proper sense; 3) even though theological knowledge is scientia proprie dicta, faith is nonetheless necessary.¹⁵ In outlining Francis' argument, Gregory's format follows almost verbatim (with some important exceptions to be noted later) Lat. 15,852, Bibliothèque Nationale.

Under point number one, that the articles of faith are known as well as believed, he cites the a posteriori arguments centering upon the undoubting nature of belief, the certainty of conclusions not out-

¹⁴ The matter of the authenticity of Corpus Christi College Library MS. 501 is dealt with at some length in G. Leff's, Gregory of Rimini (Manchester, 1961), pp. 8-14. Included are extensive sections comparing the standard version with MS. 501. Leff's conclusion is that the Cambridge manuscript, which shows strong dependence upon St. Thomas as its major authority, is not a work of Gregory.

¹⁵ Sent. I, Prol., q. 1, art. 4, (f. 5 H-J).

weighing the certainty of principles, and the object of belief as something which stands on its own. He includes Francis' distinction of the ways things are proposed to the mind (per se nota in falsitate or in veritate or medio modo). This section is closed out by the argument showing theology as determined to truth by a mediating habit, as well as the argument for the per se nature of a primum creditum.¹⁶

Under point number two, Gregory states the argument based upon the premise that theology depends upon a necessary medium, which can be summarized by the statement "every revelation from God is true." This section closes with the distinction between knowing the truth or falsity of a proposition and knowing the truth or falsity of the actual inherence of a passio in a subject. He summarizes, with illustrations, Francis' four modes of scientia.¹⁷

Under point number three, Gregory concentrates upon the idea that in theology, unlike normal discursive activity, the medium is extraneous, not emerging from either the subject or predicate of the propositions but rather introduced from outside through God's revelation. Because the form of the argument is correct, assent to the conclusion is necessary, although the evidence is not sufficient due to the extraneous nature of the medium. Because it is possible to contradict the conclusion due to doubt as to the certainty of the inherence of the passio in question in its subject, the habit of faith must be invoked to ease the doubt.¹⁸ So much for Gregory's actual summary of Francis'

¹⁶ Ibid., (f. 5 J-M). See also Chapter II above, p. 66.

¹⁷ Ibid., (f. 5 M-P).

¹⁸ Ibid., (f. 5 P-Q).

argument.

What is more interesting about Gregory's presentation of Francis' viewpoint is what is not included. If we use Latin 15,852 as the basis for comparison we find that Gregory omits the very important section in which Francis makes the distinction between two levels of meaning for the term, necessitas. This distinction is crucial for understanding why Francis feels that faith is necessary to secure confirmation of theological conclusions, even though the form of a theological argument might yield scientia in its strict sense. Why does Gregory omit this important section?

It is possible that this portion was missing in the manuscript Gregory was using, in which case failure to take account of Francis' two-fold definition of necessitas would be understandable. However, there is such a strong correlation between the statement of Francis' argument by Gregory and the actual argument in Latin 15,852 that we are compelled toward the conclusion that Gregory was using a manuscript of the same family as Latin 15,852 as the basis for his treatment of Francis, possibly even Latin 15,852 itself. A careful comparison of the opening section of article 4, question 1 of the 1522 edition of Gregory's Sentences commentary (the section containing Francis' arguments) and question 3 in Latin 15,852 (Francis' own treatment of utrum theologia sit scientia) shows that, with the exception of unimportant conjunctions and introductory word patterns, Gregory repeats verbatim the portions of Francis' arguments leading up to the section on the distinctions of media necessaria.¹⁹ Gregory

¹⁹ Gregory's treatment of Francis begins with the main body of the

then excludes the section containing the necessarium distinction, as well as three dubia which Francis puts against his own position.²⁰ (Gregory later uses two of these dubia as major points against Francis!)²¹ He then picks up the argument and carries it to its conclusion, this time with a few more omissions of a less crucial nature. But here also, what portions of the arguments are given are verbatim accounts of Latin 15,852.

It appears that Gregory was less than open about the position of Francis. Perhaps, it is too strong to say that he falsified Francis' argument. He did, however, utilize a ploy as old as rhetoric itself: he quoted his opposition out of context. It is perplexing in this case why Gregory should do this. The basic argument of Francis has enough problems in it as it stands to provide a likely target for refutation. Why Gregory should forego jumping in to fight the major issue (Francis' peculiar definitions of per se nota and necessitas) and instead be content with stock rebuttals is a mystery that will not be solved in this brief study. But it does raise questions about Gregory's technique in argument which bears watching as more inquiries are made into the source

latter's argument and so does not embrace the introductory arguments in Francis which are simply the pro and contra prelude to his major points. The fact that there is such a striking correlation between Francis' text and Gregory's presentation of Francis' argument confirms the reputation which Gregory has acquired as an outstanding representative of the fourteenth century historical-critical school.

²⁰ What a large and significant body of information this omission entails can be seen by referring to footnotes 51-67, pp. 76-82. Chapter II above.

²¹ Sent. I, Prol., q.1, art. 4, (fols. 5 Q-6 A).

documents of his opponents.²² We must now look more closely at Gregory's specific criticisms of Francis' position.

Part 2: Gregory's Critique of Francis

The first objection that Gregory brings against Francis is that the articles of faith are not per se nota. We have encountered this objection before in the writings of William of Ockham.²³ In content, the arguments are the same. If theological propositions are per se nota, then the infidel would be as capable of grasping them as the Christian believer. But it is clear that when exposed to such propositions those who do not already share the belief do not respond to them as true and self-evident.²⁴ The reason for this is that the be-

²² This matter of accurate representation of arguments is very important to a proper understanding of the thought of any period. As long as someone other than the originator of an argument is outlining a position, there is always the possibility, whether intentional or not, that distortion of original viewpoints will occur. This is what happened in the transmission of Aristotle to the West through Arabic translations. If all the information we had on Francis came through the explanations of Gregory, an unsympathetic opponent, we would be left with a distorted picture of his actual point of view.

²³ See above, Chapter I, p. 39. Ockham is credited in a marginal note in one manuscript tradition with directing this argument against Francis of Marchia in particular. However, the editor of the Ockham critical edition cautions against identifying Francis as the author Ockham had in mind. Only the first few lines of the Ockham text seem remotely near Francis' position. From the context of the argument Ockham's reference might conceivably be to a position held by Henry of Ghent. The editor's note reads: "Haec opinio in margine editionis Lugdunensis attribuitur Francisco de Marchia, sed minus recte, nam apud Franciscum (cod. Vat. lat. 1096, f. 4va) solummodo prima pars primi argumenti huius opinionis occurrit. Similem opinionem, partim eisdem argumentis fulcitam, recitat refellitque Scotus, Reportatio Paris., I, Prol., q. 2, nn. 6-12 (ed. Wadding, XI-1, 15b-19b." Gál and Brown, eds., Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum, p. 185.

liever is disposed toward acceptance because of his prior commitment through the habit of faith and his relation to the church, while the unbeliever has no such commitment. Gregory, it should be noted, does not deal at all with Francis' inductive methodology for arriving at the conclusion that theological principles are known per se. Such considerations would, of course, force him to deal with the deeper issues of Francis' understanding of necessity, i.e., its two-fold nature and the need for faith to assure the believer of the truth of conclusions stemming from supposedly self-evident principles. As we have noted above, Gregory, for some reason, seems reluctant to do this.

A second objection by Gregory focuses upon a distinction he makes between knowledge, opinion, and theology. His position is that a habit directed toward an object is not able to co-exist with a different habit also directed toward the same object. Consequently, the habit of theology is incompatible with the habit of opinion directed toward the same object; so also the habit of faith and the habit of knowledge understood as scientia cannot be directed toward the same object.²⁵

Francis, as noted above, held that knowing and believing must exist

²⁴ Sent. I, Prol., q. 1, art. 4, (f. 5 Q-6 A): ". . . quod non omnis articulus est per se notus non oportet probare cum experientia hoc doceat quemlibet viatorem cui articuli proponuntur; patet etiam, quia si essent per se noti etiam infidelis sciens quid importatur per nomen et omnem notitiam necessariam ad assensum propositionis per se notae habens quam fidelis habet, ita assentiret sicut et fidelis cum propositio per se nota dicatur quam quilibet probat auditam, ut dicit Boetius. Et tamen oppositum contingit."

²⁵ Ibid., q. 2, art. 2, (f. 8 M): "Et una est quod theologia actus non est compossibilis scientiae actui seu quod impossibile est eundem eidem obiecto assentire actu simul assensu scientiali et assensu theologico. . . . Ultima est quod theologia habitus non est compossibilis scientiae habitui et intelligo in omnibus praedictis de compossibilitate in eodem subiecto et de theologia cum scientia eiusdem obiecti."

together in order for the viator to conclude the demonstration necessary for faith-knowledge and to relieve whatever doubt may be attendant upon the total operation.²⁶ Gregory opposes this by saying that the assent of knowledge to a given proposition excludes the assent of faith.²⁷ If a theological proposition is self-evident, then by definition it will elicit the assent necessary to affirm it as true without any added benefits from faith. If this were true, a self-evident faith-proposition would be in the same category as a geometrical proposition.²⁸ Just as any man will assent that a triangle is a three-sided figure whose angles equal two right angles, so will any man consent to the proposition that God is three and one, as soon as he has learned the meaning of the terms "God," "three," and "one." Gregory, of course, feels this is preposterous. By virtue of the kind of assent that would be involved according to Francis' interpretation, faith is relegated to an unnecessary role. In Gregory's mind, Francis' position is contradictory: the assertion that theological principles are known per se is incompatible with the assertion that faith is necessary to properly assent to an article of faith.

Gregory distills Francis' basic argument to this formulation: if

²⁶ See above, Chapter II, p. 79.

²⁷ Ibid., q. 1, art. 4, (f. 6 F): "Ex hac sequitur sicut dicendam correlarium quod si propositio enuntians veritatem de propositione theologica sive sit articulus sive alia est evidenter scita non est necessaria fides aliqua alia propter assensum illius propositionis de qua veritas enuntiatur. Ratio est, quia si veritas illa est scita et ista etiam est scita vel saltem sine omni fide potest sciri et propter nullius talis assensum est necessaria fides."

²⁸ Ibid., "Alias posset dici quod fides esset necessaria ad assentiendum alicui conclusioni geometricae quae est scita per aliam vel alias conclusiones priores."

it is said that theology is a deductive science based upon self-evident propositions, it can be reduced to the affirmation that it depends upon the self-evident apprehension of the necessary medium, "every revelation from God is true."²⁹ But as it turns out, the assertion "every revelation from God is true" is not self-evident. The major proof of this is the fact that the infidel does not accept it as true.³⁰ But even more interestingly, neither do all Christian theologians. There are some Christian thinkers who hold the position that God could, if he willed it potentia absoluta, reveal falsely.³¹ If there are even some within the Christian community who feel this way, it is obvious that the medium "every revelation from God is true" cannot be a self-evident principle. Gregory's use of this argument is interesting. He appears to have accepted the distinction made between God's absolute power and his ordained power (as long as the assertions made under the category of potentia Dei absoluta did not contradict assertions about the nature of God as they are found in the Sacred Scriptures). Although Gregory does not accept the position that God could reveal falsely, he finds the fact that some theologians think that God could reveal falsely (potentia Dei absoluta) helpful in his

²⁹ Ibid., (f. 5 Q, 6 C).

³⁰ Ibid., (f. 6 A): "Secundo, si deducerentur ex per se notis hoc esset secundum opinionem, quia deducuntur per illud medium, omne revelatum a deo etc.; sed illud non valet, quoniam praemisse huius medii non sunt per se notae nec etiam ex per se notis deductae; non enim maior constat enim quod ipsam negasset philosophus cum ipsa implicet unum quod philosophus falsum reputat scilicet deum intelligere aliquod extra se; non est ergo per se nota."

³¹ Ibid., "Multi theologi tenent quamvis non recte ut infra probabitur quod deus posset revelare falsum. Ergo illa non est per se nota."

arguments against Francis.

Before we move to the next aspect of Gregory's argument we should consider briefly his own position on the nature of theological principles. We have seen that he rejects the idea that theological arguments yield demonstration and therefore scientia. He is just as strong as Francis and the other scholastics we have considered so far in affirming that theology does not yield opinion. What then is the basis for the confidence of the viator that what he believes is true? Gregory offers three reasons, all grounded in the experience which the Christian has living in fellowship with other believers. The contents of the Sacred Scriptures have been revealed by Christ and the viator can be confident of their truth because the church believes it, the Fathers have taught it, and it is preached in the contemporary church.³² There is no other way to appropriate the truth that is involved in believing than by simply believing. There is no other basis for confidence than the truth, itself, revealed through the Scriptures.

The primary source for theological knowledge is the Scriptures.³³

³² Ibid., (f. 6 B): "Nam mere creditum est quod contenta in sacra scriptura fuerunt a Christo revelata; per nullam enim viam hoc scimus nisi quia hoc credit ecclesia et sic audivimus a patribus nostris et sic in praedicta sacra scriptura continetur. Sed constat quod hoc non reddit illud esse nobis per se notum aut ex per se notis deductum sed mere creditum sicut etiam patet ex sententia Augustini in De Utilitate Credendi. Item non est nobis per se notum nec per se nota per notificabile quod ipse fuerit deus aut etiam quod ipse fecerit miracula illa et ideo minor illa nobis remanet mere credita."

³³ Ibid., q. 1, art. 2, (f. 2 Q): "... discursus proprie theologicus est qui constat ex dictis sive propositionibus in sacra scriptura contentis vel ex his quae deducuntur ex eis vel saltem ex altera huius."

These writings do not, however, exist in a vacuum. They are preserved by the church, preached by the church, and at times seem to acquire their normative character from the church. Was it not Augustine, himself, who, when questioned about the basis for his belief in the doctrines taught by the church, responded: Ego evangelio non crederem nisi me ecclesiae catholicae commoverent auctoritates.³⁴ It seems from this that the eminent fifth century Father regarded not Scripture, but the institution which conveyed it, as the locus of authority. Gregory acknowledges that this is an obvious interpretation, but denies that this is the explanation of the real reason for Augustine's belief.

In the first place, the apostles did not have this principle to guide them, since there was no church existing to instruct them in what should be believed. Secondly, even if the church should rightly order a doctrine believed, that would still not be a proper exercise in theology. The order to believe could not be properly issued until theological argument based upon the principles and conclusions of Sacred Scripture arrived at such a determination. Consequently, the church is an authority, but only in so far as it comes to theological decisions on the basis of what is in the sacred canon.³⁵ As it goes about this work it accrues the kind of authority which would move Augustine to utter that famous remark.

Theology, for Gregory, results from an attempt to understand the

³⁴ Augustine, "Contra Epistolam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti," liber uns, 5 in Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (Vienna, 1866-).

³⁵ Sent. I, q. 1, art. 2, (f. 2 Q): "Confirmatur, quoniam ideo ecclesia praecise eam determinavit quia vidit eam sequi necessario ex dictis sacrae scripturae."

sense of the Scriptures and to make deductions from basic principles uncovered through this process. This is what differentiates the theologian from the simple believer. A theologian has no greater "knowledge" or faith than the Christian who has simply accepted the symbols of the church. He is, however, engaged in a process of study and clarification which sets him apart from the simple believer. The theologian engages in theological argument and debate to acquire a habit for proving matters theologically from the Sacred Scriptures for the practical end of nurturing the faithful and defending the faith against the attacks of the impious.³⁶

The third objection which Gregory brings against Francis' position is that not every proposition enunciating truth concerning an article of faith is properly known or knowable.³⁷ Here the question does not focus on the issue of attaining truth, because truth is already presupposed. Instead the attention is directed toward ascertaining in what sense a given true proposition of theology is "known." Gregory's contention is that an article of faith is not "properly" knowable.

We should recall at this point that Gregory understands scientia in the strict sense as demonstratio.³⁸ To produce knowledge in the

³⁶ Ibid., q. 1, art. 4, (f. 7 G): ". . . acquirit tamen habitum probandi ex sacra scriptura theologiam veritatem et per consequens defendendi et roborandi fidem contra impios et nutriendi in ipsis fidelibus."

³⁷ Ibid., (f. 5 Q): "Non omnis propositio enuntians veritatem de articulo est proprie scita vel scibilis. Ex hac infertur correlarium quod illud medium omne revelatum a deo, etc. cui totam inniti dicit theologiam non est demonstrativum."

³⁸ Although with some important modifications in regard to the idea of an adequate signifier, as was noted above. Ibid., q. 1, art. 1, (f. 1 H): "Primam conclusionem proba. Primo sic, si obiectum

strict sense, theological statements would have to conform to the criteria of demonstration. Theological statements, however, have a shortcoming which excludes them from use in demonstrations (in addition to the already noted contention that they are not per se nota). They deal with contingents and contingents cannot properly be terms in the propositions of a demonstration.³⁹ This observation in conjunction with the fact that the medium "every revelation from God is true" is not self-evident excludes theology from the realm of knowledge strictly understood.

To illustrate his point, Gregory uses the accepted theological proposition, "God will judge the world." It is true that God will judge the world and Christians rightly hold this as an article of belief. But the statement is also contingent, because it is also possible that God might not judge the world.⁴⁰ How can this be? Gregory,

scientiae esset ipsa conclusio sequeretur quod quilibet actu sciens scientia acquisita per demonstrationem actu apprehenderet conclusionem sue demonstrationis. Hoc patet, sed consequens probatur esse falsum per experientiam. Nam plerumque immo quasi semper contingit quod demonstrans quamvis formet conclusionem non tantum actu reflectitur super illam apprehendendo ipsam sed directe figit suum aspectum in id quod ipsa significat. Nihilominus tantum acquirit scientiam per illam demonstrationem, cum sit syllogismus faciens scire."

³⁹ Ibid., q. 1, art. 4, (f. 6 B): "Secunda conclusio probatur primo, quia aliqua est contingens, verbi gratia haec ista propositio 'deus iudicabit mundum' est vera contingens. Ergo non est proprie scibilis. Patet consequentia, quia scientia non est nisi de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere, primo Posteriorum."

⁴⁰ Ibid., (f. 6 B-C): "Antecedens probatur, nam constat possibile esse quod deus non iudicabit mundum cum libere et contingenter sit iudicaturus. Ergo ista est possibilis: 'deus non iudicabit mundum'. Ergo ista non est necessaria: 'deus iudicabit mundum.' Et per consequens nec illa propositio scilicet 'ista est vera "deus iudicabit mundum"' cum haec necessario inferat illam. Et si consequens est contingens, antecedens non sit necessarium."

in characteristic Augustinian fashion, was sensitive to the question of God's omnipotence. This means excluding any condition which limits the power of God. One must never put himself in the position of predicating something about God which limits his power. In order to make statements about God and at the same time account for his omnipotence, scholastic theologians utilized the distinction between God's absolute power and his ordained power. His ordained power involves what he has determined to do as shown through his revelation; his absolute power is what it is possible for God to do within the limits of the principle of contradiction.⁴¹

When Gregory says that the statement "God will judge the world" is contingent, he means that it would have been possible for God in his infinite wisdom to create a world which it was not necessary to judge. Without contradicting his own nature God could have created a world which would not have fallen. However, the world that he did create is fallen and God has revealed that it will be judged. Consequently, it is certain from the standpoint of revelation that the world will be judged. But it is not "necessary" that the world be judged, if "necessary" implies the eternal nature of the world as reflected in Aristotle's thought. From a Christian perspective, it is necessary that God judge the world only because God has decreed and revealed that it must be judged. The necessity of God's judgment does not imply that God must judge the world because there is some compelling ontological reason in created things calling for judgment,

⁴¹ For an excellent discussion of the interrelation of the two powers, see the Prolegomena of Oberman's The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 30-56.

compelling reasons over which God has no control. That would mean the structures of creation were superior to the creator, himself, which is absurd. God's judgment of the world is necessary only in the sense that God through his revelation has bound himself to judge it. Such "necessity," dependent as it is on the free will of God, is not coterminous with the "necessity" of which Aristotle speaks and which scholastic theologians regard as an essential element in demonstration.⁴²

Since the proposition "God will judge the world" is not necessary in the Aristotelian sense, it cannot be properly used in a syllogism whose goal is scientific knowledge.⁴³ Lack of necessity excludes such theological propositions from consideration as scientia, since necessity is a sine qua non in the Aristotelian definition of science. This characteristic of contingency is important for Gregory's criticism of the medium of theology in Francis' thought, "every revelation from God is true." If the theological statement "God will judge the world" is true, but nonetheless contingent, then it is not possible for the medium, "every revelation from God is true" to be true in a scientific sense.⁴⁴ As a theological statement it is true (and in Francis' terms

⁴² The idea of God's absolute power has sometimes been interpreted to mean that de potentia Dei absoluta God might override something which he had established and revealed through his ordained power. Thus, he might save a person outside the normal channels of salvation provided by the church; God might even lie, or cause men to hate him without themselves incurring sin. It appears that some of the scholastic theologians who are sometimes associated with the left-wing of Ockhamism did hold such opinions. Gregory by his own admission did not. It is very likely that Ockham did not either.

⁴³ Sent. I, Prol., q. 1, art. 4 (f. 6 C): "Ex hoc autem correlative sequitur quod illud medium, 'omne revelatum a deo' etc., non est demonstrativum seu faciens scire, quoniam per ipsum ita haberi posset scientia de propositione praeassumpta sicut de aliqua alia quoniam eodem modo penitus probaretur quod illa 'deus iudicabit mundum' fuerit a deo revelata, quo probaretur de ista 'deus est trinus et unus' aut aliqua alia in scriptura sacra contenta."

even necessary, according to the second level of necessitas) and should be believed by the viator. As a statement susceptible to scientia, it is either unknowable or, according to the three-value logic of Peter Auriol, either true or false, or opinion. Since theology deals with contingents, it is not possible for theological statements to meet the appropriate criteria for demonstration.

Gregory's fourth major objection against Francis reflects his distinctions between knowledge, opinion, and faith and their respective habits.⁴⁵ Each category has its own peculiar objects, its own propositions, and results in a kind of "knowledge" peculiar to itself. Knowledge in its strict sense focuses upon self-evident principles; opinion upon probable statements; theology upon the statements of faith found in the Scriptures. Each area of investigation has a habit unique to itself and no mixing of the categories is permitted.⁴⁶ Thus, the habit of knowledge is employed when pursuing scientia; the habit of opinion when working with probabilities; the habit of faith when seeking theological conclusions.

Each object, whether of knowledge, opinion, or belief has its own habit or inclination which bears the perceiver along the path provided by the premises. Thus, the activity related to concluding a demonstration, by virtue of the homogeneous nature of premise and conclusion, will stimulate the rise of the habit of knowledge; suppositions and

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*; "Probatur etiam correlarium illud eo quod praemisse huius medii, 'omne revelatum a deo' etc., non sunt evidentes et una illarum est mere credita, ut ostensum est."

⁴⁵ See above, p. 96.

⁴⁶ See above, footnote 25.

probable premises will occasion the habit of opinion; theological principles, the habit of theology. Seen in this perspective, argument and habit have the same common feature as premise and conclusion: they are homogeneous.⁴⁷ Theology, for Gregory, cannot be synonymous with either the product of demonstration or the totale significatum of a conclusion from probable premises because neither give rise to a habit that can be called truly theological.⁴⁸

A principle always exists in a homogeneous relationship with its conclusion, and the habit engendered while pursuing principles to their conclusions will also share this characteristic. Any attempt to mix the argument of one with the habit of another or the conclusion of a third would result in nothing productive. If theological truth is one's goal and the totale significatum of theological conclusions the focus of the human soul, then their source must be consistent with that end. Of course, for Gregory, Sacred Scripture is such a source.⁴⁹

Theology, however, does share a common element with other ways of "knowing." In the preliminary stages, while gathering the sense of the propositions in question, the habitus of theology is not different

⁴⁷ Ibid., q. 1, art. 2 (f. 2 M): "... quia discursus et habitus quo mediante elicitur sunt unigenei; ita quod sit unus est physicus vel metaphysicus aut qualiscumque talis est et alius non enim discursus elicitus mediante habitu geometrico est metaphysicus vel moralis nec elicitus mediante opinione est scientificus."

⁴⁸ Ibid. (f. 2 P): "... omnis conclusio sequens ex propositionibus vere theologicis est conclusio theologica; patet quoniam conclusiones et principii sunt unigenea. . . ."

⁴⁹ Ibid. (f. 2 Q): "... discursus proprie theologicus est qui constat ex dictis sive propositionibus in sacra scriptura contentis vel ex his quae deducuntur ex eis vel saltem ex altera huius."

habitus

from the habitus of knowing or supposing.⁵⁰ Having once arrived at a sense of the words, it is then possible to draw out implications from them, implications which stem directly and necessarily from the sacred contents. Such concentration of effort, concerning studio et notitia sacrae scripturae, involves an information-gathering process and logical reasoning which is no different from what is done when self-evident or probable propositions are considered by the mind. In this sense the habit of theology and the habit of knowing share the same characteristics.

When we come to the matter of assent to propositions, however, Gregory makes a distinction in order to keep theology, knowledge, and opinion in their appropriately separate categories. When a believer assents to the totale significatum of a theological proposition, the habit of theology ceases to have any similarity to the habit of knowledge or opinion. This does not mean, of course, that the same man cannot know something, suppose something, and believe something at the same time. The habit of one kind of assent is always compatible with the act of another.⁵¹ However, the habit of assent to a theological proposition cannot co-exist with the habit of knowledge or

⁵⁰ Ibid., q. 2, art. 2 (f. 8 M): ". . . theologia potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo pro habitu vel habitibus quo vel quibus quis novit sensum sacrae scripturae et scit unum dictum eius per aliud exponere et probare necnon alia quae non secundum se formaliter continentur in ipsa ex his quae in ipsa continentur deducere et inferre et penes hunc modum potest accipi theologia etiam pro actu vel actibus praedictorum habituum. . . Theologia primo modo accepta sive pro actu sive pro habitu sumatur compossibilis tam habitui quam actui scientiae in eodem homine circa idem obiectum."

⁵¹ Ibid.: "Alia quod theologia actus compossibilis est scientiae habitui et theologia habitus scientiae actui."

the habit of opinion toward the same theological proposition; nor the habit of theology with the habit of knowing in regard to a self-evident proposition.

In summary then, Gregory is not such a thorough-going Biblicist as to be uninterested in what the human mind might have to contribute to theological argument. He has high regard for the procedures of reasoning accepted by the schoolmen with whom he labored. He accepts an epistemological frame of reference rooted in sense experience and acknowledges that scientific demonstration is possible within the limits of what is knowable by human reason. Theology does not happen to fall within those limits. Gregory sharply limits the areas of knowledge, opinion, and faith. When the question of assent is at stake, there can be no way in which the habit of one way of apprehending can co-exist with another way of apprehending. Self-evident propositions can give demonstrative proofs, i.e., knowledge; probable propositions yield probable conclusions; the Sacred Scriptures yield theology, understood primarily as belief and only secondarily as "knowledge." Theology in its proper sense excludes knowledge in its proper sense.

Part 3: Evaluation of Gregory's Critique

As indicated above, the account of Francis' argument which is given by Gregory is extremely accurate to the extent that it is given. This is yet another confirmation of the reputation which Gregory has acquired among present-day scholars for a high level of scholarship. His research efforts took him into the sources to examine directly the arguments of other scholastics on important issues, just as he had returned to the original corpus of St. Augustine when reconsidering the

ideas of the Bishop of Hippo. However, while his verbatim reporting of Francis' argument reflects his serious investigative technique, it also reveals his method of handling an opponent's argument. His omission of important features of Francis' discussion suggests that he manipulates opponents' arguments to his own advantage. It would be useless to speculate on his motives for doing this aside from saying that it may reflect a man's basic desire to put his own ideas in the best possible light. When a person is put in the position of quoting his own opposition it is probably natural that he would present the argument in the weakest possible way. Suffice it to say that while this short study confirms Gregory's scholarly reputation, his accounting of opponents' arguments should be treated with suspicion. Any modern research effort which pretends to do justice to the controversies in which Gregory was involved will have to examine carefully what his opponents had to say for themselves.

Why Gregory should avoid Francis' peculiar treatment of self-evident propositions and take a more conventional tack in responding to the problems raised is a puzzle. Gregory could have mounted a strong attack against Francis purely on the basis of the latter's unusual formulations. Gregory could have simply pointed out that Francis' understanding of per se nota was reached through an inductive process stemming from his own presuppositions as a theologian. On this basis his notion of per se nota could have been rejected out of hand, without going into all the arguments against the self-evident nature of theological principles which are based upon appeals to common experience.

In addition, Gregory actually ignores Francis' discussion of necessitas. By so doing he missed another opportunity for rejecting

Francis' contention that theology is scientia proprie dicta. It is obvious if one considers closely the distinction Francis is making that he is actually hedging on the scientific nature of theology when he puts theology in the category of the second level of necessitas. The effect is to transfer theology from the realm of scientia strictly considered to sapientia, a distinction we encountered earlier in the discussion of Scotus. By simply calling attention to this less than subtle shift in meaning of necessitas Gregory could have further undermined Francis' initial contentions about the nature of theology. And yet he chose not to do so. It may be that Gregory did not think Francis' arguments worth answering. Or, the Doctor Authenticus may have felt uncomfortable launching into a discussion of the problem that was not based upon the usual presuppositions of the question. Whether or not the manner in which he treated Francis on this issue is merely a singular instance of Gregory's approach to opposition arguments will have to wait upon the outcome of more research into the source documents of the theologians against whom he argued.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The several points of view examined in this paper prompt a few observations. In the first place, one has to be cautious about describing certain periods of history by one general characteristic. On the issue of theology as science, for example, since Thomas dominated thirteenth century thought the way he did, it is tempting to consider the thirteenth century as the period of theology as scientia proprie dicta. But the thirteenth century was also the time of Scotus who represents in his views on this question a movement away from Thomas toward an appreciation of theology as sapientia. In like manner, the fourteenth century cannot be categorized entirely as the period of theology as belief. Francis of Marchia and Gregory of Rimini were contemporaries, along with William of Ockham. In the area of epistemology they all show the influences of a revised look at Aristotle; they are all sensitive to the new possibilities for logic and for a dependable route to knowledge which stresses the cognitio rei singularis. But, as we have seen, at the same time they show marked differences on the issue before us, theologia qua scientia. This is one more confirmation of the fact that the easy generalizations that have sometimes been made about thirteenth and fourteenth century thought must be received with a great degree of caution. On the positive side, scholars ought to welcome points of view which reveal a period of history as full of dynamic interaction of people and ideas. To that end, efforts at redefining the terms with which we think about these two centuries ought to be rewarding and exciting, as indicated by the efforts in that direction by D. Trapp.

To balance this perspective, it must also be remembered that there are elements of continuity that bind the thought of these two periods together as well. As diverse as were the epistemological views of Thomas and Ockham, both were in agreement on the source and inspiration of the knowledge essential for the viator's salvation. Both were agreed on the limitations of metaphysics and Greek philosophical ideas in helping man along his way to the fulfillment of his eternal destiny. If other dimensions of Francis of Marchia's theology were known, it is very likely that the radical difference we have seen between him and Gregory on only one issue might be moderated somewhat. A strong danger in accenting the differences between points of view is that one overlooks the fact that dialogue would not be possible in the first place unless there were some areas of common presupposition.

This short study has confirmed some assumptions about the historical-critical accomplishments of Gregory of Rimini. At the same time it raises some questions about his debating procedure. That Gregory may have been less than straight-forward about the complete scope of an opponent's viewpoint, suggests that concentrating on the thought of only major figures in any given period may lead us into a distorted picture of what was actually transpiring. By examining the actual argument of only one opponent of Gregory, we have enlarged our view of the dimensions of the problem in question and discovered that the issue is more complex than a simple reading of Gregory would suggest.

One of our concerns in this paper has been to test the assertion that Francis of Marchia was a faithful follower of Duns Scotus.

Because of the limitations of the transcribed material, attention had to be restricted to the question of theology as science. On the face of it, especially to the degree that he stresses the self-evident nature of theological principles, Francis appears to mark a rejection of the Scotistic formulation and a return to a position more like that of St. Thomas. Although he rejects the subalternation theory of Thomas, Francis nonetheless clings to the notion of theology as science in its proper sense. However, Francis' treatment of necessitas introduces a new dimension to the problem which takes his viewpoint out of the category of strict science and puts it more in the framework of sapientia. In this respect Francis could be said to reflect the position of Scotus, and Ockham also for that matter. The answer hangs on our interpretation of Francis' understanding of per se nota. If it is meant in a strictly logical sense (theological principles are in their very nature self-evident) then Francis is not in the Scotistic camp; if it is meant in an existential sense (the Christian holds the principles of theology with the same sort of certainty that one would hold self-evident principles) then he is stressing the affective nature of theology and is viewing it more as wisdom. Only more digging into the thought of Francis will offer any hope of answering questions like these.

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