Use of Force: Moving Beyond the Academy

The Deployment and Implementation of the Patrol Rifle for Critical Incidents

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Use of Force: Moving Beyond the Academy
The Deployment and Implementation of the Patrol Rifle for Critical Incidents

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Abstract
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The Deployment and Implementation of the Patrol Rifle for Critical Incidents

Gary D. Lewis

Under the Supervision of Dr. Susan Hilal

Statement of the Problem

Law enforcement officers are legally given the authority to use force to detain and control a suspect or situation. Research has identified that the combative skills that a new police officer is taught in the recruit academy provides only a basic foundation of combative skills needed to perform the duties of a police officer (McElvain, 2006). Law enforcement agencies need to recognize that basic competencies and static training programs fail to advance the combative skills and proficiencies of their officers. The FBI's latest findings in 2008 regarding officers killed or assaulted (58,972) reinforces that officers are still at a significant risk of injury and death while trying to fulfill their occupational duties.

The incorporation of the black rifle or AR-15 patrol rifle is a growing identifiable symbol of law enforcement's role in protecting themselves and the communities they serve. The AR-15 patrol rifle provides officers with the ability to handle significant deadly threats from a greater distance with increased accuracy. The rifle provides an offensive weapon into the officers "toolbox" as the handgun is primarily viewed as a reactive and defensive weapon. The intention of this paper is to provide policy makers, particularly chiefs of police, with literature and documentation to the benefits of a comprehensive patrol rifle program. Policy examination and implementation strategies will be provided. Further police administrators, may find this
document as a critical component in selling a rifle program to their city government budget officials and constituents during tough economic times.

**Methods of Approach**

This research paper consists of analysis of case studies and the use of secondary research. Research relevant to adult learning models, firearms instruction, and combat stress is used. An analysis of active shooter events and fundamental terrorist group activities and their potential impact on American society is addressed to justify the need for the patrol rifle as a standard issue piece of law enforcement equipment for patrol officers. Patrol rifle polices, studies regarding their use, and effective training for deployments is reviewed for proper program implementation at the agency level.

**Findings**

Current trends in society, lack of proper combative training, and failing to implement a patrol rifle program significantly limits a law enforcement agency and its officers ability to adequately perform in a high level critical incident. Through proper leadership and structure an agency can significantly increase the combative and tactical skills of its officers while accounting for cost. The patrol rifle will enhance the agency's mission to protect their community and will be accomplished utilizing a solid training program founded in adult learning principals and rifle training that moves beyond a static firing range.
Table of Contents

Title Page I
Acknowledgements II
Abstract III
Table of Contents 1

Chapters

I. Introduction: Societal influences dictating the necessity of the patrol rifle 3
   A. Active shooter defined 6
   B. Method of approach 7
   C. Limitations and assumptions 7

II. Literature Review 8
   A. Evolution of Active Shooter Incidents 8
      a. School shootings 9
      b. Work place violence 11
   B. Terrorist Active Shooter Events 12
      a. Beslan, Russia 12
      b. Mumbai, India 13
      c. Fort Hood, Texas 15
   C. Training 16
      a. Behavior and target discrimination based training 17
      b. Advanced live fire training 21
      c. Stress inoculation training 22
      d. Alternatives to live fire training 24
III. Theoretical Framework
   A. Bloom's adult learning theory 26
   B. Cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion 27
   C. Boyd's OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop theory 29

IV. Implementing the AR-15 patrol rifle 31
   A. Patrol rifle deployment 31
   B. Civil liability and training 33
   C. Policy development 35
   D. Mandatory tactical patrol training 38
   E. Multi-jurisdictional training and policy development 39
   F. Overcoming common training excuses 40
   G. Suggested future research 41

V. References 43

VI. Appendix
   A. Chandler, Arizona Police Department General Order Firearms 52
   B. University of Texas at Austin Police Dept. Duty Weapons Policy 58
   C. Rialto, California Police Department Patrol Rifles Policy 61
   D. Iowa City, Iowa Police Department Patrol Rifle General Order 64
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION-DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

Statement of the Problem

Law enforcement officers are legally given the authority to use force to detain and control a suspect or situation. Research has identified that the combative skills that a new police officer is taught in the recruit academy provides only a basic foundation of combative skills needed to perform the duties of a police officer (McElvain, 2006). Law enforcement agencies need to recognize that basic competencies and static training programs fail to advance the combative skills and proficiencies of their officers. The FBI's latest findings regarding officers killed or assaulted reinforces that officers are still at a significant risk of injury and death while trying to fulfill their occupational duties. In 2008, the FBI identified 58,792 officers assaulted with a quarter of these officers being injured as a result of the assault (FBI, 2008). For officers feloniously killed in 2008, a firearm was used by the suspect in 35 of 41 deaths (FBI, 2008).

The incorporation of the black rifle or AR-15 patrol rifle is a growing identifiable symbol of law enforcement's role in protecting themselves and the communities they serve. The AR-15 patrol rifle provides officers with the ability to handle significant deadly threats from a greater distance with increased accuracy. The rifle provides an offensive weapon into the officers "tool box" as the handgun is primarily viewed as a reactive and defensive weapon. Tragic active shooter events at schools, churches, workplaces, and banks were the catalyst for issuing and evolving away from the shotgun to the AR-15 patrol rifle to ensure that officers were not outgunned. The threat of international terrorism on American soil through jihadist style attacks similar to Beslan, Russia and Mumbai, India further illustrates the need for American police officers at the patrol level to be outfitted and proficiently trained in the deployment of AR-15 patrol rifles (National Tactical Officers Association, 2010).
The intention of this paper is to provide policy makers, particularly chiefs of police, with literature and documentation as to the benefits of a comprehensive patrol rifle program. The patrol rifle will enhance the agency's mission to protect their community and will be accomplished utilizing a solid training program founded in adult learning principals and rifle training that moves beyond a static firing range. Policy examination and implementation strategies will be provided. Further police administrators, may find this document as a critical component in selling a rifle program to their city government budget officials and constituents during tough economic times.

**Significance of the Problem**

The identity of the American police officer has evolved from watchman, to peacekeeper, to community servant, and ultimately problem solver. Police officers are tasked with being someone different for each individual he/she comes in contact with depending on his/her complaint or situation. Despite law enforcement's increased role in promoting community programs, engaging in quasi social work practices, and mediating people's problems there is still a core function that no other profession can legally fulfill which is crime fighter.

The community policing era is slowly evolving into the era of homeland security (Oliver, 2006). The era of homeland security is a direct result of terrorist attacks on US soil on September 11, 2001. Government funding has shifted away from community policing programs such as COPS, which allowed agencies to hire additional personnel for their community policing programs into programs dedicated to homeland security (Oliver, 2006). The trend towards homeland security is a queue to local law enforcement that preparation to handle nontraditional law enforcement problems is not out of the questions. Agencies need to prepare officers to
utilize military style tactics and prepare to confront violent situations from a new perspective. Violence on American soil is nothing new however suspects are now using weapons with higher ammunition capacities and utilizing simple homemade improvised explosive devices to carry out their violent agendas.

The modern professional police officer has evolved into an efficient problem-solver but the core foundation as a crime fighter remains. In order to fight crime, individuals who become police officers have to be trained and skilled in the techniques that allow them to lawfully use force against an individual and protect the community. This foundation is established in the basic law enforcement recruit academy. Recruits are taught basic self-defense, control techniques, and weapon handling skills. For example, the State of Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB) 520 hr basic recruit academy devotes 19% of academy time to defense and arrest tactics and firearm skills (LESB,2007). This equates to 102 total hours of combative skills training. This training equates to a high school diploma in combative techniques and firearm skills. The newly trained officer is then immersed in the use of force policies and procedures of their individual agencies. The law enforcement agency now has the responsibility to continue and advance the combative skills training of the individual officer so they may be prepared to succeed in the deadliest use of force encounters.

Police officers, unlike any other non-military occupation, are legally permitted to use force on an individual in order to affect a lawful arrest. Despite public perception, police use of force is uncommon and fewer than 1% of police-citizen encounters will result in the use of force (McElvain, 2008). To increase the burden placed upon the rookie police officer, when they take their oath of office, they are telling the community and themselves they are willing to use lethal force to stop the threat, if that person's actions jeopardize the safety of the community. There is a
clear need to move beyond basic static defensive tactics and firearms drills. Officer's need to engage in advanced combative training to improve their overall weapons handling skills and tactical movement.

**Active Shooter Defined**

The active shooter is a law enforcement problem that has been evolving since Charles Whitman's killing of 14 people and wounding 30 others in 1966 on the campus of the University of Texas-Austin. Whitman demonstrated how one trained, but more importantly, heavily armed and barricaded individual could continually kill and hold off inadequately trained and equipped police officers (Bauldry, 2003). As active shooter incidents continue to present themselves, law enforcements response continues to evolve. The most simplistic definition of an active shooter can be defined as, "an active shooter is an armed person who has used deadly physical force on other persons and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims" (Maketa, 2004, p.1). Ball State University police provides a more comprehensive definition of an active shooter,

One or more subjects who participate in a random or systematic shooting spree, demonstrating their intent to continuously harm others. The overriding objective appears to be that of inflicting serious bodily injury/death rather than other criminal conduct. (Ball State University Police, 2010)

Simply stated any person who enters into a populated area and begins to use deadly physical force towards individuals known or unknown to the person regardless of intent is defined as an active shooter and law enforcement agency protocols should be initiated to stop the active shooter threat.
Methods of Approach

This research paper consists of analysis of case studies and the use of secondary research. Research relevant to adult learning models, firearms instruction, and combat stress will be used. An analysis of active shooter events and fundamental terrorist group activities and their potential impact on American society will be addressed to justify the need for the patrol rifle as a standard issue piece of law enforcement equipment for patrol officers. Patrol rifle polices, studies regarding their use, and effective deployments will be reviewed for proper program implementation at the agency level.

Limitations and Assumptions

There have been a significant number of active shooter events both nationally and internationally that could contribute to the text of this seminar paper. Additionally patrol rifle programs vary based on department needs to include style of instruction for use and rifle configurations and platforms. This seminar paper cannot address every program and the fact that a policy, incident, or training program is not included does not diminish the relevance of that program to the topic. A reasonable conclusion can be made that there are programs and policies that are a viable solution that are not presented in this paper.
SECTION II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review consists of three sections. Section one is an examination of active shooter events located in the United States which have occurred in the school and workplace setting. Section two covers terrorist activity abroad and on US soil. Section three covers four styles of firearms training to provide an overall foundation to the basic components needed for advanced combative training which incorporate the use of police patrol rifles.

Evolution of Active Shooter Incidents

Indentifying specific traits inherent to the active shooter and defining the overall nature of the active shooter critical incident provides law enforcement first responders, the media, and general public with a greater knowledge and understanding of the critical incident and why law enforcement needs to respond with aggressive, military style tactics. The active shooter event is unlike any other domestic or civilian law enforcement problem. Active shooters generally lack a criminal motive beyond mass murder (Johnson, 2006). The El Paso County Sheriff's Office active shooter policy defines the typical characteristics of an active shooter based on past incidents. The policy defines the characteristics of the event and not necessarily the person. Workplace and school active shooters as individuals display similar traits. Fascination with weapons, insecurity, jealously, depression, and significant life change are common themes that arise when profiling an active shooter (Johnson, 2006). Social status and personal attacks towards the shooter's sense of masculinity play a key role leading up to the active shooter event. The shooter(s) believe they are fulfilling a righteous mission and violence is a justifiable solution to resolve social injustices they have been subjected to (Tonso, 2009). When defining the active shooter or the overall event, law enforcement and the general public needs to embrace and accept that the active shooter's primary objective is to kill and to kill as many people as possible. The
active shooter does not wish to negotiate with law enforcement and will likely kill themselves or be killed by law enforcement. The active shooter typically does not try to conceal their identity, plan escape routes, will heavily arm themselves, seeks locations where victims are abundant (schools, malls, hospitals, workplace), and kills indiscriminately absent a criminal objective beyond murder (Maketa, 2004). With this knowledge, it is clear that law enforcement must quickly address the active shooter and stop their threat to eliminate their ability to kill.

Law enforcement’s primary responsibly once an active shooter event has begun is to stop the threat presented by the shooter. Standard patrol tactics through the late 1990's was to contain and wait for specialized units. Active shooters were deemed a special weapons and tactics (SWAT) or emergency response team (ERT) problem. Patrol officer's mission was to contain the area and prevent the shooter from escaping and limit access within the perimeter so the shooter could not encounter or acquire additional targets or victims. The implementation of a patrol rifle program will provide first responding officers with a weapon system which will increase their ability to effectively engage the active shooter(s) and stop the threat they are presenting within a school, workplace, or other venue where innocent people may become victims. Past active shooters within the school and workplace provides law enforcement with clear direction that some intervention needs to occur to prevent the further loss of life.

School Based Shootings

Parents expect that their children will be safe when they leave each day for school. Despite the relatively low risk of a student becoming a homicide victim while attending school. Twenty-nine school shootings have occurred between 1997-2007 resulting in the deaths of 95 people which includes students or school personnel (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).
Despite the relatively low incidence of death on our school's campuses, each individual act creates a significant impact on each individual community and the nation as a whole. Prior to 1999, law enforcement maintained the surround and contain technique to resolve the active shooter problem. Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold in April 1999 exposed law enforcement's weakness and failure to train the active shooter problem. Defined as rampage shooters, the shooter is a current or former student, the shooter's intent is to carry their violence in a school setting or event, does not target one specific individual, and the goal is to create multiple victims (Langman, 2009). By defining the intent of the rampage shooter it becomes clear that law enforcement's preferred tactic of surround and contain provides the shooter with a distinct advantage in accomplishing their mission.

The death of 13 student and faculty members of Columbine High School and the wounding of 23 others was an unacceptable loss. The law enforcement community was tasked with developing and implementing a new way to intervene and minimize the overall number of those killed and wounded. Despite new training programs, the threat continually evolves and forces law enforcement to prepare with new equipment and response plans. Seung Hui Cho, nearly 10 years later in 2007, killed 32 and wounded 37 on the campus of Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia (Langman, 2009). Active shooter programs specifically geared towards the school setting had been implemented across the country. In 2003, El Paso County Sheriff's Office specifically dictated in policy the goal, "police response at an active shooter event is neutralization by denying access to additional victims, rescuing injured victims, and/or rescuing potential victims" (Maketa, 2004, p.3). Analysis of attacks within institutions of higher education revealed approximately 3% of attackers have moved between buildings, while 4% have moved within a building (Drysdale, 2010). Seung Hui Cho at Virginia Tech challenged law
enforcement by breaking the typical model that law enforcement had been training under. Seung Hui Cho killed his first two victims in a residence hall and moved to a lecture hall and began killing again approximately two and half hours later (Drysdale, 2010).

Workplace Shootings

The American workplace is not immune to rampage violence or the active shooter threat. Many of the same characteristics observed in the high school or college rampage shooter can be observed in the workplace shooter. Omar Thornton, a 34 year old beer truck delivery driver killed eight coworkers using a handgun after being given the choice to resign or be fired (Waldman, 2010). Thornton chose to resign and while being escorted out of the building, Thornton began shooting at his coworkers (Waldman, 2010). In August of 2003, Salvador Tapia returned to his former employer six months after being fired and began shooting coworkers with a semi automatic handgun (Roberts, 2003). Tapia killed six former coworkers and died from police gun shots after engaging in a gun fight with responding law enforcement officers (Roberts, 2003).

The rampage shooter's intent is to kill and needs some form of intervention in order to stop their agenda. Whether law enforcement arrival causes them to commit suicide or law enforcement themselves stops the shooter's threat, some form of intervention must take place. By reviewing past school and workplace shooter incidents, the majority of shooters tend to commit suicide. With this knowledge it becomes clear to law enforcement that early intervention is the key to preventing further casualties at the hands of an individual who expects to die. Beyond the general stressors that influence work place violence, job loss, performance
evaluations, economic conditions, etc., the work place is now being infiltrated with religious and/or political inspiration as a cause for inflicting mass violence.

**Terrorist Threat**

It is hard to predict when and where the traditional active shooter incident will present itself. By looking at past incidents, the overwhelming majority of active or rampage shooters typically commits suicide once they are aware of a law enforcement presence or they have fulfilled their agenda by killing their intended victim and those in the immediate area. Active shooter's intent on killing, fueled by religious or political motives, will not stop killing until law enforcement intervenes. These individuals abide by and adhere to a doctrine as professed by Mozar Barayev a 25-year-old Chechen leader who led the assault on Beslan's middle school (Giduck, 2005). Mozar Barayev stated to his hostages repeatedly, "I swear by Allah we desire death more than you desire life". "We have come here to die, and you are going to die with us"(Giduck, 2005, p.79). American law enforcement needs to prepare to stop a threat that does not intend to negotiate and is willing to die for their cause. Terrorist activities in Beslan, Russia, Mumbai, India, and the mass killings of US Army personnel in Fort Hood, Texas have provided examples of the capabilities and tactics used by those intent on killing and creating mass hysteria within in a community.

*Beslan, Russia*

The first day of school in Russia is referred to as the Day of Knowledge, and is attended by the students entire family and has a festival style atmosphere (Giduck, 2005). In September 2004 on the first day of school, Beslan would become the venue for one of the worst acts of terrorism committed in the world. Chechen rebels fighting for Chechen freedom from Russia
and fueled by Islamic hate took 1,181 individuals, primarily children, hostage for 62 hours in an attack that took approximately 15 minutes to herd students into the school and secure the building (Giduck, 2005). The Chechen rebels killed any adult male, teenage or preteen male whom they viewed as a potential threat or resistor (Giduck, 2005). One father was killed in front of his two sons when he attempted to calm families and children when a Chechen terrorist walked over to him placed the barrel of his assault rifle at the father's head and fired the weapon (Giduck, 2005). The women and girls taken hostage were repeatedly raped by the terrorist to include the use of foreign objects, particularly the barrels of assault rifles (Giduck, 2005).

The Chechen rebels terrorist group consisted of 49 individuals including two female Chechens wearing all black and outfitted with explosives on their person (Giduck, 2005). However, the terrorist group was not comprised solely of Chechens. The terrorist group consisted of ten different nationalities to include 10 from Arab countries who are believed to have sponsored the Chechen's to further advance their violent ideology to the world (Giduck, 2005). 330 individuals to include 172 children, 11 men from Russia's elite special operations groups, and an additional 10 soldiers from the Russian military died and 700 individuals were wounded due to the terrorist actions initiated on September 1 (Giduck, 2005).

**Mumbai, India**

Mumbai is the commercial and entertainment venue of India including the location of the famous Taj Mahal Palace and Trident-Oberoi hotels (Rabasa, 2009). Mumbai has not been immune to terrorist attacks with a train bombing occurring in 2006 with 209 casualties and multiple bombs detonating in a single day throughout the city in 1993, killing 257 (Rabasa, 2009). In November 2008, jihadist terrorist out of Pakistan utilized a new tactic bringing a city of 20 million people to a standstill griped with fear and uncertainty for 60 hours (Rabasa, 2009).
Ten terrorist hijacked an Indian fishing vessel in order to avoid security checkpoints and detection by Indian authorities (Rabasa, 2009). The ten terrorist broke into four attack teams armed with AK-56 automatic assault rifle (the Chinese version of the AK-47), seven 30 round assault rifle ammunition magazines, 9mm handguns with two ammunition magazines, 8 to 10 hand grenades, and explosive materials which could be used to fashion improvised explosive devices (Rabasa, 2009).

The four attack teams appeared to begin moving systematically throughout the city as individual attack teams. Indian intelligence now believes the attack had been in its planning stages since mid 2007 as a Pakistani terrorist was intercepted in late 2007 with intelligence information that contained information for sites that were eventually attacked in November 2008 (Rabasa, 2009). Each attack team appeared to have a specific course of travel to arrive at their designated target location. By attacking multiple locations simultaneously, the city of Mumbai fell into a state of confusion and fear. The attack teams were highly mobile and when they encountered any type of legitimate resistance from Indian police they would move to their next target location (Rabasa, 2009). The attackers utilized improvised explosive devices, drive-by shootings, targeted victims (police officers, American, and British citizens), and the random killing of Indian citizens in train stations, hotels, and restaurants resulting in the deaths of 172 people (Rabasa, 2009).

The areas targeted by the terrorist were deemed "soft" targets as they had little or no security or defensive infrastructure present (Rabasa, 2009). The areas identified included the central train station, Taj Mahal palace hotel, two other high profile hotels, the Leopold Cafe, a popular location for foreigners and Indian citizens, and the Jewish Chabad center were locations that would create high body count, high emotional value, and international media attention
(Rabasa, 2009). Through detailed preparation, overwhelming firepower, and small mobile attack teams the terrorist were able to create a state of confusion that the Indian government or police service was unable to effectively counter. Past terrorist acts consisted of a single bomb or bombs detonating at the same time. Inspections of railway stations, vehicles, and hotels have hardened those structures against improvised explosive devices. Additionally the attackers may also be moving away from the martyr ideal of simply pressing a button and committing suicide by bomb but becoming a martyr warrior, actively engaging with security forces until death (Rabasa, 2009).

**Fort Hood, Texas**

Nearly one year after the Mumbai, India attack utilizing small attack teams with firearms, a United States Army base in Fort Hood, Texas would fall victim to a terrorist act by a single gunman. Twelve soldiers and one Army civilian were killed while thirty were injured by gunshots (West, 2010). Major Nidal Malik Hasan, entered the Soldier Readiness Center on November 5, 2009 and began shooting at soldiers who were preparing for an upcoming deployment (Pariante, 2009). Major Hasan continued shooting at unarmed soldiers as they tried to escape the building until Fort Hood law enforcement officers intervened and exchanged gun shots with Major Hasan, incapacitating and ending his threat of violence (Pariante, 2009). Major Hasan represents the home grown, self radicalized terrorist, who uses readily available weapons to their deadliest capabilities (Jenkins, 2009). The adoption of concepts that the West and Islam are "irreconcilably opposed", expression of extremist views via the internet, and correspondence with Anwar al-Awlaki reveal that Major Hasan killed to fulfill jihadist ideology (Jenkins, 2009). Major Hasan killed not only Americans but American soldiers who he viewed as directly responsible for the killing of the people he is morally and spiritually connected to.
**Training**

The standard firearms qualification provides agencies with the ability to pass/fail or grade their officers in firearms proficiency. Despite the majority of officers passing these marksmanship qualifications, field data indicates that officers are hitting their target only 25% of the time (Honig, 2008). Whites (2006) analysis of officer involved shooting from the Philadelphia Police Department found that, "shooting accuracy is influenced by a host of variables and that different dynamics are in play during the encounter that affect whether an officer's shots are on target". The distance of 10 ft or less was found to be the distance were officers are most accurate and accuracy declines the further away the suspect is from the officer or if the suspect is actively struggling with the officer (White, 2006). White's review of Philadelphia's officer involved shootings revealed that over half of the incidents occurred at distances greater than 10ft (White, 2006). This could cause one to derive the false conclusion that training to increase marksmanship should be increased. Agencies already are overtly focused on marksmanship training as opposed to combat training.

Eighty-one percent of officers killed were within 7 yards or less of the suspect and 49% or 268 officers were within 0-5ft (Miller, 2009). A significant number of deadly assaults occur within the normal range in which we can converse. Despite the academy mantra of create distance, if the deadly threat presents itself within 0-5ft, the ability to create distance has been voided. Training must incorporate the FBI's newest findings regarding those who attack the police and their weapons. These offenders were found to utilize their front waistband followed by either the groin or small of back to conceal a weapon (Pinizzotto, 2009). Offenders also displayed signs which officers missed indicating that they were carrying a concealed weapon. Dress, types of movement, and unconscious gestures were identified as visual cues which
officers need to be trained to recognize (Pinizzotto, 2009). Two primary observations the study prompts officers to look for are, "unnatural protrusions or bulges in the waist, back, and crotch areas, which include shirts that appear rippled or wavy on one side of the body while the fabric on the other side appears smooth and frequent touching of a concealed gun with hands or arms to assure themselves the weapon is still hidden, secure, and accessible" (Pinizzotto, 2009, p.13).

The FBI Violent Encounters study reinforces that instinct will not provide enough of an advantage during a violent assault. Offenders are training with their firearms at a rate far greater than officers due to a false impression that officers are at the range two to three times a week (Pinizzotto, 2009). Training programs must also create real life scenarios that allow the officer to experience the realities of a gun fight. Pinizzotto's study found that 40% of the offenders had been involved in prior gun fights before their assault of a police officer (Pinizzotto, 2009). The law enforcement officers killed and assaulted study for 2008 completed by the FBI, concluded that 19.3% of officers were assaulted with some type of dangerous weapon (FBI, 2008). 35 of the 41 officers feloniously killed in 2008 were killed by use of a firearm and 6 of the 35 died from injuries inflicted by a rifle (FBI, 2008). Officers have to be equipped with the necessary tools and proper training and policies to effectively use these tools to confront and succeed in a critical incident. The development of a sound patrol rifle program is an area agencies can address to help their officers succeed and enhance their combative and firearms training programs.

Behavior and Target Discrimination Based Training

Every firearm and defensive tactics training program will ultimately fail the individual officer if the training does not incorporate suspect behavior into every module. The officer's
ability to initiate and ultimately use force against an individual is rooted in the actions of the individual. Officer's who learn to recognize and react appropriately to suspect behavior can initiate force sooner, which often results in the decreased risk of injury to the suspect and officer. To prevent the sudden attack or assault, officers must be made aware of certain visual, audio, and behavioral cues exhibited by the suspect. Honig found that, "to react, an officer must first perceive a threat, which will typically result from processing the actions of the suspect and then determining the appropriate response" (2008, p.141). The recognition of these cues may offer the officer the micro second advantage needed to control the situation. It is more important for the officer to quickly recognize a threat and efficiently utilize the environment and training rather than simply racing to complete the athletic movement of quickly drawing their firearm and shooting which is the standard for most law enforcement firearms programs (Pincus, 2006). Reinforcing the concept, that action is always faster than reaction.

The Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB) Defensive and Arrest Tactics defines assaultive behavior as, "when an individual's direct actions generate bodily harm to the officer(s) and or another person(s)" (2007). LESB instructs officers to engage in threat assessments as part of their tactical evaluation throughout the course of the citizen contact. Specific areas identified by LESB include levels of resistive tension, early warning signs, pre-attack postures, signs of mental illness and weapons control factors (2007). A study conducted at the Manhattan Psychiatric Center identified "four or more normal signs of aggression" prior to a patient on patient and patient on staff assault (Crowner, 2005). Some of these behaviors included fist shaking, pointing, taking a karate or boxing stance, and approaching or beckoning (Crowner, 2005).
Basic or recruit level training is incapable of implementing the necessary repetitions in behavior cue recognition and force option decision making. Time quickly erodes away covering the basic defense and arrest tactics and basic firearms marksmanship. Firearms training consists of shooting at a humanoid target which simply registers a score based upon where the bullet impacts. These targets are non threatening, nor do they invoke a sense of harming an actual human being since they are simply silhouettes. The lack of realistic pictorial targets and heavy reliance on scoring targets or those depicting stereotypical "outlaws" plays a significant role in an officer's misperception of a threat which ultimately creates a delay in the officer's decision to use force (Bohrer, 2008). Time constraints and accurate fire becomes the only stress placed on the recruit officer (McElvain, 2006).

A comprehensive study conducted in Colorado utilized a control group comprised of Denver CO citizens, Denver CO police officers, and officers from around the United States attending a law enforcement conference in Colorado (Correll, 2007). The study was conducted in three phases with phase one being the primary study. Phase one consisted of 124 officers from four of the six patrol districts of the Denver CO Police Department, 129 civilians who by chance were visiting a DMV office within the four patrol districts and agreed to participate in the study, and 113 police officers which comprised a national sample as these officers were attending a police related seminar in the Denver area (Correll, 2007). The study consisted of a 100 image trial with random pictures of a white man armed, white man unarmed, black man armed, and black man unarmed (Correll, 2007). The images were obtained by photographing 25 black men and 25 white men each photographed in five poses holding various objects (large black 9mm, small black revolver, large silver revolver, small silver semi auto, large black wallet, small black cell phone, silver coke can, small silver cell phone), these photos than had one of 20 unpopulated
Photoshop backgrounds added (Correll, 2007). Participants in the study were asked to sit in front of a computer monitor and observe the images. Each image was timed and the participant had two options: shoot or don't shoot. The length of time to make a decision and whether or not the correct decision was made was recorded. The video game was scored with positive points for correct shooting decisions and negative points for timing out and incorrect shooting decisions (Correll, 2007).

The research concluded the police officers showed a distinct advantage over their civilian counterparts relative to the ultimate decision to shoot/no shoot. The study found that the civilian group had significantly more errors and appeared "trigger-happy". Ultimately, the study concluded that race may factor into the speed of the decision to shoot/no shoot by the officer however it does not affect the officer's accuracy (Correll, 2007). Correll stated, "to fully characterize the presence of any bias among police, it is therefore critical to examine bias in the communities they serve" (2007, p.1008). The study highlights that untrained citizens will base their decisions on preconceived stereotypes and not suspect behavior. This study reinforces that training based in suspect behavior and actions will enhance an officer's awareness and ability to recognize cues that will illicit some form of action on behalf of the officer.

Target identification is a key component to the use of deadly force and an officer must first see before they can shoot (Howe, 2005). The ability to quickly identify and discriminate between targets is a perishable skill which will degrade quickly if not practiced (Lamb, 2008). A simplistic non-firing target identification and recognition can be conducted utilizing a set number of pre made targets, staged at various depths and angles throughout the room, with only one target armed with a weapon (Howe, 2005). Students are instructed to not look only at the hands but to first look at the whole person and then scan down one side and down the other to identify
if the target presents a threat (Howe, 2005). By training the officer to first identify the whole person and then use a systematic process to identify if the person is in possession of a weapon will reduce the incidents of friendly fire (Howe, 2005). Charles notes, "it will be counterproductive to hone marksmanship skills without simultaneously refining the 'shoot/don't shoot' decision-making skills"(2002 p.28).

Advanced Live Fire Training

Advanced live fire training does not and should not be the agencies primary focus for their patrol rifle training program. The high cost of .223 caliber ammunition and current demands on supply have forced agencies to find alternatives for training. Live fire training should account for 30 percent of your firearms training program (Howe, 2005). To decrease live fire training cost agencies can purchase and utilize .22 conversion kits for their patrol rifles. The .22 conversion kits allow for greater flexibility on the firearms range and the ability to utilize reactive steel target which have a high probability of being damaged when using the .223 caliber ammunition (Lamb, 2008). Lamb, lead instructor for Viking Tactics and former special operations soldier concludes, "I have not found a more inexpensive way to achieve training goals" (2008, 217). Ammunition cost for .223 is approximately $50 for 100 rounds while .22 ammunition cost approximately $8 for 100 rounds (Smith, 2010). Any live fire training course developed for the .223 patrol rifle could be conducted and the same training goals met by incorporating .22 ammunition and conversion kits into an agency's rifle program.

Combat Focus Shooting utilizes a range drill for handgun use that can be adapted to the patrol rifle operator. "Push Your Limit" is a self timed drill the forces the student to push themselves to increase the speed and precision in which they shoot. The drill's objective is to
create a shooter who can quickly and accurately deliver follow up shots in order to stop a threat. The drill is conducted by having the student officer begin by counting "one-one-thousand", "two-one-thousand", up to five and firing one round at the start of each number (Pincus, 2006). The next step would be to count "one and two and three " up to five again firing one round at the start of each number (Pincus, 2006). The final evolution of the drill is to quickly count, "one, two, three, four, five" essentially firing all five rounds in under a second (Pincus, 2006).

Viking Tactics Zig-Zag Drill provides police officers armed with a patrol rifle a live fire exercise which incorporates forward and lateral movement and multiple target engagement while moving which would simulate the realities of a multiple shooter school or terrorist critical incident. The Zig-Zag Drill utilizes five targets with the officer firing 3 rounds into target 1 while moving forward, makes a right turn and fires 2 rounds in targets 2, 3, and 4 while moving to the right, turns and runs to right rear of the training course, and fires 3 rounds into target 5, makes a left turn and fires 2 rounds into targets 2, 3, 4 while moving to the left and ultimately stopping at a designated location (Lamb, 2008). This course can be modified to incorporate shoot/no shoot targets which force target discrimination while moving, target depth can be varied to challenge the officer's ability to quickly gain target acquisition, and the shooter can be placed under a timer to increase performance anxiety.

Stress Inoculation Training

Agencies owe it to the safety of their officers to invest in training that will provide the greatest opportunity for success in the field. A study conducted through the University of Amsterdam utilizing Dutch police officers found that reality based firearms training improved police officer accuracy and performance (Oudejans, 2008). Oudejans has studied elite athletes
and found that by placing athletes under pressure training scenarios the likelihood of these athletes "choking" during competition decreased (2008). A firearms training program was initiated utilizing this same principle of applying realistic pressure that an officer would encounter during a gunfight (Oudejans, 2008). The results of the study found that officers practicing against live opponents showed marked improvement during a combative style qualification test when compared to the control group which maintain a standard training regimen of traditional non-threatening targets (Oudejans, 2008). Oudejans concludes, "under pressure one not only learns to execute the task, but also to execute it under the new conditions of increased self-consciousness"(2008 p.271).

Stress inoculation training helps officers to control the release and effect of adrenaline within the body and maintain performance under psychological and physiological stimulation (Honig, 2008). When an officer is experiencing anxiety related to a threat stimulus there is a decrease in physical skills and increased attention is directed towards internal thoughts of self preservation and information related to the threatening stimulus (Nieuwenhuys, 2010). A research study concluded that when officers were placed in a condition of high anxiety there was a significant decrease in shooting accuracy (Nieuwenhuys, 2010). Long complex scenario based training modules are not the single answer as they are cost prohibitive, time consuming, and do not allow for sufficient training reps. Officer movement speeds up during a state of high anxiety decreasing his/her ability to shoot accurately (Nieuwenhuys, 2010). Simple isolation drills which capture a particular moment during a violent encounter will provide the officer with the mental and physical framework to reference during a deadly force critical incident. Complex scenarios should be developed so officers can perform in a critical incident, recall details, and prepare a thorough use of force report. Scenarios which incorporate these fundamentals will enhance the
officer's overall resiliency in the aftermath of a critical incident (Honig, 2008). Scenarios should be used sparingly as an evaluation resource, once instructors are confident police officer students have demonstrated the necessary skills and appropriate tactical responses to successfully complete the evaluation.

Alternatives to Live Fire Training

The use of Airsoft and Simuniton equipment provides agencies with the opportunity to allow officers to engage in "gunfights". The United States Air Force provides fighter pilots with real flight simulated and computer simulated dogfights in order to create combat experience so the pilot has a frame of reference to draw from during actual combat flights (Berger, 2005). An evaluation of air combat from World War I through Vietnam conducted by the Litton Corporation found that if air crews survived their first 10 combat missions their rate of future success greatly increased (Berger, 2005). Trainers need to provide officers with gunfight experiences. Airsoft provides agencies with a low overhead option for force on force training. This platform allows officers to utilize weapons similar in weight and feel to their actual weapons. Officers can draw the weapon from their own holster and practice techniques that will allow them to move then shoot and shoot from the inside position. Close quarter combat shooting does not rely on the use of the weapons sights but officers who have not been exposed to this style of shooting will revert to academy level marksmanship shooting. Officers have to break away from the habit of trying to align their sights during close quarter confrontations as this action will place the officer in a disadvantaged position. Air soft AR-15 rifles provide patrol officers and swat teams the ability to utilize long guns in a variety of training venues. An officer's garage or office in the police department can effectively become a range that can be used for marksmanship or tactical entry training (Lamb, 2008).
Within 25 yards Simunition pistols and their live fire counterparts have been found to be comparable in accuracy. Trainers can increase stress by utilizing force on force scenarios as the impact of the Simunition bullet will induce some pain. Trainers could also set up a qualification course by firing at an actual person wearing a white shirt. The shirt can have the scoring rings identified and the paint pellet round will indicate where the human target was hit. This style of training will allow for combat style firearms training as actual human beings will be advancing on the target as opposed to the mechanical movements of a range target or remote controlled device. Police agencies who have access to Simunition or Airsoft pistols can replicate the high anxiety firearms component of a study conducted in the Netherlands in any room within their police department. Students were positioned within combat shooting distances across from an opponent target who randomly shot back at the student during their prescribed course of fire (Nieuwenhuys, 2010). Students were instructed to fire four rounds, one round each in the left and right leg and two rounds at the chest, while taking a step to the right after the first round fired and a step to the left after the third round fired, and magazines were loaded with only two Simunition rounds to force an additional manipulation of an out of battery magazine reload (Nieuwenhuys, 2010). Student's performed this course of fire for 10 evolutions resulting in 40 rounds of ammunition fired at the target while the student was under the constant threat of not knowing when the human target, who was assigned 7 rounds of ammunition for the entire course, would shoot back (Nieuwenhuys, 2010).
SECTION III. THEORECTICAL FRAMEWORK

Law enforcement training grounded in adult learning theory will enhance an agencies overall training program. By developing training programs directed towards the mature student, officers will discover that the training is relevant to their livelihood and improve their overall job performance for the communities they serve. Blooms adult learning theory provides an overall concept to the adult learning process, cognitive-motivational-relational theory explores anxiety and stress related to combatives training, and Boyd's OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop theory specifically relates to combat and improving the officer's overall abilities in a critical incident.

Bloom's Adult Learning Theory

Bloom's taxonomy of adult learning outlines the different cognitive domains of adult learning and comprehension. Bloom's taxonomy consists of knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation (Pitts, 2007). Knowledge is the basic understanding of a subject and is typically taught through lecture or individual reading. Comprehension is obtained when the student can readily define and understand their new found knowledge. Application is the culmination of a student's knowledge and comprehension such as correctly filing a police report based on law and department policy. Analysis, synthesis, and evaluation move into the higher levels of cognitive thinking. Analysis is the ability to categorize and define the relationships of the information surrounding the problem (Pitts, 2007). Synthesis is the officer's ability to define new relationships based on the analysis (Pitts, 2007). Evaluation is the highest domain and can provide new policy or procedure based on the overall assessment of the previous cognitive domains (Pitts, 2007).
Standard law enforcement training tends to focus in the domains of knowledge, comprehension, and application. The traditional pedagogical model of learning which is primarily lecture based has worked well in providing students with basic competencies in technical and procedural skills (McCoy, 2006). The theory of andragogy promotes a student centered style of instruction where the teacher facilitates learning and students play an active role in their education (McCoy, 2006). A training environment promoting andragogy is mutually collaborative and utilizes the past experiences of its students to promote overall instruction and comprehension (Birzer, 2001). Moving to this level of instruction is key particularly with an increased number of new police officers coming into the work force with military combat experience and tactical training. When students are not active in the learning process they fail to develop critical thinking and problem solving skills. Tactical skills are not simply the act of pulling a trigger or handcuffing a suspect. Instructors can move officer's into the higher cognitive domains of Bloom's taxonomy by creating scenarios that force the student to actively participate, research, and develop response plans to critical incidents.

**Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory**

Applying the appropriate amount of stress to the learning environment will help officers in their ability to transfer the techniques and concepts taught in training to real world application. In order to ensure that transfer of learning is to occur, instructors need to account for anxiety and its ability to significantly impact the officer's ability to learn particularly in mandatory combative skills training. Preparing the student prior to training for potential performance degradation due to stress and anxiety will improve the overall learning experience for the student during training (Atkins, 2004). Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory of Emotion identifies primary and secondary appraisal systems for how an individual identifies with training and ultimately copes
with the stress and anxiety either caused or perceived by the expected training (Morales-Negron, 2008). Lazarus (1991), identified the three primary appraisals as goal relevance, goal congruence, type of ego-involvement with the secondary coping appraisals as blame or credit, coping potential, and future expectations (as cited in Morales-Negron, 2008). The primary appraisals account for why the training is relevant for the individual, will this training harm or benefit the individual in their overall job function, and how will the training affect the individuals sense of self or others perception (Morales-Negron, 2008). The training needs to have meaning for the student to ensure that the learning process has transferred from short term to long term memory and the student needs to recognize potential benefits or downfalls of integrating their new found knowledge (Brewer, 1999).

Morales-Negron, "an individual who believes that he/she can not cope with the mandatory training environment, or that these confrontations could result in a potential loss of personal meaning, is very likely to develop feelings of anxiety"(2008, p. 13). Mental training techniques such as self-talk, schema reconstruction, problem solving, and goal setting can be used to diminish the anxiety and stress related to training (Morales-Negron, 2008). Tennyson & Elmore define schemas as "cognitive structures that serve to organize information into meaningful concepts"(as cited in Bennell, 2007, p. 39). Having a student talk out loud for self-talk does not produce the same learning gains as those students who have been instructed in self explanation techniques (Bennell, 2007).

In a study conducted by Morales-Negron of U.S. army soldiers attending mandatory combative instructor training either by choice or orders found that the group who received the intervention which included the teaching of goal setting, positive thinking, self-talk, concentration routines, arousal regulation techniques, and imagery had a better response to
anxiety than the control group (2008). The mental skills training occurred after the course of five days with morning and afternoon session occurring on the first four days. Day 1 identified the recognition of the physiological, emotional, an psychological indications of anxiety and how anxiety comes to exist within the individual (Morales-Negron, 2008). Day 2 consisted of anxiety management with the introduction of arousal regulation, imagery, cognitive reconstruction, self-talk and a muscle relaxation session (Morales-Negron, 2008). Day 3 was specific application of mental skills training to combatives (Morales-Negron, 2008). Day 4 expansion of coping skills beyond combat training to other faucets of life and training others in mental skills technique (Morales-Negron, 2008). Morales-Negron concluded, "cognitive-behavioral strategy implemented with the intervention group to reduce combatives state anxiety was successful and aids the participants to better control their combative state anxiety during different aspects of the training" (2008, p. 62).

**Boyd’s OODA Theory**

Training adults to be successful in combat requires law enforcement instructors to conduct training which fulfills Boyd’s OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop theory. The theory behind the OODA loop is that successful combatants have the ability to compress time by cycling through the four stages faster than their adversary while concurrently overwhelming their adversary with information that inhibits their ability to react and counter (Howe, 2005). Individuals can enhance their ability to observe and move through this stage quickly by learning to recognize areas which have a higher probability of a threat emerging and not overloading the brain with unnecessary images by focusing on non threat areas (Howe, 2005). Boyd believed that the most critical component of his theory was the orient stage of the loop (Howe, 2005). During the orient stage, individuals need to move aggressively utilizing angles and taking
advantage of manmade and natural points of cover while minimizing their exposure to their adversary, in order to overwhelm their adversary and not allow them to feel they are in a superior position (Howe, 2005). Basic recruit academy, legal update training, and law enforcement agency's use of force policy fulfill the decide component of the theory. Individuals need to have an intimate knowledge of their agencies use of force policy and state law regarding what criteria needs to be met in order to justify the use of deadly force. Those who have studied and have a comprehensive understanding of the deadly force requirements can quickly move through the decide component of the loop. Act is the technical component of the loop and requires that officer's have the ability to manipulate and fire their weapon (Howe, 2005).
SECTION IV. IMPLEMENTING THE AR-15 PATROL RIFLE

Patrol Rifle Deployment

Law enforcement agencies have multiple options for ensuring that their officers have the ability to protect their communities through the deployment of the patrol rifle. The implementation of a patrol rifle program can take one of three primary forms: SWAT officers, selected officers, or full agency deployment (IACP, 2007). Budgetary issues is the primary reason to avoid full agency deployment however in order to achieve the benefits of a patrol rifle program maximum officer deployment is the goal. By only providing rifles to SWAT officers, patrol officers will have to decrease distance to address an armed suspect severely limiting their tactical advantage that could be gained if a rifle was deployed. The patrol rifle allows the officer to engage an armed suspect from a greater distance, minimizing their exposure to the armed suspect, and decreasing their likelihood of being engaged by the armed suspect. At 25 yards, when placed under physical stress an above average shooter will have minimal success effectively engaging an armed suspect (Chudwin, 2005). Agencies who cannot afford full rifle deployment will allow officer's to purchase their own rifle for duty use. The AR-15 rifle is a precision weapon and agencies that do offer full deployment by issuing rifles to every patrol vehicle should still grant officer's the authority to deploy personally owned rifles. Officers who purchase their own rifle have a greater likelihood of training with their rifle and ensuring that the rifle is properly maintained (IACP, 2007). Issuing rifles to every officers or the outfitting of every vehicle with a rifle for agencies that can't afford individual issue is the favored form of rifle deployment (IACP, 2007).

A primary consideration for the adoption of the patrol rifle as a replacement to the traditional police shotgun is the rifle's greater ease of use (IACP, 2007). Fairborne (1994),
concluded that despite the advantages officer’s gained from using a shotgun, officer’s did not perform well when deploying a shotgun due to the pain associated with the use of a shotgun and a lack of training (as cited in Bauldry, 2003). Agencies should issue weapons which officers can operate effectively, essentially eliminating the use of the shotgun which is unpleasant to train with due to the weapons recoil and difficult to manipulate for some smaller stature male and female officers (Buziecki, 2002). The patrol rifle has a higher ammunition capacity, less recoil when fired, weighs less than the shotgun, and is more accurate (IACP, 2007).

Agencies have two ways in which to transport rifles in the field within the patrol car. Rifles can be placed in rifle racks inside the car or cased in the truck of the patrol vehicle. For ease of use and immediate access, rifle proponents suggest placing the rifles in secure racks within the vehicle (IACP, 2007). The handgun is a defensive weapon and is by designed is not meant to be an exclusively offensive weapon. The United States military does not send soldiers into combat armed with only a handgun for this reason. Patrol rifles should be deployed when officers can reasonably articulate that their use is imminent. Officer’s should be removing the patrol rifle from the vehicle on every call where a weapon is known or the suspect is threatening the use of a weapon. The concepts and issues paper presented in 2007 by the International Association of Chiefs of Police national law enforcement policy center identifies a justifiable adversary which would justify the deployment of a patrol rifle, "any threat to officers by and armed individual prepared to fire upon officers from a distance that precludes the accurate use of handguns would presumably justify deployment of the patrol rifles and preparation for their use" (IACP, 2007). Law enforcement agencies need to discount the portion related to "accurate use of handguns" and focus on armed individuals when developing their deployment protocol. Jeff Chudwin states, "given his choice, a knowing man didn't go into harms way armed with a
handgun" (Bauldry, 2003). To avoid civil liability, a department needs to develop a comprehensive policy and training program that ensures officers are proficient in the use of the rifle and the training program is not deficient or improper (IACP, 2007).

**Civil Liability and Training**

An effective training and documentation system is the key to avoiding civil litigation. The primary allegation brought forth under a Section 1983 civil suit is that municipalities provided inadequate or improper training for its officers (Kappeler, 2006). Canton v. Harris 489 U.S. 278 (1989), is the standard set forth by the US Supreme Court to determine whether deliberate indifference was the result of an agencies failure to provide adequate training (Chudwin, 2005). To successfully defeat a Section 1983 challenge and limit municipal liability a comprehensive training program and agency policy needs to be developed. A training program should adhere to the following components a classroom phase (rules, policies, rifle familiarization and handling), range training, and requalification (IACP, 2007).

Training frequency is a key component to developing an advanced rifle program and ensuring that officer's are confident with their ability to engage a deadly threat with precision and from distance. Simple range drills firing at a static target for a prescribed number of rounds will fulfill a qualification standard however does not provide the officer with enough background or familiarization with the rifle. FBI trainer John Hall stated, "frequency is more important than quantity" (Chudwin, 2005, para 32). Exposing officer's to weekly drills for 10 minutes will improve their familiarity with the rifle, the use of the fire selector, proper sight alignment, and overall weapon handling skills. Rifle qualification needs to be practical and relevant based on how the agencies wishes to deploy the rifle. If an agency allows officers to utilize the rifle for
use in a close quarter environment and for long range engagements than qualification courses need to be established to document both of these scenarios.

Rifle qualification should have a zero tolerance miss standard, this is effectively stating that the officer was perfect and hit 100% of rounds fired during qualification (Aveni, 2002). By establishing a zero tolerance policy agencies can document that the officer was perfect in all stages of the qualification as opposed to a pass/fail or averaged score qualification where an officer is typically weak at distance but accurate at close distances (Aveni, 2002). Trainers need to establish qualification courses that accurately reflect how the agency will chose to deploy the rifle. An agency may be engaged in deliberate indifference and failing to properly train its officers if the rifle qualification course is set at 10, 15, 25 yards if the expectation is for the officer to deploy the rifle at ranges of 50 -100yards as a standard. Plaintiffs' will try to establish liability based on the adequacy of the training related to the task performed (King, 2005). Infrequent requalification resulting in a lack of demonstrated proficiency may form the basis of a civil suit if a plaintiff contends that the injury was a result of a failure to train (IACP, 2007). International Association of Chiefs of Police (2007), suggests, "thorough training protects both the department's officers and the public from injury and helps to protect the department itself from civil liability that may result from inadequate or improper training" (2007). There is a clear degradation of physical skills and cognitive abilities during stressful training so increased exposure is critical to ensure officers success during a critical incident (Atkins, 2004). Training officers using cognitive learning principals has the potential according to Bennell, "to enhance ability to understand, recall, and effectively defend their use-of-force decisions when required to do so by courts of law" (2007, p. 54). The key to patrol rifle program success is to identify the
purpose, deployment, maintenance, qualification, storage, and rifle modification either in a standalone policy or incorporated within the departments overall firearm's policy.

**Policy Development**

Patrol rifle policy development needs to be comprehensive and outline how rifles are to be deployed, officer qualification for use, storage, and rifle maintenance. Policies should also outline what type of rifles officer's are authorized to personally purchase, outline how personally owned rifles are documented and accounted for, and what type of modifications to the rifle are authorized (type of sling, additional magazines, optics). Patrol rifle policies can be a standalone document or incorporated into the agencies firearms policy as a sub heading. Training standards can be incorporated into the standalone patrol rifle policy or the overall tactical training policy of the agency. The following will outline four separate agencies policing geographically and demographically different environments each specifically dictating how patrol rifles will be utilized to police their jurisdictions.

The Chandler Arizona police department addresses the patrol rifle in two separate documents under their firearms order (Appendix A). Officers are allowed to purchase their own rifle or are individually assigned a rifle through the department. Rifles are sighted to the individual officer and the right to carry a patrol rifle can be rescinded by those designated in the policy. The patrol rifle policy outlines the purpose of the rifle and the general conditions in which the rifle should be deployed. Rifles are to be transported in the truck of the patrol vehicle, modifications must be approved by the Firearms Training Unit, rifle maintenance is outlined and type of ammunition to be carried. Qualification is outlined in the general firearms qualification order and dictates that officers must score 90% on the Arizona Police Officers Standards and
Training patrol rifle qualification course utilizing iron sights and with optics if their weapon has this modification. Officer's must also pass a target identification and discrimination course designed by the department. The policy also outlines steps for remediation and defines when certification to carry a patrol rifle will be suspended.

The University of Texas-Austin police department patrol rifle policy is incorporated into the agency's duty weapons policy (Appendix B). The policy describes the type of patrol rifle issued by the department but does state that personally owned weapons are authorized by the chief of police when the officer demonstrates proficiency with the weapon. Officers are required to qualify two times a year with any authorized weapon however this policy does not outline the qualification course or standard used. Policy states that the rifle will be transported in the truck of the vehicle, magazine loaded with 28 rounds, and officers authorized to use the rifle will check the rifle's condition at the beginning of each shift. Deployment of the rifle is left to the discretion of the officer and the policy outlines how the rifle is to be handled once removed from the trunk of the vehicle. Maintenance of the rifle is to occur monthly and after every firing session.

The Rialto California police department has a specific policy dedicated to the patrol rifle (Appendix C). The policy encompasses the purpose, type of rifle, ammunition, maintenance, training, how the rifle should be carried and deployment. The Rialto police department does allow for officers to purchase their own rifle for patrol use. Officers are required to attend an initial 16 hr training and qualification course followed by quarterly training and qualification. The policy does not address the standards for qualification but does specify remediation steps needed to pass a failed qualification test. The patrol rifle is carried in the trunk or rifle rack inside the patrol vehicle and certified officers must check out/in the rifle from the armory for
their patrol shift. The policy does not address the specific use of optics or other modifications but simply states all modifications must be approved by the rangemaster or armorer.

The Iowa City, Iowa police department addresses the patrol rifle in a standalone policy under general order 07-01 (Appendix D). The patrol rifle policy identifies the specific make and model of the rifle deployed by Iowa City and refers to those authorized to carry the rifle as Patrol Rifle Operator (PRO). The policy identifies that a PRO may be removed from the patrol rifle program if the officer moves to a different watch. Each watch commander is assigned four rifle operators to their group and a department issued rifle would need to be reissued to ensure the watch commander has their appropriate compliment of rifle operators. The policy identifies general descriptions of events which authorize the rifles deployment and instructs officers to carry the rifle in the trunk of the vehicle with the assigned ammo load of 90 rounds. Officers are not to store the rifles in the trunk of the vehicle at the completion of their shift and should store the rifle in a secure location. The policy does not dictate the qualification course but states officers will qualify bi-annually and does specify the steps needed for remediation if an officer does not qualify. The policy is very specific as to modifications of to the weapons stating all rifles will have a tactical sling, 65 lumen attached light, and the optional use of optics. Patrol Rifle Operators are authorized to carry a personally owned rifle with a 16 or 20 inch barrel however may carry a short barreled rifle of no less than 10 inches if they register under the guidelines specified under the National Firearms Act.

Some policies specifically dictate the standards of the qualification course while others just refer to a course specified by the training staff of the department. Every policy is specific as to the purpose of the program and how to deploy the rifle. Some agencies were very specific in their articulation to how the rifle should be deployed while others leave it to officer discretion.
based on the facts of the call for service. A consistent for every policy is the steps of remediation for when an officer fails a qualification course and ultimately identifies when an officer will be decertified from patrol rifle use.

**Mandatory Tactical Patrol Training**

The adoption of polices and qualification standards to deploy the patrol rifle does fulfill two primary components needed for a rifle program. A comprehensive patrol rifle program will implement tactical movement as an element of the program which will enhance the officers success in utilizing the weapon. Officers have to be competent in marksmanship skills and target discrimination as one skill is predicated on the ability to be effective in the other. If officers do not have a basis for tactical movement, room clearing, and team tactics they will never be able to move into a position to utilize target discrimination and marksmanship skills. Based on current trends in society it is socially acceptable for police agencies to adopt aggressive militaristic policies to confront armed/active shooter situations however officers are being asked to engage in tactics traditionally reserved for specialist while only receiving minimal training (Pratt, 2010). Tactical patrol training should be ongoing and incorporated into every firearms training and qualification. The fundamentals of room entry can be practiced with training firearms or dry fire runs followed by using the same movements on the range with live fire (Cain, 2010). Tactical movement is a technique and perishable skill that needs to be drilled frequently . Long training days and elaborate scenarios will not enhance an officer's overall tactical skills.

Agency trainers need to develop a simple standard of drills that dictate how officer's tactically move which can broadly be applied to every critical incident (Howe, 2005). Once trainers have determined the preferred technique for hallway movement, room entry, movement
to the problem area, and close quarter battle techniques they have provided officers with a framework to addresses the majority of critical incidents they may encounter. This foundation in tactical movement will provide officer’s the ability to move into positions of advantage to increase the effectiveness of the patrol rifle. Ultimately agencies need to incorporate training into their firearms program that requires officer teams to move and engage threats to simulate conditions likely to occur during an active shooter/critical incident.

**Multi-Jurisdictional training and policy development**

The likelihood of a single agency engaging in a critical incident requiring the use of team tactics and the deployment of the patrol rifle is highly unlikely. Absent the major U.S. cities the vast majority of American law enforcement agencies would need mutual aid from adjoining jurisdictions and state agencies to effectively handle a critical incident. Law enforcement agencies within a geographical region should develop active shooter policies similar to the EL Paso County TX Sheriff’s office to ensure a uniform response amongst participating agencies. This precedence has already occurred in relation to how vehicle pursuits should be conducted where there is a high likelihood due to proximities and overlapping jurisdictional boundaries that the pursuit will effect multiple agencies. Agencies which have established a tactical patrol program should reach out to surrounding jurisdictions and incorporate their officers into their training days. To ensure an effective critical incident response the primary agency will benefit from the support that surrounding jurisdictions will be able to provide. By fostering joint training, officers will have the opportunity to train alongside officers they may only know on a casual basis. A critical component the Israeli Defense Forces attribute to their success is the ideology of combatant’s brotherhood and cohesion that is formed through familiarity with team members, extensive training, and combat (Catigani, 2004). Training alongside neighboring
jurisdictions will enhance friendships among officers which has the potential to enhance the overall combat effectiveness of the geographic region. With mutual policy development and joint training sessions, agencies executives will find comfort with the knowledge that officers in surrounding jurisdictions are training to the same standard as their agency

**Overcoming common training excuses**

Facilities and budget are two common reasons that agencies fail to implement and develop advanced training programs. The high cost of ammunition and shortage of .223 ammunition are convenient excuses for agencies to minimize rifle training and provide only the ammunition necessary for qualification courses. The use of .22 bolt conversion for the .223 rifle provides an economically feasible solution to ensure that patrol rifle training is occurring on a frequent basis. Sight alignment, trigger control, fire selector, and target discrimination drills can all be conducted for a fraction of the cost. Dry fire drills or the incorporation of air soft patrol rifles with properties similar to duty rifles provide training opportunities when a live fire range is unavailable.

Every police department contains hallways, offices, storage rooms, and other areas that tactical movement training could be occurring on a daily basis. Frequency of training is key to ensuring that a skill is fully development and an officer is proficient. Instructors should provide officers with foundational knowledge to encourage peer tutoring and training so officers can engage in on duty training during slow periods of the work day. Through peer instruction officers will enhance their own comprehension and function at a higher cognitive level when analyzing tactical situations and deployment during critical incidents.
Suggested Research

A critical component to this research would be the contribution of a patrol rifle study which affirms or contradicts the hypothesis that the use of .22 bolt conversion for training will not affect an officer's ability to qualify with the patrol rifle. The .22 bolt conversion will enhance the officer's ability to deploy the rifle due to increased familiarization with the weapon and greater frequency of training opportunities. The study could be broken down into two separate groups; novice or inexperienced rifle users and certified police officers with rifle experience. Each group would then be divided into three separate groups consisting of a control group (A), .22 bolt conversion (B), and standard .223(C). Each group would fire a 25 round qualification course engaging scoring targets from positions of cover from 12 yards, 25 yards, and 50 yards and close quarter combat shooting moving towards the target from 15 yards and 10 yards.

Each group would shoot the qualification course three times and obtain an average score for each participant. Participants would then be randomly assigned one of the three groups. Once assigned to a group the group would then be given an overall average score based on the performances of each member of the group. A four week training program with participants training two days a week for eight total training sessions will occur for groups B and C. Group B and Group C will shoot the same training course of fire and a rifle will be shared by a member of each group. Group B will shoot their assigned rifle with a .22 bolt conversion modification while Group C will shoot the rifle with the original .223 bolt. Group A will not engage in any type of rifle or handgun training during the four week training phase.

The original qualification course will then be shot for a total of three rounds with all groups firing the patrol rifle configured in its original .223 platform. Participant's individual and
overall group scored will be compared to test the hypothesis. Groups B and C should both perform significantly better than Group A since they did not receive the training program. If Group B and Group C both show marked improvement over Group A and a negligible difference between the two, than the use of .22 bolt conversion would be appropriate. Confirmation that the .22 bolt conversion provides a scientifically backed training alternative eliminates arguments against their use based on personal opinion. Law enforcement executives would be able to provide a training platform that has an abundant supply and minimal cost and ensure that their officers have the proficiency to deploy the patrol rifle to protect themselves and the communities they serve while fulfilling their mission to fight crime and solve problems.
REFERENCES


y%20Equipment/Patrol%20Rifle--Carbine.pdf


National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA)(2010, May 3-5). Law enforcement response to mass hostage taking. Oshkosh WI.


APPENDIX A

Chandler Police Department General Orders (General Purpose Rifle and Qualification)

CHANDLER POLICE
DEPARTMENT
GENERAL ORDERS
(Serving with Courage, Pride, and Dedication)

E-02 FIREARMS

Subject: 300 General Purpose Rifle
Effective: 04/15/09

Summary: This order applies to department-owned and personally-owned rifles.

A. POLICY

1. OFFICERS WILL OBTAIN WRITTEN AUTHORITY from the team supervisor and lieutenant in their chain of command to carry the general-purpose rifle upon completion of the departmental rifle course.

2. THE POLICE CHIEF, COMMAND OFFICER, FTU SUPERVISOR, OR DIRECT SUPERVISOR MAY RESCIND an officer’s right to carry the rifle on duty.

3. THE DEPARTMENT MAY ASSIGN department-owned rifles to individual officers on specified patrol teams.

B. PROCEDURES

1. PURPOSE: Use as an additional tool when the primary firearm would be handicapped by distance and accuracy.

2. TRAINING: Complete a training course specific to the weapon system and meet the requirements set by the Training Unit and the Firearms Training Unit (FTU).

3. CONDITIONS: Use discretion when deciding to deploy the rifle. Examples include:
   a. Active shooter(s)
   b. Perimeter positions
   c. Arrest of armed suspects
   d. Searching for armed suspects
   e. Sniper incidents

C. APPROVED MAKES AND MODELS

[1.3.9]

Colt semi-automatic, AR15, CAR15, or an approved variant from a licensed firearms manufacturer, chambered for the 5.56 x 45 mm round with two 20-round magazines for duty carry.

D. SIGHTING

THE RIFLE WILL BE SIGHTED to the assigned officer. Rifles equipped with optic sights will have iron sights also.

E. TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS

1. CARRY THE RIFLE IN a department-approved case or scabbard secured in the trunk of the officer’s patrol vehicle.

2. TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS:
   a. Chamber empty
   b. Action closed
F. MODIFICATIONS

1. DO NOT MODIFY or add accessories to department-owned rifles without the authorization of FTU (Modifications or accessories may require installation by a certified armorer)

2. YOU MAY ADD slings, flashlight mounts or lights, optical sight systems, and/or magazine pouches to personally-owned rifles with the approval of the FTU (Modifications or accessories may require installation by a certified armorer)

3. TEST FIRE THE WEAPON after any modification or accessory addition to ensure sight "zero" and function

G. MAINTENANCE / INSPECTIONS:

1. CLEAN THE RIFLE after firing

2. CARRY RIFLE IN A CLEAN condition only

3. THE FTU WILL INSPECT all rifles annually for safe operation

H. AMMUNITION

CARRY ONLY DEPARTMENT-ISSUED AMMUNITION on duty or when the general-purpose rifle is used for law enforcement

+++
Summary

This order describes qualification requirements for carrying any approved firearm while on or off duty for law enforcement purposes.

A. POLICY

1. OFFICERS WILL COMPLETE TRAINING AND DEMONSTRATE PROFICIENCY WITH ALL FIREARMS used in a law enforcement capacity annually and prior to carrying a new firearm, which includes:
   a. Knowledge of department policies regarding the use of force, escalating force, and deadly force
   b. Knowledge of laws including legal updates pertaining to the use of firearms
   c. Familiarity with the operation and safe handling of the firearms the officer is authorized to carry

2. THE FIREARMS TRAINING UNIT (FTU) and qualified firearms instructors will schedule and supervise training and qualifications, and document results in the officer's training files

B. ANNUAL QUALIFICATION

1. AZ POST QUALIFICATION PROFICIENCY COURSE
   a. No live practice immediately prior to the test
   b. All time limits and shot requirements for each step of the course will be enforced
   c. Alibi shots will only be allowed for malfunctions the officer attempts to clear. No alibi shots are allowed for failure to manage ammunition or failure to make times.
   d. No coaching or remedial instruction during the test
   e. Primary weapons from the primary carry duty holster
   f. All rounds must strike within the designated scoring area to count

2. ALL OFFICERS WILL ANNUALLY:
   a. Achieve a score of 84% with primary, backup, and off-duty firearms, on the approved AZ POST daytime or the nighttime qualification course as determined by the training staff
   b. Achieve a score of 60% with the general purpose rifle on the approved AZ POST rifle qualification course using the iron sights and any optical sights if so equipped
   c. Annually obtain a passing evaluation on a target identification and discrimination (“decision making”) course approved by the agency
   d. Obtain a passing evaluation on all other firearms-related training as deemed necessary by the department training staff and supervisors, which may include but is not limited to:
1) Malfunction clearance/reload drills
2) Combat/shoot house drills
3) Written tests
4) Specialty courses for SAU
5) FX / Scenario-based training
6) Low light/night conditions

3. SPECIALLY DESIGNATED SHOOTERS MUST ANNUALLY.
   - Designated less-lethal officers: Obtain a passing score on the written less-lethal certification test and pass the 5-shot qualification course designed for less-lethal beanbags
   - Designated shotgun officers: Obtain a passing score on the AZ POST shotgun qualification course

4. RIBBON: Officers shooting a perfect score (250) with their primary weapons on the first attempt during the annual AZ POST proficiency test will be awarded a proficiency ribbon for excellence.

C. FAILURE TO QUALIFY:
   PRIMARY WEAPON
   [33.1.5]

Figure 1. Procedures for Failure to Meet Standards on Primary Weapon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Notifications</th>
<th>Ratings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st day, 1st attempt failure</td>
<td>Officer will:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Attempt qualification a second time the same day</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Receive a letter from the range supervisor suggesting the officer attend open range days to improve the officer's proficiency and receive skill-building instruction from a firearms instructor as needed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st day, 2nd attempt failure</td>
<td>Officer will:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Receive remedial instruction by a firearms instructor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Attempt to qualify again once that day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Will attend open range days to receive instruction and improve proficiency during three of the next six months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st day, 3rd attempt failure</td>
<td>FTU staff completes a non-intrusive verbal and physical evaluation to determine if physical limitations are the cause of or contribute to failure to meet standards (address eyesight, corrective lenses, injuries, etc.)</td>
<td>FTU sergeant and officer notify the officer's supervisor FTU sergeant forwards a memo to the Community Services Section commander explaining:</td>
<td>Immediate supervisor: Document &quot;Needs Improvement&quot; in critical job task portion of officer's rating Place on 90-day special evaluation for failure to meet standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Notifications</td>
<td>Ratings</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|      | • Suspend officer's permit for all off-duty work in armed capacity until he successfully meets standard | • What occurred  
  • The apparent problem  
  • Planned action for resolution | FTU will notify first line supervisor |
| Earliest possible date / Within 30 days | Officer:  
  • Attends a remedial five-hour firearms course taught by FTU  
  • Receives individual instruction and attempts to qualify on the course of fire one time  
Qualifies:  
  • Officer returns to active duty  
Fails:  
  • Officer remains in non-enforcement capacity | First line supervisor | |
| After 1st remedial class and within 30 days | • Attend a second remedial class taught by a different firearms instructor as soon as possible  
Qualifies:  
  • Return to active duty and attend 10 of the 12 open range months for the next calendar year  
Fails:  
  • Personnel action up to termination for failing to maintain minimum standards | Training officer notifies division commander via memorandum | “Unsatisfactory” in critical job task portion of rating |
| After 1st day, second year in a row | Failure to meet standards after three attempts:  
  • Attend five-hour remedial class  
Qualifies:  
  • Attend 10 of 12 open range dates for the next calendar year  
Fails in remedial class:  
  • Remove from active duty  
  • Grounds for personnel action up to termination for failing to meet minimum standards | “Unsatisfactory” in critical job task portion of evaluation-failure to respond to training  
  • Place on 90-day special evaluation | |
| After 3 attempts on 1st day, 3rd year in a row | Fails:  
  • Remove from active duty  
  • Will take personnel action up to termination for failure to meet minimum standards | | |
1. OFFICERS COMING OFF INJURY involving ability to manipulate firearms or whose qualification has lapsed must requalify prior to being released to full duty

2. CHANGING OR ADDING PRIMARY, BACK-UP, OR OFF-DUTY WEAPON: Qualification follows annual qualification procedures (exceptions approved by FTU supervisor)

D. FAILURE TO QUALIFY: BACK-UP AND OFF-DUTY WEAPONS

FOR BACKUP AND OFF-DUTY WEAPONS:

1. PROHIBITED FROM CARRYING the weapon until a passing score is achieved

2. NO REMEDIAL TRAINING will be offered; however, an officer may use open range ammunition for that month to qualify

3. AFTER THREE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS, the officer may use open range days in future months to improve skills until able to obtain a passing score with that weapon

E. ANNUAL RIFLE/SHOTGUN/LESS LETHAL QUALIFICATION

REQUIRED FOR CONTINUED CARRY: Annual qualification on an AZ POST-approved course

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attempt #</th>
<th>If Pass/Fail</th>
<th>Then</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st and 2nd</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>Continued carry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>One hour of remedial instruction from certified instructor, then attempt to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Continued carry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3rd | Fail | • Certification suspended  
• Use open range time or practice on own 
• Attempt to recertify at next scheduled general purpose rifle, less lethal, or shotgun qualification |

F. FAILURE TO QUALIFY: SAU QUALIFICATION

SAU members assigned special weapons will meet the standards set by the SAU commander. Failure to meet minimum qualification standards may result in the removal from the SAU team.
APPENDIX B

University of Texas at Austin Police Department Duty Weapons Policy

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICY A-13

TITLE: Operations
SUBJECT: Duty Weapons
PURPOSE: To establish departmental policy regarding carry and use of duty weapons.
REFERENCE: Policy B-7, B-23, System Policy III-74-1 & III-74-1A
STANDARDS: 13.4, 13.7, 13.8, 13.9, 13.10, & 27.2.2

A. General Specifications:
   1. Officers will only carry weapons issued by this department while on duty, unless authorized by the Chief of Police to carry other weapons. The Chief of Police may authorize officers to carry personally owned weapons once the officer has demonstrated proficiency with that weapon during departmental qualification. Officers shall not carry or operate any duty weapon unless trained and qualified on that weapon in accordance with Policy B-7 and B-23.
   In compliance with the policy of the Office of Director of Police for the UT System, all personnel authorized to carry firearms are required to fire a qualifying score with all firearms authorized to be carried on duty at least two times per year. However, nothing in this policy shall be construed to prevent officers from using any weapon at their disposal to protect themselves or third parties from death or serious bodily injury in a bona fide emergency.
   Officers shall not, in any way, alter or modify the trigger or any other part of a duty weapon without written permission from the department armorer. Each employee will, by every practical means, secure all weapons from unauthorized access.

B. Ammunition:
   1. Officers will only carry ammunition issued by this department while on duty.

C. Off-Duty Firearms:

D. Inspection and Care of Firearms:
   2. Weapons will be inspected by a firearms instructor during qualification.

E. Texas Concealed Handgun Law:
   1. This policy prohibits non-commissioned or civilian employees who obtain a concealed handgun permit from carrying a weapon on The University of Texas at Austin property.

F. Handgun:
   1. The departmental issued handgun is the Glock model 23.

G. Patrol Rifle
   1. The departmental issued patrol rifle is the Bushmaster AR-15 type carbine.
   2. Patrol rifles are to be stored in the trunk of patrol vehicles in hard cases. The weapons are to be kept in the following condition:
      a. Chamber empty.
      b. Hammer forward on an empty chamber.
      c. Magazine loaded with 28 rounds and inserted in the weapon.
      d. EQ-1 Tech sight turned off. Spare batteries will be stored in the case.
   3. Qualified officers are responsible for checking the weapon's condition prior to beginning each shift to include verifying that the batteries are charged.
   4. Deployment:
      a. The patrol rifle may be deployed at the discretion of the officer in any situation where drawing the handgun or deploying a shotgun in the anticipation of using deadly force would be appropriate. The operator will then perform the following pre-operation functions:
         b. Power up, verify the sight is operating, and adjust reticle brightness, if needed.
         c. Chamber a round
         d. Place selector lever in SAFE position.
5. Manual Safety Protocols: The following procedure will be followed by officers operating the weapon in a tactical environment:
   a. Carry the weapon on SAFE until ready to fire the weapon.
   b. Engage the safety when carrying the weapon in a non-tactical situation.
   c. Engage the safety anytime both hands are removed from the weapon (i.e. slinging the weapon or handing the weapon to another officer).
6. Returning the weapon to ready condition using the following procedure:
   a. Ensure the selector lever is in SAFE position.
   b. Power down the sight.
   c. Remove the magazine.
   d. Eject the chambered cartridge.
   e. Visually and manually ensure the chamber is empty.
   f. Point the muzzle in a safe direction and pull the trigger allowing the hammer to go forward on an empty chamber.
   g. Re-insert the magazine after topping off with ammunition.
   h. Place the weapon in the vehicle after reloading.
7. Maintenance:
   a. The patrol rifle will be cleaned by the assigned shift at least once a month and after any live fire. The department armorer will inspect and log the cleaning. Supervisors may direct additional cleaning as needed.
8. When a police unit is removed from the line for repair, it will be the responsibility of the officer driving the unit to ensure that the rifle is removed from the unit and placed in the spare unit. If no spare unit is available the officer will ensure the rifle is removed from the unit, and that the weapon and ammunition are turned in to their supervisor.
9. Safety Function Check:
   a. Officers performing maintenance on the patrol rifle will perform the following safety function check upon reassembly:
      WARNING: If the rifle fails any of the following tests, immediately remove the rifle from service. Forward the rifle and a memo describing the failure to the department armorer.
      i. Remove magazine if installed. Pull Charging Handle assembly to rear. Visually and manually check that chamber is clear. Let bolt and bolt carrier close. Do not pull trigger. Leave hammer in cocked position.
      ii. Place selector lever in SAFE position. Point the muzzle in a safe direction. Pull trigger. THE HAMMER SHOULD NOT FALL.
      iii. Place selector lever in FIRE position. Pull Trigger. THE HAMMER SHOULD FALL.
      iv. Hold trigger to the rear, pull charging handle to the rear, and release pressure on the trigger with a slow, smooth motion, without hesitations or stops, until the trigger is fully forward. AN AUDIBLE CLICK SHOULD BE HEARD – THE HAMMER SHOULD NOT FALL.
      v. Repeat the FIRE position test five times. The rifle must not malfunction during any of these five tests.
      vi. Check the sight for battery function and turn off when done.
      vii. Make ready prior to placing the carbine in the vehicle.
10. Shotgun:
    1. The departmental issued shotgun is the Remington model 870.
    2. Shotguns are assigned to most marked police units and to individual officers as needed.
    3. Shotguns assigned to a marked police unit may be checked out by any officer driving that marked unit. Other shotguns will be checked out only when authorized by a supervisor.
    4. Prior to leaving for assignment, the officer having control of a shotgun is responsible for ensuring that there is no shell in the chamber, the hammer is not cocked, and the weapon is secure, unless being readied for immediate use. Always ensure the muzzle is pointed in a safe direction while performing these checks.
    5. When a police unit is removed from the line for repair, it will be the responsibility of the officer driving the unit to ensure that the shotgun is removed from the unit and placed in the spare unit if the spare unit is equipped with a shotgun rack. If no spare unit is available or if no shotgun rack is installed, the officer will ensure the shotgun is removed from the unit, unloaded and that the weapon and ammunition are turned in to their supervisor.
11. Chemical Agents and Munitions:
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN POLICE DEPARTMENT

1. Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Spray [a.k.a. "Pepper Spray"]
   a. OC spray is an optional piece of equipment that officers may carry.
   b. Officers designated to be issued OC spray must be properly trained in its use before being authorized to carry or use it.
   c. Only department approved OC spray is authorized for use when on-duty or in a Department uniform.

2. Chemical munitions weapons and tear gas are considered specialized equipment for use by specifically trained personnel only.
   a. Specialized chemical munitions weapons and munitions are assigned to, and under the control of, the Crowd Management Team whose supervisor is responsible for coordinating the training, maintenance, and cleaning of the weapons.

J. Batons
1. The baton is an optional piece of equipment that officers may carry.
2. Only department issued or authorized batons may be carried.
3. Officers will not be allowed to carry a baton until they have successfully completed a department approved training program and have been specifically authorized to carry it.
4. Officers shall not alter or modify an approved baton (A replacement endcap does not constitute a modification.)

K. M-26 Advanced TASER (a.k.a. Air Tasers, TASER, M-26):
1. The TASER is deployed as an additional police tool and is not intended to replace firearms or self-defense techniques. The TASER may be used to control a dangerous or violent subject when deadly force does not appear to be justified and/or necessary, or attempts to subdue the subject by other conventional tactics have been, or will likely be, ineffective in the situation at hand; or there is reasonable expectation that it will be unsafe for officers to approach within contact range of the subject.

2. Qualification and Certification.
   a. Officers must successfully complete a department approved training program before they carry or use the TASER.
   b. Authorized officers will only carry a department issued M-26 Advanced TASER, M-26 TASER cartridges and equipment.
   c. Officers shall not, in any way, alter or modify these weapons.

3. Duties After Deployment of TASER.
   a. TASER probes that penetrate the skin should be removed by medical personnel.
   b. Photographs will be taken of probe impact sites and any other related injuries and placed into evidence.
   c. Probes which have penetrated the skin, should be treated as biohazards. Probes should be carefully placed, sharp tip first, back into the expended cartridge bores and secured with tape.
   d. Cartridge should be labeled, secured and placed into the evidence locker.

4. Reporting Procedures.
   a. Use of the M-26 Advanced TASER is considered a use of force and is subject to the same reporting requirements as other uses of force required by this agency.
   b. With the exception of training, all instances of TASER usage, including accidental discharges, shall be reported in a use of force offense/incident report.

5. Maintenance.
   a. Testing and maintenance of the TASER shall be consistent with manufacturer's specification. Officers shall check the TASER at the start of their tour of duty to insure that the weapon has a full battery charge.

Jeffrey M. Van Slyke
Chief of Police
APPENDIX C

Rialto Police Department Patrol Rifle Policy

Patrol Rifles

432.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
In order to more effectively and accurately address the increasing level of fire power and body armor utilized by criminal suspects, the Rialto Police Department will make patrol rifles available to qualified patrol officers as an additional and more immediate tactical resource.

432.2 PATROL RIFLE

432.21 DEFINITION
A patrol rifle is an authorized weapon which is owned by the Department or personally owned by a sworn member of the Department and which is made available to properly trained and qualified officers as a supplemental resource to their duty handgun or shotgun. No personally owned rifles may be carried for patrol duty unless pre-approved in writing by the Chief of Police.

432.3 SPECIFICATIONS
The authorized patrol rifle issued by the Department shall be the DPMS .223 Panther Carbine. Personally owned rifles will be chambered alike in .223 caliber only. These personally owned rifles must first be inspected by the Department Rangemaster and/or Armorer and approved by the Chief of Police prior to duty use.

Officers are responsible for the care and maintenance of any personally owned rifles that are approved for duty use.

432.31 RIFLE AMMUNITION
The only ammunition authorized for patrol rifles is that which is issued by the Department. The ammunition issued will consist quality factory load in a .223 caliber.

432.4 RIFLE MAINTENANCE
(a) Primary responsibility for maintenance of Department issued patrol rifles shall fall on the Rangemaster or Armorer who shall inspect and service each patrol rifle on a monthly basis.
(b) Each patrol officer carrying a patrol rifle may be required to field strip and clean an assigned patrol rifle as needed.
(c) Each patrol officer shall be responsible for promptly reporting any damage or malfunction of an assigned patrol rifle.
(d) Each patrol rifle shall be subject to inspection by a supervisor, the Rangemaster or Armorer at any time.
(e) No modification shall be made to any patrol rifle without prior written authorization from the Rangemaster or Armorer.

432.5 TRAINING
Officers shall not carry or utilize the patrol rifle unless they have successfully completed departmental training. This training shall consist of an initial 16-hour patrol rifle user’s course and qualification score with a certified patrol rifle instructor. Officers shall thereafter
be required to successfully complete quarterly training and qualification conducted by a certified patrol rifle instructor.

Any officer who fails to qualify or who fails to successfully complete two or more department sanctioned training/qualification sessions within a calendar year will no longer be authorized to carry the patrol rifle without successfully retaking the initial patrol officers user's course and qualification.

432.6 DEPLOYMENT OF THE PATROL RIFLE
Officers may deploy the patrol rifle in any circumstance where the officer can articulate a reasonable expectation that the rifle may be needed. Examples of some general guidelines for deploying the patrol rifle may include, but are not limited to:
(a) Situations where the officer reasonably anticipates an armed encounter
(b) When an officer is faced with a situation that may require the delivery of accurate and effective fire at long range
(c) Situations where an officer reasonably expects the need to meet or exceed a suspect's firepower
(d) When an officer reasonably believes that there may be a need to deliver fire on a barricaded suspect or a suspect with a hostage
(e) When an officer reasonably believes that a suspect may be wearing body armor
(f) When authorized or requested by a supervisor

432.61 S.W.A.T. MEMBERS
Members of the Department's Special Weapons and Tactics Team (S.W.A.T.) may carry a department issued or personally owned department approved rifle that differs in specification and equipment from that of the department issued rifle.

Members of the department's S.W.A.T. team receive unique tactical and military style training allowing them to more effectively deal with critical incidents beyond the normal scope or control of the patrol officer. Nothing in this policy is designed to limit or preclude members of the Department's S.W.A.T. team, when circumstances warrant, from using their training and experience in both weapons and tactics to achieve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.

The Chief of Police and the S.W.A.T. Commander must approve any rifle prior to its deployment in the field by a S.W.A.T. member.

432.7 DISCHARGE OF THE PATROL RIFLE
The discharge of the patrol rifle shall be governed by the Department's Deadly Force Policy, Policy Manual § 300.

432.8 PATROL READY
Any qualified officer carrying a patrol rifle in the field shall maintain the weapon in the "patrol ready" until deployed. A rifle is considered "patrol ready" when it has been inspected by the assigned officer and meets the following conditions:
(a) The chamber is empty
(b) The rifle bolt is forward with the hammer down
(c) The rifle safety is on
Rialto Police Department

(d) There is a fully loaded magazine in the rifle with no more than 27 rounds
(e) The dust cover is closed
(f) The rifle is stored in the locked patrol vehicle’s rifle rack or trunk

432.9 RIFLE STORAGE
(a) When not in use, patrol rifles will be stored in the department armory in rifle racks
(b) At the start of each assigned shift, any qualified, on-duty officer may contact the Watch Commander or a patrol supervisor for access to the department armory
(c) At the end of the assigned officer’s shift, the patrol rifle will be returned and secured in the department armory
APPENDIX D

Iowa City Police Department Patrol Rifle Policy

OPS-20.1

PATROL RIFLE

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<td>February 27th, 2009</td>
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<th>Amends / Cancels</th>
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<td>1.3.9, 1.3.10, 1.3.11</td>
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INDEX AS:
Ammunition Training
Firearms Weapons
Munitions Use of Force
SRT

I. PURPOSE
To provide guidelines for the proper use of semi-automatic rifles in the performance of police duties.

II. POLICY
The Iowa City Police Department issues or approves semi-automatic rifles to specifically selected officers for unconventional situations where the police may face heavily armed and/or ballistically protected suspects. These rifles are a tool to allow the potential resolution of these incidents by providing a tactical advantage not available with more conventional police firearms.
III. DEFINITIONS
SEMI-AUTOMATIC RIFLE. For the purposes of this order, the ICPD issue patrol rifle is the Rock River Arms CAR A4—a semi-automatic rifle in .223 caliber with 16 inch barrel and 30 round capacity box magazine.

PATROL RIFLE OPERATOR (PRO). A specially selected and trained officer of the patrol division currently issued one of the above rifles; or an officer selected and trained to carry a personally owned rifle approved by the department. Operators are selected based on guidelines established by the Commander of Field Operations.

IV. RULES
A. Patrol rifles are only to be deployed under guidelines established by this order.
B. The decision to fire the rifle shall be in accordance with State Law and the ICPD Use of Force General Order 99-05.
C. Off-duty Patrol Rifle Operators may only remove agency issued rifles from the Department premises for practice purposes. Rifles shall be stored and secured in accordance with Iowa Code 724.22(7) and ICPD General Order 00-08 Weapons.

V. PROCEDURES
A. Deployment of Patrol Rifles

1. Patrol Rifles shall be deployed only in situations that the officer reasonably believes that the tactical advantage afforded by the rifle may be necessary.

   This order does not seek to articulate the only situations where rifle deployment is appropriate. The on-scene judgment of the officer or supervisor is the first indicator of appropriate deployment.

2. The patrol rifle may be deployed in situations:
   a. Where the officer believes a suspect he/she may encounter is wearing protective body armor or
   b. Is believed to be armed with or has immediate access to high powered or shoulder fired weapons or
   c. Is believed to be armed and situated in a distant or fortified location which affords the suspect a tactically superior position.
d. Other situations where approval for deployment of patrol rifle is authorized by the Watch Supervisor.

B. Department Guidelines for Patrol Deployment

1. The patrol rifle is issued to individual officers specially trained in their use. The rifles are issued in protective cases with up to 90 rounds of department approved and issued ammunition.
   a. All rifles are to be stored in the trunk of the assigned officer’s patrol car during their tour of duty. Department issued rifles are to be secured in the officer’s locker at the end of tour. No rifles shall be left in fleet vehicle trunks.
   b. Officers are responsible for the safe and secure storage of their issued rifles at all times.

2. Physical readiness of the rifle.
   a. The rifle shall be stored in the case with a magazine inserted in the rifle, chamber empty, and safety on.
   b. Rifle magazines will be loaded consistent with the training provided by Departmental PRO Instructors.
   c. The rifle should be inspected frequently and adequately maintained. An armorer’s inspection of the rifle and its magazines shall occur at a minimum of one time per year.

3. Qualification
   a. PRO’s shall qualify with the rifle bi-annually in addition to quarterly sight confirmation in accordance with standards established by the Department’s Rifle Instructors.
   b. During qualification, failure to fire a passing score will result in a second attempt approximately one month later. Failure to fire a passing score at that time will result in the officer being suspended from the rifle program for a period of not less than three months. Upon failure to qualify on the second attempt, the officer shall surrender the department issued rifle to their Watch Commander. The Watch Commander may re-issue the rifle to another qualified PRO on the watch or the Commanding Officer Field Operations may designate a new PRO. Upon the expiration of the 3-months, the Commanding Officer Field Operations shall determine if the rifle will remain with the current PRO or revert to the original officer.
C. Personally Owned Patrol Rifles:

The Iowa City Police Department may allow individual officers to purchase and carry their own patrol rifles, on duty, pursuant to this order.

1. Qualifications for Individually Owned Patrol Rifles
   
a. The officer must have successfully completed his/her probationary period.
   
b. The officer must submit a request to the Commander or Field Operations, via the Chain of Command.
   
c. The officer’s immediate supervisor and the Commander of Field Operations must approve the officer and weapon before a personally owned rifle can be used on duty.
   
d. The rifle shall be inspected by the department’s Lead Range Officer in accordance with General Order 00-08 Weapons.

2. Training
   
a. Officers desiring to purchase and carry their own rifle must complete the same training and qualification as PRO’s using Department owned weapons.
   
b. The Department Rifle Instructors shall track and keep records of both department owned and personally owned rifles being used by Patrol Rifle Operators. All qualification and sight confirmation records will be provided to the Department’s training officer.
   
c. The officers approved to carry personally owned rifles must successfully complete bi-annual department rifle qualifications and quarterly sight confirmation. Qualification rules as outlined in Section B3 above apply to personally owned rifles as well.

3. Weapon Specifications
   
a. Rifle shall be a gas-operated, semi-automatic, .223-caliber rifle of the type commonly known as AR-15, but with various designations depending upon manufacturer.
   
b. Rifle manufacturer must be approved by Commander of Field Operations.
   
c. The rifle barrel must be between 16 and 20 inches in length and may have either a fixed or collapsible stock. Officers who wish to carry a National Firearms Act registered short barreled rifle with a barrel length of less than 16 inches may do so with proof of registration submitted at time of application. Barrels of less than 10 inches are prohibited.
   
d. Rifle must be equipped with an approved tactical sling.
e. Rifle must have an attached light with illumination capabilities of at least 65 Lumens.
f. The rifle must have either fixed or flip-up iron sights.
g. An optical sighting device may be used. Common examples of acceptable optics would be Aimpoint or EOTECH holographic sights.
h. Officers shall only use magazines approved by the Commanding Officer Field Operations. Magazines shall be inspected on an annual basis by a Departmental Armorer.
i. Officers must have an appropriate case to protect the rifle in the patrol car.
j. Rifle shall only be deployed with .223 ammunition approved and supplied by the Iowa City Police Department.
k. The owner of any weapon(s) approved pursuant to this policy, is responsible for all expenses related to the care, repair and maintenance of the weapon unless otherwise approved by the Commanding Officer Field Operations.

D. Special Response Team Members

Trained SRT members may carry their assigned shoulder weapon while on duty and on their patrol watch. SRT members carrying their assigned weapon must follow the guidelines provided in this policy.

E. To the extent practical, each Watch Commander will have assigned to their watch four (4) Patrol Rifle Operators. If an officer is a designated PRO and desires to transfer to another watch, that officer may be removed from the Patrol Rifle program and the rifle surrendered to the Watch Commander. The Watch Commander shall secure the weapon and may designate another officer as a PRO. The newly appointed PRO shall have completed the minimum course for Patrol Rifle Operators and supply qualifying range scores and sight confirmation records to the Training and Accreditation Sergeant.

Samuel Hargadine, Chief of Police

**WARNING**

This directive is for departmental use only and does not apply in any criminal or civil proceeding. The department policy should not be construed as a creation of higher legal standard of safety or care in an evidentiary sense with respect to third-party claims. Violations of this directive will only form the basis for departmental administrative sanctions.