THE POLITICAL CAREER OF SAMUEL JACKSON RANDALL

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

by

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Date..August 15... , 1934.
To Professors:

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This thesis having been approved in respect to form and mechanical execution is referred to you for judgment upon its substantial merit.

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CHAPTER ONE

EARLY LIFE IN PENNSYLVANIA

Each generation in the history of the United States has produced its great and near great political leaders. The fame of the small number which is called great, is recorded in poems, orations, and popular literature. Many of the near great have not been so favored. The record of the qualities which enabled them to lead is buried in the dusty newspapers of their era, or else one of their many ideals has been twisted, thrown out of all relation to their character, and given to posterity as the real man. Many such leaders who were "kings for a day" are now remembered solely for the mistakes which accompanied their last years. The story of their substantial contributions to their generation has been neglected. Just why did their numerous personal followers respond to such leaders? Obviously a restatement of the case of many of these men is needed. The character and reputation of Samuel Jackson Randall surely deserves such analysis.

Anyone who feels that family traditions and early training will explain much of a man's later character will be interested in knowing such details about Samuel J. Randall. He inherited the tradition of public service from both of his grandfathers, from his own father; and even from his marriage

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to a daughter of General Aaron Ward of Sing Sing, New York, he acquired a father-in-law who had served in Congress during the Jacksonian era. His paternal grandfather was Matthew Randall, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia. His mother was Ann Worrell, the daughter of Joseph Worrell, one of Thomas Jefferson's political lieutenants. His father seems to have been a man of genuine stature. Judge Campbell of Philadelphia described him as

... a leading lawyer at the Philadelphia Bar. He was a man of high character and strong-willed. He was a prominent politician in his day, being an old time Whig and an ardent admirer of Henry Clay. He was a Prohibitionist. It was from him no doubt that Samuel got his ideas of protection. Those principles were grounded in him while a youth and he held to them all his life.

Young Samuel was born October 10, 1828 in Philadelphia. His family then lived at Seventh and Walnut Streets in the heart of the present day city. He grew up in the company of three younger brothers, William, Robert, and Henry, in the years when his home city was fast becoming a great industrial center. A few years at the University Academy on Fourth Street completed his formal education. Turning from his studies at the age of 17, he spent a few months working in the

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1 The Press [Philadelphia], April 14, 1890.
2 Press, April 14, 1890.
4 Quoted in Press, April 14, 1890.
5 Public Ledger [Philadelphia], April 14, 1890; Press, April 14, 1890; Leader [Wilkes-Barre], April 14, 1890.
6 Congressional Directory, 38th Congress, 1st Session; Press, April 14, 1890.
counting-room of the mercantile firm of Morris L. Hallowell & Company on Market Street. This employment was followed by an independent venture into the coal business with the firm of Randall and Merideth, with offices on South Front Street. At the age of 21 he became a partner in the firm of Earp and Randall, dealers in odd-lot iron, a type of commerce which to-day we might call a glorified junk business. 7

In his twenty-third year young Sam joined his father in campaigning for Judge Campbell, who was running for a minor city office in the face of the aroused opposition of the Know-Nothings. 8 Samuel evidently was impressed with the strength of this purist movement, since when he ran for the Common Council of Philadelphia the next year, he called himself an "American Whig." 9 He was successful in his contest and continued a member of that body for four years. The eighth Ward which he represented is described as "that part thereof lying between 7th Street and the River Schuylkill, and between Spruce and Chestnut Streets." 10 This was usually referred to as the "Locust Ward." 11 It was filled with small shop-keepers and mechanics, whose homes obviously bordered on the waterfront.

7 The Patriot [Harrisburg], April 14, 1890; National Cyclo-pedia of American Biography, op. cit.; Press, April 14, 1890.
8 Press, April 14, 1890.
9 Patriot, April 14, 1890; Acts of Consolidation, (Publication of the City of Philadelphia), 1854, Preface.
11 Press, April 14, 1890.
Randall's father was on rather intimate terms with James Buchanan. During Buchanan's years at the Court of St. James's, Josiah Randall often wrote him long letters on the Democratic party in Pennsylvania. One of these letters makes a reference to George Peabody, the great financier, and gives the impression that Josiah Randall was his representative in Pennsylvania. Evidently the elder Randall had left the sinking Whig party and was on the verge of going over to the Democrats, carrying with him his two politically-minded sons, Samuel and Robert. While writing to Buchanan in November 1855, Josiah Randall claimed that Pierce wanted to be a candidate again and that Jeff Davis did not wish to run. The elder Randall revealed the preliminary plans of the Buchanan boom within the state of Pennsylvania and showed that 57 delegates had already been selected, mostly pledged to Dallas as a blind. By February 1856 Randall's father could report to Buchanan that Virginia would fall into his column. This letter was written in the hand of young Sam, who was now acting as his father's political secretary.

The three Randalls journeyed to the Cincinnati convention in the interest of Buchanan not, however, as delegates, possi-

12 Buchanan Mss., August 15, 1853; February 3, 1854; June 9, 1854; November 5, 1855; November 19, 1855; February 25, 1856.
13 Ibid., February 3, 1854.
14 Ibid., November 5, 1855; November 19, 1855.
15 Ibid., February 25, 1855.
bly because their Whig connections had been too recent. There they held open house at the Burnett Hotel, and they probably contributed somewhat to the successful nomination of Buchanan. The Randall boys became sufficiently well known to Buchanan to enable them to write personal letters to him on one or two subsequent occasions. The elder Randall continued to offer advice as to appointments and to serve as a political lieutenant for Buchanan.

The next step in Samuel's political apprenticeship was a two-year term in the Pennsylvania Senate from 1858 to 1860. He was elected to fill a vacancy caused by the death of Charles B. Penrose. Within the circle of such a small group of legislators (only 34 in all) the newcomer very soon found himself in a position of some power. Two of his three committee assignments carried only routine duties, but his place on the Committee to Compare Bills was somewhat strategic. He soon became adept at parliamentary tricks, using this new knowledge to facilitate the passage of legislation which was of concern to his constituents. His home city was in the midst of an epidemic of street railway building. Each district, each ward, even each important street, seemed to feel that it must have its own railway. Somebody had to secure charters for these

16 Ibid., May 30, 1856; May 30, 1856; October 24, 1857.
17 Ibid., July 3, 1856.
18 Journal, Penna. State Senate, January 5, 1858.
19 Ibid., January 11, 1858.
mushroom companies, so Sam Randall devoted much of his time to seeing that these corporations were legally launched. During his two year term Randall introduced bills incorporating 22 such companies,²⁰ most of which bills were pushed through to completion, sometimes when Randall himself was in the Chair in Committee of the Whole.²¹ One such company, the Fairmount and Arch Street Passenger Railway Company, incorporated April 16, 1858, had Randall's brother William listed as one of the commissioners to open books and sell stock for the company.²² Such attention to the "corporate" interests of his constituents brought Randall the appointment as Chairman of the Railroad Committee in the 1859 session of the Senate.

During these two years at Harrisburg Randall continually revealed an anti-bank complex. There may have been some personal cause for this which has not as yet come to light. Randall's own business ventures were not too successful. Banks and the Panic of 1857 may have played their parts in producing this condition. A more plausible explanation of his anti-bank phobia may appear from the obvious fact that these very constituents who were building street railways were forced to borrow from banks at high rates to finance their projects. A debtor-creditor relationship was thus established which was bound to grow worse as the expected profits from the utilities

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²⁰ Ibid., 1858-59.
²¹ Ibid., March 11, 1859.
²² Philadelphia Digest of Laws, 1866 Appendix, 63.
failed to appear. Early in January 1858 Randall introduced a
general banking law for Pennsylvania, designed to regulate the
practices of all banks. 23 Failing to get any action, Randall
revised and expanded his bill and reintroduced it on January
6, 1859. 24 During this session he was the second ranking
member of the Committee on Finance, 25 but even from such a
vantage-point he was unable to put it through. The banks of
Pennsylvania had suspended payment of specie, but Randall
joined in a movement to force the resumption of specie pay-
ment. 26 He occasionally voted against the extension of bank
charters, 27 in favor of loan and savings associations, 28 and
helped to prevent frauds by bank officials. 29

One of the most interesting incidents in his state legis-
larive career is revealed in his intimate connection with
Pennsylvania's little "Salary Grab of 1858." April 6, 1858
Randall made the motion to raise the salary of state legisla-
tors from $500 to $700, the same to be retroactive for that
session. 30 The motion was defeated on that day but Randall
continued agitation for its passage on April 7th 31 and saw it
accepted on April 19th. 32 The next year, conscience or pub-

23 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, January 11, 1858.
24 Ibid., January 6, 1859.
25 Ibid., January 10, 1859.
26 Ibid., February 12, 1858; March 11, 1858.
27 Ibid., March 4, 1858; March 5, 1859; April 6, 1859.
28 Ibid., January 11, 1858.
29 Ibid., March 2, 1859.
30 Ibid., April 6, 1858.
31 Ibid., April 7, 1858.
32 Ibid., April 19, 1858.
lic opinion produced a contrite attitude at Harrisburg, which resulted in the refunding of the extra $200 for 1858, but continuing the salary at $700 for 1859. This was passed by a vote of 28 to 2, with Randall insisting upon a yea and nay vote so that the public might plainly see that its servants had learned their lessons.33 Randall, of course, voted with the majority on the measure. Yet he must have considered this to be only the passing fancy of a few citizens of Pennsylvania since, in 1873, he allowed himself to be closely associated with the national "Salary Grab of '73."

Randall's promising career as a franchise broker and state legislator was abruptly interrupted in 1860, when he failed in his campaign for re-election to the State Senate. It was possibly a case of too much Randall on the ticket since his brother Robert was running for the legislature at the same time from a portion of the same district.34 Rumor has it that their father Josiah warned them against the danger of too many members of the Randall family before the public eye, but they had to learn for themselves. Their set-back was only temporary, since Bob was elected to the legislature the next year, and Sam was sent to Congress the year after.

In the 1880's Randall was a member of the George H. Meade Post of the Grand Army of the Republic. Still one's imagina-

33 Ibid., April 1, 1859.
34 Press, April 14, 1890; Ledger, April 14, 1890.
35 Ibid., April 14, 1890.
tion would have to be stretched considerably to call him a soldier. His military career was respectable but far from arduous, most of his duties being routine reconnoitering which seldom led him under fire. In May 1861 he joined the 1st City Troop as a private, which was a select cavalry organization requiring each man to provide his own horse. The unit to which Randall was attached was ordered to Carlisle, Shippensburg, Chambersburg and finally to Williamsburg on the Potomac. In the course of this short campaign Randall was promoted to the rank of quarter-master sergeant.36 A subsequent movement to Charlestown and Harper's Ferry, Virginia completed the 90-day enlistment period of the troop, after which Randall returned home. Again in May and June of 1863 Randall participated in the movements around Gettysburg, although on the days of the battle he was miles away at Harrisburg. During this campaign he served as captain and later as Provost-Marshall.37

Meanwhile, in November 1862, Randall had been elected to the National House of Representatives. He represented the old 1st district of Philadelphia which had recently been gerrymandered so as to put all the Democratic strength in one district and thus guarantee the success of the Republicans in the four other districts of the city. Randall's opponent was

37 Ibid., op. cit., 1442; Press, April 14, 1890.
Richard Vaux, three times Mayor of Philadelphia in the years 1856 to 1859, and a man who afterwards was to be one of Randall's staunchest supporters.\textsuperscript{38} W. D. (Pig-Iron) Kelley was the most famous of Randall's colleagues then representing Philadelphia in the House.\textsuperscript{39} C. R. Buckalew, of Bloomsburgh, who had been in the State Senate with Randall, was now in the National Senate, having been elected to succeed David Wilmot in 1863.\textsuperscript{40} Randall's district was composed of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 11th wards,\textsuperscript{41} all heavily Democratic, especially the 6th. The 4th ward was under the domination of Squire William McMullin for a quarter of a century. The "Squire" had his own very effective methods of keeping his charges in the Randall camp. In times of real crisis such as in December 1879, he broke up anti-Randall Democratic meetings in the 4th and 5th wards by means of gangs of toughs, some gun-play and one manslaughter.\textsuperscript{42}

Sam Randall's career in the House of Representatives lasted for 28 consecutive years. After 1875 his national prestige made his election a matter of routine except in 1878. Yet it must be made clear that his first dozen years in the House were made possible by the continued support of many such characters as Squire McMullin. Randall knew the tricks of

\textsuperscript{38} Congressional Directory, 1st session, 38th Cong., 16.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{42} The Record [Philadelphia], December 3, 1879.
ward politics and could play the game with the best of them. His district was tailor-made for his proportions, principles and personal popularity. Republican legislatures did not disturb his district, possibly because he continued to be "right" on the tariff. He always kept in touch with the dock-workers, mechanics, tradesmen and store-keepers who comprised his district. Later his vision expanded to include the broad interests of his state and to some extent the welfare of the whole country, yet he always kept his finger on the pulse of his district in a manner which was positively uncanny.
The new representative from the Third Pennsylvania district appeared in Washington in December 1863 to be sworn in as a member of the Thirty-eighth Congress. He was assigned a seat in the third row of the House chamber, near the wall on the Speaker's right. Such a seat carried with it the consolation of being a good listening and observation post if nothing else. Randall could gaze at a solid array of such Republican patriots as Thad Stevens, James G. Blaine, W. D. Kelley, W. B. Allison and James A. Garfield. It was not to be long before he would be crossing verbal swords with these fellow near-greats, especially with Stevens and Kelley. His future relations with Garfield and Blaine were to lead to reciprocal respect, so much so that it was rumored that Speaker Blaine in 1875 may have consciously aided Randall's rise to national prominence.

The Democratic leaders of this Congress were distinguished for their comparative youth, personal eccentricities and mental mediocrity. Such sterling champions of the people as S. S. (Sunset) Cox and J. W. English occupied seats in the front row, with the weak-voiced Colonel William R. Morrison, a new

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1 Congressional Directory, 1st Session, 38th Congress.
member from Illinois, holding down a seat of honor in the second row. W. S. Holman of Indiana and G. H. Pendelton of Ohio represented the nearest approach to real statesmanship to be found on Randall's side of the House. The Republicans so far outnumbered the opposition that they overflowed well beyond the center aisle, thus swamping the Democrats in numbers as well as in ability. It would be too much to expect that such a man as Sam Randall would long acquiesce in being treated like a poor country cousin by the administration leaders, as they rushed legislation through with little or no regard for the "traitorous minority." Let us take a good look at this new Congressman from Philadelphia.

He represented all the majesty of the largest manufacturing city of his day. He was not far removed from the political and social contacts gathered in the grog-shops of the fourth ward in his home city. He had a tongue that could snap out sarcastic quips with lightening speed. His voice was pitched rather high, and in moments of excitement its metallic ring approached a shrill screech. His countenance was usually very attractive, his fine smile showing perfect teeth. But this face became a thundercloud when he was in a defiant mood. Then his great jaw would project below thin, closed lips, while blazing eyes completed the fighting picture. He walked with his head cocked a bit to one side, his left shoulder

2 Ibid.
slightly raised. His gait was a brisk shamble that covered ground very rapidly. During his more than quarter of a century in Congress he always wore the same style of clothing, a cutaway coat, baggy trousers, spotless linen, broad shoes and a "remarkable" hat.3

Obviously such a figure would attract some attention from the older members of the House. The sad lack of real leaders within his own party meant that the stage was clear for any new figures who could supply real leadership. But his party was in the minority and fated to spend more than a decade under the partisan charge of treason. Thus Randall started his national political life with a small, powerless, persecuted minority. The experience trained him in opposition, in obstruction, in destructive criticism -- a kind of negative leadership. This long training left its mark on him, depriving him of what little innate talent he may have had for constructive leadership. His life was spent gaining limited objectives, most of which were concerned with preventing the Republicans and those within his own party who differed with him, from passing legislation which he felt would be disastrous to his state and country.

The first decade of Randall's service in Congress was not entirely occupied with the routine which falls to the lot of

3 Photographs in possession of the Pennsylvania Historical Society in Philadelphia, Penna.; The Leader [Wilkes-Barre], April 14, 1890; The Inquirer [Philadelphia], April 14, 1890.
the new member. At times he led his party in whatever opposition was offered to the more extreme manifestations of Radical Reconstruction. He worked vigorously on various problems connected with banking and currency and joined in the movement to stop further land grants to railroads. He watched over the interests of Philadelphia industrialists as well as those of the mechanics of the Philadelphia Navy Yard. Probably the greatest contribution to his party was his very effective questioning of items in appropriation bills, an activity which supplied his party with its battle cry of retrenchment and reform and helped to lead it out of the maze of its post-war wanderings in the wilderness of defeat and disgrace.

Randall's committee assignments during this period are some indication of the scope of his activities. His first committee work with the Committee on Public Grounds and Buildings was, of course, not very strenuous. In the next Congress Speaker Colfax gave him another rather unimportant assignment, viz: the Committee on Expenditures in the State Department. He was also, however, put on the Committee on Banking and Currency, which really challenged his best efforts. In the second session of theThirty-ninth Congress, Randall found himself placed on the Joint Committee on Retrenchment and Reform, an assignment continued in the next Congress. In

4 Congressional Directory, 38th Congress, 1st Session, 27.
5 Ibid., 39th Congress, 2nd Session, 61.
the Forty-first Congress he was also placed on the Committee on Elections. Making the mistake of taking this committee seriously, he spent many weary hours defending the Democratic claimants in all disputes, only to see his client lose on every occasion. At least he presented arguments which were sufficient to satisfy the Democratic folks back home of the justice of their case, but positive results in the shape of more Democratic Congressmen were lacking.

Reconstruction

On the concrete issues involved in Reconstruction Randall followed a rather consistent course. He fought any activity which would lead towards centralization of power, whether it be by executive or legislative action. June 15, 1864 he gave his first long speech opposing the Thirteenth Amendment. Since it contains much of Randall's mental stature and beliefs at the time, a brief summary is appropriate. He opposed the amendment because:

1. War time is an inopportune time to take such action.
2. It will prevent any possible peaceful restoration of the Southern states to the Union.
3. It tends towards centralization of power, by striking at the very roots of State institutions.
4. It would not be the end of like usurpations of the Executive -- Lincoln's extra-legal acts are comparable to the British acts directed against the Colonies from 1765 to 1775.
5. The only way to restore the Union is to have due regard for the mutual advantages and interests of the

6 Ibid., 41st Congress, 1st Session, 53.
7 Congressional Globe, January 25, 1870; February 8, 1870; February 16, 1870.
6. Let the Constitution alone. It is good enough.  

Nothing in this speech was very startling news. It was surely very conservative, and would not prevent its author from supporting Andrew Johnson at a later date when Johnson was trying to resist the "usurpations of the legislature." Yet this speech and Randall's general attitude of opposition to Lincoln caused the President to take a hand in the elections held in the Third Pennsylvania district in November, 1864. An official letter signed by Lincoln was sent to the workers in the Philadelphia Navy Yard, urging them to oppose Randall's re-election.  

During the first months of Andrew Johnson's administration, Randall reserved judgment on the President's reconstruction policies. Randall told Montgomery Blair in June, 1865 that "the North Carolina plan if fairly carried out in the spirit and meaning of its words meets my approval." When the radical hosts of Thad Stevens & Company began to close in on President Johnson, Randall found himself battling in defense of the President. His long speech on February 5, 1866 was a complete summary of his thinking on the subject. It is also an excellent statement of Johnson's case, so complete

8 Ibid., June 15, 1864.
9 Ibid., December 19, 1866. Admitted by a Republican Congressman O'Neil of Philadelphia in debate with Randall.
10 Johnson Mss., June 21, 1865, Randall to Montgomery Blair.
that nearly all of Randall's future outbursts in defense of
the Tennessee tailor were refinements or repetitions of this
speech. Again a summary of Randall's points seems appropriate:

1. The Southern States have never been out of the
Union -- Failure of the Rebellion is failure of
Secession.
2. A State cannot commit treason.
3. The Republican party by allowing Johnson to remain
in the Senate in 1861 and by nominating him for
Vice-President in 1864, denied the secession of
Tennessee.
4. The Supreme Court has stated that the States are
still in the Union.
5. Lincoln's 10% plan is precedent for Johnson's
actions.
6. The Constitution of the United States was a per-
petual Union.
7. Individuals who seceded are liable to executive
and judicial departments of the government:
where the exclusive power of pardon rests.
8. The loyal inhabitants of the rebel states retain
their rights and privileges.
9. Taxation of the South at this time is taxation
without representation.
10. The cultivation and production of the South are
necessary to the payment of the public debt, and
to the proper balance of trade with foreign
countries.
11. Such development will in turn lower the burden
of taxation in the North.11

This very able presentation of the Johnson arguments, of
cursose, had no effect upon the plans of the Radicals. It is
of value only in so far as it reveals Randall's mind and be-
iefs. Continued repetition of such speeches could not fail
to impress many people of the South with the fact that Sam
Randall was their friend and champion. In the 1870's he was
able to draw upon this "storehouse of merits" to provide the

11 Congressional Globe, February 5, 1866.
votes necessary for his election as Speaker of the House. In fact there are many times during this Johnson era when Randall seemed to be purposely "putting on a show," not to aid his hopeless cause but to make the South and his own party conscious of the parliamentary skill and oratorical ability of Samuel Jackson Randall. The South could heartily join with Randall in all his arguments against Negro suffrage for the District of Columbia. 12

Other speeches in the same general vein followed on February 27, opposing a Civil Rights amendment to the Constitution, 13 and on May 10, 1866, directed against the report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. 14 By this time Randall had become a leading defender of Johnson in the House. He soon formed a political friendship with the Tennessean which lasted until the death of the ex-President. On May 5, 1866, Randall had the Baltimore platform of 1864 and Johnson's acceptance speech read into the record to show that Johnson had not been false to his party, but that his party had changed. 15

On June 4th Randall led a group of Democratic members of the House to talk with Johnson. This visit was so successful that Randall felt called upon to send the President a work of encouragement in the following short note:

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12 Ibid., January 16, 1866.
13 Ibid., February 27, 1866.
14 Ibid., May 10, 1866.
15 Ibid., May 5, 1866.
Mr. President,

Your equanimity was wonderful. Do not despair. They all felt easy after they had relieved themselves. We shall move steadily on. The result will prove our determination and the propriety of our efforts. Success will come to you and us. More when an opportunity to see and converse with you is presented.

Yours very truly,

Sam J. Randall

The next month Sam Randall was one of forty-one signers of the call for the National Union Convention to be held in Philadelphia on August 14, 1866. Senator Doolittle, A. W. Randall, L. D. Campbell and Montgomery Blair were the committee which issued this call to support Johnson. The next week Sam Randall felt that Pennsylvania might be carried by the Johnson forces if the state were rewarded by a cabinet appointment. He expressed this opinion in another letter to the President on July 12. His hopes for Pennsylvania were not very wrong, as shown in the October election when, in a total vote of 600,000, the Radicals had a majority of only 15,000. During these hectic weeks in October Randall felt called upon to voice his opinion of Stanton in another very positive letter of advice to the President, as follows:

My dear President,

Push on. Relieve the people of their suspense - Bring Sherman to Washington as speedily as possible - The people will endorse Stanton's

16 Johnson Mss., Randall to Johnson, June 5, 1866.
17 Doolittle Mss., (Wisconsin Historical Society), July 4, 1866.
18 Johnson Mss., Randall to Johnson, July 12, 1866.
19 Ibid., William Bigler to Johnson, October 18, 1866.
removal. I write after very full and careful consideration and conference. This matter is my constant thought - I hope to see you in a few days.

Yours truly,
Sam J. Randall. 20

A week later, just before leaving for New York, Randall wrote to the President's son, Robert, enclosing Philadelphia newspaper clippings which revealed the reaction of the general public to Johnson's recent conferences with Sherman. Randall again pointed out that Stanton would not leave, that the Radicals insisted on his remaining. 21

On January 22, 1867 Boutwell's Judiciary Committee reported out House Bill 239, which was meant to override the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of "Ex parte Garland," which had declared the Test Oath unconstitutional where it applied to counsellors and attorneys in the courts of the United States. The Democrats wanted at least one hour to debate the bill in the House. They knew that its ultimate passage was assured but insisted upon a chance to be heard before the final vote. At this point Randall directed his first great filibuster, an engine of obstruction which was often to be his staff in future battles on the floor of the House. By means of successive motions to adjourn, to take a recess, yea and nay counts, and skilful use of the disappearing quorum, he was able to stall the machinery of the House for sixteen hours un-

20 Ibid., Randall to Johnson, October 24, 1866.
21 Ibid., Randall to Colonel Robert Johnson, October 31, 1866.
til his party received its hour for debate. He was thus impressed with the practical value of such tactics. He enjoyed such a parliamentary game, since it gave him fiendish pleasure to taunt the Republicans while hiding behind a maze of their own rules. He tried similar methods in opposing the Military Reconstruction Bill (H.R. 1143), and succeeded in holding it up fourteen days.

When impeachment proceedings against Johnson first assumed real proportions, Randall attempted to keep the question in the hands of the Judiciary Committee rather than to allow a separate committee to run wild on the subject. By the middle of the summer of 1867 he was challenging Boutwell, the Chairman of the Judiciary, with taunts accusing the Radicals of being afraid to impeach the President. Randall may have guessed that Boutwell and his committee were afraid to act, but he could do little to stop Thad Stevens when, in February 1868, he determined on impeachment. Washburne's resolution calling for a special committee of seven was passed February 25, 1868, even though Randall aided by Holman of Indiana, Eldridge of Wisconsin, and Burr of Illinois tried their best to forestall such action. A fifteen-minute speech on February 29 reviewing the partisan activities of the Republicans,
and an abrupt refusal to act as teller during the election of the seven managers of impeachment on the part of the House, completed Randall's attempts to protect the President from the ordeal of impeachment proceedings.

When, in the summer of 1869, Johnson seemed about to be returned to Washington as Senator, Randall wrote him a letter of congratulation on his preliminary victory, but also warned him of a rumored corruption fund, which would "defeat his election as Senator, if the southern legislature of Tennessee is anything like our northern legislatures." 29

**Banking and Currency**

One of the most persistent charges leveled against the Democrats by the Radicals was that Democratic victory at the polls would mean either assumption of the Confederate debt or repudiation of the National debt or both. Such an accusation was believed rather completely by many northern businessmen, especially after 1868 when the Democrats were so politically unfortunate as to flirt with the "Ohio Idea." Randall expended much energy in trying to offset the evil effects of such beliefs. December 5, 1865 he introduced a resolution characterizing the public debt as "sacred and inviolate, which must and ought to be paid, principal and interest; and any attempt to repudiate, or in any manner to impair or scale the

28 Ibid., March 2, 1868.
29 *Johnson Mss.*, Randall to Johnson, August 8, 1869.
said debt should be universally discountenanced by the people and promptly rejected by Congress if proposed." 30 This resolution passed the House by a vote of 162-1. Two weeks later Randall expressed himself as in favor of an amendment to the Constitution which would prevent either a state or the United States from levying any tax to pay for the Confederate debt. He felt that all such money should go towards payment of the National debt. 31 Four years later in December 1869 Randall again denounced the whole spirit of repudiation in a remarkably short but very effective speech. 32

The anti-bank complex which Randall showed while in the Pennsylvania Senate became even more pronounced when he entered the Halls of Congress. The National Banks 33 and the few large banks in New York, Philadelphia and Washington were the special objects of his attack. He worked for three distinct policies which would clip the power of these institutions. First, he would have a more complete extension of the Sub-Treasury system for deposit of federal funds. 34 This would cut down the total resources of the national banks and thus partially destroy their monopoly. Second, he would call in the National Bank Notes and replace them with Greenbacks in

30 Congressional Globe, December 5, 1865.
31 Ibid., December 19, 1865.
32 Ibid., December 16, 1869.
33 Ibid., May 25, 1868; March 1, 1869; March 3, 1869.
34 Ibid., June 6, 1866; July 15, 1867; January 16, 1868; January 28, 1868; June 13, 1868.
exactly equal amounts. This would deprive the national banks of their graft of "double interest", since they would no longer receive interest on Federal Government bonds and at the same time on their currency in circulation. Third, he would have the Federal Government take entire charge of the selling of its bond issues and thus save the commissions now paid to banks. In fact he would not vote for any funding bill which would necessitate borrowing more money and thus give the banks a chance to profit.

Most of the points in this program are found in Randall's 5 minute speech of December 16, 1869, as follows:

I am utterly opposed to repudiation. But the moment allowed me gives me the opportunity to remonstrate against the enunciation of any scheme of legislation which I believe would place my country in a dishonest attitude before the world. Not only do I believe we should pay the debt, but, I believe, what is of vastly more importance, that the country has the ability, the disposition and the resources to pay it.

I agree with the gentleman from Ohio [Munger] that the debt was negotiated at ruinous rates. That is a matter of just criticism against the party who then controlled the government and made the negotiation. But as regards those who hold bonds upon which is stamped the faith and credit of the country, I say repudiation stands in no other light except the light of dishonesty. In saying this I but repeat what I have said before my constituents. But sir, I do not apprehend half the danger from speeches such as that of the gentleman from Ohio that I do from the extravagance, from

35 Ibid., July 25, 1866; February 21, 1867, July 21, 1868; December 16, 1869; March 12, 1870; June 8, 1870; July 7, 1870.
36 Ibid., July 18, 1868; March 19, 1868; March 11, 1868; February 20, 1868.
37 Ibid., July 1, 1870.
the corruption, from the undue and unequal taxation which has been placed on the statute books by the majority of this House. I have a vast deal more apprehension of the growth of the spirit of repudiation from that cause. Again, the same thing is to be apprehended when the majority stand up here and defend one of the most crushing, one of the most wasteful monopolies — the banking interest of this country. The same thing is to be apprehended from the legislation there has been with the view of making the few rich at the expense of the many. I believe that in the interest of my country there should be no question about paying the entire principle of the public debt.38

Watching over the interests of Philadelphia

Political manipulation of the personnel of the various United States Navy Yards has long been a profitable game for administration leaders. Highest and lowest alike have stooped to play this game.39 The presence of a Navy Yard in his district presented Sam Randall with a fine opportunity to exercise his talents in this game. When the administration was hostile to him, Sam would do his best to get increased appropriations for the Yard40 and then let his supporters know of his efforts regardless of what success he might have. When his friends within the Yard were locked up for suspected fraud, he attempted to get a House Committee appointed to investigate rather than to leave it to an unfriendly Navy Department.41

38 Ibid., December 16, 1869.
39 Referring to Lincoln, Nov. 1864, Cong. Globe, December 19, 1866, and to Henry Cabot Lodge, in W. E. Chandler MSS., 1883-1884.
40 Congressional Globe, February 25, 1864.
41 Ibid., December 7, 1864.
In the fall of 1866 Andrew Johnson interfered with the politics of the workers only to have Randall rush to his defense with the reminder that Lincoln had done the same thing in 1864. In fact, every example of political pressure when proved by Congressman O'Neil was checkmated as Randall pointed out the Republican origin of such activity. By February 1870 the shoe was on the other foot again and Randall was assailing the partisan political activity then running wild in the Philadelphia Yard. He accused Grant's Secretary of the Navy of increasing the number of men employed at the Yard from eight hundred to over twenty-five hundred, "without any public necessity for it what ever; and the men who are there now are really in each other's way."  

Throughout his entire career Sam Randall fought all kinds of jobbery whenever he saw it. But when it concerned his home city he could not always see very well. This does not mean that he consciously closed his eyes to rotten situations at home. At times he fought against excessive appropriations for Philadelphia, for example, in 1880 he was so strongly opposed to a proposed Rivers and Harbors appropriation for the Schuylkill River, that he left his Speaker's chair to debate the question on the floor of the House. Yet he did get caught in Scofield's "League Island Swindle" as E. B. Washburne

42 Ibid., February 3, 1870.
43 Congressional Record, January 8, 1880.
called it.44 This was a project calling for the construction of a Navy Yard for iron-clad ships, to be located at League Island, situated a few miles below Philadelphia on the Delaware River. The plans were debated over a ten year period and finally adopted with the real assistance of Randall although he cannot be called the leader of the scheme. Much of the land turned out to be marsh land: transportation facilities were not adequate, all resulting in too much money being sunk in the yard for very little return. Since this deal necessitated the selling of river-front facilities of the old Philadelphia Navy Yard to private business and thus took away some of Randall's political strength, it is difficult to explain his embracing the League Island movement. A considerable group of Congressmen were working to obtain this iron-clad yard for New London, Connecticut. Possibly this very challenge to Philadelphia was enough to make Randall rush to the defense of League Island. He kept up a running fire of speeches over a six year period, pointing out the fine, defense features of League Island, its location adjacent to Washington and New York as well as its nearness to the very center of the iron and steel materials necessary for the construction of such ships.45

44 C. C. Washburne Mss., E. B. Washburne in Paris to his brother in Congress, February 5, 1870.
45 Congressional Globe, December 13, 1864; June 7, 1866; Jan. 12, 1870; January 19, 1870; January 26, 1870.
Sam Randall never tired of protesting against the "burden of taxation" which the American people had to bear. He felt that much of this load could be lightened by a careful surveillance of expenditure, but he also was insistent that such a "burden" should not strike any one group or section more heavily than another. Especially was he concerned that Philadelphia should not be forced to struggle under the load of any tax which forced her to pay more than her share. 46 He wished to protect the liquor-distillers of his state by reducing the excise tax on whiskey and by permitting them to have free use of the bonded warehouses for three years so that they might compete on an even footing with foreign importers. He was righteously stirred up when he discovered the practice of refunding internal revenue taxes for supposed overcharging; all at the discretion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. These refunds were rather large, in some instances varying from $500,000 to $1,000,000. Randall presented such a finished case on the subject that an amendment, causing all refunds of over $500 to be tried in the Federal District Court, was accepted by the House. 47

Randall despised the income tax provision of the Internal Revenue law claiming that it was inquisitorial and vexatious. He possibly realised that it possessed the capacity of attain-
ing such sizeable figure that tariff revenues would no longer be needed to run the country; then a change in the tariff thinking of the country would appear. He supported Stough-
ton of Michigan in his desire for a two cent tax on each check, draft, or order of payment, because it would reduce the burden of taxation on the poor man by $1,000,000 as well as being another check and annoyance to his pet hate -- the banking monopoly. Anything that would reduce the taxation on arti-
cles which the poor man used would always receive the support of Randall. Whiskey has been mentioned before. Matches re-
ceived his best efforts in 1870, cigars in 1867, especially cheaper cigars. He reserved his greatest energies for his long fight to provide the poor man with a "free breakfast" by means of repealing the tax on tea and coffee. This motto was his great talking point in 1871 as he received the sanc-
tion of the House for this repeal. At the time the tax on tea produced an annual tax yield of $10,000,000, while the coffee tax amounted to $12,000,000. Some students of the period feel that this was a most momentous day in the history of the American tariff system, since it meant that henceforth the United States Treasury was to be filled by revenues from

48 Ibid., July 9, 1870.
49 Ibid., June 1, 1870.
50 Ibid., June 1, 1870.
51 Ibid., February 15, 1867.
52 Ibid., March 10, 1871.
53 Ibid., March 10, 1871.
import tariffs instead of excise taxes on domestic goods. The answer to such a statement seems to be the comparative insignificance of the total yield of tea and coffee taxes as quoted above.54

Samuel Jackson Randall is known to cursory students of United States History as the high-priest of protection who dominated the Democratic party in the 1870's. There is much evidence to substantiate this characterization, but one of the purposes of this study of his life will be to offer a detailed analysis of his tariff views, showing some refinements of interpretation and extenuation. In this portion of the paper the subject will be carried down through the tariff debate of 1872.

Evidence that would paint him as a protectionist is plentiful in the period 1867-1872. He supported the Wool Tariff of 1867, the copper tariff of 1869 and the Schenck Tariff Bill of 1870.55 He voted for the Spink Tariff resolution of February 28, 1870, even though most of his party did not. He wanted the Welles report on Revenue "printed at the earliest moment, so that the arguments and conclusions of the gentleman may be better refuted, and so that those who are disposed to concur with him may the better see the statistics and grounds on which he bases his recommendations."56 May 8, 1872 he re-

54 Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland (New York, 1932), 284.
55 Congressional Globe, July 14, 1870.
56 Ibid., December 21, 1869.
plied to Kerr of Indiana who had charged that the tariff was extortionate. He quoted figures from the census of 1870, concerning Philadelphia manufacturing interests, showing total annual production of $334,000,000; total pay roll of $61,000,000 divided among 137,000 men, women, and children, "... and yet gentlemen who stand here would strike down such interests as that, I am glad that I have the nerve and courage to resist them whether they are inside or outside of my party." 57

The description of the hard-shelled, uncompromising, protectionist which we have come to associate with every member of the Republican party in Pennsylvania, does not fit the Democrat, Sam Randall. He was open to reason on the question. He did admit that some tariff charges were exorbitant and he did fight to lower various items. When he supported higher tariff rates it was largely because he believed that the benefits of such high rates were passed on to the labor population. Is the following speech on a beef tariff "extreme protection"?

I look upon this as a question of cheap or dear beef. Now, sir, if there is any particular in which the public at large have been imposed upon, it is by combinations of drovers and others by which the price of beef has been raised to an exorbitant figure. The high price of beef has, during the last few years, been a subject of universal complaint; and I for one do not want to impose an increased duty so as to afford those who have engaged in these combinations the opportunity to raise the price of beef still higher;

57 Ibid., May 8, 1872.
for the mass of people are even now almost debarred from the use of that article.\textsuperscript{58}

In commenting on the Welles Report, Randall admitted that the Tariff on pig-iron was too high:

I say to him [Kelley] here to-day that the tariff on pig-iron is too high and should be reduced. I say further, that the profits of the manufacturers of pig-iron in my own state warrant that reduction. I do not know yet what the Committee of Ways and Means will recommend in that respect; but I shall endeavor so to vote here as to protect my people as I have always done, in connection with this tariff question. I yield to none in that respect; but I am not going to vote to put a tariff on pig-iron which will enrich enormously these iron-masters when all those of us not iron-masters are made tributary to their enormous profits.\textsuperscript{59}

Later in the tariff debate Randall accused Kelley and all the Republicans of Pennsylvania of voting to seat Sypher of Louisiana in return for his vote in favor of their iron interest.\textsuperscript{60} April 22, 1870 Randall protested the tax of $22.40 per ton on iron-clippings, saying that one half of it or $11.20 would be plenty.\textsuperscript{61} In May of the same year Randall succeeded in getting a hearing on his request for a bounty on nickel. Even though he asked for only 30¢ a pound, the House insisted that he take 40¢ whether he wanted that much or not.\textsuperscript{62}

Randall always trained his best guns on Schenck, the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee in the 41st Congress.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., March 12, 1866.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., January 20, 1870.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., April 20, 1870.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., April 22, 1870.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., May 11, 1870.
\end{flushleft}
This Republican worthy presented a petition signed by ninety-five railroad executives calling for a higher tariff on steel rails, claiming that this showed that those most liable to be injured by such a tariff were in favor of it. Randall's penetrating voice immediately cracked back with the sarcastic quip that many of these railroad executives were also engaged in the business of making steel rails, which charge he proved by offering names. 63

When "Sunset" Cox of New York claimed that the prosperity of Philadelphia was due to robbery of other sections of the country, Randall used this opportunity to clarify and summarize his position on the tariff, including in his speech a portion of the Pennsylvania Democratic platform of 1871 to prove that he was a tariff reformer:

Moreover, the gentleman, seeking perhaps to break the influence of my vote here, charged that my position on this question was one of the remnants of my Whiggery. Sir, I tell the gentleman that I represent what was formerly a Whig constituency. And I say further, that whenever he wants to strip his party of the old Whigs of Philadelphia he will find if he succeeds that it will be less than it is now. Instead of its being any cause of regret, I am proud of the education I received in that school, because I am enabled to engraff upon legislation and thereby make conservative some of the radicalism which there is in the only constitutional party now in existence in this country.

Nor am I, sir, different from the Democratic party of my own State in this particular. I have here a resolution of the Democratic State Convention of

63 Ibid., May 3, 1870.
last year, which came from the committee on resolutions as their unanimous verdict, and which was unanimously indorsed by that convention. -- 'that the present tariff is in many of its features oppressive and should be revised; and we herewith request our Representatives in Congress, when the tariff shall be the subject of readjustment to see that the immense products of the States and its industries are cared for.'

But I say to the gentleman that when he cites here the statistics of Schuylkill county to show what Pennsylvania has obtained, it is but fair that he should state that of that great interest 90%, so far as I am informed, should be credited to labor. Therefore we are not protecting the monopolists who own the land at all, but we are doing everything to increase the wages of labor so as to make people happier and more prosperous.64

Watching the Financial and Natural Resources of the United States

Congressman Holman of Indiana has often been described as the "Watchdog of the Treasury". An examination of Randall's early record on economy in appropriations forces us to admit that Randall must have been either the master of this watchdog or an animal of the same general habits. No items were too small for him to protest if he felt that they were unnecessary. January 18, 1869 he squabbled over a clause in an appropriation bill which would allow $10 worth of packing boxes to each member, with the proviso that the member might take the money in lieu of the boxes.65 During his third term in the House, Randall formed the habit of holding up nearly

64 Ibid., May 10, 1872.
65 Ibid., January 18, 1869.
every appropriation bill offered by the Republicans, while he examined each item and sub-item, forcing its authors to explain the necessity for each. In this manner he became acquainted with the genuine needs of each department of the government and prepared himself to direct the work of the Appropriations Committee when his party came to power. Of course, Randall was not alone in this type of activity; but a perusal of the record gives one the impression that such men as Holman and Eldridge were working under Randall's guidance. He was perfectly willing to work with the Republican chairmen of the Appropriations Committee in ferreting out dishonesty or cutting down the "new-born graft" which appeared in the legislative calendar under the respectable name of Rivers and Harbors Bill. Randall did not like to see the Republicans getting credit for all this good work; particularly was he angry at C. C. Washburne who had followed the advice of his brother E. B. Washburne and was grabbing credit for reductions.

Randall was thoroughly aware of the vicious practice then in use which called for the offering of only routine appropriations to the House for debate, all the while encouraging various departments to expend more than allotted by law. These extra expenditures would then have to be made up by supplementary and deficiency estimates rushed through in a great hurry.

66 C. C. Washburne Mss., E. B. Washburne to C. C. Washburne, February 5, 1870.
with little or no debate. So he set about to remedy an illegality which was fast becoming a habit. **First**, he asked whether all departments in sending to the House and to the Committee on Appropriations, had included in those estimates any estimate for a deficiency. **Second**, he offered and had accepted an amendment to the Legislative Appropriation Bill of 1870, which provided that:

> It shall not be lawful for any department of the government to which is given the authority to expend appropriations herein made to expend any sum in excess of such appropriations during the coming year, or to involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money in excess of the sums herein appropriated. **68**

**Third**, he introduced a resolution which was agreed to calling for:

> . . . the Committee on Rules to inquire into the expediency of introducing an amendment to the joint rules taking from all committees of conference the power of increasing in amount any item of appropriation bills in which the two Houses have concurred, or introducing any new item of appropriation not previously considered by the House or the Senate. **69**

Both Houses of the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1871 passed the following resolution on the public domain:

> Whereas, the public domain, which is the national inheritance of people is fast diminishing by the continued granting of land subsidies to railroads and other corporations; and whereas the continuance of such a policy is calculated to impair the

67 For example the Navy Department, *Congressional Globe*, February 2, 1870.

68 *Congressional Globe*, February 24, 1870.

interests and welfare of the poorer classes of
the country:
Therefore, Be it resolved . . . that our Senators
in Congress be instructed and our Representatives
be requested to oppose the further passage of
laws granting subsidies of public lands to rail-
road companies or corporations under any pretext
whatever. 70

Randall presented this resolution to the House of Representa-
tives, but it was also a summary of his own feeling on the
subject. Since 1866, he had been opposing any new land grants
to private corporations. He attempted to have such subsidies
referred to the Committee on Public Lands, 71 or to the Commit-
tee of the Whole, 72 rather than to the friendly Pacific Rail-
road Committee. Many smaller roads found that they could not
complete their promises of building within the specified time
limit and asked for extension of time, often even for exten-
sion of acres. Randall was particularly wrought up over such
a request by the St. Croix and Lake Superior R. R. in Wiscon-
sin. He accused Governor Fairchild of making an illegal
agreement with General Land Office Commissioner Wilson, where-
by the State of Wisconsin retained control of this land after
the company's charter had elapsed in 1869. 73 Randall's at-
tack laid him open to the charge of being the servant of rival
railroad lines within the State of Wisconsin. Lucien Fair-
child did not name Randall but reported to Governor Washburne

70 Ibid., March 10, 1871.
71 Ibid., June 20, 1866.
72 Ibid., April 24, 1866.
73 Ibid., March 15, 1872.
in 1872, that "the bill is recommitted with pretty tough in-
structions, . . . . the fight made by those interested in rival
roads is very bitter indeed. They have made every possible
effort to defeat the bill and probably will continue to do so
to the ends." 74

This narrative has now been carried up to the days when
Randall was on the threshold of his years of real power.
Grant's second administration was the background, even the
foil, for the struggle which saw him get complete control of
his party within his state, while his leadership in reform, in
economy and retrenchment rallied his party to victory at the
polls in 1874. We shall first trace his career in Congress
during these four years.

74 C. C. Washburne Mass., Lucien Fairchild to C. C. Washburne,
March 2, 1872.
Investigations

Randall's earliest legislative activities have been marked out by the previous chapter. His friendship for the South, his currency agitation, his opposition to new land grants, all stand out prominently. His tariff ideas were still in the formative stage, although his concern over the irregularities in the internal revenue system was rather definite. Grant's second administration found him continuing to act along these same lines, often in a more spectacular manner than he had displayed before. He also ventured into a new field by his leadership in conducting the investigations of some of the most outrageous scandals of the Grant era.

The first of these was the case of the notorious Credit Mobilier. On January 6, 1873, he offered the following resolution:

Whereas, The Secretary of the Treasury in a recent report to the Speaker of the House stated that the Union Pacific was in default because of money paid illegally to the Credit Mobilier Company.

Be it resolved, that the President of the United States is herewith requested to cause the employment of two attorneys, well learned in the law, at a just and reasonable compensation, with further directions to them to commence and prosecute a suit in the appropriate court or courts against the said corporation, to wit, The Credit Mobilier of America, and its several stock-
holders . . . \(^1\)

The House passed this resolution by a vote of 93-25 but, with no quorum present, final decision was put over for a week. Then Randall offered an amendment to the Legislative Appropriation Bill which would

> forbid any money being paid for transportation of troops, mail, etc., to any railroad which may now be in default for interest due to the government on the bonds of the United States given or loaned to such railroad company for the construction of the railroad of said company so in default.\(^2\)

This was aimed primarily at the Union Pacific, but could be used as an excellent excuse for the investigation of other roads.

When Stevenson introduced a resolution calling for the extension of the Credit Mobilier investigation to the Dubuque & Sioux City R. R., Randall tried to have this extension made complete so as to apply to all land grant railroads, and eventually succeeded in forcing an investigation of the Central Pacific.\(^3\) Randall had no direct connection with the actual hearings during the investigation, but on the day of judgement voted to expel Oakes Ames and to express condemnation of James Brooks.\(^4\) He did not, however, think much of the personnel of the investigation committee, since in August, 1875 he referred to S. S. Cox as a "dirty fellow capable of

\(^1\) Congressional Globe, January 6, 1873.
\(^2\) Ibid., January 11, 1873.
\(^3\) Ibid., January 23, 1873.
\(^4\) Ibid., February 27, 1873.
all such acts [who] forgets he appointed at Blaine's instance the Credit Mobilier whitewashing committee." 5 Randall's sarcastic tongue struck out again on February 20, 1873 when he called for a yea and nay vote on Wood's resolution to impeach Schuyler Colfax, adding the cryptic comment that on this subject "the best speech is a man's vote." 6

The next year Randall turned his investigating guns on the Sanborn contracts, when he suspected that Sanborn and his agents were operating as skirmishing parties for Ben Butler and fellow Republicans. The Legislative Appropriation Act of May 8, 1872 had contained a clause which authorized the Treasury Department to let contracts for the collection of certain back taxes due to the United States government, with the right to retain as commissions 50% of taxes so collected. The only contract had been made with Sanborn & Co., who had not attacked the more difficult and impossible cases of default, but had specialized in the harassing of lawyers retained for the settling of comparatively wealthy estates, many of which were in arrears in payment of Federal taxes due to technicalities involved in settling such estates. Such efforts did little but speed up the payment of taxes which would be paid; hence Randall felt that this practice ought to be stopped. His resolution calling on the Secretary of the Treasury for all

5 Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, August 17, 1875.
6 Congressional Globe, February 20, 1873.
contracts and papers on the subject was adopted February 13, 1874. A month later a resolution to investigate these activities was passed by a narrow margin 87-77, with Randall offering to cite cases of real tyranny committed by such officials in Philadelphia. Returning to this theme on May 20, 1874, he charged Dawes of Massachusetts with being in on the whole scheme. The final destination of the commissions collected by Mr. Sanborn is not clear, but rumor had it that Ben Butler's campaign fund was greatly augmented by such moneys.

Randall's opposition to the general practices of the Union Pacific R. R. and the Central Pacific R. R. has been mentioned before. He now extended this animosity to include the Pacific Mail Steamship Company which he felt was a subsidy scheme of a similar nature, designed only to fill the pockets of a few by the taxation of the many. After defeating a mail subsidy bill in the Forty-Second Congress, he went on to force an investigation of alleged attempts to bribe Congressmen while the bill was under discussion. The Committee on Ways and Means did not get around to this investigation until late in December 1874, when testimony was taken at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York. Randall, called upon to testify,

7 Congressional Record, February 13, 1874.
8 Ibid., March 10, 1874.
9 Ibid., May 20, 1874.
10 W. E. Hesseltine to author.
11 Congressional Globe, March 20, 1872.
12 Ibid., February 20, 1873.
13 The Times [New York], January 1, 1875.
revealed that John B. Storm, a Congressman from Pennsylvania, had told him that he had been offered $1,000 for his favorable vote on the bill.\(^1\) Randall was very careful to explain then and later in Congress that Mr. Storm had never wavered in his opposition to the bill.\(^2\) The really significant contribution of this investigation was revealed by the testimony of Mr. Irwin who claimed that "one of the things that Stockwell expected Forney to do was to keep Sam Randall quiet." Irwin also said that he "felt all along that there wasn't any use to make such an effort because Randall was an active and consistent opponent of the subsidy bill. He could only laugh at the previous testimony of Stockwell about Sam Randall; he wanted all to see what Stockwell's idea was - in short, impinging Randall's integrity."\(^3\)

**Salary Grab**

Randall's connection with such a series of investigations was slowly bringing him to the attention of the country. Yet he was forced to labor under a cloud of suspicion emanating from his very definite connection with the Salary Grab of 1873. He supported Ben Butler's amendment to the Legislative Appropriation bill calling for a 50% salary raise for members of Congress. Randall pointed out that in 1865-66, when he had

\(^{1}\) Ibid., January 10, 1875.
\(^{2}\) Congressional Record, January 19, 1875.
\(^{3}\) Times, January 26, 1875.
voted for a similar increase, every Republican paper in his
district had commended his vote. He expressed his belief that
"I earn the $7,500 which I propose to vote for ... I be-
lieve I earn that money; and if my constituents are not will-
ing to pay me what I earn, they had better find some other
Representative." 17 When Upson tried to strike out the retro-
active clause of this salary raise, his motion was defeated by
a no quorum vote of 60-76; Randall, meanwhile, sat by silently
while an unsuccessful attempt was made to force tellers. 18
Four days later the Salary Grab amendment passed the House by
the close vote of 100-97. The whole bill was then referred to
a conference committee which was made up of Garfield, Butler,
and Randall as conferees from the House. 19 On the last day of
the session the conference report, accepting the raise, was
presented; Randall admitting that "maybe this was being done
in the face of the whole country and reminding those who voted
against this that they had no right to take the back pay." 20

A large portion of the voting population of the country
had experienced a sharpening of their political consciousness
as the result of the Liberal Republican movement of 1872 and
the Credit Mobilier investigation of 1873. Hence such a retro-
active salary raise, which, on the last day of the session,

17 Congressional Globe, February 24, 1873.
18 Ibid., February 24, 1873.
19 Ibid., February 28, 1873.
20 Ibid., March 3, 1873.
gave $5,000 as an extra gift to each member of Congress, was a rather severe strain on the loyalty and patience of the faithful voters. In some districts those who voted for this "steal" failed to be re-elected in 1874 as punishment for their votes. Some of the anti-Grant intellectuals devoted the entire summer of 1873 to agitation against this pay raise. The storm of protest was so violent that the first week of the next session produced another series of speeches over the question of the proposed repeal of this "grab". "Sunset" Cox, uncertain as to what the Democrats should do, wired Samuel J. Tilden for advice. 21 Randall had no such difficulty, since he found a delightful defense for his action, a defense which was rooted deeply in state pride and in national custom. His speech of December 11, 1873 brought out the fact that every previous salary raise in the history of Congress by the Third, the Fifteenth, the Thirty-Fourth, and the Thirty-Ninth Congresses, had been retroactive. He also revealed that Albert Gallatin and Robert Morris had both voted for an increase and had taken back pay. 22 Randall's re-election to the Forty-Fourth Congress seems to be a good answer to the accusation that his constituents would strongly disapprove of his leadership in such a salary raise.

21 Tilden MSS.; S. S. Cox to Tilden, December 1, 1873.
22 Congressional Record, December 11, 1873.
"Hard" Versus "Soft" Money

Randall's most important committee assignment continued to be that of Banking and Currency, during the Forty-Second and Forty-Third Congresses, but he soon found himself tossed about by the conflicting and rapidly changing currents of public opinion on monetary matters. He was fundamentally a "hard money" man, possibly because of his conservative family heritage and business relationships. An illustration of this tendency appeared in 1873 when he suggested to the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee that "gold" instead of "money in the Treasury" be used in payment of the 1858 bonds then falling due. He felt that since the loan was "negotiated in coin, and for the credit of the country, it should be paid in coin." In other words, he would have nothing to do with the "Ohio Idea". This, however, did not mean that he had no use for "greenbacks" or "legal tenders". As mentioned before, he wanted them to replace the national bank notes, but did not want the total amount of currency expanded, although he did prefer "greenbacks" as a means of expansion if some additional currency were absolutely necessary.

"Soft" money advocates continuing their demand for more circulating medium, Randall offered three changes which might result in more money circulating without increasing the total

23 Congressional Record, December 9, 1873.
24 Ibid., April 9, 1874; Congressional Globe, Dec. 3, 1872.
25 Congressional Record, February 9, 1874.
amount. These suggestions were:

1. Diminish the amount of legal reserves in the National Banks; thus throwing some money in circulation.

2. Permit the payment of one half the customs dues in legal tender. The amount of customs dues during the last year had been $180,000,000; hence the payment of one half in gold and one half in legal tender would not be harmful, as the interest on the gold bearing bonds was only $98,000,000.

3. Do away with the warehouse system which was only an artificial stimulus to importation set up by R. J. Walker in the Tariff of 1846. This would keep $60,000,000 in gold in the country and encourage the local market.26

In this same speech he recognized "the desirability of resumption at some given day," yet, when in January, 1875, Maynard, the chairman of Banking and Currency, reported a resumption bill to the House, Randall accused him of playing false to the understanding which he had with his committee.27 Randall's anger at Maynard may help to explain his negative vote on the Resumption bill, although it was handled as a party measure by the Republicans.

The question of "hard" vs. "soft" money was thus forced on the country. The "hard money" Republicans were successful in Ohio;28 the Democrats in New York29 and Massachusetts30 came out for "hard money", but Randall found that the Pennsylvania Democratic convention at Erie would not accept the "hard

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26 Ibid., April 9, 1874.
27 Ibid., January 7, 1875.
28 World, October 10, 1875.
29 Ibid., September 18, 1875.
30 Ibid., September 23, 1875.
money" report of his resolutions committee, but demanded that "the volume of money be made and kept equal to the wants of trade." 31 This non-committal plank in the platform adopted by a convention which Randall was supposed to have dominated, caused Randall much embarrassment and contributed to his defeat for the Speakership in 1875. The "soft money" accusation against Randall may have been partially correct, since in the next session of Congress, he spent more than a little time in pushing through a bill to replace $163,000 of fractional paper currency with silver, 32 and followed this with an attempt to turn $25,000,000 of silver bullion into fractional silver currency, a figure which was eventually cut down to $10,000,000 and passed. 33 His vote in favor of the Kelley Free Silver Bill on July 24, 1876 revealed that he was by then over in the camp of the Bland-Kelley free silver men. 34 This vote to restore the coinage act of 1837 was a warning of future pro-silver rulings by Speaker Randall in the legislative struggle which culminated in the Bland-Allison Act of 1878.

Randall's earlier concern with the Internal Revenue Office resulted in an attempted reorganization of the service. On January 12, 1874 he introduced a bill to that effect, which was referred to the Ways and Means Committee, but reported ad-

31 Ibid., September 12, 1875; The Record [Philadelphia], September 12, 1875; Tribune [New York], November 22, 1875.
32 Congressional Record, March 31, 1876.
33 Ibid., June 21, 1876.
34 Ibid., July 24, 1876.
versely. \textsuperscript{35} He continued to attack its notorious practice of "refunds," but was particularly concerned with the growing number of employees in the office, who represented a type of "inquisitorial" taxation which irked him. These officers interfered with the liquor distilleries in his constituency and often acted as agents for his political opponents in fighting him. This situation was the cause of a very able speech delivered on March 11, 1874, in which he showed that

\textit{... the amount collected had declined during the period 1866-73 from about $300,000,000 to $100,000,000 and in 1874 the variety of sources was reduced to five general sources plus stamps, yet the number of employees had increased from 193 to 293 in this period. Why? Also the reports of the amounts appropriated for the Internal Revenue Office last year were dishonest so as to make the new demands seem like a reduction. The new figure asked was $5,398,380, the old figure claimed to be $6,504,140, whereas the actual old figure was $5,504,140. \textsuperscript{36}}

\textbf{Filibusters}

The Democratic victory in the mid-term elections of 1874 meant that the "Lame-Duck" session of the Forty-Third Congress would be the last opportunity for the unrestricted passage of Republican legislation for some little time to come. This was a rather critical period in the history of the Republican party for a variety of reasons. The white elements had regained political control of most of the Southern States, the numerous scandals of Grantism were coming to light, while saner public

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., January 12, 1874.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., March 11, 1874.
opinion in the North was beginning to doubt the authenticity of "bloody-shirt" stories. To complete the picture a "traitorous" party of "copperheads" was about to rule the House of Representatives, which party was still flirting with the dangerous doctrine of inflation. Hence the short session was filled with a hectic struggle to pass the Resumption Act and to cement still further, by appropriate legislation, the loosening hold of the Republican party on the South.

The Civil Rights and the Force bills were meant to provide ammunition for future Republican oratory and to enable President Grant to continue to control the political situation in the South during his term in office. The failure to pass the Force bill and the emasculation of the Civil Rights bill may be traced to two definite sources. **First,** Opinion within the Republican party in Congress was not in complete agreement on the subject of such stringent legislation. Many members of the party, notably Speaker Blaine, resented the attempts of Ben Butler and Coburn to pass such "reconstruction" measures ten years after the close of the war. **Secondly,** A little band of Democrats in Congress composed of Beck of Kentucky, Eldridge of Wisconsin, Niblack and Holman of Indiana, and Randall of Pennsylvania, rallied their slender forces and by means of two extended filibusters, one of 46 and one of 72 hours, postponed consideration of these measures until it was too late in the session for effective work. Randall's surprising leader-
ship of these filibusters, showing his extensive parliamentary ability, caught the fancy of his party at home and in Congress so that he suddenly became a very prominent candidate for the Speakership in the Forty-Fourth Congress. These parliamentary struggles are of sufficient interest to be described with some care and detail.

The Senate had passed an extensive Civil Rights bill during the first session of the Forty-Third Congress, which guaranteed equal use of schools, cemeteries, etc., to all races. The bill was very stringent in scope, yet had some real sentiment behind it, since it represented the wishes of the deceased Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. This bill was first in order on the Speaker's table of the House of Representatives. Therefore, until it was disposed of, no other business on the Speaker's table could be taken up; in other words, if the Democrats could prevent the House from reaching business on the Speaker's table, then only routine legislation, such as appropriation bills, would pass during the short session. Early in January, 1875 Randall, Beck, and Eldridge, by successive motions, prevented Ben Butler from getting this bill from the Speaker's table. Randall offered to allow a similar bill to be reported as a new House bill from the Judiciary Committee, knowing full well that such a bill could not pass that session.37

The Republicans held two caucuses on January 23 and January 5, 1875; Times, January 6, 1875.
uary 26 on the subject. At the first meeting, they drew up plans for a new rule which would prevent all dilatory motions and place within the control of the majority all the business of the House. 38 At the second caucus they decided to bring out the Civil Rights bill from the Judiciary Committee and keep it before the House until action could be had on it. If the Democrats wished to filibuster, the House would sit it out. 39 The Republicans were unable to get their new rule adopted before the struggle began on Wednesday, January 27, so all knew that the end would come only with exhaustion. A contemporary description of "Sam" Randall by a Philadelphia newspaper man will help to refresh the picture of him as he marshaled his forces for the struggle.

He is over 6 feet, weighs 185, is 47 years old, stoop-shouldered, and loosely built. His face is clean-shaven, sallow and wrinkled with much scheming and thought. He has a good sized head, surmounted by wavy short hair, slightly tinged with gray. He has a voice that is very shrill and very metallic. He is not a flowing talker, but his dogged earnestness and untold courage make him always a prominent figure in debate. No man knows the rules of Parliamentary debate better than he, and none will fight more bitterly and intensely for the rights of his party under them. I have seen him walk right up to the Speaker's desk when Blaine was doing his best to drown his voice by hammering like a worker on boiler-plate, and complete a fiery sentence that would ring far above the uproar of the Speaker's call to order. A plucky man is Sam Randall. 40

38 Times, January 24, 1875.
39 Ibid., January 27, 1875.
40 World, November 22, 1875, reprint from the Philadelphia Press.
The next morning after the struggle began, the New York Times carried a two column description of the fight on its front page. Excerpts from this story reveal the leadership of Randall as well as give much of the flavor of the scene:

The bill had been recommitted to the Judiciary with a motion to reconsider the vote of recommittal entered and pending. The effect of reconsidering the motion to recommit would be to bring the bill before the House for action. No sooner was this question called up by General Butler than the Democrats began their filibustering opposition, which has been so long threatened; Messrs. Randall, Niblack, Eldridge, and other Democratic leaders were on their feet shouting to the Speaker for recognition . . . . Checked at that point, Mr. Randall, who assumed the leadership for the Democrats, demanded the yeas and nays on the motion to reconsider, and pending the call moved that when the House adjourns to-day it be till Friday next, and demanded yeas and nays on that motion. Mr. Eldridge moved to strike out Friday and insert Saturday upon which tellers were demanded and ordered.

. . . Mr. Randall again made a motion to adjourn till Friday, and demanded the yeas and nays. Mr. Cessna raised a point of order that the House had already voted on that motion and decided it adversely. Considerable excitement prevailed at this time, a number of members being on their feet addressing the Speaker at the same moment, raising a volume of unintelligible sound that came up to the galleries like the howl of a menagerie. Mr. Randall, who is perhaps the best parliamentarian on the Democratic side stood looking defiantly toward the Republican side, while Butler stood quietly gazing at the Speaker who was rapping for order. When the members ceased their shouting, the Speaker overruled the point of order, and decided that under the rules of the House, Randall's motion was proper. This was received with satisfaction by the Democrats, who retired smiling to their seats. Mr. Cessna remarked that he merely raised the point to show the necessity for changing the rules, to which Randall responded, "We are ready to proceed with the Appropriation bills and other necessary legislation. . . . General Butler then offered a
compromise but Randall replied that the Democrats would agree to take up the Post Office Appropriation bill, which had been made a special order for to-day.

... At one time Speaker Blaine called Mr. Cessna to the chair. The Democrats took advantage of this and worried Mr. Cessna with points of order and parliamentary questions until Mr. Blaine was compelled to resume the chair and extricate the House from the noise and difficulty into which it had drifted.41

This scene of energetic confusion soon died away, but the Republicans could not gain their legislative objective. On Friday morning at 10:30, Butler and his cohorts suspended hostilities for the time being.42 The filibuster had lasted $46\frac{1}{2}$ hours; the roll had been called 75 times, with each call consuming about forty minutes.43 The Democrats were still in the favored position, since when the House met the next day, they could consume the entire legislative day with the reading of the journal of the long struggle just finished. This was done, to prevent the opposition from giving notice of a change in the rules.44 If this notice had been given, the rule change would have gone through on Monday by a simple majority vote, but instead it had to run the ordinary course of a two-thirds vote on Monday,45 then be put over to Tuesday since a $\frac{2}{3}$ vote could not be found to force its consideration on the ........................

41 *Times*, January 28, 1875.  
45 *Congressional Record*, February 1, 1875.
same day. On Tuesday, when the vote on the new rule was taken, Ben Butler and 12 other Republicans voted with the Democrats, for they did not like the way the new rule was worded. However, it was finally pushed through by a vote of 181-90, after Randall and Cox had both resigned from the Rules Committee because of the manner in which the new rule had been introduced.\textsuperscript{47} The Civil Rights bill then passed the House 163-98, but with some of the more objectionable features, such as those sections applying to schools, stricken out.\textsuperscript{48}

Three weeks later the members of the minority were again fighting with their backs to the wall to prevent the passage of General Coburn's Force bill. This was a caucus bill, based on an investigation in Alabama, drawn by General Coburn's Committee. Its provisions were very extensive, since by the Thirteenth section, the President was authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any state or part of a state when, in his judgment, the public safety may demand such suspension. The operation of the bill was absolutely unlimited as to time or territory. If it were passed by this Congress, it could not be repealed by the next unless the Republican majority in the Senate and the President of the United States should consent.\textsuperscript{49} Such a bill, when administered by Republi-

\textsuperscript{46} Times, February 3, 1875.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., February 6, 1875; Congressional Record, February 4, 1875.
\textsuperscript{49} Times, February 25, 26, 1875.
cans, might paralyse the remnants of the Democratic party in
the South, which were now slowly marshalling their strength
for the first time in a decade or more.

The bill was sprung on the House in violation of an under-
standing to continue consideration of the Sundry Civil Appro-
priation bill. Since, after the next day, February 25, the
motion to suspend the rules would be in order at any time, Ben
Butler gambled on catching Randall and his "phalanx" unpre-
pared, and tried to rush the bill through. He soon found out
that Randall could not be caught by such methods. Instead
Butler himself turned out to be unprepared, since the Demo-
crats soon discovered that the Republicans did not have suffi-
cient members present to make up a quorum. This happened
during an evening session; Butler could not simply call in the
missing members from the cloak room, but had to sit throughout
the night and well into the afternoon of the next day, waiting
for the absentee.

During this long night Speaker Blaine
refused to count members present who did not answer the roll
call, although Butler urged him to do so. This action of
Blaine has sometimes been construed as reflecting animosity
for Butler and his Force bill, as well as personal friendship
for Randall.

50 Ibid., February 26, 1875.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., February 26, 1875.
53 Congressional Record, February 25, 1875.
When the House assembled on Friday, the Democrats insisted upon reading the journal of Wednesday's proceedings. Threatened with this boredom, the Republicans offered a compromise which called for taking up the Sundry Civil Appropriation bill until 5 o'clock that day, then spending the evening in debating the Force bill, which would be called up for a vote on Saturday. The Democrats accepted this arrangement, since it was then too late for the Senate to pass the bill that session.

Thus Randall completed the Forty-Third Congress in a surprising blaze of parliamentary glory. His party and the South could not help recognizing his services. He had left S. S. Cox, one of his rivals for the Speakership, far behind in the procession of public acclaim. His only real opponent was Michael Kerr of Indiana, a man of excellent traits with a record of associates and activities quite different from Randall's. An analysis of their contest for the Democratic caucus nomination for the Speakership is now in order.

**Speakership Contest of 1875**

When Randall left Washington at the close of the Forty-Third Congress, he was definitely recognized as one of the real leaders of the Democratic party. Sidelights on his brilliant filibusters were continually appearing in the press of the day as well as in the correspondence of his friends. He

54 *Ibid.*, February 26, 1875; *Times*, February 27, 1875.
went home to spend the summer in a long fight for the control of his party in Pennsylvania. He was successful to a remarkable degree as shown by the convention at Erie in September, 1875. Yet in December, 1875 Michael Kerr of Indiana was the caucus nominee of the Democrats for the Speakership of the House. The explanation of such a setback in the political fortunes of "Sam" Randall is rather difficult. The whole pattern of the struggle is a patchwork of prejudiced political intrigue, of greedy grasping for railroad subsidies, of mistaken monetary beliefs, of salacious stories of Southern support and salary grabbing, and of political associates, more or less polite.

Michael Kerr had been the caucus nominee of the Democrats for the Speakership in 1873. Randall was thus placed in the role of a usurper in his attempts to lead the party in the House. Kerr had a spotless record on all major issues, except inflation, which he had mistakenly espoused in 1870. He was a low tariff man, had not been a salary-grabber, had even refused to accept his back pay, and had continuously fought subsidies of all kinds. He came from the mid-western state of Indiana, and was not cursed with enough Southern support to make him the target for "bloody-shirt" oratory. His political associates had always been of a high type, far removed from the besmirching influence of ward politics. Finally, he had

55 Tribune, November 20, 1875.
the support of Democracy's most powerful newspaper, the New York World, while in the last days of the race, Dana and the New York Sun came out for him strongly. Throughout the summer he was supported by Governor Tilden of New York, although Randall felt that he had broken this connection during the final month.56

Randall was really embarrassed by the variety and caliber of his support. The New York Tribune favored him strongly; the New York Times also leaned in his direction. Both of these papers were Republican, hence their support possibly harmed him with his party. Southern newspapers, notably the Richmond Whig, joined the Randall movement and, of course, the majority of the papers in his home state favored him. Despite all of this press support, he still lacked the support of the two New York papers whose good opinion he most valued, viz: The Sun and The World.

Randall's relations with Dana during this period reveal the New York editor as a man of convictions who would not waver even when he was cornered. Dana's paper had an extensive circulation in Pennsylvania, more so than any other out-of-state, Democratic paper. Chauncey F. Black of York, Pennsylvania, the son of Judge Jeremiah Black, was a steady contributor to the Sun of articles dealing with Pennsylvania politics. During the summer of 1875, Randall used his friend-

56 Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, November 8, 1875.
ship with Chauncey Black to exploit his exposure of the "Ring of Treasury Thieves at Harrisburg". Dana cooperated rather well in the publishing of these articles, although he did not always confine his news and editorials to pro-Randall material. Late in October Dana found himself doubly indebted to Randall for services rendered in extricating him from legal embarrassments, in that Randall used his influence to have null prossed a libel prosecution then pending in a Philadelphia court against Dana, and also persuaded John Morrissey to render Dana similar aid in New York. Chauncey Black bombarded Dana with articles, summaries, and resolutions favoring Randall, but Dana stuck to his decision stated earlier in the year, and firmly refused to follow Randall, as shown in his letter of November 15:

Dear Mr. Black:

I have your article, but am sorry to say I can't quite go it. My own judgment is that the election of Kerr would be a great deal better for the party and for the country than that of Randall. I like Randall personally and for this reason it has been more difficult for me to come to such a conclusion.

Yours sincerely,

C. A. Dana

Randall's southern support did not materialise as rapidly as he had expected. He blamed his opposition to the Texas-Pacific subsidy for this lukewarmness on the part of the

57 See Chapter Four, ante.
58 Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, November 8, 1875; Ibid., A. M. Gibson to C. F. Black, November 10, 1875.
59 Ibid., C. A. Dana to C. F. Black, March 23, 1875.
60 Ibid., C. A. Dana to C. F. Black, November 15, 1875.
Southern states of Louisiana, Tennessee, and Missouri. Since Judge Jeremiah Black had many fine Southern contacts, a heritage from his days in the cabinet of President Buchanan as well as from his long years as a Washington lawyer, Randall did not hesitate to use his personal friendship with the Judge's son Chauncey to get the support of various Southern leaders. On July 24 he told Chauncey to "express to your father my thanks and to Gov. Jenkins - a word to Toombs & others would be of use." On August 11 Chauncey was telling his father that "you ought to seize eagerly every opportunity to help Randall. Gov's Jenkins and Graham and others like them could be of great service with Southern men. It is getting more and more important every day." On August 17 Randall asked Chauncey to "thank your father cordially for his advocacy of my claims - He can do me much good South - if he has the time to write - Georgia & Tennessee are now the points for effort." The next day in a postscript to a letter to Chauncey, Randall wrote "Tell your father I need aid in Georgia with Hill & others. This is what French call a 'back thought.'" The fact that Randall had been one of the leaders in the "Salary Grab" may have been a real factor in his defeat. Dana

61 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, December 5, 1875.
62 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 24, 1875.
63 Ibid., C. F. Black to Judge Black, August 11, 1875.
64 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 17, 1875.
65 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 18, 1875.
was continually striking at him on that charge. The independent press in general never tired of repeating the reference to that unwarranted pilfering of the public treasury. Just prior to his defeat by Kerr, some members of the House were heard to say that, "We cannot afford to encounter the constant newspaper cry about this salary business. We cannot afford to be continually on the defensive because of the Speaker we elect." 66 Randall's tariff stand was not a serious factor in the canvass for the Speakership, because the question had not become a major issue and Randall's own beliefs were still in the formative stage. His unfortunate connection with the "soft money" convention at Erie in September, 1875 hurt him tremendously. He knew this, and told Chauncey Black that the Pennsylvania Democracy would have done better to have taken his advice: "I resisted with all my power - In this Wallace & I agreed. Had they taken our advice - our position would be much better." 67 Nevertheless, Randall was unable to escape the stigma of being connected with this Erie platform even though he had fought to prevent the adoption of its money plank.

From March to December, 1875 Randall was continually embarrassed and worried by public and private rumors that the entire Pennsylvania delegation in the House would not support

66 *Times*, December 6, 1875.
67 *Black MSS.*, Randall to C. F. Black, November 8, 1875.
him in his canvass for the Speakership. During the early months most of these rumors came from the agents of the Republican Treasury Ring at Harrisburg. Randall's relentless campaign of exposure of their methods was bringing results, forcing Mackey and Don Cameron to strike back with threats of cutting Randall's support from under him. Party discipline was so lax and money so plentiful that such a threat was no idle one. During this entire period, also, Randall had the feeling that William A. Wallace, the new Democratic Senator from Pennsylvania, would like to knife him in the back if he dared. However, by November 8, Randall felt reasonably sure that his own delegation would be a unit in his favor, "notwithstanding the threats of thieves." This security was premature, for rumors continued to fly about respecting the activities of Colonel Levi Maish of York. A. M. Gibson, a newspaper man, warned Chauncey Black of these developments and asked him to look into the activities of his fellow townsman. By November 25 this news had been given to Randall. In a confidential letter, he asked Chauncey to "have a chat with Maish - a word to the wise sufficient - ask him how matters look etc." 

The very next day Randall reported strange declarations as com-

68 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, June 30, 1875; Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 3, 1875.
69 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, November 25, 1875; Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, November 27, 1875.
70 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, November 8, 1875.
71 Ibid., A. M. Gibson to C. F. Black, November 10, 1875.
72 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, November 25, 1875.
ing from Laish\textsuperscript{73} and within two days actually announced that "Laish has given encouragement to the idea that a portion of our delegation was not a unit." \textsuperscript{74}

Those zealous ward politicians who came to Washington to aid Randall in the final days before the caucus probably did him much more harm than good. Such men as Johnny Morrissey of New York and Billy McMullin of Philadelphia were bound to offend those who looked for some approach to purity in politics. Morrissey treated the contest like a horse race by setting up, at the Imperial Hotel, a betting pool on the Speakership, with his own bet of $10,000 on Randall leading the list.\textsuperscript{75}

The final charge against Randall seems like the most absurd of the group, yet was a vital factor in the contest. He was accused of having promised Tom Scott and the Texas-Pacific R. R. that he would set up the Pacific R. R. Committee in favor of the claims of their subsidy. How could any right-minded person believe such a rumor, knowing Randall's continual fight against land-grants, subsidies, and all kinds of jobbery. This claim was received by a credulous public for a variety of reasons. First, Tom Scott was a resident of Philadelphia whom Randall had known as far back as Civil War days when Scott was Assistant Secretary of War under Cameron. Secondly, Tom Scott and his group had a habit of betting on all the horses in any

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, November 26, 1875.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, November 27, 1875.
\textsuperscript{75} Tribune, December 1, 1875; World, December 1, 1875.
race so as to guarantee their own schemes. For instance, the diary of President Hayes reveals that Hayes accepted Tom Scott's private car as transportation from Ohio to Washington for the Inaugural ceremonies of March 4, 1877. Following this habit, Scott had earlier approached Kerr, only to be warned off by Kerr's refusal to play the game. This meant that Randall was the last to be approached and so carried the final stigma. Finally, Tom Scott was working for Randall by holding off Senators Wallace and Cameron who wished to break up the Pennsylvania delegation in the House. This action on the part of Scott may have been caused by the necessities of state politics and be little concerned with the fortunes of the Texas-Pacific subsidy. It might be well to state here that later during Randall's five years as Speaker, Tom Scott and the Texas-Pacific received no favors from the Speaker; so definite was Randall's antagonism that this group of subsidy-seekers opposed his re-election as Speaker in March, 1879.

Randall's letter to Chauncey Black after Kerr had been chosen, gives a rather excellent evaluation of the truth of this subsidy charge against Randall:

The Result is reached - The future in a party sense is full of hope - to the Democracy.
The charge that Tom Scott wanted me had its effect.
The energy of his friendship is shown by the votes of Louisiana - Tennessee & Missouri in our caucus.

76 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, November 23, 1875.
77 Ibid., A. M. Gibson to C. F. Black, November 25, 1875.
The three states which have within their limits the three forks of the route at Eastern End in these States I received two votes - one in Missouri a warm personal friend & Mr. Young of Memphis. Texas stood by me on personal effort of my three true personal friends. Throckmorton, Mills & Hancock.\footnote{Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, December 5, 1875.}

Two days before the caucus Randall's supporters claimed 85 votes, and \textit{The World} admitted that he had the best preliminary vote. The tide shifted on December 3, and appearances revealed the drift to Kerr. On December 4 the Democratic caucus met and chose Kerr on the third ballot. Randall moved to make it unanimous and gave a short speech in good taste calling for a united front against the Republicans.\footnote{\textit{The Nation} believed it to be the support of the jobbing elements in his party which had defeated Randall. \textit{The Times} felt that Randall's connection with the "salary grab" had been the deciding factor. \textit{The Tribune} for December 6 carried an editorial which seems to offer a valuable summary of the situation:}{1875}

Mr. Randall was associated in the public mind with those who conspicuously fought his battles. It was fatal to him that the worst class of Democrats and the worst class of Republicans were both anxious to have him succeed... the offscourings of Tammany, the tools of the Canal Ring, the jobbers at Washington, and the Republican third termers were of one accord in this contest. The zealous aid of the most corrupt administration men injured Mr. Randall beyond measure.\footnote{\textit{Tribune}, December 6, 1875.}
CHAPTER FOUR
CONTROL OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEMOCRACY

The Democratic party in Pennsylvania reached the peak of its power during the administration of President Buchanan. It had recently been strengthened by the addition of many old-line Whigs, such as Josiah Randall and his two sons, after the disappearance of that old party of banking, protection, and conservatism. The new Republican party soon made rapid strides in getting control of the state, thanks to the unscrupulous but able leadership of Simon Cameron. However, in the two decades from 1855 to 1875 party lines were not sharply drawn, and there was much shifting of allegiance from one group to another, as shades of political opinion varied. For example, during this period Simon Cameron ran for office under four different party banners, first as a Democrat, then Fusionist, then Democrat again, next as a Know-Nothing, and finally as a Republican.  

Andrew G. Curtin ran for office as a Whig, then as a Republican, and finally as a Democrat. Randall himself ran the gamut of political change as a Whig, American Whig, and Democrat.

Such a confused political situation provided an excellent situation provided an excellent

2 Ibid., January, 1905.
3 Chapter I
stage for the activities of political bosses who liked their politics "raw" and stopped at nothing. The rapid industrialization of the country during the Civil War, as well as the extensive railroad expansion in the years following, could not help but make Pennsylvania a Republican stronghold, since the doctrines of that party would guarantee the continuance of patriotism and prosperity for the old Quaker state. As the Democratic elements saw their power slipping, some of the weaker souls became adept at selling out to the Republicans, who seemed to have the cash for such purchases. Occasionally the aroused leaders of the Democracy would prevent such sell-outs by means of some rather sturdy, strong-arm methods. Rudolph Blackenburg has the following interesting tale to offer concerning the election of Buckalew as Senator in 1867:

On the day the ballot was taken for Senator, the aisles and galleries of the State House were thronged with a band of determined Democrats under the leadership of the redoubtable Esquire William McKullen, now deceased, of Philadelphia, each with a revolver in his right coat pocket and his hand on his revolver ready for business. In the face of such determined surveillance and ready argument no treacherous Democrat dared to vote for Cameron and Charles R. Buckalew, the Democratic caucus candidate was elected by one majority. Cameron was thus compelled to defer his senatorial aspirations for four years, when he was elected to the Senate over Andrew G. Curtin after one of the bitterest contests ever witnessed in Pennsylvania.4

The days of Democratic triumph in Pennsylvania came less often as the seventies and eighties slipped by. The years

1874 and 1882 provided their only major successes during this period, each victory representing a public reaction to a severe dose of Republican misdeeds in both national and state administration. After 1870 Democratic success in Pennsylvania was possible only when the Republican party was unable to settle its own family quarrels. The differing elements within the party of Thad Stevens and Lincoln formed the convenient habit of appealing to varying factions among the Democrats for silent support. Persistent rumors of such transactions follow Samuel J. Randall throughout the later days of his political career. Bits of evidence continually appear to show that the charge had some foundation, such as his expressed hope that Rawle, the Democratic candidate for State Treasurer in 1875, would be defeated,\(^5\) as well as Oberholtzer's open charge that Randall was subsidized by George Childs and other Republican businessmen of Philadelphia.\(^6\) It cannot be denied that Randall's district was not gerrymandered out of existence in 1873, when it was possible for a Republican administration to have done so.\(^7\) The Democratic faction, which was led by Senator William A. Wallace of Clearfield and drew its support from central Pennsylvania, undoubtedly did play the game with Don Cameron and the Republicans. The Democrats of western Penn-

\(^{5}\) Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, November 2, 1875.
\(^{6}\) Oberholtzer to author, March 31, 1934.
sylvania, led by Malcolm Hay of Allegheny and later by William L. Scott of Erie, managed to keep their reputation fairly clean in this regard. In 1875 Randall set about to expand his influence in the party beyond the confines of his home city. Surely the "shifting sands of party politics" would provide only a precarious footing for any man who would attempt to control such a political set-up as has just been described.

Randall had served as Chairman of the State Democratic Committee during the campaign of 1872. His headquarters had been set up in the Merchant's Hotel, Philadelphia, which Randall by then was designating as his Philadelphia residence, since he had moved his family to his small home at 120 C Street Southeast on Capitol Hill in Washington. George R. Berrell served as Treasurer with Randall, assisted by three secretaries. Randall evidently found difficulty raising funds for his campaign, for the Black papers contain letters from Randall to Judge Black reminding him of the $500 assessment

... levied on him by Randall's committee, and complaining that we are without the means to pay the most ordinary expenses of the committee and an efficient campaign as at present situate - is thus rendered impossible - it is a disagreeable task for me thus to write, but it is a duty from which I cannot shrink. 8

Randall performed only routine party duties during the next year and showed little or no enthusiasm in their execution.

8 Black Misc., Randall to Judge Black, July 23, 1872; Ibid., Randall to Judge Black, August 8, 1872.
By 1874 he had so far lost contact with the party that he did not even attend the State Democratic Convention at Pittsburgh, where William A. Wallace acted as temporary chairman, but instead took a trip to New York and on to Cape May, New Jersey, with his family.

The Democratic landslide of 1874 carried 17 Democratic Congressmen into office from Pennsylvania. This was approximately double the usual number and materially changed the complexion of the party set-up in the state. In other words, control of the party in the state would mean something in the form of patronage, privilege, and power, for a year or so to come. The party had been taking orders from William A. Wallace of Clearfield at the time, as shown by the action of the Democratic caucus in selecting Wallace for United States Senator. Randall was decidedly out of the main stream of Democratic politics within the state, yet by September, 1875 it is safe to say that Randall had become the most powerful Democratic leader in the state, although he was far from being an absolute dictator. Such a role was impossible for any man in a state whose party politics were as turbulent and factional as Pennsylvania.

On January 6, 1875 Patterson, a Democrat from Allegheny,

9 Record, August 27, 1874.
10 Black Ess., Randall to C. F. Black, August 27, 1874.
11 Record, November 6, 1874.
12 Ibid., January 15, 1875.
was elected Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representa-
tives. Some time in February Randall visited Harrisburg and
penned a series of resolutions calling for an investigation of
the activities of the State Treasurer, Robert A. Mackey, and
his predecessor, Kemble. Manipulation of the Sinking Fund as
well as the illegal appropriation of the interest on State
Funds were the alleged charges. These resolutions were
promptly referred to the Judiciary Committee for burial. Ran-
dall later in the month met Patterson in Philadelphia and re-
ceived his promise to have the resolutions brought from their
hiding place. This was done, resulting in their passage by
the Democratic House but their rejection by the Republic Sen-
ate. Thereupon the House appointed its own committee of in-
vestigation which met during the summer of 1875. The State
Treasurer refused to recognize such a committee as legal and
marshalled his support among the leaders and press of both
parties. Randall responded with a very careful and complete
program of publicity, private pressure, and correspondence.
The fight was made difficult for Randall, since it early de-
veloped that "Mackey, Kemble & Co." had many friends among the
Democrats, who were not afraid to threaten Randall with loss

13 Ibid., January 7, 1875.
14 Ibid., July 16, 1875; Black Mss., S. Jones to C. A. Dana,
March 2, 1875, quoting letter from Randall; Ibid., Ran-
dall to C. F. Black, March 31, 1875.
15 Black Mss., March 2, 1875.
16 Record, July 16, 1875.
of support for the Speakership if he would not call off his dogs. 17 Randall defied them in private with the statement that "I do not care a fig for Speaker as compared with overthrow of Ring." 18 Randall probably began this house-cleaning with mingled motives. He was honestly concerned over the financial irregularities at Harrisburg. Such activities irked his sense of economy as well as of honesty. Yet he was consciously driving Mackey and Kemble to the wall with the definite knowledge that success in this undertaking would give him the acclaim of the Democrats of Pennsylvania, thus matching his recent success on the national stage in conducting the filibusters on the Civil Rights and Force bills. Threats to rob him of speakership support would prove boomerangs and he knew it; thus he welcomed such opposition. 19

Randall's press attack on the "Treasury Ring" came from four separate directions. First, and foremost, he used Chauncey F. Black as his agent to write astounding articles for the New York Sun. Dana sometimes refused these articles but more often than not published them, sometimes as editorials. Since the Sun had an extensive circulation in Pennsylvania, this was a powerful weapon. Secondly, he had W. B. Reed, an old friend of his, write articles which were published in the New York World. Reed was somewhat lacking in courage and had to be con-

17 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, August 3, 1875.
18 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 18, 1875.
19 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 3, 1875.
tinually pushed by Randall to keep up the good work. Early in August, 1875, Randall, through Reed and Manton Marble, let loose in the *World* a blast of information which made the Ring run for cover.\(^20\) Third, within the State Randall had A. J. Steinman and W. U. Hensel, co-editors of the *Lancaster Intelligencer*, working with him to supply blasts at the enemy from their own back yard in the central part of the state. Chauncey Black also contributed to this Lancaster paper, hence able to let his sweeping literary style have full sway, free from the skeptical frown of C. A. Dana of the *New York Sun*. Fourth, Randall himself took care of the Philadelphia press, not by writing many articles himself but by shopping around "newspaper row" with the vitriolic compositions of Black, Gibson, and Cooper, usually finding an outlet for such writings in *The Commonwealth*, although the *Public Ledger* as well as the *Inquirer* were sometimes willing to aid him. There should be no minimizing the fact that Randall had to use all of his political and personal connections, such as Richard Vaux, to force some of these papers to publish such articles.\(^21\) He never had much success with Alexander K. McClure, the editor of the *Philadelphia Times*, although McClure did have some justifiable grievances against Randall's allowing Cooper and Reed to slam McClure in the *World*, while continuing to profess friendship

\(^{20}\) Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 1, 1875.  
\(^{21}\) Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 1, 1875.
for him.²² The opposition was not lacking in newspaper weapons. The Williamsport Banner, the Williamsport Bulletin, and the Harrisburg Patriot were the main press voices of the Ring.²³

The most important single figure in the entire campaign was a newspaper man by the name of Cooper. At the suggestion of Judge Black and W. B. Reed, he was employed by the New York World to take a pilgrimage throughout the eastern and central parts of Pennsylvania, to uncover whatever was to be found on the Treasury Ring.²⁴ Randall made a special trip to New York to urge Cooper's employment, offering to share one half the cost if Marble felt it too expensive, because,

I deem a full exposure & a short & decisive fight as a remedy & the safety of the State. When I am in a struggle of this sort I don't count the cost - I have a consciousness of rectitude of purpose and they can commence war on me as soon as they please.²⁵

By July 3 Cooper was on his way with instructions to visit Temple, one of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, as a means of getting the figures on the manipulation of those funds. Temple had planned to postpone his investigation until after the September convention at Erie,²⁶ but Cooper's detective work brought results within a month.

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²² Ibid., A. M. Gibson to C. F. Black, September 22, 1875.
²³ Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, March 31, 1875.
²⁴ Ibid., W. B. Reed to Judge Black, June 23, 1875; Ibid., W. B. Reed to Judge Black, June 24, 1875.
²⁵ Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, June 30, 1875.
²⁶ Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 3, 1875.
Cooper continually kept in touch with W. B. Reed, Chauncy Black, Randall, and later with A. M. Gibson, a close friend of Black and Randall and a former correspondent for the Philadelphia Times. He fed these men strange stories of corruption and dishonesty, which they in turn passed on to the newspapers. Among Cooper's many discoveries was the fact that Senator Wallace had been a partner of S. F. Meyers of the Harrisburg Patriot when a new mortgage had been mysteriously taken out on the plant of that publication. The money for this new mortgage had been supplied by various members of the Treasury Ring. This information was a tremendous aid to Randall in his claims to leadership of his party, since the dominant wing had thus been revealed as at least partially tainted by the "Treasury Thieves." Cooper, becoming rather impatient with Reed for being afraid to publish such astounding news, asked Randall to meet him in Lancaster or Philadelphia to lay plans to force publication. This was finally done during the first week of August after Randall had made a trip to New York to see Reed and Marble.

On July 24 Randall, in a letter to Chauncy Black, commented on the news that somebody had broken into Cooper's desk drawers and stolen four or five letters sent to him by Randall

27 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 19, 1875.
28 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 12, 1875; Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 19, 1875.
29 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 1, 1875.
and Black. Randall's cryptic rejoinder was that

Persons guilty of robbing the Treasury would not hesitate at a trifle like breaking into desks stealing private letters and publishing them. It ignores the old accepted maxim that there is honor among thieves.
You are not the man I suppose you to be if you don't blow these men out of Society.30

These same letters were mysteriously returned to Cooper's desk drawer within a week,31 but the enemy had made very good use of them. Randall was not much concerned about his letters stolen from Cooper,32 but one of them written by Chauncey Black was shown to McClure of the Philadelphia Times, thus making him turn from tacit support of Randall to open support of Wallace because of private information in that letter.33

The Committee appointed by the Democratic House of Pennsylvania made its report on July 16, in which it was claimed that $3,000,000 had been withdrawn from the Sinking Fund and spent on General Appropriations, over half of this sum before the Act of 1870 making this lawful. Attention was called to the fact that the state constitution forbade such operations; therefore the act of 1870 itself was probably unconstitutional. $1,400,000 was the alleged amount of illegal interest taken by the State Treasurers since 1862.34 Two weeks later on August 2nd, the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund met at Harrisburg,

30 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 24, 1875.
31 Ibid., Cooper to C. F. Black, July 27, 1875.
32 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 24, 1875.
33 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 13, 1875.
34 Record, July 20, 1875.
where a resolution was passed directing the redemption of certain state loans and certificates exceeding in amount the balance then in the Sinking Fund. This action would soon force some rapid explaining by the Treasury authorities. Likewise, at this meeting on August 2, State Treasurer Mackey felt called upon to submit a detailed statement of the condition of the Treasury, including a list of the depositories of the state funds, which he requested the commissioners to examine and verify.  

Randall pointed out to Chauncey Black that this report revealed that three brokerage houses in Erie -- Franklin and Towanda -- were State depositories to the tune of $16,000, while two smaller banks had over $500,000 of the state's money.  

The climax of this entire campaign against the "Treasury Ring" was to be the Democratic Convention at Erie on September 8, 1875. In many of his letters Chauncey Black hinted that Randall would receive his just due on that occasion. Randall, while genuinely disturbed at the criminal practices uncovered by his campaign, knew that his great chance to get control of the Pennsylvania Democracy had arrived. His letters to Chauncey during the summer months of 1875 make continual references to correspondence with various Democratic leaders throughout the state. Randall was not content to let such men get the

35 Ibid., August 4, 1875.
36 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, August 17, 1875.
news from the press, but used personal letters to point out the iniquities of the Wallace gang. He carefully investigated the merits of those men who were brought forward as candidates for nomination to state offices. He asked his closest friends, such as Black, to "make the issue square & direct against Mackey in your county convention." 37 Wallace, Miller, James, and others tried to interfere with Randall's control of the Philadelphia delegation to Erie by "postponing our nominations but we beat it and as a consequence have a ticket without a single drawback. Miller made an issue & he waged battle under distinct [?]. I presume he will let us alone hereafter. Our delegation to Erie can be made nearly unanimous in same direc-

As the day for the convention approached, Randall and Black drew up some resolutions on the "Treasury Ring" which they planned to make a part of the Erie platform. Randall felt that Wallace would "go as far as we wish on Resolutions for reasons apparent." 39 The real fight would appear not in the vote on such resolutions, but in the personal control of the delegations from the western and southern parts of the state. Randall planned to "camp on the ground at Erie on Saturday September 4th," and wanted both Chauncey and his father, Judge Black, to promise to be at Erie. 40

37 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 3, 1875.
38 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 19, 1875.
39 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 18, 1875.
40 Idem.
He actually arrived at Erie on Monday September 6, quite alone, since Buckalew, Vaux, and Chauncey Black were not present. 41

Randall's success in this convention was not complete, but was marked enough to designate him as the strongest single leader of the Democracy in the state. The platform was written by Randall with the exception of the money plank. Randall tried some last minute press coercion on this subject by publishing in the Erie Dispatch a letter sent him by George W. Biddle, a leading Philadelphia lawyer, which urged on Randall the necessity for adopting a hard money policy. 42 However, a plank calling for mild inflation was inserted, after H. B. Wright of Luzerne, the permanent chairman of the convention, had given an inflationist speech. 43 The "Treasury Resolutions" of Randall and Black were written into the platform in section 4 which condemned the management by the State Treasurer of State finances and put in a plea for state and national economy, by section 5 which called for a searching and thorough investigation of the State Treasury, and by section 6 which pledged the nominees of the convention to employ all the Sinking Fund money to the Sinking Fund as required by law. 44

In the matter of controlling nominations, it is difficult to say just how much success was Randall's. Judge Cyrus L.

41 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, September 2, 1875.
42 Record, September 8, 1875.
43 Ibid., September 8, and 11, 1875.
44 Ibid., September 11, 1875.
Pershing was nominated for Governor on the 11th ballot over Bigler and Hosss. On June 30, Randall had written Chauncey Black his opinion of Pershing in the following manner, "he is the holder of a Judgeship now - given him by Repub. voters in Schuylkill Co. He is a Penn R. R. [ - ] candidate and somewhat in sympathy with our opponents (Patriots peoples favor him)." Randall’s feeling towards Bigler, another candidate for governor, changed during the summer. On July 12 and 19 he was classifying him as a Wallace man, with no backbone. On his trip to New York, July 29, he had a long talk with Judge Black who spoke very favorably of Bigler. Randall gradually swung his support to Bigler, but never was able to work up much enthusiasm for any of the leading candidates, which might mean that he was really more interested in publicity for Samuel Jackson Randall than in the personnel of the various state offices. He definitely did not like Hawle who was successful in receiving the nomination for State Treasurer, but he was unable to produce a better candidate; although Randall was able to prevent the nomination of Dougherty, a Wallace man, for that office.

After reading the last few paragraphs some may question the claim that the Erie Convention signifies Randall’s suprem-

45 Ibid., September 11, 1875.
46 Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, June 30, 1875.
47 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 1, 1875.
48 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, November 2, 1875.
acy in the state. The weeks immediately following the convention brought developments which proved Randall's growing power. Gibson wrote Black that "The result of Erie is Randall's absolute supremacy in the state. He daily receives intelligence from every quarter of the State assuring him of the devotions of this & that man." 49 Randall himself thanked Providence for his success at Erie and spoke of Reighard, a political power in the state who had come over to his camp as the result of Erie." 50

Randall kept up his fight against the Ring, in the elections of 1875, using all of his old contacts to drive the "rascals" out of office and into the penitentiary. His success was not startling, but he was able to force the Pennsylvania Democrats in Congress to support him for the Speakership, despite the efforts of some members of the "Ring." Randall's strength in his home state was to grow in the years to come. On a few occasions as in 1885, this power became absolute, but he never was able to rest on his laurels. The years from 1876 to 1880 produced a terrific struggle in Pennsylvania, since Randall as Speaker of the House carried prestige, power, and patronage with him, while Wallace in the United States Senate likewise was well equipped to exercise power and spread his influence throughout the State.

49 Ibid., Gibson to C. F. Black, September 25, 1875.
50 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, September 25, 1875.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE SPEAKERSHIP

Kerr, in an able fashion, conducted the House during the first session of the Forty-Fourth Congress. His vision was not distorted; his decisions were unusually fair and just, and were so recognized. Most of his committees, chosen with great care, performed excellent service, especially in the uncovering and prosecution of such frauds as the Whiskey Ring, the Belknap scandal, and general corruption in the Interior and Navy Departments. Colonel Morrison, the Illinois free-trader, was appointed chairman of the Ways and Means committee over the head of Fernando Wood, a semi-protectionist. Randall's talents were utilized as chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, where he busied himself with the task of carrying out the Democratic promises of economy and retrenchment. A more complete statement of his success in this work will be given in a later chapter, but it must be mentioned here that Randall's physical force and natural leadership allowed him to be the real floor-leader of the Democracy, even though such honor usually falls to the head of Ways and Means.

Many times, even for days, Kerr was absent from the Chair due to his precarious health. Cox of New York and Salyer of

1 Hubert Bruce Fuller, The Speakers of the House, (Boston, 1909, 194, 195.
2 Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, December 14, 1875.

(84)
Ohio usually presided in such emergencies, although Kerr "many times pleaded with Randall to take the place 'pro-tem' and each time Randall refused because his work was not yet finished." While thus harried by sickness Kerr was faced with the important problem of choosing the Pacific R. R. Committee. In both political camps, the subsidy elements continued to exert tremendous pressure. Honestly wishing to be square with all interests, Kerr offered the chairmanship to Lamar. Displeased, Holman, Wiggington and Randall drew up an all-inclusive, anti-subsidy resolution to present to the House. According to Randall, Senator Wallace was lobbying for the railroad by means of giving Kerr questionable advice as to the inclinations of the various members. Kerr was so harrassed that he wished to put the whole matter over until after the Christmas Holidays.

By January 12, 1876, Kerr had seen the error of his ways and was listening to Randall, even making some changes in committee appointments. He reported this new state of affairs to Chauncey Black in a letter marked Personal:

All I said was true. The truth is Wallace blackballed the entire delegation. He could not hurt me and knew this. Morrison is my authority. Kerr is now listening to me – and in future our delegation will be treated right. Stenger already has been appointed to another Com. at my request. Mackey complains very much not having been placed on Banking & Currency.

3 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, Sept. 15, 1876.
4 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, December 14, 1875.
5 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, December 14, 1875.
which he was promised through Wallace & by him. He tells us this himself...

The scene of Randall's next struggle with Wallace was the Democratic State Convention at Lancaster in March 1876. Randall spent the first week of the new year in a fight to control the Philadelphia delegation to this convention. He felt that great success had been his since after the election he was able to count on at least 40 out of the 46 of his city delegation. A movement to deprive him of his own election as delegate was beaten in 72 out of 73 divisions. A. K. McClure of the *Philadelphia Times* turned loose a blast on Randall and his associates all during January and February. He charged that Randall's distribution of the patronage had alienated his delegation thus weakening the party in the state. Randall became rather upset by such an attack but held his peace, possibly because McClure had turned to attack one of Randall's weak spots, viz: Squire McMullin.

Randall continued to hold his tongue but speeded up his plans designed to bring him recognition at the convention. His letter of February 9 reveals this state of mind very clearly:

... I now write mainly to ask your presence here at an early day in next week for consultation on the

6 [Ibid.], Randall to C. F. Black, January 12, 1876; the Mackey referred to in this letter is Levi A. Mackey of Lockhaven, not to be associated with Robert Mackey, State Treasurer of Pennsylvania.

7 [Ibid.], Randall to C. F. Black, January 6, 1876.

8 [Ibid.], Levi Maish to C. F. Black, January 31, 1876; [Ibid.], Randall to C. F. Black, February 1, 1876.
Penn Convention & the Candidacy for President. It is quite essential that I should see you promptly. There is a good deal going on here as well as in Pennsylvania. I mean to go to that convention - Judge Campbell in the interests of Hendricks I believe - made the fight against me in Philada aided by all they could gather and I and my true friends beat them. I want the recognition but we will mark out path when we meet. I shall be in Philada during Saturday 615 Walnut St.

Yours truly,
Sam J. Randall

P.S. There is nothing on earth I want except to pay my debts in friendship for friendships realized. As to McClure I have some curious documents to show you. 9

The Lancaster Convention met on March 22, in the Fulton Opera House. No state officers were nominated, the main fight taking place over the election of four delegates-at-large to the National Convention at St. Louis. Some differences of opinion also appeared when a new chairman of the State Central Committee was chosen. Wallace and Randall were both present marshalling their henchmen. Other leading Democrats such as Buckalew, Wright, Barr, Dill and North were to be seen at the gathering. 10 Randall and Wallace shared the honors of the convention. Together they pushed through an anti-rag-money platform to reverse the "Erie folly". The vote for the delegates-at-large to St. Louis stood Clymer 210, Wallace 209, Dill 168 and North 140. Clymer alone of this group was a Randall man. Randall's victory came with the defeat of B. F. Meyers, of Harrisburg for State chairman. Wallace wanted his

9 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, February 9, 1876.
10 Record, March 22, 1876; World, March 22, 1876.
old partner on the *Harrisburg Patriot* to have the office, but Randall was able to swing the election to William McClelland.\(^\text{11}\) Randall himself was chosen a representative delegate from the Third District with William McMullin as alternate.\(^\text{12}\)

The Pennsylvania delegation was not pledged to any candidate at St. Louis. Wallace was promising to swing it for Hendricks and Curtin; McClure for David Davis and Curtin.\(^\text{13}\) Randall did not agree with either of them since he believed that Curtin was not a real Democrat while Hendricks would be opposed by the Germans.\(^\text{14}\) Randall felt that Tilden's chances were on the rise and if the New York Governor were nominated Randall would prefer Holman rather than Hendricks for the second place on the ticket, both for political and personal reasons.\(^\text{15}\) After taking such an active part in the canvass Randall was unable to go to St. Louis in June, but sent his brother Robert instead.\(^\text{16}\) Randall tried to rush his Appropriation bills but found an obstinate Republican Senate blocking his attempted economies. The intensity of the struggle necessitated his presence in Washington at every moment.

Randall had to spend most of the summer in Washington continuing his appropriations fight with the Senate. During

\(^{11}\) *Record*, March 23, 1876.
\(^{13}\) *Black MSS.*, Randall to C. F. Black, April 4, 1876.
\(^{14}\) *Ibid.*
\(^{15}\) *Ibid.*, Randall to C. F. Black, April 24, 1876.
\(^{16}\) *World*, June 26, 27, and 28, 1876.
the last weeks of the session Speaker Kerr had to be absent from the city, trying to recover his health. August 19, 1876 tuberculosis took him away, thus bringing the question of the speakership to the front again. "Sunset" Cox in all modesty wrote Randall begging him not to be a candidate for the vacancy, but Randall could see no reason to satisfy this request.

In September, Tilden, while visiting Philadelphia asked Randall to go to Indiana to aid the cause. Randall expected to be accompanied by ex-Governor Bigler but the latter, detained by personal business, occupied himself by organizing speaking tours for Curtin and Wallace in central Pennsylvania.

During the last week of the election contest Randall refused Chauncey Black's request that he come to York because, "I have to be here to watch some people - who have the object near and dear to them to defeat me through agencies in the opposition between whom a natural sympathy exists." After the election Randall sent Tilden a telegram congratulating him and the country on his victory. Within a week the disputed votes in Louisiana, Florida and South Carolina had put the outcome in doubt. Randall accompanied by Bigler and Moses P. Handy, a newspaper man, was on his way to New Orleans with

17 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, September 15, 1876.
18 Tilden Mss., Randall to Tilden, September 26, 1876; Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, September 21, 1876.
19 Tilden Mss., Bigler to Tilden, October 19, 1876.
20 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, October 28, 1876.
21 Tilden Mss., Randall to Tilden, November 8, 1876.
the "visiting statesmen." Stopping at the St. Charles Hotel were other Democratic leaders such as Watterson of Kentucky, Morrison of Illinois, and Ex-Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin. The preliminary investigation included some interviewing of the Louisiana returning board by this group. Doolittle exploded to his son about the "foreordained military determination of Grant" as revealed by his actions during the trip. This excursion accomplished little by way of settling the problem of counting the electoral vote. Hence all eyes turned to the approaching session of Congress, knowing full well that there would be a definite struggle between the Republican Senate and the Democratic House for control. In such a rough and tumble fight Randall was at his best; his days of real power were not far away.

When the members of Congress began to reassemble in Washington in the week preceding the opening of the session, it became obvious that much of the time of the short session would be taken up with the dispute over the counting of the electoral vote. Randall brought forth the claim that the Twenty-Second joint rule for counting the electoral vote was still in force. This rule had been used in 1864, 1868, and 1872, yet

22 *The North American* (Philadelphia), April 14, 1890; statement of Moses F. Handy who roomed with Randall.
23 Doolittle *Mss.*, Doolittle to his son James, November 14, 1876; Henry Watterson, *Marse Henry* (New York, 1919), I, 297.
25 *Times*, December 4, 1876.
had been dropped by the Senate in January, 1876. It states that if either house objected to the counting the electoral vote of any state, the entire vote of that state would be thrown out and not counted. Since Tilden possessed 184 undisputed votes and Hayes only 166, this rule would operate to elect Tilden. Randall claimed that because the House had failed to concur with the Senate in dropping this joint rule, therefore it was still legally in force. While this claim may seem to be rather thin, yet it caught the fancy of the Democrats.

The leading candidates for the nomination were Morrison of Illinois, Salyer of Ohio, Cox of New York, and Randall. Of these, Randall's past record would seem best to fit the requirements of the situation. His knowledge of the rules, his partisanship, his dogged obstinacy, would all help the Democrats to assume control of the dispute and force their will on the Senate.\(^{26}\) The necessities of a single day (February 1, 1877) would determine who was to be the next President; hence a powerful parliamentary leader was necessary.\(^{27}\) Randall had the added prestige of being considered Mr. Tilden's choice. Objections soon appeared to Morrison on grounds of physical unfitness and to Cox because of general flightiness of mind.\(^{28}\)

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26 The Nation, December 7, 1876; Times, December 4, 1876.
27 World, December 1, 1876; quoting Hewitt's letter to Springer of Illinois. Hewitt was chairman of the Democratic National Committee.
28 The Nation, December 7, 1876.
The Democratic caucus met on December 2 and chose Randall by a vote of 73 to 63 for Cox, Morrison and Salyer both having withdrawn their nominations before ballots were taken. Two days later on Monday, December 4, Randall was elected Speaker of the House by a vote of 162 to 82 for Garfield. Randall's opening speech contained the advice to the House to use its

... patience, calm and firm judgment and wisdom, in this time fraught with so much peril. Use unceasing vigilance to prevent even the slightest departure from the Constitution and the laws, forgetting in the moment of difficulty that we are adherents of party and only remembering that we are American citizens with a country to save which may be lost if unauthorized and unconstitutional acts of executive officers be not frowned down at once with relentless and unsparing condemnation.

This constitutes a prophecy of his devotion to the letter of the Constitution. It also contains some of his political philosophy which led him to think of the House as the real representative of the people. The last clause contained a slap for President Grant because of his past use of the army and a promise of action if such acts were repeated.

**Randall and the Electoral Count of 1877**

Immediately after the election of Randall as Speaker, Hewitt asked unanimous consent to introduce a resolution appointing three investigating committees, one for each of the states in dispute. Two days were necessary to pilot this

29 *Times, December 4, 1876.*
30 *Congressional Record, December 4, 1876.*
31 *Ibid., December 4, 1876.*
resolution through the parliamentary maze erected by the Republicans; Randall's knowledge of procedure and his rulings finally bringing success on December 5. 32 Randall immediately appointed Salyer of Ohio as chairman of the South Carolina committee, Thompson of Massachusetts to lead the Florida committee and named Morrison to conduct the important investigation in Louisiana. 33 These committees evidently went to work promptly as on December 8 a telegram arrived from Morrison at New Orleans. 34

The week-end of December 9 and 10 found Randall in New York City, leading a group of Congressional leaders, including Watterson and Hewitt, in a conference with Tilden to learn what action he wished to have taken. 35 On Monday, December 11, at a Democratic caucus Randall explained Tilden's position as calling for patience while the committees were working in the South. 36 These three committees worked throughout December and early January, making reports which were more or less discouraging to the Democrats. Florida seemed to offer the best chance for victory but even there Thompson felt that the State Supreme Court could not be trusted to help. 37 Randall's claim that the Twenty-Second joint rule was still in force was

32 Ibid., December 4 and 5, 1876.
33 Ibid., December 5, 1876.
34 Ibid., December 8, 1876.
35 Times, December 12, 1876.
36 Ibid., December 12, 1876.
37 Tilden MSS., Hewitt to Tilden, January 8, 1877.
brushed aside by the Senate with only four votes supporting his contention. Each passing day pointed to some legislative compromise as the only possible way out of a situation that was fast becoming a real crisis.

This compromise was offered by the Electoral Bill presented to the House on January 18. Sections 4 and 5 of which have particular importance as a guide to an understanding of the actions and rulings of Randall during February.

§ 4: That when the two Houses separate to decide upon an objection that may have been made to the counting of any electoral vote or votes from any State, or upon objection to a report of said Commission, or other question arising under this act, each Senator and Representative may speak to such objection or question ten minutes and not oftener than once; but after such debate shall have lasted two hours, it shall be the duty of each House to put the main question without further debate.

§ 5: such joint meeting shall not be dissolved until the count of electoral votes shall be completed and the result declared; and no recess shall be taken unless a question shall have arisen in regard to counting any such votes, or otherwise under this act, in which case it shall be competent for either house acting separately, in the manner hereinbefore provided, to direct a recess of such house not beyond the next day, Sunday excepted, at the hour of ten o'clock in the forenoon. And while any question is being considered by said commission, either house may proceed with its legislative or other business.

A Democratic caucus was held immediately after the committee reported this bill. Hunton, a member of this committee,

38 Times, December 9, 1876.
39 Congressional Record, January 18, 1877.
40 Ibid., January 18, 1877.
explained the proposed bill with a long speech. Towards the close of Hunton's speech a number of questions were asked him by Randall and other members. The point most vigorously raised was the constitutionality of the bill. In private discussion of the bill by Randall, Bayard, Thurman, and Watterson, Randall said little believing that the bill must be passed as the best solution. The New York Times carried vigorous editorials on the bill, calling it "Republican surrender" and "The Unconstitutional Plan." Randall wrote Tilden "to send for W. O. Bartlett if you want The New York Sun in accord with you - in full - and particularly on the Joint Com's bill." Garfield was so upset at the action of the Republican Senate in even considering this bill that he sat right down to pen Hayes a letter of indignation as follows:

I have no words strong enough to describe my indignation at the fact and the manner of the surrender which the senate has made of our position. The danger of violent resistance to your inauguration absolutely passed away with the failure of the 8th January conventions - Nothing in the world was necessary but for the Senate to support its presiding officer in following the early precedents, which were made under the fresh impulses of the Constitution then recently adopted - A little bluster a new burst of newspaper wrath - and all would have been over. Our friends on the House Committee would never have agreed to the bill but from the conviction that enough Republican Senators would follow Conkling to leave Ferry without support. The worst we can get is David Davis. [Thus] we have a 3 out of 4 chance with David Davis the 4th.

41 World, January 19, 1877.
42 Watterson, op. cit., 307.
43 Tilden MSS., Randall to Tilden, January 20, 1877.
44 Garfield MSS., Garfield to Hayes, January 19, 1877.
In the Senate some Republican leaders such as Morton fought hard to prevent the passage of the bill. Both sides seemed to have considered it a compromise; yet the real ray of hope for the Democrats was the expectation that the fifth Justice would be David Davis, "who would probably have decided in favor of Tilden, since he was that 'rara avis', a public man with an unprejudiced judgment and a sensitive conscience." 45 This democratic hope was soon smashed by the election of Davis to the Senate to succeed Senator Logan. Forty ballots were necessary to complete this senatorial contest, with the final vote representing the combined strength of all the Democrats and all of the independents except two. A friend wired Tilden's nephew that Davis had been elected by McCormick's friends. 46 Davis was probably elected largely as the result of an honest attempt on the part of the conflicting elements in the Illinois Legislature to find a man who would be an acceptable compromise to the Greenback and Democratic elements. His acceptance of the election and subsequent refusal to serve on the Electoral Commission merely demonstrated that he was afraid of the responsibility of being the neutral member of the Commission and thus gladly seized such a heaven-sent opportunity to escape.

Davis' refusal to serve would leave only two avowed Demo-

46 Record, January 25, 1877; Tilden MSS., January 25, 1877.
crats on the bench, therefore the five justices chosen must line up as three Republicans and two Democrats. However, the Electoral Act was finally passed in the House on January 26, already having passed the Senate, and was approved by President Grant on January 29. In the Senate the vote was 47-17, with 21 Republicans and 26 Democrats approving it and 16 Republicans and 1 Democrat opposed. The vote in the House was 191-86, with 158 Democrats and 33 Republicans voting yea, and 13 Democrats and 68 Republicans nay. Randall took the unusual step of having the clerk call his name so that he might exercise his constitutional right to vote and thus be put on record as favoring the act.

An appreciable number of writers on Congressional affairs in this period lavish great praise on Randall for his fight with the members of his own party who wished to filibuster and thus prevent the completion of the electoral count before March 4, 1877. Mention is made of Randall's ruling dilatory motions out of order, of his skill in controlling an unruly house and his patriotic service to the American people in preventing the anarchy that might have followed during March

48 House Journal, January 26, 1877.
49 Congressional Record, January 26, 1877.
50 Samuel W. McCall, Life of Thomas Brackett Reed (Boston, 1914), 119; George R. Brown, The Leadership of Congress Indianapolis, 1912), 79; Mary P. Follett, The Speaker of the House of Representatives (Boston, 1916), 44.
if no President had been officially chosen. Thus, the count was completed just in time, and it is also true that Randall's power as Speaker and his actions at the time of the final crisis were the largest factors in the successful completion of the count, yet an analysis of his rulings and activities during the month of February shows that he did not always act in a manner worthy of such great praise.

Until February 23, 1877 Randall was decidedly partisan and seemingly in league with those who counseled delay. His rulings always ran true to the letter of the Electoral Law as quoted in sections 4 and 5, but they most obviously were not true to the spirit of that compromise, since he continually allowed the house to take a series of recesses on February 10, February 17, and February 19. On February 17, he kept a Senate secretary waiting at the bar of the house for an hour, while the house voted a recess. On February 19, Randall gave vent to a fire-eating speech in caucus suggesting that the House amend the Act of 1792 so that the Secretary of State could be made acting President of the United States until a new election should be held and that in the meantime the House should take a recess from day to day until that amendment

51 DeAlva S. Alexander, History and Procedure of the House of Representatives (Boston, 1915), 44.
52 Congressional Record, February 10, 1877.
53 Ibid., February 17, 1877.
54 Ibid., February 19, 1877.
55 Times, February 18, 1877.
should be accepted by the Senate. Failing in that, to let the
election go by default and have a new one under the law as it
now stands. He also declared that Hayes' policy would be of
such a character as to overwhelm any Southern man in view who
aided in carrying out their agreement in good faith. Yet aft-
er all the fireworks the caucus adjourned and agreed to take
no action until after the vote of Oregon had been counted. 56

The next day in the House Randall's rulings were general-
ly in line with the decision of the caucus of the preceding
evening. The count proceeded to Nevada when objection was
made and another separation of the two houses was necessary.
Later on that same day the House refused by a vote of 197-57
to take a recess. 57 Randall's rulings during the day led the
New York Times to speculate as to whether he were making an
about face. On the morning of February 22 Randall was reported
to have spent an hour in Senator Conkling's committee room be-
hind closed doors, after which additional conferences were held
in the Speaker's room with Democratic leaders. 58 Like most of
Conkling's conferences the conversation of the two men is not
known, yet this conference may help to explain why Randall
adopted a new course of action during the next day in the
House. Another Democratic caucus was held at 4:00 P.M. on

56 Ibid., February 20, 1877; World, February 20, 1877; Ecken-
rode, 224, quoting from Hayes Papers.
57 Times, February 21, 1877.
58 Ibid., February 23, 1877.
February 23, with Randall speaking mildly in favor of moderation in view of the importance of the issues involved, yet the resolution was passed to take a recess on the next day for over the week-end. 59

The following Saturday, February 24, a motion was made to take a recess to 10:00 A.M. on Monday, February 26. This motion was in accord with the decision of the Democratic caucus of the preceding day, yet was defeated 112-158. 60 Lane of Oregon then offered another motion to take a recess to 9:30 A.M. on Monday, February 26. Hale of Maine claimed that the privilege of the House to take a recess was exhausted by the first motion and that the second motion was dilatory. Randall astounded his opponents, many of his party, and all of the New York newspaper correspondents by sustaining Hale's point of order. Randall based his ruling on the Electoral Act and the Constitution in the following words:

The chair is unable to classify it in any other way than dilatory. Therefore, he rules that when the Constitution of the United States directs anything to be done, or when a law under the Constitution of the United States, enacted in obedience thereto, directs any act by this House, it is not in order to make any motion to obstruct or impede the injunction of the Constitution and the laws. 61

Why this seeming about-face on the part of Randall? From that day to the end of the session he worked rather steadily

59 Ibid., February 24, 1877.
60 House Journal, February 24, 1877.
61 Congressional Record, February 24, 1877.
and strenuously to complete the count. There were some stretches of time during the last two days when it seemed that Randall was hesitating, or losing courage or perhaps just catching his breath. Occasionally, by his rulings and speeches, especially after the Poppleton resolution was introduced on March 1, it looked as though Randall were playing both sides and possibly was purposely postponing the completion of the count until the dramatic last moment.

The legislative day of March 1 continued until 4:10 A.M. on March 2. Randall's activities during this last session reveal some indecision of mind. Ten months later Burke of New Orleans brought out a rumor to the effect that in the early part of the evening of March 1, Randall sent word to Conkling to canvass the Senate and report who would be chosen President pro-tempore of the Senate if he, Randall, would prevent the completion of the count. Burke claimed that only when Randall was informed that the objectionable Morton of Indiana would be chosen, did Randall decide to complete the count.62 Also early in the same evening Levy, a Democratic Congressman from Louisiana, appeared on the floor of the House, told Randall of the successful results of the Wormley conference held on February 26, and then turned to address the members of the House, telling them that they had:

62 Times, January 29, 1878.
... truthful assurances from prominent members of the Republican party, high in the confidence of Mr. Hayes, that in the event of his elevation to the Presidency he will be guided by a policy of conciliation toward the Southern States, that he will not use the Federal authority or the Army to force upon those states governments not of their choice, but in the case of these states [Louisiana and South Carolina] will leave their own people to settle the matter peaceably of themselves.63

Some time after midnight Randall received a telegram from Tilden sanctioning the completion of the count.64 Mills made his final attempt to delay by offering an amendment to the objection made to the counting of the vote of Wisconsin. Randall refused to recognize Mills, the House acted on the Wisconsin objections and at 4:00 A.M. the Senate filed in for the closing scene.

Many factors probably entered into Randall's about face during the last week. It is impossible to believe that he was speaking the whole truth when he told Tom Reed that "it was an inspiration from God." 65 The New York Times suggested that Randall became aware of the fact that some of his personal enemies within his own party were using his partisan rulings as a means to discredit him with the public and his party.66 Randall's conference with Conkling also possibly influenced his change. Randall probably had some concern for the anarchy, bloodshed, and business instability that would follow the

63 Congressional Record, March 1, 1877; Fuller, 202.
64 Eckenrode, 230.
65 Thomas B. Reed in "Saturday Evening Post," December 9, 1899.
66 Times, February 26, 1877.
failure to choose a president, yet he did not reveal such concern until his closing speech on March 3. Randall and his party were continuously reminded by the press that the Democratic party had been largely responsible for passing the Electoral Act with only 14 Democrats in the House and Senate combined voting against the law, and Randall himself going out of his way to be put on record as favoring the act. Randall's past legislative career had been associated with the struggle to restore to the South their pre-rebellion rights as citizens. The successful termination of the Wormley and other conferences gave him strong assurances that the South would receive fair treatment at the hands of Hayes. A strong deciding factor was the decision of the Democratic caucuses of February 17, 19, and 23. In most matters Randall was willing to follow the dictates of the caucus.

Randall's actions during the hectic month of February 1877 are surely very puzzling on the surface. As it became increasingly clear that the Electoral Commission was going to decide each case in favor of Hayes, Randall showed the natural animosity of one who feels that he has been cheated. His rulings which permitted the House to take continued recesses were merely stalling on his part, marking time while waiting for something to happen. As the original filibusterers ceased their antics, a new group interested in forcing some concessions for the South appeared. Randall was at least conscious
of this movement; was in sympathy with it and may have been working in closest harmony with its leaders. During the last week and especially after Levy's announcement to the House that assurances had been received from Hayes, Randall worked to complete the count. His largest single reason for this may have been the knowledge that his Southern friends had been provided for, hence why stall any longer? Thus an explanation of Randall's course will not be complete without a thorough analysis of this supposed bargain between Hayes and some Southern leaders.

In December 1876 a group of responsible Southern citizens approached Garfield, asking him to sound out Governor Hayes to learn his probable course in the handling of Southern affairs, if the Electoral dispute were decided in his favor. Garfield passed on the request by writing Hayes in the following vein:

. . . This morning I received a letter from Judge Williams of Michigan, one of our sensible members of the House which I enclose to you. The gent. to whom he refers, I find to be Gen'l Casey Young, who stands well with the Southern members. I do not quite believe there are so many Southern men as he supposes in the temper indicated but if a third of the number would come out in behalf of peace, and acquiesce in your election it would do much to prevent immediate trouble, and would make your future work much easier. Just what sort of assurance the Southern members want, is not quite clear; but I have no doubt it would be possible to adopt a line of conduct which would be of great help to them, which would be consistent with the best interests of the country and with justice to our party.

Let me say, I do not think anybody should be custodian of your policy and purposes at present, or have any power to commit or embarrass you in any way,
but it would be a great help if in some discreet way those southern men who are dissatisfied with Tilden and his more violent followers could know that the South was going to be treated with kind consideration by you. . . .67

Hayes dispatched a prompt reply to Garfield as follows:

I am exceedingly obliged for your letter. Your views are so nearly the same as mine that I need not say a word. I am wholly uncommitted on purposes and policies except as my published letter and other public utterances show. There is nothing private. The war feeling has no hold in Ohio worth a moment's consideration. The lawful result will be received as it should be. I am overwhelmed with letters and other affairs so excuse this crusty note.68

The passage of events in February caused such negotiations to be speeded up. Louisiana in particular was concerned over the question of whether Hayes would recognize the Nicholls government or continue to support the Kellogg faction. A Democratic committee worker from Louisiana named Burke appeared in Washington to force the recognition of the Nicholls group. As early as Friday, February 16, he had a conference with Matthews, who was a brother-in-law of Hayes. A preliminary agreement was reached and a memorandum of the points guaranteed was delivered to Matthews the next day.69 Early Sunday morning Burke called on Hewitt and explained that Louisiana could not wait until 1880 when the Democratic party might be vindicated in the election. Hewitt was sympathetic and said that he would see his

67 Garfield Mss., Garfield to Hayes, December 13, 1876; both in letter-book and original which had been returned.
68 Ibid., Hayes to Garfield, December 16, 1876.
associates to see what could be done. Burke then spent the next week conferring with Republicans such as Matthews, Foster, and Dennison, who claimed to have a monopoly on Hayes' ear. Burke himself also worked to organize a filibuster again among the Democrats and estimated that their number rose from 41 to 116 during the next week.70

In the Democratic caucus of February 19, Springer of Illinois suggested that riders be attached to each remaining appropriation bill to force President Grant to recognize the Nicholls government in Louisiana and the Hampton government in South Carolina.71 This suggestion was put in the form of a resolution in the House with an attempt being made to pass it under a suspension of the rules, but without success. February 26, a famous conference was held at the Wormley Hotel, with John Sherman, Garfield, Charles Foster, ex-Governor Dennison of Ohio, Stanley Matthews, Congressmen Ellis, Levy and Watter-son present.72 This conference had been preceded by two meetings at the Capitol, one in a House committee room with Foster, John Young Brown, and Senator John B. Gordon present; the other in a Senate committee room with E. A. Burke, Sherman, Matthews, and Dennison present.73 The next day a remarkable series of telegrams passed between Governor Nicholls and his

70 Ibid., 971.
71 Times, February 20, 1877.
72 House Document 31, 45th Congress, 3rd Session, 976.
73 Eckenrode, 217.
agents Burke, Ellis and Levy in Washington. An examination of these wires reveals what took place at the conference:

F. T. Nicholls to E. A. Burke

Will Hampton-Nicholls resolution be called up tomorrow. Was it by party vote that rules were not suspended? Answer quick.\(^{74}\)

E. A. Burke to Gov. Nicholls

On reading over dispatches I see that I have not clearly explained that the recent strength of filibusters is a spasmodic movement organized to save Louisiana and South Carolina and largely composed of members who allow us to use them for purpose securing substantial assurance for our state, but who cannot be held together for any other purpose. The movement was organized by ourselves independent of the original opponents of the count and after the party was helplessly demoralized. Our leaders have no defined policy, and we have prospect of anarchy - some other Republican - or a new election under Republican auspices. On the other hand the substance of safety for our state. The Nicholls and Hampton resolution at present is the shadow only.\(^{75}\)

Burke, Ellis and Levy to Gov. Nicholls

We have been one week organizing a force to compel guarantees with Sherman, Matthews, Dennison, Garfield and Foster. We assure peace order, protection of the law to white and blacks; no persecution for past political conduct; no immunity for crime. On the other hand by gradual process such methods as result in your full possession of the government by withdrawal of troops, no-interference, revocation of military orders.

As to Senate so close, party lines so drawn, their

\(^{74}\) Chandler Mss., February 27, 1877.

\(^{75}\) Ibid., February 27, 1877; The above citations as well as the two following are in the form of typewritten copies, obviously typed long after the year 1877, possibly even as late as the 20th century. They are copies of telegrams possibly given to Chandler at the time and since recopied by Chandler or some person in charge of his papers.
friends believe if Kellogg and a Democrat present credentials March 4, great danger of Kellogg being seated. Could we agree as part of this arrangement to let long term Senatorship remain vacant now, and call extra session about March 10 to elect, and provided the vote on admission of long term Senator be deferred until the extra session could elect. Our leading Senators assure us Kellogg's admission can be prevented until extra session of legislature can elect. This arrangement would not prevent immediate selection of Eustis or short term Senator. There may be favorable action by the President immediately, Gibson sick.76

Burke, Ellis and Levy to Gov. Nicholls
Washington, February 28, 1877
We have the authorized statement of the President concerning military orders, in writing and confirmed by the President to four different parties. We have the guarantees of Sherman, Dennison, Matthews, Garfield and Foster confirming the agreement as submitted to caucus, which, with action caucus committed to writing, copies exchanged and satisfactory, with written assurance from Hayes that he is correctly represented by his friends here Foster and Matthews, from whom we have written guarantees. Gibson recovered.77

Thus we may safely conclude that notwithstanding the Potter Investigation of 1878, such a bargain did exist. What is more, some of the Northern leaders such as Hewitt were willing to help a filibuster until the bargain had been sealed and Tilden had agreed to it as the one shred that might be saved from the fire.78 It seems incredible that such negotiations could be going on right under Randall's nose without him being conscious of the same. His share in the proceedings can only be seen by inference, but his early friendliness with the

76 Ibid., February 27, 1877.
77 Ibid., February 28, 1877.
78 H. E. Fuller, op. cit., 201.
filibusterers, his change of heart and his final struggle to complete the count all coincide with the development of the negotiations which culminated in the Wormley conference.

Re-election as Speaker of the Forty-Fifth and Forty-Sixth Congresses

Randall's course of action in the closing days of the Forty-Fourth Congress was generally applauded except by the more stubborn of the filibusterers. After a month in Philadelphia he returned to his Washington home, to perfect his plans for re-election as Speaker of the next Congress. Again his most pressing and difficult problem consisted of ranging the entire delegation of Pennsylvania Democrats back of him in his effort. During April he worried about Stenger but "felt he would come around if left to his own conclusions." He was "sure of Heilty, Bridges, Wright, Clymer, Turney and Maish." 79 Francis D. Collins of Scranton was the most difficult individual to handle. Randall had Wright work on him but without much success. 80 He later found an explanation of such stubbornness in the fact that Collins and Robert Mackey had been friends at Harrisburg. 81 Randall continually complained of the combination of B. F. Keyers, Senator Wallace and Bob Mackey which worked against him. 82 Other opposition he considered temporary and

79 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, April 11, 1877.
80 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, April 22, 1877.
81 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, May 13, 1877.
82 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, May 13, 1877.
due to personal peevishness but the Wallace opposition was rooted deeply in the struggle for absolute control.

Randall's rivals for the caucus nomination were again Cox of New York, Salyer of Ohio, Morrison of Illinois and, in the final days of the canvass Blackburne of Kentucky and Goode of Virginia. None of these men had any outstanding support, their manipulations being concerned with the problem of uniting on one of their number as an opponent for Randall. However they soon discovered that they were unable to transfer their support.83 In May, Cox and Salyer, both damaged their chances somewhat by supporting G. H. Butler as special agent for the Post-Office department. Since this individual had a notoriously corrupt reputation, Chauncey Black was able to refer to Butler's backers as the "two suicides," an appellation which the press of the country soon exploited.84 Randall counselled Black to

\[\ldots\] strike back at Morrison - I believe his intellectual weakness is the true assault. He is a man of integrity - but an imbecile in a legislative body - Kerr & he promised us a reform in Tariff & he was made Chr. of W. & M. to accomplish this result. He could not be taught or learn the details of Moore's tariff, was afraid to ever allow its discussion either in House of Com because his utter incompetency would have been plain to all. He knows & feels this. \ldots \]85

Returning to Philadelphia in July, Randall took steps to

83 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, April 22, 1877.
84 The Nation, May 10, 1877; Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, May 13, 1877.
85 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, May 13, 1877.
get partial control of The Commonwealth, a Philadelphia newspaper which was on the point of suspending publication. The surprising aspect of the scheme was that Colonel Pelton, Tilden's famous nephew, was to furnish the cash for the gradual purchasing of the newspaper. 86 Some hitch in the deal held up the proposed purchase but by November the paper was publishing again with Colonel Pelton backing it. 87 The only support which caused Randall serious embarrassment was again that of Colonel Tom Scott and the Texas-Pacific Company. The Pennsylvania Democrats, in their September convention had decided against all subsidies, which meant that if Randall were true to the expressed wish of his own state, he would lose the support of some Southern states such as Louisiana. 88 Randall's own explanation of the reason for such Texas-Pacific support is interesting:

If everybody in Texas & Pacific are for me - then they are so without promises of any sort. I learn - Jay Gould, Huntingdon - Sidney Dillon and Tom Scott are all for me - how these different interests are reconciled I do not conceive but we will talk this point when we meet in Philada. One thing is certain they are all of opinion I am sure to win & I think that controls or forces their action or non-action. 89

... It is not true that I ever authorized any one to communicate to Col. S. a ray of hope - that I would give the least support or countenance to his

86 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 28, 1877.
87 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 1, 1877; Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, November 18, 1877.
88 Record, September 12, 1877.
89 Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, May 13, 1877.
subsidy. In conversation with persons who I sup-
posed came from him or would at least communicate
back to him I have said - that in no event - could
I vote for his subsidy - but I did not propose if
I was Speaker to use the great power of the office
for or against any legislation - by undue exercise
of the rules. I could not, as you know for we have
discussed together this point, afford to be unfair
nor unjust in the chair.

I stand to-day where I have stood for fourteen
years. I have never had the corporation collar
about my neck and I have over & over again been
overcome by their direction. I have never been and
am not now & never will be their willing, persuaded
or interested toll Few men in Penn. have received
more hard knocks from this power and its minions
than I have and few have been more steady in biting
back - in season and out of season - than I have
tried to be. No shadow in future will be cast upon
my past record. And why should I now compromise
with a crippled power and lean upon their broken
staff? It is difficult to ascribe motives - when
we do not know source of action. So in this case,
but I have met the unfriendly inference as directly
as I was capable of - I once lost speakership - be-
cause I could not compete with the modes adopted of
reaching its attainment - I can afford to lose it
again but I will never forfeit my views grounded in
principles.

In addition I ought to relate to you that I
have never seen Mr. S. but twice since adjournment
and then Texas & Pacific was not mentioned.

On the Tuesday or Wednesday after the strikes
commenced I met Ald. McMullen in the West Philada
Depot, he asked me to go up to see Col. S. I took
it for granted Col. S. wanted to see me and had
asked him to do as he did. I believe so yet. I ac-
cepted because I supposed him in trouble & to refuse
would indicate an indifference to the trouble then
existing. I soon found why I was wanted - After
usual salutations & further conversation generally
as to strikes. Col. S. asked me to write or tele-
graph "President" Hayes to call out by proclamation
a further force. Mr. S. Mr. Felton followed in same
strain at first moment - I abruptly & pointed said -
I could not & would not do so. In the after part of
the same day I was in his office to learn what was
taking place in other parts of the country.

With these two visits - my sight of Mrs. S.
ended, nor have I seen him since - nor had I seen him before then since February when he was in Washington - when he called on me. . . .

By September Randall was growing more confident with more good reports of his prospects rolling in every day. He wrote Black that:

Let the matter of the Times go - it is too late - The South is coming up with vim - I learn from authentic source - I will receive every vote in Alabama. All as I supposed in West Va. Maryland five out of six & so throughout - I have nothing like a drawback. . . .

Cox is besotted. It is charitable to think so. I do not fear Sayler - He may be the residuary of all the opposition but the judgment of the members is against his promotion - for various reasons. At present all looks well Tucker has broken down Va. & Southern candidate scheme by his letters in reply - to letters sent him & by his personal conversation.

I am glad Gibson is to be in New York I wish he & you would come on to Lancaster & meet me there.91

Since the Forty-Fourth Congress had adjourned without passing the Army and Navy Appropriation Act for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1877, President Hayes was forced to call a special session. He deferred this until October 15, possibly with the idea that his southern policies would be better appreciated by then.92 The Democratic Speakership caucus was called for October 13.93 Some support soon appeared for Blackburn of Kentucky as well as Goode of Virginia. A rumor floated about town that Hayes would prefer to have a

90 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 14, 1877.
91 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, September 11, 1877.
92 C. R. Williams, The Life of Rutherford Birchard Hayes (Boston, 1914), 11, 114.
93 World, October 4, 1877.
Southerner as Speaker as an additional indication that the North was ready to bury the hatchet. On October 8 the preliminary roll of the House was made up by the clerk, reading 152 Democrats, 139 Republicans, and 2 disputed districts, thus giving the Democrats a majority of 13. From October 8 to 12 various attempts were made to rally all of Randall's opponents around some southerner, preferably Goode; Cox, especially, working hard to defeat Randall. These attempts were unsuccessful so that even a day or two before the caucus both the New York World and Times were prediction Randall's nomination on the first ballot. When the caucus met, Randall was nominated immediately by a vote of Randall 107, Goode 24 and Salyer 12. The spirit of the caucus was fine, showing very little hostility. The New York press generally admitted Randall's personal power, his parliamentary skill, and the general confidence of the country in him due to his completion of the count. The World made the pertinent observation that the issues of the coming session were not as yet clear, hence the need of a man who could control the House.

Randall's re-election as Speaker of the Forty-Sixth Congress in March 1879 was quite different from his "walk over the field" in the Forty-Fifth Congress. Congress had adjourned

94 Times, October 8, 1877.
95 World, October 13, 1877; Times, October 13, 1877.
96 The Nation, October 18, 1877; World, October 15, 1877; Times, October 14, 1877.
on March 4, 1879 without passing two major Appropriation bills, due to the Republican Senate's refusal to repeal the federal election laws, etc. Hayes immediately called a special session to meet on March 18. This precipitated a mad scramble for the speakership, even in the Republican party. The new House would have 139 new members, of whom 20 would be Greenbackers. At the moment, approximately 10 of the Democratic members were sick at home, while some of the new Democratic members were at home in the far west not expecting such a sudden call for a special session. For a while there was a serious possibility that the Republicans might unite with the Greenbackers and, due to Democratic absences, elect Garfield as Speaker. This hope was dashed by all the Democratic members making a strenuous effort to arrive on time and by Garfield's refusal to make a bargain with the Greenbackers.

In the Democratic party Randall had a real fight on his hands to defeat Blackburn of Kentucky. Randall's lobby support had deserted him due to his anti-subsidy record during the Forty-Fifth Congress. Blackburn's residence in the South cut into Randall's usual Southern support. Randall had been beaten by Senator Wallace of Pennsylvania in his attempt to control the Pennsylvania Democratic convention of the previous year, hence he could not count on the solid support of his own State. He appealed to Black to help him by his presence in Washington and by having The Sun, The Lancaster Intelligencer,
The Charleston News and The Pittsburgh Post speak a good word for him. Randall supplied Black with a brief of the points which he thought ought to be stressed in such a newspaper campaign:

1. Impropriety of change in view of 1880's contest which is to be sectional.
2. Against thought of Hings triumphing over my record.
3. No occasion to drag Presidential contest into this struggle. . .

Before the heat of the scramble both candidates took a trip to New York over the week-end of March 8 and 9. Randall was announced as a speaker at the Manhattan Club, yet refrained from speaking and spent most of his time at Gramercy Park with Tilden. Randall returned to Washington on March 13 and set up his headquarters at the National, in an unfashionable part of town, but very near the railroad station, whence it would be possible to collect a large share of the 139 new members when they got to town. Blackburn set up his headquarters at the Willard and soon had them filled with Southern men. Randall's chief workers were the important committeemen of the preceding Congress such as Atkins, Heagan, Sigleton, Stephens, and Wood. By March 14 each leader had set up an auxiliary headquarters in his opponent's hotel. By March 16 the Randall

97 Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, March 6, 1879.
98 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, March 7, 1879.
99 Times, March 8, 1879; World, March 15, 1879, reprinted from the Utica Herald.
100 World, March 13, 1879.
101 Ibid., March 13, 1879.
men felt secure; they announced that they had 87 pledged members and possibly 94. Wood smiled derisively under the corners of his white mustache when Blackburn's election was mentioned as a possibility. They made no bones about announcing that "The result had been effectually secured by arrangements quite outside of the caucus." 102

The Democratic caucus met on March 17 with 144 present. This represented all but 3 of the Democratic membership of the House. The three candidates Cox, Randall and Blackburn did not vote, hence 71 would be necessary to a choice. The ballot was secret which was no help to Blackburn as timid new members could thus vote to maintain the group then in power, without seeming to be false to their campaign speeches. 103 On the first ballot Randall was nominated by a vote of Randall 75, Blackburn 57, Cox 4, McMahon 2, and Morrison 2. 104 However, due to the very scant Democratic majority in the House the final result was still in doubt until the next day when Congress met. On the first roll call Randall received 143, Garfield 125 and scattering 14. Since this was one less than the required 144, it appeared to be a deadlock, but O'Reilley arrived from New York on the noon train and cast his vote for Randall thus giving him the required total and insuring the

102 Ibid., March 17, 1879.
103 Record, March 18, 1879.
104 World, March 18, 1879; Ibid., March 19, 1879; Hayes Diary, Edited by H. B. Williams, III, 529.
Democrats of the privilege of organizing the House to co-operate with a Senate which now was also Democratic. 105

Committee Appointments

Randall announced his committee appointments for the Forty-Fifth Congress on October 29, 1877. He had waited some days before making known his selections, until it became clear whether the special session would continue on into the regular session. 106 His committee list as announced showed the following chairmen: Ways and Means, Wood; Appropriations, Atkins; Banking and Currency, Buckner; Interstate Commerce, Reagan; Public Lands, Morrision; Pacific R. R., Potter; Judiciary, Knott. Salyer and Stephens were the Democratic members serving on the Rules committee with Randall. 107 One historian of the House particularly commends the team of Wood and Atkins, pointing out that Atkins was bold, ready, independent, and sometimes impudent, while Wood was ably equipped for the heavy political work of finance, with his sardonic intellect and immunity against formal censure by anybody. 108 This list of committees included many of the original Kerr appointees as chairmen with the very notable exception of Ways and Means. Here Kerr had jumped Morrision a Free Trader, over the head of Wood a semi-protectionist. Randall now restored Wood to his

105 World, October 11, 1877.
106 Times, October 30, 1877.
107 Times, October 30, 1877; World, October 30, 1877; Nation, November 1, 1877; Alexander, 240.
108 Alexander, 130.
expected heritage and sent Morrison to the Committee on Public lands. Some of these appointments seemed to show revenge. Sunset Cox, with 16 years experience was reduced from Chairman of Banking and Currency to the Library Committee and the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Cox declined to serve as did Mills who was given a minor assignment. Ellis of Louisiana, was cut down from the Chairmanship of the Mississippi Levees, which he held in the last Congress and one of his colleagues, Robertson, a new member, whose seat was being contested, was given the place. Ex-Governor Walker of Virginia who had been chairman of Education and Labor, was deprived of his chairmanship in order to make a place for his colleague Goode, who was one of Randall's competitors for the Speakership.\textsuperscript{109}

The entire Appropriations committee was composed of men who were solidly in favor of retrenchment and economy. Banking and Currency was about evenly balanced with a leaning to defer the resumption of specie payment; Buckner of Missouri, its chairman may have been put on to conciliate the South and Southwest on soft money.\textsuperscript{110} The \textit{Times} ranted a great deal at the large number of Southern chairmen.\textsuperscript{111} It was obvious to all who knew the personnel of the House that Randall's two pet interests, economy and protection, were carefully provided for by these committees. Some 40 disgruntled Democrats led a

\textsuperscript{109} Record, October 30, 1877.
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}, October 30, 1877.
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Times}, October 30, 1877.
movement to force a re-organization of the committees. This could be done under House rule 64 which gave the House the right to organize its committees at any time and in any manner it may see fit. Such a movement would require the support of nearly all the Republicans. Enticements in the form of larger Republican membership on the larger committees, were offered to the opposition, but the proposition was declined since the Republican leaders doubted whether there were 40 Democrats who would actually enter into the proposed scheme.\textsuperscript{112}

A number of factors went to complicate Randall's problem of committee appointments for the Forty-Sixth Congress. He obviously had to draw up his list in a hurry without the opportunity of spending the summer months in acquiring information about the desires, tastes and abilities of the new members. The special session had been called on two weeks' notice and brought with it a total of 139 new members, many of whom were entirely new faces, inexperienced and untried material for important positions.\textsuperscript{113} The party was about to enter a "do-or-die" struggle with the President and strong party men were needed for the battle. Randall's re-election as Speaker had been effected by "arrangements quite outside the caucus" which was construed as meaning bargains with individual members.\textsuperscript{114} The old committee chairmen had worked effectively

\textsuperscript{112} Record, November 6, 1877.
\textsuperscript{113} Times, April 12, 1879.
\textsuperscript{114} World, April 12, 1879.
for their leader's nomination and would have to be rewarded. Rumors continued to float about that Randall was attempting to organize a House that would be favorable to the renomination of Tilden. His occasional trips to Gramercy Park would tend to substantiate that rumor. Randall still felt the need to protect the interests of his Pennsylvania constituents and wished to continue his excellent work of economy and retrenchment.

The committees were announced on April 11, 1879, with the World condemning them bitterly, especially the re-appointment of Wood. The Times was sorry that Randall had such poor material from which to pick. Yet this slate has some admirable points. Ways and Means was made especially strong by the addition of Tucker, Morrison, Mills and Carlisle. Tucker was an outstanding member from Virginia; Morrison and Mills were leaders of the first rank, while Carlisle was the coming young Democrat of the House, later to be Speaker. Appropriations also was strong with Atkins retaining the chairmanship, ably assisted by Blackburn; Cox, the perennial rival of Randall, was given charge of Foreign Affairs; Goode on Education and Labor, and Springer on Elections, completed the list of major chairmen. The Republican membership on Ways and Means was very able with Garfield, Frye, Kelley, Conger of Iowa and Dunnell of Minnesota.115

115 Ibid., April 12, 1879; Times, April 12, 1879; Congressional Directory, 1st Session, 46th Congress.
These committees show that Randall by now realized that he must use the talent within his party, regardless of whether it might be possessed by those who strongly disagreed with him. Ways and Means was filled with men of this type, then Wood was retained as chairman "to sit on the lid" and serve as floor leader. The chairmanships of the 52 committees was evenly divided between the North and the South even though the North possessed only one major committee chairman, that of Ways and Means.

Randall's Connection with Legislation

The Texas-Pacific subsidy continued to bother Randall in the Forty-Fifth Congress. He had originally appointed Clarkson N. Potter of New York, as the chairman of the important Pacific R. R. committee, but Potter soon resigned due to his connections with some small railroad interests in Pennsylvania, which were connected with Tom Scott's system. This left Throckmorton of Texas, an inveterate supporter of the Texas-Pacific as the probable chairman, much to the pleasure of Tom Scott.\(^{116}\) Such an arrangement would damage Randall's reputation with those who opposed the subsidy, hence he considered appointing first Hewitt, then Alexander Stephens, to supercede Throckmorton.\(^{117}\) The seniority rules of the House would prevent this, but the situation was critical. Randall admitted

\(^{116}\) Record, November 19, 1877.
\(^{117}\) Ibid., November 21, and 30, 1877.
to Black that he was having trouble with Texas and Pacific but hoped to come out right in the end. Stephens warned Randall that if he had any aspirations for the future, he had better not meddle in the matter but allow the committee to decide for itself as to who should be chairman. Randall followed this advice and allowed the committee to choose Throckmorton. During the session this committee voted uniformly 7-6 in favor of the interests of Tom Scott, yet it was never very active in pressing his pet scheme.

During the week preceding January 28, 1878 there were a series of hearings before the sub-committee of the Pacific R.R. committee, with testimony by Governor Brown and by Tom Scott. Affairs seemed to be progressing in favor of the subsidy when suddenly, on January 28, the House passed the Baker Anti-Subsidy resolution by a vote of 174-85. The next day the House passed a resolution directing the Speaker to enforce rigidly the rule preventing all persons, except those so privileged under the rules, from the floor of the House. Randall served notice that all cards of admission then held by individuals would be revoked and hereafter none would be admitted except those entitled to the privilege. This rule operated to bar from the floor of the House many jobbers and lobbyists,

118 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, November 21, 1877.
119 Record, November 20, 1877.
120 Times, January 29, 1878; World, January 29, 1878.
121 House Journal, January 28, 1878.
122 Times, January 30, 1878.
but was far from absolute in its operation since former Congressmen were allowed floor privileges under the rules and most of the lobbyists were retired Congressmen. This rule was enforced rigidly at least temporarily.\(^{123}\) On March 2 the House Pacific R. R. committee voted 7-6 to report favorably the bill for the Texas-Pacific subsidy. At the time this decision excited little interest or fear since it was clear that because of the large number of other committees which would report, this bill would not get very far during that session.\(^{124}\)

Ever since the passage of the Resumption Act by the "lame-duck" session of the Forty-Third Congress, repeal of this act had been fomented as a party policy of the Democrats. In the fall elections and party conventions of 1877 repeal of resumption had been generally endorsed.\(^{125}\) The Democratic House was thus echoing the beliefs of its supporters when on October 31, 1877 it went on record as favoring repeal of resumption by vote of 135-116. This vote showed a defection of 21 Democrats against repeal which was more than made up by 29 Republican votes. Randall allowed this resolution to be put to a vote and a similar one the next day which reduced the repeal majority to 8.\(^{126}\) Repeal of resumption had not been made a strictly caucus proposition yet was considered a party policy. On

\(^{123}\) Ibid., January 30, 1878.
\(^{124}\) Ibid., March 5, 1878.
\(^{125}\) Williams, op. cit., 114.
\(^{126}\) World, November 1 and 2, 1877.
November 15, 1877, Randall refused to leave town to visit Black "because the resumption bill is to be voted on, and it will never do for me to be out of my seat on such an occasion." 127 The final vote was postponed until November 23, when the House passed the repeal by a vote of 133-120. 128 The Repeal bill then remained in the hands of the Senate Finance committee without receiving much attention until after the passage of the Bland-Allison Silver Act in February 1878, but finally was allowed to die in committee.

Early in the special session of the Forty-Fifth Congress Randall revealed his willingness to have the House consider proposed free-silver legislation. He had used his office to prevent consideration of such legislation during the short session of the Forty-Fourth Congress but seems to have co-operated with Bland in the passage of the new Bland bill which was precipitated into the House in a very suspicious fashion. On November 5, 1877, Bland moved to suspend the rules and pass his bill which was lying on the Speaker's table. This motion which involved a currency question was being offered by Bland as chairman of the committee on Mines. Randall entertained this motion which operated so as to preclude any amendment or debate. When put to a vote the motion received the surprising vote of 163-34, thus passing the bill. 129 The suspicious fea-

127 Black Mss., Randall to Black, November 15, 1877.
128 House Journal, November 23, 1877; Times, November 24, 1877; World, November 24, 1877.
129 House Journal, November 5, 1877.
ture of the whole affair was that this was allowed to come before a special session which had been called for appropriation and not for general purposes. It was put on a day when there were 94 members absent, the absentees being mostly from Eastern states where elections were being held. There were 5 absent from Massachusetts, 24 from New York, all of the Connecticut delegation, 4 from New Jersey, 20 from Pennsylvania and all of the Maryland group but one. These absentees came from states which, due to their financial, propertied interests, had shown the greatest opposition to free silver. Bland had framed various copies of this bill which varied only in minor details with the result that when the bill was considered, a bill which did not have the exact number as that which Bland called for was passed. The whole affair could not have been put through in such fashion without Randall's closest co-operation.

Randall's co-operation also was necessary to the launching of the Potter investigation, because of parliamentary technicalities involved. A memorial passed by the Maryland legislature, under the guidance of Montgomery Blair, called for an investigation of President Hayes' title to office. Agitation for such action gradually came to the boiling point

130 Times, November 6, 1877; World, November 6, 1877; Williams, II, 115.
131 World, November 12, 1877.
132 World, January 9, 1878; Williams, II, 146.
during the months of March and April, 1878, aided by some Republicans such as Conkling and W. E. Chandler who were not satisfied with the way Hayes was treating them.

On May 3, 1878 a meeting of the Joint Democratic Caucus committee was held with Randall among those present. The committee was unanimous in favor of some investigation but disagreed as to its scope, some wishing to confine it to Florida alone. Over the week-end of May 5, Randall was at home in Philadelphia, probably making plans for the coming state Democratic convention. On May 7 the World explained that no steps were taken by the House since the Democrats doubted their ability to get the necessary two-thirds vote for suspension of the rules. Therefore it would have to be introduced as a question of privilege which would require the Speaker's consent. At another meeting of the Joint Democratic committee on May 9, it was decided to have the Judiciary committee present a resolution calling for an investigation limited to Florida and Louisiana. That same day Randall was reported as in conference with Finley, Williams and Davidson as to the best way to proceed. The Democratic members of the Judiciary committee declined to take the job. The irreconcilables then turned to Williams who said that he would present a reso-

133 *World*, May 4, 1878.
olution from the sub-committee based on Florida alone. Randall was not satisfied with the form of the resolution. May 11 found another meeting of the Joint Committee held with all present including Randall. The members of the committee were pledged to secrecy, yet the rumor was persistent that the only obstacle now was the problem of drawing up the resolution in such a form that Randall would be able to admit it as a question of privilege, which could be supported by a simple majority vote.

The resolution was finally introduced as a question of privilege on May 13, by Potter instead of Williams, due to the former’s debating ability. It was based on the Maryland memorial and included both Florida and Louisiana as well as mentioning both Governor Noyes and Secretary Sherman. Randall read a carefully prepared ruling from manuscript sustaining Potter’s claim of privilege. Conger appealed this ruling, which appeal was laid on the table by a vote of 128-108 with Ben Butler voting with the Democrats. When the motion was put to the House the Republicans refused to vote, hence the necessary quorum of 146 was lacking with the total vote standing at 116-1. Garfield was thankful that the Republicans could forget their personal feelings towards Hayes and rally to his defense. He

137 Ibid., May 11, 1878; Times, May 11, 1878.
138 Times, May 13, 1878.
139 Congressional Record, May 13, 1878; World, May 14, 1878; Times, May 14, 1878; Williams, II, 150.
felt that this resolution more than any one thing helped to reunite the conflicting elements within his party. The New York Times, however, felt that the resolution in its final form was a defeat for Blair, Judge Black, and Tilden; and felt constrained to complement the Democrats on the fact that the investigation had been limited to Florida and Louisiana. The deadlock between the parties held until May 17, when the resolution passed by a vote of 145-2. In the interim both parties held caucuses, with the Democrats revealing some ill feeling because a caucus had not been called before so as to prepare for the vote.

On May 19, Randall left to attend the Pennsylvania Democratic convention, and had Salyer read the list of members whom he had chosen for the investigation. The list included seven Democrats and four Republicans and was praised by the Times as a very fair group, but one of Hayes' biographers does not like the membership of the committee as selected by Randall. On May 22, while Randall was away, the House became over-exuberant and, by viva voce vote, authorized the Potter committee to investigate all fraud connected with the whole election. After Randall had returned, the House, on

141 Times, May 14, 1878.
142 House Journal, May 17, 1878.
143 Times, May 15, 1878; World, May 15, 1878.
144 Williams, II, 157.
June 14, passed the Burchard resolution which aimed to remedy this rash step and stated that no Congress had the right to amend the action of the Forty-Fourth Congress in regard to the election of 1876. 146

Randall's action throughout the whole affair seems to have been centered about an attempt to restrain the limits of the investigations to cases where actual fraud might be proved, and then to use such proof as ammunition in the election of 1880. His supposed trip to New York on April 29 is significant of this tendency. The resolution was worded so as to suit him and to allow his ruling it a privileged one. While he was away at the Pennsylvania Democratic convention, a fatal step was taken in extending the scope of the investigation. However, there seems to be abundant evidence to the effect that the whole thing was forced on the Democrats by the anti-Hayes men who were disgruntled because of his Southern policy, which robbed them of a corrupt means of livelihood. Senator Conkling certainly had a finger in the pie, probably because of his patronage quarrel with Hayes. W. H. Smith, speaking in 1883, recalled a conversation with Hayes in which the President gave it as his opinion that:

Most of the Democratic party did not want a row when the Potter commission was gotten up. Potter himself was reluctant to serve on the committee. That was forced on the Democrats by Conkling and Butler. A

146 Ibid., June 14, 1878.
meeting was held at the latter's house to which Democrats had been invited. Conkling promised such developments as would compel Hayes to flee the White House within ninety days. 147

The short session of the Forty-Fifth Congress and the following special session of the Forty-Sixth were largely taken up with the attempts of the Democrats to repeal the juror's test oath, the "posse comitatus" clause in the general statutes, and to prevent the illegal use of federal supervisors and marshalls in elections. In the short session a Republican Senate refused to acquiesce, while in the special session, President Hayes stood on guard with an endless succession of vetoes which forced virtual surrender by the Democrats.

Randall's share in this whole struggle was important because of his position as Speaker. However, Randall cannot be considered as one of the real leaders in this fight. Garfield, in private correspondence, referred to it all as "Thurman's Program." 148 Garfield as the leader of the Republican opposition to this repeal should know just who was his main antagonist. Randall was really the party wheel-horse in facilitating the desires of the Democrats. The meagre results of the long struggle gave a distinct check to Randall's personal philosophy of the House of Representatives as the counterpart of the English House of Commons. The loss of prestige which he suffered as a result of his party's partial failure had a

147 Hayes, Diary, 484.
148 Garfield MSS., Garfield to Hinsdale, May 20, 1879.
real effect upon his political future. Success in this at-
tempt to repeal the election laws, etc., would have given Ran-
dall, Thurman and Fernando Wood added political lustre. As it
was, Garfield's sterling struggle against huge odds, as well
as the excellent personal advice which he gave to President
Hayes brought him national prominence which was rewarded by
the Republican Nomination for President in 1880.

**General Characteristics as Speaker**

Randall did not hesitate to use the powers of his office
to defeat or shelve legislation which he strongly disapproved.
His careful choice of committees was preliminary caution in
such matters. His use of the Speaker's right of recognition
was nearly as arbitrary as Speaker Cannon two decades later.
He particularly used such powers to prevent any "unwise" tar-
iff legislation and to side-track any proposed wasteful extra-
vagance. Strange to say Randall was really rather proud of
his share in the developing of stringent House rules to pre-
vent action. Buckalew, speaking in Congress after Randall's
death, explained Randall's political beliefs as follows:

> He held with Mr. Madison that of all the branches of
government in a free country the legislative is the
most liable to an abuse of its powers and requires
the strongest limitations. Possessing the power to
make laws, it is stronger than the executive or the
judiciary, charged with the subordinate and secondary
duty of expounding, applying and enforcing those
laws; its members standing free from constitutional
impeachment, and the two Houses from their very con-
stitution, being peculiarly liable to hasty, passion-
ate, impulsive influences, and little fitted to re-
sist them, it follows that there should be strong
curbs upon their action besides the executive check
of the veto provided for by the Constitution. These
were the matured views announced by Mr. Madison in
his later writings. It is not my business at pres-
ent to argue this proposition or to defend it, but
to state it as the ground of Mr. Randall's position
upon so-called obstructive rules, which he assisted
to form and uphold, and in the utility and necessity
of which he firmly believed.149

Unfriendly press representatives saw such a course of ob-
struction purely as a do-nothing policy dictated by a despot.
The Washington Post, tiring of such inaction, published a
ringing editorial as follows:

'Wanted a Leader'
A mediocrity of purest water himself, with cunning,
craft and low methods, instead of culture, intellect
and high purpose, what wonder that he used the power
of his great position not to subserve the public in-
terests but only his personal prejudices and private
purposes. A man without either ideas or ideals, with-
out scholarship or refinement, without principles or
convictions, without any fixed purpose save that of
success in holding public place, what wonder that
Speaker Randall organized the House precisely as he
would have organized the ward politicians of the city
council of Philadelphia, the school of his political
training, upon the basis of rewarding his friends and
punishing his enemies.150

On May 1, 1877 William M. Singerley became the owner and
manager of the Philadelphia Record. This paper then had a
rapid increase in total circulation as a reward for presenting
complete political and business news in a very interesting
fashion. Singerley generally followed a course antagonistic

149 Congressional Record, June 14, 1890.
150 Record, January 17, 1878, quoting Washington Post of
January 16, 1878.
to Randall, especially to the Randall elements in city and state politics. Occasionally the Record handed out bouquets of praise for Randall but more often than not it revealed an impatience with his lack of positive leadership. Singerley wanted to stir up a crusade to lead the Democratic party into the glory of extensive political reforms, thus could only condemn the general policy which he called "Samrandallism". February 18, 1879, one of Singerley's correspondents described "Samrandallism" as follows:

It is a movement without any other program other than opposition to Republicans. It allows the party members to be on both sides of tariff, subsidy, monopoly, banking, etc. . . . It is the cause of the dwindling Democratic majority in the House. It does not represent statesmanship. . . . Speaker Blaine was partially responsible for raising Randall to the Speakership by his friendship to Randall during the Force Bill Filibuster. . . . The House is organized to do nothing. . . . The supremacy of the Appropriations committee over Ways and Means is unnatural.151

After the collapse of the Democratic claims to vindication in the Potter investigation, and after the comparative failure to make good the Democratic promises in the matter of repealing the test oath and elections laws, Randall turned to the approaching election of 1880 as a chance to retrieve his party's and his own prestige. As will be shown in a later chapter he worked during the later weeks of 1879 and the early months of 1880 to bring about Tilden's nomination. He really neglected his work as Speaker while he wrote hundreds of let-

151 Ibid., February 18, 1879.
ters to Democratic leaders all over the country and commuted 3 or 4 times a month to New York for conferences with Tilden. In order to have freedom for such activities Randall organized the House to do nothing but pass the necessary appropriation bills. Financial or tariff legislation was ruled out. This may have been politically wise since it would not give the Republicans any legislation to pick to pieces, but it was deadening and demoralizing to the spirit of his party.

The various historians of the House of Representatives usually place Randall in the select class of great Speakers along with Henry Clay, Robert Winthrop, James G. Blaine and Tom Reed. He belongs in such a group not for any positive powers of leadership, but because he increased the powers and prestige of his office; he aimed consciously for power by changes in the rules; he taught the House that it should control appropriations; he continued the tradition of Colfax and Blaine that the Speaker should be a party instrument and not an impartial moderator, and finally because, as Tom Reed said:

Perhaps there may have been better parliamentarians, men of broader intellect and more learning, but there have been few men with a will more like iron or a courage more unfltering.153

152 Ibid., January 20, 1880.
153 Thomas B. Reed in "Saturday Evening Post," December 9, 1899.
CHAPTER SIX

RANDALL AND THE RULES

William A. Robinson in his biography of Thomas B. Reed, has painted a picture of a political giant whose success in Congress was largely the result of supreme parliamentary skill based on a thorough knowledge of the rules. Reed's lightning brain, his adeptness at supplying penetrating phrases and his limitless energy completed his equipment. Such a description could be rather accurately applied to "Sam" Randall except that he did not possess the superb intellect of Reed. In his knowledge and use of the rules, Randall was in the same class with Reed. In fact Randall may be considered one of Reed's earliest instructors in parliamentary procedure, since Randall was Speaker when Reed first entered the House.

Randall was placed on the Rules committee of the Forty-Third Congress by Speaker Blaine in December 1873. Except for his "resignation of protest" in February 1875, he remained on the Rules committee continuously until his death in 1890. Membership on the committee was always a recognition of party leadership but came to be even more so as the committee grew in power during the span of Randall's political life. Randall's use of the rules during the Forty-Third Congress to obstruct legislation had been referred to at great length. He
seized the opportunity to lead the uninitiated members of the majority party into a perfect labyrinth of parliamentary snares during the conduct of his filibusters. While he was in the minority he had little desire to change these complex rules which had grown out of numerous excerpts and revisions of Jefferson's Manual.

During his first service on the Rules committee, Randall's positive contributions to the proposed rule changes were few and rather insignificant. January 15, 1874, he reported a rule from the committee on Rules which vested appointment and removal of Official Reporters in the Speaker, and required the Official Reporters to furnish a list of "the memorials, petitions and other papers with their reference each day presented under the rule." This last clause would tend to give more publicity to petitions instead of having them silently dropped on the Speaker's table, notice of them never to appear in the record unless a member gave a slip to such effect to the Official Reporter.¹ This rule was guided through by Randall and adopted. It should be kept in mind since as Speaker, Randall followed a directly opposite course. On May 8, 1874, Randall reported from the Rules committee an amendment to change Rules 128 and 129 so that Friday only would be given to private bills, not Friday and Saturday. This was adopted with but little discussion.²

¹ Congressional Record, January 15, 1874.
² Ibid., May 8, 1874.
tion offered and had referred to the Rules committee a resolution calling on the committee on Rules to inquire into the expediency of so amending House Rule 130 as to dispense with the call of States for resolutions during the first hour on Mondays.3

On December 17, 1875, after the Democrats had come to power in the House, the Lawrence Anti-Rider resolution was passed, by which the majority foreswore the practice of foisting general legislation on appropriation bills.4 The Democratic press praised this as a beautiful example of self-denial in the interests of honest legislation. A month later a new clause which received the name of the "Holman Amendment" was added to House Rule 120. Under the guise of economy and retrenchment this new clause made any amendment to an appropriation bill in order provided that the effect of the amendment would be to lessen expenditures.5 Of course, this rule could and did work to invalidate the Lawrence Anti-rider resolution. Since Randall at the time was on the Rules committee and also Chairman of Appropriations, it is fair to suppose that he may have been largely instrumental in the adoption of this rule. Randall saw to it that this amendment was retained by the rules revision of 1880, and used it so extensively in the Forty-Eighth Congress that it was repealed by the Forty-
Ninth Congress over his protest.

As Speaker, Randall left a very definite imprint on the Rules of the House. One of the earliest students of the history of the House has described Randall as:

... aiming directly at increasing the influence of the Speakership and making it a governing power. This purpose he carried out systematically; he first brought about a change in the rules, and then by his administration of these rules greatly increased the authority of the chair. ... [He] appears to be the first Speaker who aimed directly at power through alteration of the rules.6

There are some powers of the Speaker which are inherent in the office. Such powers have not been put there by rule of the House but have grown up as the result of the Speaker's exercising certain powers which were not expressly forbidden to them. A timid Speaker seldom contributes to the total of such custom. More often the House itself seizes some of these rights to suit its purposes. In the nineties, Tom Reed reached out and decided that he would not tolerate dilatory motions or the disappearing quorum. The Republican House of the Fifty-First Congress sustained him in this action and later made these rulings an integral part of the Rules of the House. Yet at the time that Reed handed down these rulings, he was exercising the prerogative of his office as his powerful mind conceived such prerogative. Randall refused to entertain dilatory motions while completing the electoral count of 1877, but

6 Follet, op. cit., 111-112.
he did so because the Electoral Act was mandatory on the subject. In the Forty-Fifth and Forty-Sixth Congresses, although he may have recognized the viciousness of such motions, he did not use the Speaker's prerogative to rule them out of order. Randall's rise to leadership in the House had been facilitated by his skilful use of just such dilatory tactics. He could not break away from a confirmed course of action with such suddenness. Randall's attitude towards the disappearing quorum was shown on January 28, 1880, when Tucker of Virginia offered an amendment to the rules compelling the Speaker to declare a quorum present if a sufficient number of members was really present in the House, regardless of whether they answered the roll. Randall and many of his cohorts merely laughed at Tucker; let him argue for a while, and then moved on to other business with no action taken.7

Randall added to the prerogative of his office in two ways. His first addition provided a new and convenient method of introducing petitions to the House. Previously some considerable time had been wasted in the House by members rising merely to read by title, a multitude of petitions. The "gag-rule" had been used a half century before to keep John Quincy Adams from using all of the time of the House in reading petitions on slavery. This rule had since lapsed and the old evil returned in a different form. Randall ruled that such peti-

7 Congressional Record, January, 28, 1880.
tions might be dropped into the petition box without being immediately reported to the House, thus reversing his action of January 1874. Separate committees could then examine such petitions and report bills based on them to the House. This would facilitate legislation yet had the bad feature that it kept the House and the public in the dark as to what business was being considered by individual committees. From a party standpoint it was excellent, since bills might be precipitated on an unsuspecting House and rushed through before the opposition could get organized.

Randall's other contribution to the Speaker's prerogative was concerned with the right of recognition. His expansion of this right took varied directions. First, it should be noted that he refused to entertain an appeal from the House as to the way he exercised this right. Before Randall there were six times in the history of the House when a Speaker referred an appeal from his recognition to the House for decision. Since Randall's time no Speaker has done so. Randall's refusal to entertain such an appeal occurred on February 28, 1881, when Robeson tried to appeal Randall's decision. His ruling was that

... there is no power in the House itself to appeal from the recognition of the chair. The right

8 Ibid., April 16, 1879.
9 Asher C. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States (Washington, 1907), II, 920.
of recognition is just as absolute in the chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law. 10

Another variation of the right of recognition appeared in Randall's decision that it was not compulsory on the Speaker to recognize for the motion to suspend the rules. 11 Randall introduced the practice of recognizing committee chairmen in preference to individuals. This was protested as liable to bring about the complete domination of the House by committees. Randall's reply was to the effect that if the House was not satisfied with his recognition practice it might vote down the motions made by these committee chairmen to suspend the rules. 12

In order to relieve the Speaker of some of the difficulties of recognition various Speakers had adopted the habit of keeping a list at hand during debate. This list would be made up beforehand by the leaders of both parties. In the first few months of 1879 this practice was severely criticized. Randall gave much thought to it and even suggested that members be recognized by states, with the delegation of each state selecting the member to speak for the state. 13 The matter was referred to the Rules committee for study. On April 8, 1879, Garfield made the committee's report to the House.

10 Congressional Record, February 28, 1881; Hinds, II, 918.
12 Follet, 255; Congressional Record, February 16, 1880.
13 Follet, 267; Congressional Record, April 9, 1879.
stating that the practice of a Speaker's list was necessary, although he suggested that the Speaker should not be bound entirely by the order of the names but should use his discretion.\textsuperscript{14} The result was a rather complete victory for Bandall's claims and use of the "list." Protest against this practice was only spasmodic after the report of the Rules committee.

Randall was instrumental in increasing the power of the Rules committee. Previous to 1876 the Rules committee met in the first days of each new Congress, made a report which possibly included a few recommendations for changes then usually met no more throughout the sessions of that Congress. In the spring of 1876 Randall asked and received permission for the Rules committee to report during the closing days of the session upon questions relating to the currency.\textsuperscript{15} At the time Randall was not Speaker but was a member of the Rules committee. When the Rules committee made their report of recommended changes in December, 1879, the request was made to make the Rules committee a standing committee. This was sanctioned by the House in February 1880. Such a change might not have been very important except for the fact that "Speaker Randall added greatly to its prestige, by holding that all propositions to change the rules in order to be agreed to by a majority vote

\textsuperscript{14} Congressional Record, April 8, 1879.  
\textsuperscript{15} Alexander, 193.
must be referred to it and that it might report at any time upon matters relating to the rules." Students of Congressional history of the 80's and 90's will appreciate the power of this privilege to report at any time. This was the weapon used by Reed and Morrison to break Randall's power over appropriations in the 80's. It was used again by Reed to facilitate his reforms of 1890. The importance of the Rules committee was destined to grow from the moment that Randall accorded it such a privilege.

Before the Rules committee made its report to the first session of the Forty-Sixth Congress, agitation for a complete reform of the rules had broken out. The rumor was about that Blackburn, a member of the Rules committee was playing with the idea of splitting up the work of the Appropriations committee among the general committees. Since all of Randall's efforts for the preceding decade had been to prevent just such a movement, he asked Garfield and Frye to meet him at his home at 9:30 on Tuesday morning April 8. On April 9, the Rules committee made its report increasing the membership of Ways and Means, Appropriations, Commerce, Judiciary, and Elections committees. The Blackburn rumor did not appear, but instead a very surprising recommendation that henceforth a three-quarters vote would be necessary to suspend the rules and pass

16 Ibid., 196.
17 World, April 9, 1879.
18 Garfield Mss., Randall to Garfield, April 7, 1879.
an appropriation bill. This would seriously hamper the Commerce committee and its friends in passing the Rivers and Harbors bill. The grabbing element rose up in revolt against this recommendation and forced the House to adopt another clause to Rule 79 which gave the Commerce committee the right to report at any time. Later in the day the same privilege was granted to Ways and Means, Banking and Currency, and Coinage committees. Randall was helpless to prevent all these changes although they were contrary to his desires.

The experience of the House with new Rule 79 was anything but stimulating as shown by the passage of the Rivers and Harbors bill during the next month. The result was the largest Rivers and Harbors bill to date. Opinion had changed sufficiently to permit Blackburn on June 25, to introduce a resolution for the Rules committee to sit during the summer for a complete revision of the existing rules. This resolution passed the House without serious opposition.

The Rules committee which met in August 1879 at Long Branch, New Jersey was a rather brilliant group. Garfield was just at the height of his political, personal, and intellectual prestige. He had just finished fighting the Democratic attempts to force the repeal of the elections laws, etc. As the floor leader of his party in the House he had shown surprising

19 Congressional Record, April 9, 1879.
20 Ibid., April 9, 1879.
qualities of real leadership. W. P. Frye, the other Republican member represented the district adjacent to that of Tom Reed in Maine. He was just completing his last term in the House before being "promoted" to the Senate for long years of service. Randall had appointed him to the committee because he was chairman of the Republican caucus. Blackburn, one of Randall's outstanding rivals for the speakership, was a brilliant young leader from Kentucky. Alexander Stephens was nearing the end of his long service in the various legislative and executive capacities for nation, confederacy and state. His body was wracked by disease, but his advice was of great value to Randall and the other members of the committee. Randall as chairman completed the group.

August 3, Randall wrote to Garfield:

Do not fail to be at West End Hotel Long Branch - August 11th to meet committee on Rules. Mrs. Randall Mrs Frye & Miss Blackburn will be there, Why not bring Mrs. Garfield - This would be outside of committee's expenses.

Upon his arrival at Long Branch Randall sent Chauncey Black a short note reporting their preliminary progress:

I arrived as above - with Mrs. Randall all well - Our committee is without Republican representation but we proceeded yesterday organized and at that meeting and to-day we have made excellent progress. Subject however to the approval hereafter of our Republican colleagues. I send you a letter from Philada to Cincinnati Commercial, which is a cur-

22 Garfield Mss., Randall to [missing], March 30, 1879.
23 Ibid., Randall to Garfield, August 3, 1879.
ioesity as a species of systematic lying I thought I would amuse you with it. I received it here. Make every arrangement to come down with Mr. Hensel on Tuesday after our return from here.24

General good feeling prevailed at the sessions of the committee which lasted from August 12 to August 18. All politics were laid aside while this capable group worked rapidly and in good humor to condense and codify the rules.25 These "reformers" early adopted the policy that their report would contain only those items which they could support unanimously.26 The task which they faced was really tremendous. The House rules at this time numbered 166. 63 of these rules had been adopted prior to 1800; 30 of them were absolutely obsolete. 34 standing committees were provided for with 8 additional standing committees on departmental accounts.27 "Necessities of parties, the whims of Speakers, contradictory decisions, the practice of the House, the requirements of the occasion, uncertain and doubtful language - all these have contributed to make a body of rules calculated better than anything else to disturb the legislator and to obstruct legislation; a body so full of intricacies and secrets that only the most skillful and trained anatomist could by any possibility dissect it and reveal them." 28

26 Ibid., II, 694.
27 House Journal, 46th Congress, 1st Session.
28 Congressional Record, January 22, 1880, speech of W.P. Frye.
The committee made its report on December 19, 1879, when it was made a special order for the Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union for January 6, 1880. This report condensed the number of rules down to 45, with rules 1-24 being concerned with the main functions of the House. 12 old rules were retained intact. 132 of the old rules were condensed into 33 new rules. All the rules were subdivided into clauses and arranged with logical relation to their main subject headings. One writer has briefly evaluated their work with the following description:

The revisors of 1880 were not reformers. They tactfully avoided the abolition of disreputable tactics such as "riders" on appropriation bills and the "disappearing quorum." They simply sought to foster order, accuracy, uniformity and economy of time and experience has justified their recommendations; but by shunning "riders" and the "disappearing quorum," they left the real red-light district undisturbed.

The order of business was changed so as to do away with filibustering in the morning hour. The new order called for a daily call of all committees, all of whose business, except that to which no objection was made to its immediate consideration, was to go to the committee of the Whole House, whether public or private, and to be placed on a House Calendar composed only of bills not making appropriations of money. Busi-

29 House Reports, 46th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions; Report No. 24, Vol. I.
30 Idem.
31 Idem.
32 Alexander, 195.
ness on the Speaker's table was to follow, immediately, the finishing of unfinished business which was pending at the last adjournment, instead of being first in order after the reading of the journal. The old order had resulted in excessive haggling over business on the Speaker's table, thus consuming the morning hour and preventing new business. All business when referred to the committee of the Whole or placed on the calendar was to be placed on an absolute equality regardless of the committee reporting it, with the exception of Ways and Means, Appropriations, Elections, Printing and Accounts, which committees could report at any time.33

Alexander has briefly summarized the other significant changes as follows:

This revision centered in an effort to economize time as well as to simplify the practice. It stopped voting after the second call of the roll; it dropped the penalty system of absenteeism without leave; and it authorized the clerk to announce pairs instead of the members. It abolished the practice of changing a few words in a bill to make it germane as an amendment; it caused a motion to reconsider, made during the last six days of a session, to be disposed of at the time; . . . it gave preference to revenue and appropriation bills in Committee of the Whole; it required bills on the private calendar to be taken up and disposed of in order; and it provided that the previous question should bring the House to an immediate vote upon a single motion, a series of allowable motions, or upon an amendment or amendments, the effect being to carry the bill to its engrossment and third reading and then, on a renewal of the motion to its passage or rejection. To afford the amplest opportunity to test the sense of the House as to whether or not

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33 Ibid., 194; House Report No. 24, op. cit.
the bill was in the exact form it desired, it authorized a motion, pending the passage of the bill to re-commit it with or without instructions.34

The machinery for economy, which had been old House Rule 120, reappeared in this report as Rule 21, clause 3, although Garfield, in an article in the *North American Review* for June 1879 had condemned the "Holman Amendment." 35 The wording of this new rule was a word for word reproduction of the old rule. An attempt was made to avoid the evil effects of old Rule 79 which had been amended for the benefit of the Commerce committee. The report carried in Rule 11, clause 7, a provision which would allow the Commerce committee to draw up the Rivers and Harbors bill, but it would then have to be referred to the committee on Appropriations which would revise it and then report it to the House. This was obviously another attempt to control this "Treasury Grab" which was on the way to become a national disgrace.

Discussion of the report of the Rules committee had been made a special order for January 6, 1880. 36 Consideration of the report was postponed to the next day since Garfield and Frye of the committee were absent on January 6. 37 General debate on the proposed rules occupied a considerable portion of the time of the House for the next two weeks. During this

34 Alexander, 194-95.
36 See note 29, above.
37 Congressional Record, January 6, 1880.
period antagonism was expressed, chiefly, to Rule 11 which centered control of all appropriations with that committee. The members of the Rules committee were called upon to face the growing resentment of the Commerce committee because of the clauses which would restrict the powers of that committee. 38 Randall took the floor on January 8, to fight for Rule 11. General debate was ended on January 22, with an admirable summary by W. P. Frye for the committee. 39 On January 27, the House, in Committee of the Whole began the separate adoption of the new rules. Rules 1-7, dealing largely with the duties and powers of various House officials such as Speaker, clerk, sergeant-at-arms, were adopted with a very few minor changes. 40 On January 29, Rules 9 and 10 were agreed to but final adoption of Rule 11 was held up. Various amendments were offered which would again decentralize control of appropriations. Randall, Blackburn, and Garfield all rushed to the defense of their rule. 41 On February 2 Reagan proposed to amend Rule 11, clause 7 so as to give the Commerce committee the power to report the Rivers and Harbors bill separately. This was adopted by vote of 110-40, which really reinstated much of old Rule 79. 42 Later the Agricultural committee was given the same

38 World, January 15, 1880.
39 Congressional Record, January 22, 1880.
40 House Journal, January 27, 1880.
41 Congressional Record, January 29, 1880.
42 House Journal, February 2, 1880.
privilege of reporting appropriation bills. These two committees were the only exceptions to the complete centralized control of Appropriations, yet to a certain extent they represent a defeat of Randall's ideas.

All other rules except Rule 21 were adopted as the report had recommended. An amendment was added to clause 3 of this rule which defined retrenchment in terms of persons' salaries and compensations. Clause 6 was added to the same rule making it compulsory for the yeas and nays to be taken and recorded in the journal upon all general revenue and appropriation bills. The Rivers and Harbors bill was included in this last category.43

This reform of the rules was Randall's greatest constructive contribution during his speakership. The report was drawn up by a Rules committee which had been chosen by Randall. The meetings of the committee had been under his direct supervision. The work was so handled that all the members of the committee were willing to fight for each item of the report in debate with the House. At crucial moments Randall left the chair to bring his sharp, high-pitched voice to bear on the struggle. True, part of the report was cut out by Reagan and the Commerce committee, yet the new rules for the Forty-Sixth Congress were not cluttered up with obsolete excerpts from Jefferson's Manual. The new rules provided basic machinery

43 Ibid., 46th Congress, 2nd Session.
for legislative procedure in a House of Representatives which spoke as the voice of an electorate of 50 millions of people. The old rules, founded on Jefferson's Manual, did quite well for an 18th century House representing a population of three million. Final judgment will probably record that this orderly condensation of the tangled accumulation of a century of growth was a great help to Speaker Reed in 1890. Reed's problem of felling the tall timber of obstruction would have been much more difficult if Randall had not cleared out the underbrush before him.

When the Rules committee became a standing committee, and when Randall ruled that it might have leave to report at any time, the machinery was set up which could make the committee a powerful, positive, legislative weapon as well as an engine of repression. Tom Reed was one of the first to sense the new possibilities during the Forty-Seventh Congress. Reed was able to dominate Speaker Kiefer and Robeson, his fellow Republican members of the Rules committee, on questions of parliamentary procedure. Randall had two bitter experiences with his own brain-child as developed by Reed. On May 29, 1882, Randall tried to stage a filibuster to prevent consideration of the disputed election case of Mackey vs. O'Connor, but ran up against Reed who managed to bring in a new rule from the committee on Rules which prevented just such actions.44 Randall's problem of felling the tall timber of obstruction would have been much more difficult if Randall had not cleared out the underbrush before him.

44 Congressional Record, May 29, 1882.
dall and Hewitt submitted a written protest against such a change but without success.\textsuperscript{45} Again, during the last days of the Forty-Seventh Congress, Randall was a member of the Conference committee on the Kelley Tariff and found that, because of one of these special Reed rules, the House members of the Conference committee were empowered to agree to any changes in the bill which would raise the tariff rates, but could not so agree if the changes would lower any items.\textsuperscript{46}

After the return of the Democrats to power in the House in December 1883, Randall and Reed continued their parliamentary duel over the rules. The scales were now reversed since Randall wielded the power of a near-dictator during the Forty-Eighth Congress. Reed's biographer has provided an excellent analysis of Randall's strategic position:

Randall, who headed the Appropriations Committee was still a power to be reckoned with. Not only was he an able debater, a master of parliamentary tactics and an inspiring party leader, but the committee on Appropriations, under existing rules, held tremendous legislative power. By controlling in large measure, the distribution of public funds, it frequently held the power of political life or death over the individual member. Under the "Holman Amendment" it could attach legislation to appropriation bills, often the only method of securing passage for needed measures.\textsuperscript{47}

The adoption of the rules for the Forty-Eighth Congress was twice postponed for periods of 20 days each. Finally on

\textsuperscript{45} Record, May 30, 1882.
\textsuperscript{46} Congressional Record, February 24, 1883; House Journal, February 27, 1883.
\textsuperscript{47} William A. Robinson, \textit{Thomas B. Reed} (New York, 1930), 103.
February 4, 1884 "Randall, on behalf of the Committee on Rules, moved the adoption of the rules of the Forty-Sixth Congress, thus getting rid of the innovations established by the Forty-Seventh, citing in particular the amendment to Rule XVI under which filibustering in election cases had been effectually suppressed." 48 Reed immediately offered a series of amendments which were designed to speed up the business of the House. From the Democratic side Reed received the support of Roger Q. Mills of Texas who stressed the fact that "after you get beyond the boundary of tariff legislation and appropriation bills and great measures of that class, all other measures before this House come under the head of unanimous-consent legislation." 49 Bland of Missouri also complained that the House never legislated except on the privileged reports from such committees as those on Appropriations, Rules, or Ways and Means. 50

Randall opposed all the "Reed Amendments" but especially that which called for a morning hour of exactly 60 minutes. He felt that it would not facilitate legislation since, as Reed had already remarked, "this conduit had been plugged by restricting the use of the period to the reporting of bills." 51

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48 Robinson, 107; Congressional Record, February 4, 1884.
49 Robinson, 111; Congressional Record, February 4, 1884.
50 Robinson, 111; Congressional Record, February 4, 1884.
51 Robinson, 111.
necessary expenditure as justification for not supporting the "Reed Amendments." 52 The House followed Randall's advice and voted Reed down by vote of 137-128. 53

Randall and Reed had another run-in on April 17 over the existing rules. Robinson had adequately described the dispute as follows:

An amendment to the pending bill facilitating the filing of pension claims was offered; and Randall declared it should come from the committee on Invalid Pensions as distinct legislation, and not from the Committee on Appropriations. In fact, the former committee had already reported a similar bill and the rules, as Reed pointed out, prevented an amendment to any measure provided a bill embracing substantially the same provision was pending. . . . The Rules, Reed declared, made legislation impossible except on appropriation bills, and then the chairman of Appropriations would not let this legislation be attached to such a bill. The rule prohibiting amendment while a bill of substantially the same effect was pending meant that amendments were restricted to matters of slight importance, as there were likely to be bills on the calendar dealing with matters of genuine public concern. . . . Reed added that there were 1200 reports of committees on the table and no business being done except by Mr. Randall's committee "yet he, even with the assistance of Mr. Holman, is not equal to the business of the country."

Randall replied that the rules were intended to prevent omnibus bills and save public money. Furthermore, he argued the country was legislated to death. "If there be one evil greater than another to-day in this country, it is that we have too much legislation." Reed did not attempt to refute the latter statement. 54

The rumblings of many grumblings against Randall within the Democratic party became more distinct after the inaugura-
tion of Cleveland. In addition to the fact that Randall's party was running away and leaving him stranded on the tariff issue, an appreciable number of Congressmen would no longer tolerate his Appropriations committee possessing such extreme power. As the **Washington Post** said, "Congress has too long consisted of the Senate and Sam Randall." 55 Randall, realizing that he was on the defensive, "published a series of articles and press interviews pointing out that jobbery, raids on the Treasury, waste, and lack of control of the executive departments would be the inevitable consequence of the proposed alterations." 56 One of Randall's supporters in the **Chicago Times** started the rumor that Cleveland and the two New York cabinet members did not want the rules changed as to the power of the Appropriations committee since it might lead to extravagance and also hurt Randall's feelings and thus widen the breach between the majority and minority wings of the Democratic party in the House. The article also claimed that Cleveland had been talking with Speaker Carlisle to that end. This so upset Congressman Springer of Illinois, that he sent the newspaper clipping of the rumor to Cleveland and asked him to authorize Colonel Lamont, his secretary, to issue a denial. 57

During the first week of the session, in December 1885,

55 *The Post [Washington]*, December 1, 1885, quoted in Robinson, 118.
57 *Cleveland Miss.*, Springer to Cleveland, November 28, 1885.
Randall fought out his battle with the members of the Rules committee, but with no luck. Reed worked with Carlisle and Morrison, possibly because the new rules then under consideration would satisfy some of his ideas. Hiscock, the other Republican member, agreed to the majority report when it was reported to the House on December 14, 1885. This proposed:

... to give additional committees on Foreign, Military, Naval and Indian Affairs, Post Offices & Post Roads power to report appropriation bills directly to the House with the same privileges as the Appropriations Committee, which it will be remembered, included that of reporting to the House at all times, and still greater, that of demanding consideration of their reports at such times as the committee itself might suggest. The committees on Agriculture and Rivers and Harbors, had already received similar powers.

The "Holman Amendment" was to be abandoned. In addition to distributing the appropriating power, the majority report provided a second "morning hour" for consideration of bills placed on the calendars by committee reports. Furthermore procedure in the committee of the whole was somewhat simplified.58

Randall presented a minority report in which he repeated his points previously made in his press interviews. He offered as evidence the astounding growth of the Rivers and Harbors appropriations since they had passed from the control of the Appropriations committee. He also repeated Reed's remarks in February 1880 in support of the centralized power of the Appropriations committee, to show Reed's inconsistency.59

Some Republicans such as McKinley and Joe Cannon, supported

58 Robinson, 119; *Congressional Record*, December 14, 1885.
59 Robinson, 119; *Congressional Record*, December 14, 1885.
Randall but the vote on December 18 showed Randall losing by 227-70. 60

During the debate on the new rules, Holman remarked that "It will not require the voice of a prophet, to foretell that you yourselves will in the end admit that a great and vital mistake was made." 61 During the second decade of the Twentieth century the handling of governmental financial legislation became so atrocious that real agitation appeared for some type of budgetary system. Such a bill was passed on May 27, 1921, setting up an independent bureau for the preparation of the estimates of the financial needs of the departments. 62 On June 1, 1920, while such a budget bill was under discussion the House revised its committee system so as to properly handle the annual budget when presented by the President. The new rule called for one single Appropriations committee to have entire jurisdiction in respect to appropriation proposals. 63 Such a rule was a return to the rules of 1880, and a vindication of Randall's claims of 1885.

Randall continued to be the Democratic oracle who was consulted by members of his party on questions involving interpretations of rules and procedure. His real power as a positive leader in the House was never as great as it had been

60 House Journal, December 18, 1885.
61 Quoted in Robinson, 121.
62 House Journal, May 27, 1921.
63 Congressional Record, June 1, 1920.
during the Forty-Eighth Congress. His activities during his last year of life were quite limited yet he continued to serve on both Rules and Appropriations. He was bedridden when Speaker Reed effected his dramatic changes in the rules in 1890. Even then Carlisle visited the ailing Randall, and together they planned resolutions and steps to counteract the revolutionary rules of Reed. Reed himself has been reported as admitting that the task of putting over his rules would have been much more difficult if "Sam" Randall had been present and in good health to lead the broken band of Democrats.
CHAPTER SEVEN

PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS AND THE ELECTION OF 1880

Randall's comparative victory over the Wallace forces in the speakership contest of October 1877 did not end the struggle between these two leaders of the Pennsylvania democracy. They crossed swords again at the Pittsburgh convention in May 1878, with Wallace carrying off the major share of the honors.

The difficulties of launching the Potter investigation and the demands of the speakership kept Randall in Washington until May 18, when he left for the convention. Upon arriving at Pittsburgh, Randall attempted to consolidate the various elements which were opposed to Dill, the Wallace candidate for governor. Randall approached his old friend Buckalew seeking to have him take over the permanent chairmanship of the convention but Buckalew refused. During the evening of May 21, a group of Pittsburgh serenaders "parading behind very bad music and making loud demands for Hopkins for Governor" serenaded Randall at the St. Charles Hotel. Randall responded with his hackneyed tirade against corporations, and also opposing private pipe lines. This last was an appeal for the support of Western Pennsylvania which was just then engaged in a fight

1 World, May 20, 1878.
2 Record, May 22, 1878.
3 Idem.
with private oil monopolies.

The next day in convention a big fight developed over the disputed seats in the Philadelphia delegation, between the Randall followers and a group whom Randall referred to as the "Sheriff's candidates." The convention went on to choose a temporary chairman without letting any of the claimants of disputed seats vote. This upset Randall's plans and resulted in Speer, a Wallace man, being chosen temporary chairman over W. L. Scott of Erie, Randall's choice, by a vote of 122-99. Later a committee to arbitrate the disputes among the Philadelphia delegation was chosen with the Randall men getting control of this committee under the two-fisted leadership of "Squire" McMullin. Such a compromise brought little satisfaction to either side; a week later Randall told Chauncey Black that, "I do not think that we will ever hear of Arbitration Committees again - Our friends ought not to have recanted on McGrath." Randall became so disgusted that he did not even attend the final session of the convention when Dill was nominated. Calls for Randall echoed through the hall after Dill's nomination but Randall was lunching at the Duquesne club with some leading Pittsburgh manufacturers at the time. In the final ballots such counties as York, Cumberland, Frank-

4 Black MSS., Randall to Black, May 29, 1878.
5 Record, May 23, 1878.
6 Idem.
7 Black MSS., Randall to Black, May 29, 1878.
8 World, May 24, 1878.
lin, Luzerne, even Lancaster left the Randall column in part or in whole. Thus Randall's only spoils from the Pittsburgh convention was the opportunity to stifle the growing power of a rival Democratic group in his home city.9

Randall reported as usual to Black with the following:

I agree with you Wallace has overdone his work and he feels it for he has gone into print into Baltimore Gazette and Clymer has been with me to-day specially from him - I have no fear whatever at home. I will be renominated and reelected - and will be vindicated - but a great injury has been done to our Party - in associating it with grasping and corrupt corporations - I shall do my full duty and my district will give its full majority to all candidates. The rest of the city will I fear go behind, on account of our inability to get justice at the polls - in November. The Sheriff's candidates in the Spring lost us - over 100 Judges of the election in Philada. I am in good trim and will be ready for another fight.10

Randall seldom experienced any trouble in being re-elected to Congress but the campaign of 1878 was an exception to this rule. He felt no real worry over the abuse that confronted him, but did have to overcome real difficulties. The Philadelphia Times went after him with all its guns during July. He felt particularly hurt since much of this came from Tayler, a man whom he had befriended many times.11 Randall's friends had excellent fortune in securing the Democratic nomination for Congress. Beltzhoover replaced Levi Maish in the 19th District.12 Levi Mackey was renominated in the 20th13 and W. H. 

9 Black Mss., Randall to Black, May 29, 1878.
10 Idem.
11 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, July 9, 1878.
12 Record, August 16, 1878.
13 Ibid., August 23, 1878.
Dimmick in the 15th.\textsuperscript{14} Randall's own renomination on September 11 was accomplished without opposition; McMullin acting as chairman of the convention\textsuperscript{15} and threatening to defeat all the Democratic nominees in the district unless Randall's election were first assured. Such an outcome was possible due to the facility with which votes could be traded back and forth with the Republican opposition.\textsuperscript{16}

The fight became strenuous enough so that Randall felt called upon to report to Chauncey Black that:

I am having a fight in my District - unequaled here-tofore. Mackey Leeds & Quay - are giving it their special care and they seem to have an unlimited supply of money. It is the old grudge they say. They are quite confident of beating me. Mackey says its sure. I think & know it is not sure - but I am straining every nerve. I cannot go away - from near home.

Wise must be elected as we need a Democratic vote from his district, especially do I need it. Boyle ought to have been the candidate. He is a man of character and capacity. Hensel is to spend a few days with me at end of this week.

I would delight to see the old home of Mr. Dan-sin who was ever my friend.\textsuperscript{17}

Randall's appearances in the campaign were limited to his speeches: the first in the 3rd Ward on October 16, where he expressed sympathy with the Greenback-Labor Party but thought them wrong on currency questions. "The road to prosperity is through economy."\textsuperscript{18} The second appearance was in the 5th

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., September 10, 1878.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., September 12, 1878.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., September 26, 1878.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Black Mass., Randall to C. F. Black, October 7, 1878.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Record, October 17, 1878.
\end{itemize}
Ward on October 17 where he returned to his abuse of the national banking system with its 2000 banks making a profit of $12,000,000 which should be put in the pockets of the public not the stockholders of the banks.\footnote{19}

On election day Randall defeated his Republican opponent Shedden by a vote of 10,525-7,892, carrying every ward in his district but the 5th.\footnote{20} Randall commented on the election in a note to Black on November 11 as follows:

\begin{quote}
You of course have heard of the result in my district. My opponents were absolutely audacious and desperate but I won - after great anxiety and unceasing labor - through true-tried and ever faithful friends - I am in fact the creature of friendship - surprizing in public life.

Write me all about yourself - & your family and your own & their movements. I am sad at Stenger's defeat.\footnote{21}
\end{quote}

Within less than a month Randall was busy laying plans to capture the state organization in 1879. He wanted James H. Hopkins of Pittsburgh to co-operate with Barr of the \textit{Pittsburgh Post} so as to consolidate opinion in that section of the state. Randall wrote Chauncey Black on the subject:

\begin{quote}
As to Post matter I am clearly in favor of Hopkins & Barr coming to-gether - for many reasons which I will explain when we meet - I think Hopkins you - Hensel & I can make a plan by which friendly alliance can come about. Hopkins has written me full particulars & I mean to answer his note to-day - asking him to come here. - I will try & have him here at same time with you & Hensel. Write me & fix a day. I
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{19} Ibid., October 18, 1878.
\item \footnote{20} Ibid., November 6, 1878.
\item \footnote{21} Black \textit{Mss.}, Randall to C. F. Black, November 11, 1878.
\end{itemize}
will write H & you write Hensel. 22

Barr was in communication with Tilden, promised to write Randall but had not as late as January 2, 1879. 23 Rumors of Tilden's influence and money in Pennsylvania politics continued to appear in the press during the early months of 1879. The *New York Times* carried an item on February 17 which charged that Tilden was working for the election of McMullin to the Common Council of Philadelphia, since Randall could not deliver the Philadelphia delegation for Tilden without the services of McMullin. 24 Randall's affairs in Philadelphia ward politics were mostly managed by McMullin and Albert Fletcher whom Randall had appointed Superintendent of the Document Room in the House. Fletcher had been shelved at the primary elections in January, hence McMullin's election was vital. The day was saved by McMullin's success by a 1200 majority. 25

As the Harrisburg convention approached various rumors spread about as to Randall's aspirations for Governor, Senator or even a cabinet position. He decided to unburden himself to Chauncey Black knowing that the statement of his purposes and ambitions would reach the proper ears:

The letter you sent and which I now return is strong and well put - and conclusive on National Affairs. I cannot be for Powell because I am for a friend Mr.

22 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, November 30, 1878.
23 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, January 2, 1879.
24 Times, February 17, 1879.
25 Idem.; Record, February 18, 1879.
Barr. - I have done all I could to dissuade him but failing in this I go with him. I may attend the Convention - Hopkins is not impaired for Governor - which does not come off for four years - or less. Believe our friends one & all - I am not a candidate for either office - named - I want my present position where I am capable (Excuse egotism) - and in addition happy. Another point - I cannot conceive any contingency in which I would accept a Cabinet position under Mr. Tilden or any other man as President. For some reasons - in part - as made me out of field for Senator - to wit - too many friends who have sustained & exalted me are looking in that direction. It would be selfish and unjust and I will never be in their way.

In all these matters I believe I realize the old Greek maxim - "Know thyself."

I return Mr. Ward's letter - he writes well - and is correct in all his views - Except I cannot see that Powell could or should deceive Wallace. The latter has been his friend.26

Black advised Randall not to go to the Harrisburg convention since his absence would make it possible for his friends to work quietly without rousing the opposition.27 Randall was agreeable but felt concerned that "some prudent friends should be on the ground," to take care of the platform especially. He wanted Hensel as state chairman if possible.28 Black asked him to come to York early in July but Randall declined by saying:

It will be impossible for me to go to York at the present time. I wish very much indeed that you & Mr. Hensel would come down to Berwyn (16½ miles from Philada on Penn. R.R.) and remain over night

27 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, May 31, 1879.
28 Ibid.
prior to your going to Harrisburg on the 16th inst. It is essential we meet prior to that time. I write in haste. Send me copy of resolutions.29

At the convention on July 16, Randall's lieutenants throughout the state were successful in getting Randall's ideas written into the platform pretty much as he and Black had edited them. Randall's friends under Major Vaux from the county of Philadelphia were not allowed to present their credentials as delegates. Vaux and Dallas Sanders led their cohorts out of the convention, thus starting a wide-open breach in the party in Philadelphia which did not heal for over a year.30

On July 27 Black wrote to Randall at his summer home in Berwyn, Pennsylvania, giving at length his views on the State chairmanship -- and suggesting Buckalew. Randall's reply showed a distinctly poor opinion of Buckalew for such an office:

Your suggestion as to Mr. Buckalew I don't agree to in full, as you present it. The Sentiment is good and will appear well on the surface, but the State has got to be carried by thorough and efficient organization. The result depends upon getting out the vote and if we succeed in bringing out a greater percentage of our vote than our opponents do we will carry the state.

Mr. White my Private Secretary is with me and informs me that the platform is universally commended. I have ordered two hundred copies to be printed upon slips, and I mean to send a copy to each Democratic member of the House and Senate. I think it the best

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29 Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, July 7, 1879.
30 Record, July 17, 1879.
campaign speech that could be made.

I have written to Mr. Coffroth as to the Chairmanship, informing him that Mr. Scott absolutely declines even to consider the proposition & quoting to him this language from Mr. Scott's letter "I had several communications from Major Barr. Hay and others in regard to the chairmanship of the State Committee, but it is utterly impossible for me to entertain the matter even if the Convention would have elected me." So your apprehensions in this respect may be put at rest. I have still urged upon Mr. Coffroth, Mr. Hensel; first Mr. Geo. W. Miller second, and Coffroth himself third. We must have a chairman who can aid in producing harmony in Philada. At present the bitterness is intense, and the great point must be to prevent any injury to Mr. Barr, our candidate in case there should be two Democratic tickets there, which from present appearances is most probable. Either of the gentlemen named would be serviceable in that connection. But as to Mr. Buckalew, he is inert, without energy - does not even answer his correspondence, and does not inspire anybody with whom he comes in contact with the least enthusiasm. Still if he should be made chairman, I will cordially cooperate with him, for we are on the best of terms and I should say to him if I had the opportunity precisely what I have here written, as I did say to him in 1872.

Hensel confirms your judgment about Buckalew, but I don't think he knows him as well as I do, as to his qualities in a contest.31

Later in the week Randall wrote to Hensel and Black asking them to visit him at Berwyn for a few days later in August after he had returned from Long Branch. He offered buck-board trips to historic spots and political conversation as enticements. In each of these letters he again praised the platform, and revealed that he was quite pleased with the selection of Miller, whom he had known in the State Senate in 1858-59, as State Chairman.32

31 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, August 1, 1879.
32 Ibid., Randall to W. U. Hensel, August 7, 1879.
The visit of Black and Hensel was postponed due to Mrs. Black's desire to take her family to Newport for a vacation trip. Randall expressed his chagrin at such a turn of events in a letter which also contained some political news as follows:

... I go to West Chester to-day - and to Norristown Tuesday - next - I sent Mr. Fletcher to Bucks to-day to see Ermentout as to their county convention & the delegates to next State convention. You see Franklin Co. is for Tilden. We want York & Lancaster united now and all is well. It is essential that I see you soon.33

A tentative date for the postponed visit was set for September 4, but Black telegraphed that he was unable to come as planned.34 Randall replied that:

... we feel inclined to swear - Hensel will arrive from Lancaster after his experience at our home is finished. ... All seems for Tilden in our State. Bucks I know is that way - all of which I had a hand in.35

After Hensel finished his visit at Berwyn, Randall sent Black another note of invitation:

Mr. Hensel left us yesterday - We had a happy visit - and devoted ourselves very little indeed to politics - You can come alone now - or if you can induce Mr. Hensel to come again we will be happy - I will then again speak - take up the corporation thought - and also accept issue as presented by New York Convention, which declares for bayonets - & bad juries - latter is now beyond their reach. Partizan war shots are justified. You must be at Carlisle. H. & I will be there.36

33 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, August 28, 1879.
34 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, September 4, 1879.
36 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, September 6, 1879.
Randall appeared at Norristown on Tuesday afternoon, September 2, for a speech, as he had told Black in his letter of August 28. This speech received some very favorable comment from leading Democrats, especially from Alexander Stephens who called it "a first-rate 'keen' speech." 37 Randall's speech was a justification of the recent efforts of the Democrats in Congress to repeal the elections laws. In the course of his talk he claimed that 750 marshalls were sworn in in Eastern Pennsylvania, most of them to influence the result in his own District. 38 Randall's only other public appearance during the fall of 1879 was at Pine Grove Park, Mechanicsburg, for the Cumberland county open-air mass-meeting. There he sat on the same platform with Senator Wallace, W. S. Stenger and W. U. Hensel, offering a very short speech when called upon. 39

The defeat of the Democrats in Ohio and the confusion in New York State greatly discouraged Randall. 40 The Democratic defeat in Pennsylvania in November was complete. Randall took occasion on November 9 to write Black a long letter, explaining away the defeat and pointing the course for the future:

Yours rec'd. I have a good deal to say in reply and will make brief mention of ideas and let you draw your own conclusions. The Barr's took campaign out of Mr. Miller's hands as was originally intended by

37 Tilden Mss., Alexander Stephens to Randall, September 11, 1879.
38 Record, September 3, 1879.
39 Ibid., September 29, 1879.
40 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, October 18, 1879.
I. C. Barr. Mr. Miller should be protected from censure. I did for him as I promised and he will protect you. I have a letter from him yesterday - in which he makes this statement. But it was not in power of men after Ohio result to carry our State. The majority in Philada comes out of division among leaders and rank & file. Our Democrats never will poll our vote until we are freed from present dishonest and [?] authority - The Extra Session did us harm and as you know - I always believed this, it is no surprize. The predominant course is hate towards the South - & injustice to many intelligent people - I ought to say - that this unjust apprehension is entertained sincerely by many not politicians.

The effort to make me responsible for Extra session would succeed except that my enemies - Wallace Thurman & Blackburn's friends - conceived it as a means to defeat me for reelection as Speaker.

I propose to stand still and wait. Mr. Tilden will have to soon speak and the situation is that we can do nothing without the Electoral vote of that State & Indiana Connecticut is & will be against us - New Jersey - not to be depended upon. Your idea of our own delegation is exactly my own. Our personal friends everywhere - to do this we can profit by action of our opponents in State & Union when they combined all shades against Tilden. The Intelligencer did a natural thing in hoisting Potter and it will do us harm. I fear Potter is not elected, however Mr. Dana's judgment is always worthy of consideration and generally he is correct but it is illogical to take a soldier and inveigh against Army use. Next House & Senate must stand against use of Army & U. S. Marshalls as heretofore - passing similar bills - for next fiscal year or those for this year - because South can not bear use of army & New York & Indiana cannot bear use of U. S. Marshals. I hope therefore there will be no yielding on them.

If however Hancock is general judgment I will throw no obstacle - as I am really & truly indifferent to all save success of our principles - being brought out in the administration of affairs.

Let me ask one favor of you. Do not lose sight of your Congressional District and secure the delegates - from all three counties to State convention I am looking after this & you can I think depend on
a majority one way in next national convention from Penn.

Truly

P.S. I gave a helping hand yesterday to "Sunday Mail" to be edited & published by you & Aydelotte. 41

In the above letter Randall blamed the Republican majority in Philadelphia to a division among the leaders and the rank and file of Democrats. Such an explanation of the existing condition is too charitable and simple. As far back as July 1879 a group of delegates from Philadelphia under Major Vaux, had walked out of the Harrisburg convention because Chairman Speer would not recognize their claims to representation. Major Vaux's followers can be explained only in terms of Tilden and Randall. It seems to be a plain case of Randall's inability to capture the existing Democratic machinery of the city of Philadelphia for Tilden; followed by the manufacturing of elaborate claims of another group supporting Tilden and claiming to represent "Philadelphia county." 42 The county had formerly been given some slight representation in the city organization, now it was claiming equal rights to representation. By such means Randall could control the Philadelphia delegation since he also controlled a few city wards as well as the "county" led by his lieutenant Major Vaux.

The Philadelphia Record attacked Randall continuously for this condition of affairs, actually definitely charging Ran-

41 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, November 9, 1879.
42 Record, November 3, 1879.
dall with the Democratic defeat in the city. This claim was somewhat substantiated by the statistics on the election, since in Randall's district which he had carried by 1747 in 1878, the Democratic ticket in 1879 received only 868 majority. McMullin seemed to be playing both sides, actually visiting Republican strong-holds on election day. On November 18, the Vaux "county" committee met to consider the question of its political future, with Vaux in the chair, Dallas Sanders and McMullin present, doing much talking. They decided to nominate a ticket for the coming "magistrates" election and went on record as regretting that they had not nominated a full ticket of their own at the last election. McMullin expressed an intention of visiting the "Regulars'" convention of the "McGowan" gang whenever it should next meet.

On December 2, 1879 McMullin's enthusiasm for Randall's cause led him into serious trouble. He led a group of his "loyal Democrats" in raids with drawn revolvers which broke up anti-Randall conventions in the 4th and 5th Wards. In the 5th Ward McMullin's toughs broke up a McAleer meeting which was held up over Hartman's Beer Saloon at 239 Locust Street. The doors were crashed in, many fists flew, and in the fracas Heilly, one of McMullin's own gang, was fatally shot. McMullin took shelter behind the police when the rumpus got too hot for

43 Ibid., October 1, 2, November 3, 5, 1879.
44 Ibid., November 19, 1879.
such an old man. Ryan, one of McAleer's henchmen, was charged with the murder but McMullin was indicted by the grand jury on charges of riot. Immediately District-Attorney Read proceeded to prosecute an old charge of murder against McGurk, which had been hanging fire for months. The Record claimed that such was done merely to give public opinion time to cool off before bringing McMullin to the bar. The "Squire" was tried on January 26 and 27, and found not guilty by the jury. It may be merely a coincidence but the name of District-Attorney Read appears more frequently in the future in the lists of those crusaders who are leading the fight for "Sam" Randall in city, state, and nation.

In the midst of this furor the Vaux county committee met again on January 18, 1880 and nominated 8 candidates for police magistrates, 6 in Randall's district and 2 outside. Randall demanded that these names be accepted as the regular nominees in his district. Election day on February 17 presented the spectacle of 23 Democratic candidates for police magistrate competing with 8 Republicans for 8 offices. More wonder yet when it appears that 3 or 4 of Randall's men were elected, although they did not fare any too well in his own district.

46 Ibid., January 13, 1880.
47 Ibid., January 19, 1880.
48 Ibid., January 21, 28, 1880.
49 Ibid., January 19, 1880.
50 Ibid., February 11, 19, 1880.
On April 14, 1880 the Vaux-Tilden forces met and selected a complete slate of "Senatorial" district delegates to the Harrisburg convention to be held the latter part of the month. Vaux issued a protest against the past treatment of their delegation. 51 Randall had seen this protest before it was issued and approved it enthusiastically. He sent a copy of it to Black asking him to return the same direct to Vaux. 52 Just before the convention met the Vaux forces suddenly attained real respectability by the addition of Franklin B. Gowen and General Isaac Wistar to their board of strategy. Since both of these men were prominent and wealthy citizens of the city it could be seen that the Randall men would go into the convention with some real backing. 53

Randall had taken considerable steps to organize the state of Pennsylvania for Tilden even before the elections of 1879. In those elections he made sufficient inroads into the ranks of the McGowan "Regulars" in Philadelphia to warrant the belief that his little trick of organizing a county committee would bring real rewards before the next state convention in April 1880. In December 1879 Randall opened the long session of Congress with the expressed determination to make it, "a short session, reduction of expenditures, little speech making and, if the Davis Committee has discovered anything, full ven-

51 Ibid., April 15, 1880.  
52 Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, April 15, 1880.  
53 Record, April 19, 1880.
Randall spent much of his time during this entire session of Congress in fighting for Tilden. His motives may have included some desire for personal gain if Tilden should suddenly shift his mantle to him, but he was really more interested in controlling the state convention than in Tilden's nomination -- as he admitted to Black in February 1880. If successful within the state he would be in a position to continue to be even more of a power in state and nation if Tilden were nominated and elected. Randall actually probably had little real desire or hope to be nominated for the Presidency. He knew his intellectual limitations, and also sensed his positive mastery in the limited political arena of state and Congress where he could bring his marvellous personal qualities into play.

Randall's campaign to control the 1880 state convention was that of a desperate man. He had early tied his political future to the tail of Tilden's kite, yet every day Tilden was becoming more and more unpopular especially in Pennsylvania. Hence Randall had to work strenuously and with extreme care. He took continual trips to Philadelphia, some to New York and once even asked Chauncey Black to meet him in a conference at Baltimore. He spent the Christmas holidays in Lancaster

54 Black Misc., Randall to C. F. Black, November 18, 1879.
55 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, February 15, 1880.
56 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, March 26, 1880.
county with Black and Hensel looking after the Tilden movement there. In his continuous correspondence with Chauncey Black during these months he stressed three points: first, the county conventions must declare for Tilden or else make no declaration; secondly, the men chosen as delegates must be true men whom Black himself must personally pick out whenever possible; and thirdly, they must have the most tested and sturdy of men on the committee on contested seats, otherwise the delegates from Philadelphia county and other seats would be thrown out of the convention.

Randall did not try to cover the entire state, but centered his efforts on three distinct areas. The first was of course that around Philadelphia itself where he had Bucks county under the control of Herman Yorkes; Delaware county was obeying Grier Hays and Chester county was anti-Wallace although also anti-Tilden. The second district which interested Randall, was composed of the counties of Westmoreland, Beaver, Lawrence and Allegheny centering around Pittsburgh. Here Barr and Hay were working for Tilden and with Randall and eventually produced fair results. The third and most extensive district lay west of Philadelphia and south of Harrisburg and included the counties of Lebanon, Lancaster, Cumberland, Adams, York and Franklin. This section gave Randall the most concern,

57 Record, December 25, 1879; Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, December 10, 1879.
even though he had capable friends working in each county. Hensel was busy in Lancaster, aided by Steinman of the Intelligencer. Beltzhoover had Cumberland in his hands and also claimed to control Adams county. McSherry disputed Beltzhoover's claim to Adams but was working for Randall and Tilden, anyhow. In York and Franklin counties, Chauncey Black himself was on the scene to direct affairs. Randall never doubted Black; was sure of Hensel even though the latter was sometimes slow to act; never felt that he could trust Beltzhoover, but was confident of McSherry. 58

During February Randall and some other leaders conducted a discreet survey of the state by personal messengers sent to leading Democrats, with Randall bearing a good share of the cost of the survey. 59 By March 25 Randall felt that he could safely predict a 50 to 60 majority in the convention against Wallace. 60 This figure he raised to 75 "outside of Philadelphia" by the week before the convention. 61 Yet with all of his preparations Randall was entering the convention with matters standing at a stalemate with the Wallace faction. Neither side would be able to move without some sort of compromise. Randall had been defeated in his desire to have the convention

58 See Randall-Black correspondence during months of December 1879 to April 1880 for details of three preceding paragraphs. The items mentioned are scattered throughout thirty or more letters.
59 Black MSS., Randall to C. F. Black, February 15, 1880.
60 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, March 29, 1880.
61 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, April 22, 1880.
anywhere but in Harrisburg. Wallace had slapped Randall in the face by allowing the confirmation of the appointment of J. H. Kerns as Marshall for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, even though Randall had Senator Thurman's promise to stop it. Wallace was weakened politically just at that moment by a series of news articles in Pittsburgh and Lancaster papers, revealing his co-operation with Senator Cameron in the matter of this Kerns appointment.

The meeting of the State Democratic committee had been held in Pittsburgh on March 18 at Randall's suggestion, but its action was decidedly anti-Randall. Besides choosing Harrisburg for the convention site it also passed a resolution favoring the admission of the "regular McGowan" delegates from Philadelphia. Randall felt that the committee was going beyond its powers by such a resolution and said so to Chauncey Black in a letter of April 5:

We will try & undo the action of the State Com. & we want Heltzel to help us. In fact we have pitched on him to make the motion to reconsider. I agree the action should be treated as Wallace dictation. Hensel was in Philada & with us on Sunday. 1st in answer. The Com had no such power as they exercised. 2 - Even the Chr. can have no power in my judgment to report to convention - except to report to convention whatever documentary evidence he has as to mak-

62 Ibid., Randall to C. F. Black, March 14, 1880; Record, March 18, 1880.
63 Record, March 18, 1880.
64 Black MS., Randall to C. F. Black, March 11, 1880.
65 Record, March 18, 1880.
66 Ibid., March 19, 1880.
ing up roll. The Convention has sole power. The Chr. is organ of last Convention - and not of Com. He has power in premises to make up roll - by tradition & the clerical practice allowed in all original proceedings in all conventions which pertain to the character of legislative bodies.

I send tonight to Vaux your suggestion as to County Com. paper. He has already drawn up such, which he sent to me - I made various suggestions & now I shall have him to have the benefit of yours also. He will make a strong paper. Fayette Com. was "right" & not "wrong."

Maish's folly worries me.67

On April 14, Randall gave a letter to all the Philadelphia newspapers in which he opposed the unit rule for the Pennsylvania delegation. The Record felt this to be a recognition of the fact that the Tilden-Randall-Vaux group had not been able to settle their trouble with the "Regulars." Hence Randall wanted to save some crumbs.68 This letter caused some friction in New York State where the Tilden men were working for the unit rule, but Randall told them that it was a Pennsylvania problem to be settled by those who knew the State best.69 Randall also asked Barnum, chairman of the National Democratic Committee to

Have drawn & sent me at once - a resolution such as should pass our convention on the Great Fraud. I mean from Mr. Tilden's standpoint. A resolution which the public will view as an indication of Presidential preference. Send to me in Phila if written & mailed Friday - to Washington if mailed up to Sunday 12 M. & to Bolton House Harrisburg if mailed Monday.70

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67 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, April 5, 1880.
68 Record, April 16, 1880.
69 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, April 19, 1880.
70 Tilden Mss., Randall to Barnum, April 22, 1880.
Randall asked Chauncey Black to be at Harrisburg early, suggesting Monday April 26 as acceptable. In fact Randall arrived on Saturday night at midnight in company with Squire McMullin. They went after the various county delegates with surprising early successes. The Randall followers set up headquarters at the Lochiel Hotel, with such sturdies as District-Attorney John R. Read of Philadelphia, Malcolm Hay of Allegheny and Dallas Sanders of Philadelphia among those present. The "Regulars" resided at the Bolton House and were, of course, working with Senator Wallace's group from the central portion of the State and included Lewis C. Cassidy, T. J. Barger and George McGowan of Philadelphia, R. M. Speer of Huntingdon, B. F. Meyers of Dauphin and Schnatterly of Fayette. The afternoon of Tuesday, April 27 was notable for much running back and forth between the two camps, with Read acting as Randall's messenger and Samuel Josephs as Wallace's. A final conference was held at 5 P.M. in which Speer, Dill, Hutchler and Josephs met Randall and tentatively agreed to let Randall's 17 delegates from Philadelphia cast 23 votes while Wallace's 29 delegates cast only 23 votes.

After the failure of the compromise of Tuesday evening, Constable John McCormick and about 25 henchmen got possession

71 Black Mss., Randall to C. F. Black, April 19, 1880.
72 Record, April 27, 1880.
73 Ibid., April 27, 1880.
74 Ibid., April 28, 1880.
of the Opera House and barred all doors. They refused to admit E. F. Meyers -- some police and even Mayor Patterson. They admitted those delegates who had tickets from outside of Philadelphia - but from Philadelphia only those of their own (Randall's) bunch. Chairman Miller purposely was one hour late: the convention was supposed to start at 12 M. In the interim Randall, Cassidy, Barger, Dechart, and Wallace talked things over before the eyes of the assembled convention. They finally struck a compromise on the disputed delegations by the appointment of a committee of six to settle all disputes. Big ovations followed for both Randall and Wallace.75

Randall still felt optimistic after the convention, although he did not get the endorsement of the convention either for Tilden or himself. He wrote Tilden on April 30, 1880:

You have sure 32 marked - opposite the names - I think 13 more from Philada & county marked this (-) of these latter 6 are from Phil. which I have a friendly relation with agreement of amity with. Thus your vote cannot be under 40 - Will probably be 45 may go to 50. If Hancock has no chance Speer will go with me Brinton should be Jos. B. Baker. Casano is Gov. Curtin's warm personal friend. He should look after him at once. Edgar Corven should be look to. He is anti-Wallace - but may not be for you - You have but a very few absolute enemies in the delegation. Your triumph and our victory is complete and overwhelming.76

Randall's optimism turned out to be misplaced since at the convention Wallace controlled a slight majority of the dele-

75 Ibid., April 29, 1880.
76 Tilden MSS., Randall to Tilden, April 30, 1880.
gates for Hancock. Randall sent Black a short note on May 5 which reveals some bitterness:

There is no occasion to rub the sore - rather bring the plaster - altho' I have never received the like. Our reconciliation in Philada is sincere & will last - for much good to party & to individuals. You and Mr. McSherry were gloriously vindicated. Beltz-hoover did not show much pluck, Remember me to all.77

The Compromise Commission of six which was chosen at Harrisburg in April met at Philadelphia in July. Gibson, one of the Randall men, was sick and Stenger, still another Randall man, was called home by sickness in his family, yet Randall fared not too badly by the decision of the Commission.78 Evidence was heard from both the county and city committees. Randall wanted the present city committee disbanded and a new one organized, choosing two from each ward and one each from present city and county organizations. It was decided not to take Randall's scheme but to recognize as regular the present city committee, and enlarge it from 9 to 21 members with 4 of the new members from the city group and 8 from the county group. Each of these groups were to choose their own chairman.79

On July 20 temporary terms of peace were accepted by both sides by an arrangement which called for the admission of Chairman Vaux and seven others chosen by him to the city committee until after the campaign was over.80

77 Black Lss., Randall to C. F. Black, May 5, 1880.
78 Record, July 9, 1880.
79 Ibid., July 10, 1880.
80 Ibid., July 21, 1880.
other meeting of the commission was held which resulted in the final healing of the breach by terms accepted on December 29, 1880 whereby the city committee of 21 was enlarged to 39 with the Randall people given adequate and satisfactory representation.

Randall's efforts for Tilden were not limited to Pennsylvania. In October of 1878 he made a trip to Boston to light the spark for Tilden, which was rewarded the next year by a complete Tilden ticket from the city proper. Just before the opening of Congress in December 1879, Randall took a special trip to New York to see Tilden and Barnum to make plans for the handling of Congress and the coming campaign. Randall returned from New York and issued a press interview to a Philadelphia Record reporter in which he came out strongly for Tilden. By April 1880 Randall was in touch with a number of Tilden's supporters in Iowa, Alabama, Arkansas, Vermont, and Nevada. He kept Tilden continually informed of progress from such quarters, often forwarding letters from such men to Tilden. Randall also sent some Democrats from Tennessee and

81 Ibid., November 19, 1880.
82 Ibid., December 30, 1880.
83 Ibid., December 4, 1879.
84 Tilden Mss., Randall to Tilden, November 27, 1879.
85 Record, December 10, 1879.
86 Tilden Mss., Edwin Campbell to Randall, April 2, 1880;
87 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, April 6, 1880.
88 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, April 12, 1880.
89 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, May 10, 1880.
90 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, April 6, 1880.
91 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, May 12, 1880.
Ohio to see Tilden in New York and even asked that one influential Tilden man in Alabama be invited to New York for an interview. 92

On April 16 Randall was called to a conclave of Tilden men in Philadelphia. Chairman Barnum was in town in the company of the two Pendletons of Ohio and ex-Governor Stevenson of Kentucky canvassing the local situation. 93 Some weeks later, in May, Randall called Barnum to Washington to help settle some negotiations with agents of the "Readjuster" Senator Mahone by which Tilden would receive the support of half of the Virginia delegation. These interviews were successful with Randall serving as the go-between. 94 Just before Barnum's arrival in Washington on May 15, Randall had a long conversation with McLane and Gorman of Maryland in which he learned that Tilden was doing well in that state. 95

Randall's enthusiasm for Tilden included Indiana where he saw the state "as good as instructed for Tilden." 96 He even seemed a bit too aggressive by the manner in which he gave out advice to Tilden. On May 5 he warned Tilden to

Look also to Wisconsin May 19 & Minnesota May 20
& Kansas May 26 & Missouri May 28th & New Jersey

92 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, April 13, 1880.
93 Record, April 17, 1880.
94 Tilden MSS., J. W. Bryant to Randall, May 6, 1880; Ibid., Randall to Barnum, May 6, 1880; Ibid., Randall to Tilden, May 7, 1880; Ibid., Randall to Tilden, May 18, 1880.
95 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, May 18, 1880.
96 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, April 13, 1880.
I am giving some attention to New Jersey myself.97

Cincinnati was chosen for the Democratic National convention in 1880. Some talk was heard of sending it back to St. Louis as in 1876 but after a conference between Barnum, W. L. Scott and Randall in Washington, Randall wrote Tilden that:

Mr. Barnum Mr. Scott & I have conferred. St. Louis. if we could throw our entire vote to - would not have sufficient - Nor do I believe the sentiment there to be as strong as it was in 1876. We conclude Cincinnati is preferable to Chicago and 15th or 22nd of June the time. You will receive every consideration in Cincinnati - Judge Hoadley's friends here assure us of this.98

Many times in the year before the Cincinnati convention met, well-founded rumors appeared that Tilden would not allow his name to be placed in nomination. Whenever Randall was questioned as to the truth of such talk he invariably denied the story. Randall must have known that Tilden was seriously considering the advisability of retiring from the contest. What then were Randall's motives in continuing to work so hard for Tilden? Did he hope to fall heir to Tilden's support or did he merely wish to create such a stir in the convention that the eventual candidate would have to consider him in handing out the patronage? An answer to such questions is not easy. The tremendous extent of Randall's labors for Tilden makes it seem likely that he was working for the political fu-

97 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, May 5, 1880.
98 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, February 22, 1880.
ture of his party and his leader, not merely for himself. Randall realized his own shortcomings on the national stage. There is little to show that he ever seriously thought of himself as a presidential candidate. However, the course of events at Cincinnati gave Randall cause to swear at fate and at his supposed friend Tilden.

"As early as November 1879 Bigelow disclosed to Montgomery Blair the strictly confidential information that Tilden could not be induced to run again for the presidency. How and when Tilden would make his intentions known to the Democracy Bigelow did not know, but felt it a duty to tell Blair." 99 Tilden did not actually withdraw his name until June 20, 1880, the night before the convention was to meet. Even then his letter, which consisted of a long review of his public life, was somewhat ambiguous. 100 Some of the delegates interpreted Tilden's letter as instructions to swing his support to Payne of Ohio but Standard Oil support for Payne made the South shy away from him. 101 Differences of opinion over interpretations of Tilden's letter made it impossible for Randall's name to appear on the first ballot on June 23, which showed Hancock leading, nine candidates with 171 votes. 102 The convention then adjourned while the managers of the various candidates worked.

100 Record, June 21, 1880.
101 Tilden Lss., "Ned" to Tilden, June 23, 1880.
102 Record, June 24, 1880.
into the wee hours.

A Philadelphia Record correspondent met Congressman Stenger, District-Attorney Read, and Bob Randall at 3:00 A.M. the next morning. They had just succeeded in getting the promise of the New York delegation's vote for Randall, but were afraid that the Hancock boom had gone too far. Tilden had sent a wire to the New York delegation saying that Randall was his first choice but he also approved of Hancock. Randall was sorry that he had fought against the unit rule since he might have forced the Pennsylvania delegation to side with him. Two caucuses had been held on June 21 to try to settle the Pennsylvania vote, but it was divided 32 for Hancock to 25 for Randall. On the second ballot, taken on June 24, Hancock received 319, Randall 129½, and Bayard 113. The stampede for Hancock resulted in his nomination on the third ballot. A glance at the list of the Pennsylvania delegates who supported Hancock reveals some startling surprises. Who would have dreamed that McSherry, Hensel and Chauncey Black would desert Randall? The action of Chauncey Black led to a temporary estrangement and a permanent coolness between Randall and Black. Never again were they on close personal terms although they still kept up a spasmodic correspondence and co-operated

103 Record, June 28, 1880.
104 Ibid., June 22, 1880.
105 Ibid., June 25, 1880.
106 Ibid., June 28, 1880.
in some political maneuvers.

Smith Weed wrote Tilden a long letter on June 25 which offers some sidelights on the convention and on Randall's reaction to his treatment.

... It was very apparent to any one that it was not possible to have nominated you even if you would have taken it, as I know you would not. The element that sold you out at Washington in 1877 with those who were honestly fearful you could not win were enough to defeat you under any circumstances and yet the fear that we meant to try to do it prevented our being able to transfer: this feeling was kept alive by earnest but injudicious friends of yours from N. Y. and elsewhere and this and the action of our own delegation absolutely destroyed our influence in the convention. The Brooklyn people did not want you and Jacobs, Pratt and others told people they would not go for you or be transferred by you. Had they been absolutely with us and had Manning spoken your wishes we could have nominated Mr. Payne. He seemed to fear the Brooklyn people and I don't wonder for I never saw any set of men act so very ugly as they and the Fox-Shay N. Y. gang. Randall also acted bad and talked bad and yet under your advice, or what I took to be your advice, I acted with the Brooklyn and Fox gang and named him as our 2nd choice -- I did not like to do so for I feared Hancock's nomination but did not fear it so early.

Had your letter been there the Saturday morning and had we all acted together, i.e. your friends we could have nominated Payne. I don't think we could have nominated Randall. The South and South west and New Jersey were represented by a bad lot and the convention was nothing to compare with the convention of 1876. So far as I was concerned I was good for nothing, for it took about all my time to keep our delegation from kicking over the traces in some way.

I cannot write in detail but will talk it all over with you, if you want to know anything more of the disgusting subject. I do not think it an easy victory for anyone and am confident that the ticket is a fairer representation of that convention than you would have been. The fact is that their talk and action the old dictation of the South was present without the old intellect. I cannot express my
contempt for N. Y. and Brooklyn's acts.

Barnum will tell you of the talks with Hancock people. I hope he (H) will make it apparent that he is to be your friend and if so that will help him through. I am about dead as I have not slept over two hours a night since I came. 107

Randall felt that he had been the recipient of many dirty deals from his supposed friends, both in Pennsylvania and New York. He had every reason to feel that he had been cheated by the two men for whom and with whom he had worked closely for the past six months, viz: Tilden and Chauncey Black. Yet Randall entered into the campaign with tremendous vigor. He probably realized that politicians cannot afford to hold grudges. He would need Tilden's support in the future, hence he swallowed the bitter pill and went to work.

On July 28 Randall attended a huge mass meeting at the Academy of Music in New York. Tilden presided and introduced Randall as the first speaker, who endorsed the Eaton tariff commission bill and told manufacturers that they need not worry about what this commission would do to their business. 108

Randall stopped with Tilden at Greystone during this trip; and wrote him a very gracious letter of thanks for his hospitality upon arrival back in Philadelphia. 109 Randall took another speaking tour into the interior of New York during the latter part of August. He returned to Philadelphia in time to attend

107 Tilden MSS., Smith Weed to Tilden, June 25, 1880.
108 Record, July 29, 1880.
109 Tilden MSS., Randall to Tilden, August 2, 1880.
a celebration at the Headquarters of the S. J. Randall Association of the 11th ward. Much parading and applause interrupted Randall's speech in which he answer John Sherman's Cincinnati speech which had accused the Democrats of plotting to pay the Southern war claims, to reimburse the slave holders and to bankrupt the Treasury within a year. Randall pointed out that the 14th amendment prohibited the same and also reminded his audience that while Democratic administration had acquired the public domain, Republicans had given most of it away to 6 corporations. 110

Randall appeared at another Democratic rally in Philadelphia at the Americus club on September 18 where he acted as chairman. He left, soon after, for a trip to Columbus, Ohio, 111 Indianapolis, 112 and Toledo, 113 accompanied by Squire McMullin, who spent some time in Cincinnati helping to re-elect Congressman Banning who was one of Randall's staunchest supporters in the House. 114 Randall was unable to accept Chauncey Black's invitation to a huge Democratic conclave at York, Pennsylvania, because of another speaking tour of New York state. 115

After working so diligently for the success of his party

110 Record, September 4, 1880.
111 Tilden Lss., Randall to Tilden, October 3, 1880.
112 Record, October 7, 1880.
113 Black Lss., Randall to C. F. Black, October 9, 1880.
114 Record, October 7, 1880.
115 Black Lss., Fletcher to C. F. Black, October 16, 1880.
Randall must have been doubly downcast at the continued ascendency of the Republicans. Within his own State Randall was on the verge of complete control of his party since Hancock’s defeat and the ending of Wallace’s term as senator resulted in the disappearance of Wallace as a major political factor in the State.
CHAPTER EIGHT
RANDALL AND APPROPRIATIONS

Randall made governmental finance one of his major interests during his entire career in Congress. His reasons for this may have been varied, even conflicting, but he realized that a real student of government in action will come to know his subject more rapidly if he is acquainted with the financial intricacies of every arm of the government service. It was this long study of appropriations and government expenditures which prompted some leaders to say that "Sam" Randall was thoroughly qualified by technical knowledge to step into any cabinet position except possibly that of Attorney-General, on a moment's notice. Randall also was sincerely concerned over the "extravagant" habits of most Congressmen as they tossed about money and the public domain which belonged to the people of the United States. His concern over so-called "robbing of the people" was limited to questions of appropriations and internal revenue, as he could not seem to see that a highly protective tariff was only a form of extortion.

Randall's guarding of the doors of the Treasury may have been begun in all sincerity, but after a few years of such activity, he sensed that here was an issue which offered him a chance for real leadership and a chance to rally his broken
party against the relentless march of the dominant Republicans as they swept through the post-war period in all their glory of patriotism and power. In the final year of the war the actual expenditures of the government, exclusive of permanent payments, were $1,297,555,224.41. The next year, 1866, saw that figure drop to $520,809,416.90, with each succeeding year's figures showing continued decreases until 1871 when the total was $292,177,188.25. ¹ During the next four years the totals hovered about that figure, possibly dropping slightly lower, but Democrats such as Randall and Holman were not satisfied. They said loudly and often that the government could be run for approximately $40,000,000 to $50,000,000 less, and wanted the chance to prove their claims.

Such Republican leaders as Washburne of Illinois, Dawes of Massachusetts, and Garfield of Ohio deserve much credit for the beginnings of a policy of economy and retrenchment. Dawes especially had the best of intentions, but had the bad habit of breaking down in the last weeks of a session and allowing

¹ These figures are all taken from James A. Garfield, in "North American Review," June, 1879. Accurate figures on appropriations and expenditures are very difficult to obtain in this period. Because economy was a live political issue there were many figures quoted which did not tell all the truth. A variety of items might be included or omitted at the discretion of the individual so as to make the figures substantiate any claim. Even official reports of the Secretary of the Treasury varied in their scope: often omitting Post- Office appropriations or revenue to suit political purposes. Hence figures quoted by Garfield may be considered as not prejudiced in favor of Randall and the Democrats.
many bad jobs to slip through as the pressure on all sides became great. Garfield's record was somewhat better but he was aided at crucial times by Randall, when the wolves were after him because of his proposed reductions. Randall had an annoying habit of just camping on Garfield's trail whenever the Legislative Appropriation bill was up for consideration. This bill included all salaries of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments, hence contained many opportunities for unnecessary political favoritism. Randall delighted to question Garfield on each particular item, making him justify the service and salary involved.

Since all government economy was due to individual efforts, an analysis of Randall's efforts and methods is desirable. His concern over the Legislative Appropriation bill has been mentioned. He evidenced a similar concern over the Post Office bill. His anti-subsidy activities have been enumerated, including railroad jobs, Niagara canal and the Sutro Tunnel in Nevada. He was particularly concerned with the way "contingent funds" were handled by heads of departments. He had the feeling that such funds were used for strange purposes and wished an accounting of the same. The Rivers and Harbors

2 Congressional Record, March 19, April 15-24, December 15-18, 1874.
3 Congressional Globe, February 5, 1873; Congressional Record, May 20, 1874.
4 Congressional Record, December 22, 1874.
bill received some of Randall's choicest sarcasm, and later had its wings partially clipped by Rules introduced by Randall. Randall did not like the way Grant used the Army in the South so singled that department out for some of his oratory and invective. He expressed himself very definitely on the subject on January 29, 1874.

As to the Army, I agree that it is most essential that the border people of this country, who have displayed more spirit than those who remain in the East at home, receiving all the culture of civilization, should be protected in their lives, their homes, and their wives and families. But sir, the fault is not in the number in the Army but in the assignment of the Army. I say take your Army from the South; take away your Army from Louisiana, and put it to its legitimate purposes - for the defense of the lives of our citizens and not for the crushing of the liberties of our people.

After the election of Kerr as Speaker everybody conceded Randall the position as Chairman of Appropriations, which was considered to be the real post of honor for the Forty-Fourth Congress rather than the Ways and Means. Randall had very able lieutenants to serve with him on this committee, among them being W. S. Holman, John D. C. Atkins of Tennessee, and James H. Blount of Georgia. Randall was given an aisle seat in the second row on the floor of the House, and had Holman and Blount placed right before him in the front row. Thus

5 Ibid., May 21, 1874.
6 Ibid., January 29, 1874.
7 Black Mss., A. M. Gibson to C. F. Black, December 11, 1875.
9 Ibid., 144.
this triumvirate was well situated to wage their many battles against the jobbing element.

Randall called his committee together in the week preceding Christmas 1875, and gave out the word that the expenses of the army and navy would probably constitute the largest single items of reduction, though contingent sums of other departments could also expect to be cut. He also announced a proposed salary cut of 10% for all government officials and salary adjustments for Congress and the President. He early established the practice of having those Congressional committees which were handling the affairs of separate departments, conduct their own economy investigations. For instance, he asked the committee on Military Affairs to survey the War Department.

Just when Randall had launched his entire program of economy in all branches of the government, he was faced with a political dilemma which caused him much pain and worry. A private joint-stock corporation had been formed in Philadelphia for the purpose of financing and conducting the Centennial Exposition to be held in that city in 1876. The corporation was badly in need of additional funds in order to launch their venture with any chance of success. Ex-Governor Bigler and many other close friends of Randall were on the Board of Di-

10 World, December 22, 1875.
11 Record, January 11, 1876.
rectors. Imagine Randall's feelings when these men came to him as chairman of Appropriations and asked for a government subsidy of $1,500,000. If he fell in with their plans his noisy claims of economy would become as the empty soundings of clanging cymbals. Most of the Southern members, led by the Virginia delegation, were opposed to the scheme. Randall saw that regardless of his past words his political future demanded that the appropriation for $1,500,000 should pass. He postponed consideration of the bill until January 25, when he was able to get Lamar of Mississippi to make a ringing constitutional and patriotic argument for the appropriation. The bill then passed by vote of 146-130, after Holman had failed by 101-123 to strike out the enacting clause.

The Consular and Diplomatic bill was the first of the Appropriation bills to be passed by the House. A great deal of time was spent on it by Randall's committee, as well as by the committee on Foreign Affairs. Salaries were reduced to the level of two years before and some "missions" were abolished and consolidated. Many Republican leaders who talked against various features of the bill were afraid to vote against it, with the result that the bill passed 191-2. The $914,000 appropriated represented a saving of 35% over the

12 World, January 17, 1876.
13 Congressional Record, January 25, 1876.
14 House Journal, January 25, 1876.
15 World, January 18, 1876; Ibid., February 11, 1876.
16 House Journal, February 11, 1876.
previous year.17

By February 23, 1876, the Philadelphia Record could print an editorial praising Randall's record to date. It pointed out that the Pension bill had been passed according to law with no increases, that the Fortifications bill had been cut from an estimate of $3,500,000 to an actual $315,000 by means of postponing much work.18 A real rivalry developed between the Republicans and Democrats to see who could get the most stars for their economy efforts. Randall remarked that if he did not originate economy at least he would keep up the good work and give the House a lesson in the art.19

Randall early received press advice to examine the absurd pay roll estimate turned in by Secretary Robeson.20 His sub-committee reported the Navy bill, which called for $12,800,000, to the House on May 5; this figure comparing well with the $17,000,000 of the preceding year. The Navy yards at Kittery, Maine, New London, Connecticut, Charlestown, Massachusetts, Pensacola, Florida, and Washington were practically closed down by this cut, but Randall felt that all necessary work could be handled at Brooklyn, League Island, Norfolk and Mare Island. The political implications of the above are obvious when one reflects upon the locations of the yards kept in

17 World, February 12, 1876.
18 Record, February 23, 1876.
19 Ibid., February 23, 1876.
20 World, January 3, 1876.
service. The Army bill was drawn up after conferences with Secretary of War Cameron and the committee on Military Affairs. As introduced to the House on June 12 it appropriated $23,155,077, a saving of only $5,000,000, but did reduce the pay of the officers in the Army.

The first session of the Forty-Fourth Congress was prolonged until the middle of August, 1876. The inability of the Republican Senate and the Democratic House to agree on the Legislative and Sundry Civil Appropriations bills was the cause of such delay. In January a sub-committee with Randall as chairman met to draw up the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary Appropriation bill. Proposals were presented calling for a reduction in the President's salary after March 4, 1877; reductions for mileage allowed and abolition or reorganization of many bureaus in the War, Navy, Interior, Treasury and Post-Office Departments. On March 8, 1876, Randall reported the Legislative Bill to the House. The estimates of the Departments had totaled $20,773,306; last year $18,734,000 had been appropriated. Randall's bill called for $12,799,883. The committee recommended the transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department, which would save $1,000,000 in the Indian Appropriation bill, and according to General Sheridan would save $3,500,000 more in the Army bill. The report also recommended

21 Ibid., May 6, 1876.
22 Ibid., June 8, 1876; Congressional Record, June 12, 1876.
23 World, January 20, 1876.
the transfer of the Pension Bureau from the Interior to the War Department. 24 This bill met with some Democratic opposition in the House due to its extensive reductions in the clerical force and clerical salaries of the departments and the alleged favoritism shown to the clerks who were working for the Ways and Means and Appropriations committees. 25

After passage by the House this bill was radically changed by the Senate which refused to accept the majority of the salary changes asked by the House. The first conference committee was unable to agree, causing the House to appoint a new group composed of Randall, Springer and Kasson of Iowa. 26 Randall reported for this committee on July 6 that again no agreement had been reached. The Republicans claimed that the bill contained a law reorganizing certain departments of government. The Senate felt that this was contrary to its equal right to pass laws but it would agree to one-half of the reductions asked for. Randall still claimed that it was purely a question of economy instituted by a money bill which had to originate in the House. 27 The dispute was finally settled on August 9 when the House decided to accept the final reductions agreed to by the Senate. The President's and the Congressmen's salaries were not to be changed, but since only $1,500,-

24 Ibid., March 9, 1876.
25 Ibid., March 31, 1876.
26 Ibid., June 27, 1876.
27 Ibid., July 7, 1876; Congressional Record, July 6, 1876.
000 separated the two Houses, Randall and the House gave in, and finally appropriated $15,373,960, which was a saving of $3,528,277 over the preceding year.28

The Sundry Civil Appropriation bill was another bone of contention which prolonged the session. As reported on June 20, 1876, it called for $14,587,840 as against $26,644,350 in the preceding year,29 but contained an amendment which repealed that section of the Revised Statutes which related to the registration of voters and the appointment of Supervisors of Elections and of deputy and special deputy marshalls for supervision of elections.30 The Republican Senate, not agreeing to such a repeal of the Statutes, the Democrats receded from their stand and accepted the huge saving. Randall reported the conference agreement to the House on July 20 and gave the final figure of $16,357,905 for the bill.

On Monday, August 16, Randall gave a lengthy review of appropriations to the House, taking up in great detail the course of each of the major bills through Congress.31 That same day the Philadelphia Record carried an extensive editorial analysing appropriations and claiming a net reduction of $29,944,252 with a $5,000,000 Rivers and Harbors bill as the only blot.32 The World on August 10 estimated the savings at

28 World, August 10, 1876.
29 Ibid., June 21, 1876.
30 Ibid., July 19, 1876.
31 Congressional Record, August 16, 1876.
32 Record, August 16, 1876.
Garfield placed the figure at $20,000,000 each year for 1877 and 1878 but by inference reveals that he arrived at this figure by taking an average for the two years. In round numbers the House by its original action cut down the preceding year's total appropriations by $40,000,000. The Senate by its amendments reduced the saving to $30,000,000 or thereabouts. In a total budget of $258,000,000 over $120,000,000 of which were permanent appropriations on funded debt, a saving of $30,000,000 is considerable and worthy of commendation. The extended and severe struggle with the Senate and comparative success gave Randall's economy claims reality and still further elevated him in the opinions of his followers.

As speaker, Randall continued his efforts at retrenchment. The five year period of his leadership is literally filled with examples of his rulings which tended towards economy. One very effective method that Randall often followed consisted of referring to the committee of the Whole all reports which involved anything even faintly related to the appropriation of money. This procedure meant that the proposal would receive more informal discussion, would give Randall a convenient opportunity to leave the chair and speak on it, thus permitting his personal presence on the floor to rally

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33 World, August 10, 1876.
34 Garfield, op. cit., June, 1879.
support for his financial policies. Such rulings also meant that while in Committee of the Whole, the chairman of the committee making the report would not maintain the usual complete control over the debate since members were allowed five minute speeches provided they could get their names on the list of the chairman of the committee of the Whole. Randall's proneness to participate in debate led him into hot water or April 30, 1878, when he defended "Rule 120" against an attack by the Republicans. After lecturing them on economy for a while, Garfield and Caulkins of Indiana taunted Randall with his salary grab record. 35

Randall seems to have enjoyed his occasional floor battles while speaker, since he often left the chair to help his pet Appropriations committee fight its battles, even though acceptable progress was being made under the able leadership of J. D. C. Atkins of Tennessee. Atkins has been characterized before as bold, ready, independent and sometimes impudent. He was seldom independent of his chief, in fact there is much evidence to show that Randall kept complete control of the committee even on matters of detail, 36 as well as a medium of political manipulation. 37

A list of cases where Speaker Randall, or Randall's com-

35 Congressional Record, April 30, 1878.
36 Record, March 8, 1888, referring to matter of compensation for mail contracts.
37 Congressional Record, January 8, 1880. Resolution to investigate the Star Route Frauds.
mittees, or the Democrats in the House refused to expand government expenditure would reveal only one great blot each year, viz.: The Rivers and Harbors bill. This species of pork-barrel legislation was of recent origin. Until March 2, 1865 the committee on Ways and Means reported all general Appropriation bills. After that date such power was transferred to a new committee on Appropriations. In the Fortieth Congress, the committee on Appropriations being busy with other matters permitted the committee on Commerce to originate and report a separate Rivers and Harbors bill for reference to the committee on Appropriations, which committee after consideration would report it back to the House with recommendations. 38

During the Forty-Fourth and Forty-Fifth Congresses the committee on Commerce had exclusive control of the Rivers and Harbors bill, but the committee on Rules tried to change that situation as has been previously described. Randall always fought this bill on the floor of the House, even when appropriations for the Schuylkill river were concerned, thus exposing himself to the charges of beggarly economy from his home city press. 39

The other weak spot in Randall's economy record as Speaker was the passage of the Pensions Arrears bill in January, 1879. It really can be blamed on both parties since, although

38 House Report No. 24, 46th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions, 10.
39 Congressional Record, January 8, 1880; Record, March 16, 1880.
it originated in the Democratic House, it was approved by the Republican Senate and signed by a Republican President. This act which ran into 80 millions of dollars, of course helped to cut down the alarming surplus that was building up in the United States Treasury, and in passing would contribute to the silencing of low tariff advocates whose loudest and most convincing argument for reform was the existence of a large surplus caused by a high tariff. This act also shows that Randall was as susceptible to the soldier vote as the general run of American politicians, then and now.

The editors of the North American Review felt that the subject of economy in appropriations was of sufficient political importance to warrant articles on the subject by the leaders in both camps. Randall was asked to write for the May, 1879 issue on the general aspects of the Democratic economy program. He became so overloaded with work in the special session of 1879 that he could not produce his manuscript. After two postponements, Garfield's article appeared in the June issue, defending Republican policy, faintly praising Democratic continuance of Republican economy, but damning the "Holman Amendment." 41

Randall's manipulation of the Rules Revision of 1880 to provide adequate economy machinery and centralization of fi-

40 Record, January 28, 1879.
41 Garfield Ms., J. S. Barron to Garfield, March 7, 1879; Ibid., A. Thorndike Rice to Garfield, April 2, 1879.
nancial responsibility has been mentioned before, but must always be kept in mind. Such was the one big idea which he kept before him in all his rulings, his revisions and his reflections: economy and retrenchment.

Randall's work with appropriations was interrupted by Republican control of the House during the Forty-Seventh Congress. Speaker Kiefer, possibly at Randall's own request, placed him on the committee on Ways and Means. Randall's service on this committee eventually caused him great embarrassment since it was responsible for the Kelley Tariff of 1883. He probably would have fared better in a political sense if he had remained with his first love, although his presence probably would have done little to stem the tide of Republican extravagance which reached the total of $295,510,639 in the first session, climaxed by the notorious Rivers and Harbors bill of 1882 which President Arthur vetoed.42 Randall, and all of his fellow Democrats in the House except Curtin, voted to sustain President Arthur in this veto.43

Randall returned to Congress for the first session of the Forty-Eighth Congress with great opportunities for economies before him. The Republican misappropriations of Kiefer and Robeson had been somewhat scaled down by the second session of the Forty-Seventh Congress but the total was still much above

42 World, July 10, 1884.
43 Record, August 3, 1882.
Randall's desires. The American public had expressed itself very forcibly in the mid-term elections of 1882 as being sick of Republican mismanagement of finances. The Randall rules of 1880 were still in force as far as centralization of power in the hands of the Appropriations committee was concerned. Randall, although defeated for the speakership, was still a power in the House, so much so that Carlisle dared not demote him for fear of reprisal by Randall's Democratic supporters in the House who numbered about 50. With such a line-up Randall was able to do about as he pleased with both financial and general legislation.

He launched another program of economy which makes his work in the first session of the Forty-Fourth Congress pale by comparison. Public opinion had sufficiently impressed the Republican departmental heads so that the estimates of all except the Navy Department were within the bounds of reason for a change. Yet these totalled about $230,000,000, exclusive of permanent appropriations which remained rather steadily at about $115,000,000. In the course of the session Randall's committee cut these estimates to $186,542,292, and had the supreme satisfaction of seeing the final appropriations cut to $186,166,470, in spite of the Senate's obstinate fight for increased naval appropriations.44

Pensions appropriations were cut from an estimated $40,000,000 to $20,810,000. The reduction in the Postal Appropriations was much smaller, totalling only $2,000,000. The Rivers and Harbors bill was again too difficult for Randall to handle and so amounted to $13,909,200. The General Deficiency bill was cut from $11,328,385 to $6,996,610; the Sundry Civil bill from $30,346,994 to $22,311,831; and the Indian bill from $8,466,819 to $5,859,403. The story of the Fortifications appropriations bill is an excellent illustration of Randall's ability to control the House on appropriations. A few Democrats in his committee temporarily tried to defy their boss; they combined with the Republican members of the committee to report to the House a bill calling for over $3,000,000 for Fortifications. Randall and the loyal Democrats on his committee presented a minority report which called for $700,000 which the House adopted on July 2, 1884, after Randall had fought for his report on the floor of the House.

A mysterious "steal" appeared in the Senate amendment to the Consular and Diplomatic bill which called for $250,000 being paid some unknown agent for an option on a route for the Nicaraguan canal. Randall and his fellow Democrats caught this item as it was about to slide by and after lengthy conferences with the Senate conference committee succeeded in

45 Same as N. 44.
46 All figures gathered from same sources as note 44.
47 Nation, July 10, 1884; World, July 10, 1884.
having the Senate amendment withdrawn. A strong suspicion developed that this $250,000 would arrive in the campaign coffers of the Republican party by a devious route. 48

Arthur's Secretary of the Navy in 1883 was William E. Chandler of Concord, New Hampshire. In the eyes of the Republican managers of the Grant era he was a very valuable member of the party. He was clever in handling men, mostly by means of appealing to the baser side of their lives. He knew how to get whatever he wanted. His career from 1865 to 1883 showed him as mixed up in all types of political, financial, and industrial manipulations. As secretary to the Republican National Committee in 1876 he performed some very "valuable" and highly efficient work in keeping Louisiana and Florida in the Republican column. His appointment to a cabinet position was a slap in the face to the Liberal Republicans and a red flag of danger to the Democrats in Congress. His reputation was such that the opposition would suspect his every wish before it was uttered. Hence his estimates of $22,000,000 for the Navy Department were fated to be badly slashed by Randall's committee even before they were presented to Congress. Randall also had some feeling of personal animosity due to the unfair publicity which Chandler gave to Randall's routine request for the transfer of duty of an old friend of Randall's

48 Nation, July 10, 1884; World, July 10, 1884.
who was serving in the Naval Medical Corps. 49

Somewhere along the road to political fortune Chandler had picked up the friendship of a peculiar iron-master named John Roach. This proprietor of a one-horse iron works in Chester, Pennsylvania, had built some iron cruisers during Grant's administration and had since tied his industrial career to Chandler's political kite. 50 The mixture of respect and helpless worship which Roach felt for Chandler is clearly revealed in the illiterate letters which he penned to his sponsor. One of the last acts of the Republican Congress in March 1883 was the authorizing of the construction of three steel cruisers for the navy. Chandler immediately gave the entire contract for such construction to John Roach. 51 Contrary to the somewhat accepted belief John Roach did not make money out of these contracts. He had to struggle against too many difficulties such as government inspectors, inadequate facilities and finally continually changing specifications as presented by various naval officials. 52 Roach knew that a Democratic administration would cause him still more trouble and so importuned Chandler to dispense with additional Boards of Advisors since they always caused more delay by more new

49 Chandler Mss., W. J. Mitcheson to S. J. Randall, December 17, 1883; Ibid., Mitcheson to Randall, December 31, 1883.
50 Nevins, op. cit., 218, 219.
51 Idem.
The Democratic leaders and press felt that somehow the money appropriated for John Roach's "steal" cruisers would not find its way into his hands. Chandler's reputation and his close connections with the jobbing element in his party sustained this suspicion. It is probable that if the Republican campaign fund were to benefit by the naval appropriation that such money would come from the auxiliary and subsidiary contracts which were let for the completion of the ordnance and armaments of the ships. On February 11, 1884, Chandler sent a memorandum to a Republican Congressman, W. H. Caulkins, which contained a list of the ordnance requirements of the new steel ships totalling $2,770,427. Just previous to that date the House Appropriations committee had recommended $168,000 as the proper figure. Here was the opportunity for campaign contributions since these ordnance contracts would be let to a number of steel companies. That same week Chandler sent word to Speaker Carlisle asking for a deficiency appropriation of $267,577 for repairs on seven old ships. In March Chandler cabled James Gordon Bennett, then at Nice, France, asking his support in the New York Herald for the program of naval construction. He received a favorable answer the next day. Chandler's correspondence.

53 Ibid., Roach to Chandler, June 15, 1883; Ibid., Roach to Chandler, July 8, 1884.
54 Ibid., Chandler to W. H. Caulkins, February 11, 1884.
55 Ibid., February 2, 1884.
56 Ibid., Chandler to James Gordon Bennett, March 26, 1884.
respondence with Commodore J. E. Jowett shows that a definite campaign of lobbying was being directed against the Democratic Congressmen including even Speaker Carlisle. 57

With such a multitude of suspicions and rumors flying around Randall's committee cut down Chandler's estimate to $14,263,196; the House passing the bill in that approximate form on March 6, 1884. 58 The Senate committee reported the House bill to the Senate on March 31, with many changes including $400,000 for armaments of the new cruisers and $2,000,000 for the completion of the double-turreted monitors. The House had refused to build more new steel vessels asked for by Arthur and Chandler but the Senate gave $2,500,000 for this purpose. 59 The lines of battle between the House and Senate were thus clearly drawn. At this point Congressman Hewitt came to the rescue of the Democrats with a startling discovery. He visited the Treasurer of the United States and found that $40,000 which Chandler had received by the sale of old naval equipment had not been "covered" into the Treasury but stood on call subject to Chandler's personal check. 60 Chandler had to talk fast but was never successful in fully explaining away this charge.

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57 Ibid., J. E. Jowett to Chandler, February 7, 1884.
58 House Journal, March 6, 1884.
59 Nation, April 3, 1884.
60 World, April 27, 1884; Chandler Mss., Memorandum on pages of Congressional Record for April 25; Chandler Mss., A. U. Wyman to Chandler, April 29, 1884.
The argument continued through May and June with no signs of weakening by either group. On July 1, 1884, Randall submitted the report of the conference committee to the House, announcing an inability to agree. The chief items of disagreement, he said, had been the work on the new cruisers, and on the double-turreted monitors. Nothing but an instruction from the House would induce the House conferees to recede on these two points. This refusal to agree was sustained by the House by the heavy majority of 90-147. When the conference report was reported to the Senate it too insisted upon its position. The question was thus forced to lie over until the next session, and the navy department had to struggle along on an appropriation of only $8,859,817 which was allocated mostly for pay-roll purposes.

During the summer Chandler tried to soothe Randall's ruffled temper by inviting him to take part in a memorial service for the Greely expedition to be held at Portsmouth early in August. In fact this same invitation was sent to key men on the House and Senate committees who were "interested in the affairs of the navy." Randall surprised many by appearing on the same platform with Chandler at Portsmouth and eulogizing Chandler's activities in connection with the rescue of the

61 Congressional Record, July 1, 1884.
62 Ibid., July 2, 1884.
63 Chandler Mss., Randall to Chandler, July 29, 1884; Ibid., J. E. Dow to Chandler, July 30, 1884.
Greely expedition. When the speech was printed as a government document, Randall edited his manuscript so as to delete these words of praise.64

Late in November 1884, just before the opening of the second session of Congress, Chandler sent W. H. Jaques, his private messenger and secretary, on an excursion to visit the various iron and steel works in Pennsylvania to get a line on the situation. On November 21, he reported back from Philadelphia that Senators Hawley and Morgan as well as Congressmen Randall, Crisp, and Reed were in Philadelphia examining ordnance plants themselves.65

When the House met, the struggle was again taken up with the Senate on the question. The Senate wished to continue discussion on the basis of the bill of the preceding session but Randall insisted on a new bill which might be revised to suit the new circumstances.66 Temporary Naval bills were passed to carry the Navy through January, then another for February, and on the last day of the session the House still opposing the new steel cruisers, the Senate gave in. Randall had won a fight lasting over a year.

Other appropriations in the short session were passed after typical Randall revision, except in the case of Pensions,

64 Ibid., J. R. Soley to Chandler, October 18, 1884.
65 Ibid., W. H. Jaques to Chandler, November 21, 1884.
66 World, December 21, 1884.
where a $60,000,000 estimate was cut only $24,000. 67 The Rivers and Harbors bill was cut from an estimated $34,500,000 to an actual $11,399,200. 68 The Sundry Civil bill was cut over $10,000,000 from an original figure of $32,000,000. 69 These appropriations bills accumulating at the end of the session seemed to threaten an extra session, especially as long as the deadlock on the Navy question continued. Randall went without sleep during the last 36 hours of the session, even though he was a very sick man, and later was forced to spend a month recuperating from the strain. In the midst of these hectic last hours he took up the question of ex-President Grant being restored to the rank of General so as to aid him in his recent financial embarrassments. Although opposed by some Democrats he was able to drive the amendment through.70

Appropriations were handled with much less difficulty under the Cleveland Administration. Still at the close of the first session Randall sent Cleveland a letter reviewing the past session and pointing out his desires for the future.

Referring to a recent conversation with you touching the preparation, by the several executive Departments of the annual estimates for the expenses of the Government, I desire respectfully to call your attention to the enclosed printed statement, prepared for the use of the committee on Appropriations, concerning the estimates for the fiscal year 1887, which were

67 Ibid., January 7, 1885.
68 Ibid., January 18, 1885.
69 Ibid., February 24, 1885.
70 Pomerantz, 158.
submitted to Congress at its session just closed. An examination of this statement discloses the following facts:

The estimates for the expenses of the Government for the fiscal year 1887, were greater than those for 1886, by $11,470,652.35; they exceeded the appropriations made for 1886 $55,730,070.80; they were in excess of the estimated revenues for 1887 $24,589,552.34; and they were reduced by Congress, as shown by, the total of thirteen regular appropriation bills $31,667,166.54.

I submit that these facts are worthy of your most careful attention and that of the Heads of the several Executive Departments.

The great disparity between the sums total of the Estimates annually submitted to Congress and the amounts voted is anomalous and cannot be accounted for on any ground except that the Departments annually ask for much larger sums for conducting the Government than they expect will be granted and than are necessary for the economical and efficient administration of the Government.

I am strongly convinced that there should be a radical change from the present method of preparing the annual estimates of expenditures, and that for the fiscal year 1888, every item submitted should receive the careful scrutiny and approval of the Head of the Executive Department submitting the same and should be based solely upon the actual needs of the public service. 71

A few days before Randall gave a long speech in the House reviewing the record of his committee and speaking in a similar vein. 72 An ominous trend appeared in the rapidly growing Pensions appropriations which during that year reached $75,-000,000. In the short session Randall fought hard to get reductions in the Navy bill and again made the Republican Senate eat dirt on the question. He also refused to let the Deficiency and Fortifications bills go through because the Senate

71 Cleveland Miss., Randall to Cleveland, August 7, 1886.
72 Congressional Record, August 4, 1886.
amendments were incredibly high.  

After all this fine record of economy spread over more than two decades, Randall's brain seemed to slip a cog. He actually supported the Dependent Pension bill, even over the veto of President Cleveland. What explanation can be offered for his support of a measure which contained possibilities of great fraud but above all would cost the American people millions of dollars? Randall changed his mind very suddenly on this question. He had opposed just such a bill many times and now supported it with a rabid determination. He may have felt the continued pressure of the Grand Army in its campaign for such a bill. He was losing his political support at home and in Congress. Such a course may have seemed to him to be an easy method of continuing in power. But Randall was not the type of man who would act from such motives. He acted as though he felt that he had been deceived and now wanted to strike back at his deceivers. How had he been deceived? Rumors had been flying about for three or four years that he was to be read out of his party because of his tariff stand. Yet not only was he retained but was allowed to occupy a position of real power. Why? One very good explanation is that the low-tariff men of his party realized that their best argument in their campaign for tariff reform was the existence of a huge surplus in the Treasury. As long as that surplus existed,  

73 Ibid., March 1-4, 1887.
they had oratorical ammunition for their theory. When it disappeared their trump card was gone. Randall's passion for economy and his skill in managing the House and his committee guaranteed the existence of that surplus. He did not sense the roots of his power over such men as Carlisle, Morrison, and Mills, or at least did not show such knowledge until after Cleveland & Co. turned on him. He immediately struck back with a variety of weapons, one of which was an attempt to spend the surplus by one big splurge of extravagance.

Such a disappointing end to Randall's appropriations work should not cause us to undervalue his work. He continued in the Fiftieth Congress, working with his committee although the state of his health prevented much strenuous work. The habits of a lifetime of public service reasserted themselves and helped him to continue the fight for a decent, reasonable, orderly system of governmental finance.
Before beginning a detailed discussion of Randall and the tariff, some of his convictions which are related to the subject should be clearly set forth. First, Randall was a Jeffersonian Democrat in his aversion to too much government and bureaucracy. As such he despised the entire Internal Revenue system because it necessitated a large staff of agents and gave these agents an opportunity for what he called "inquisitorial taxation." Such taxation was direct taxation which fell on the most common of everyday commodities such as tea, coffee, sugar, salt, tobacco and whisky. He may have been used by protectionists who saw that a huge revenue from such sources would endanger their tariff schedules, but Randall was sincere in his abhorrence of the whole system. Secondly, he honestly believed that a large portion of the benefits of protection were passed on to labor in the form of higher wages and better living conditions. Not until later in life did he sense that a large portion of the benefits from any raise in tariff schedules remained in the pockets of the grasping industrialists. Still, by that time other considerations made him cling to his course of action. Thirdly, Randall clearly saw that the tariff was a dangerous political issue. For the
sake of his party's future he tried to commit it to a policy of "not disturbing the system." This was especially true just before the elections of 1880 and 1884. It is appropriate to mention here that he felt that his success in preventing the tariff from being an issue in the campaign of 1884 was one of his greatest accomplishments which really contributed tremendously to Grover Cleveland's victory over James G. Blaine.

Fourthly, Randall preached a doctrine which he called "incidental protection." This called for a tariff high enough to carry the cost of operating the government, but to be arranged with such care and foresight that incidental protection would be supplied to those industries which really needed it. It should be admitted that such a tariff policy could only be a sweet dream in the midst of American industrial development in the latter half of the 19th century. But Randall knew so little about the tariff and was so naive on the ways of the protectionist lobby that he could sincerely believe in such a dream. Finally, Randall came from Whig ancestry and represented a highly industrialized community. If then, he ever strayed from the path of protection in his thinking and speeches, he found himself voting for most tariff bills as a political necessity. He could rationalize his opposition to Morrison's, Carlisle's, and Cleveland's attempts to lower the tariff by classifying their reform tariffs as scatter-brained schemes from the brains of those who did not understand the
needs of the industrial sections of the country.

All such generalizations cannot hide the fact that Randall more often than not followed the dictates of protection, but they should serve to point out that he was not the "high-priest of protection," he was not a typical, hard-shelled Pennsylvania Republican on the tariff question. The tariff issue brought him what little space he fills in the standard histories of the period, but it also caused his Waterloo. His inability to cope with the issue brought about his political downfall and deprives him of a position among the first-rank statesmen of the period.

In 1873 a general 10% reduction in tariff schedules was passed. Early in 1875 the "lame-duck" Congress restored that 10%, giving the depression in industry as an excuse. Randall and every other Pennsylvania Congressman except Storm voted for the restoration.\(^1\) By this act all the fruits of the struggle of the tariff reformers since the Civil War went for naught.

When Randall became Speaker in December 1876, Morrison gave up his plans for tariff reform during that session and took charge of the investigating committee which visited Louisiana. His tariff had been introduced during the preceding session of Congress but the selection of such a protectionist for Speaker told him that any tariff such as his which

\(^1\) Times, February 21, 1875.
called for reductions averaging a third would never pass the House. If Randall had any doubts as to the importance of protection to his home city they were dispelled by a statistical pamphlet which circulated during the summer of 1876 and showed that Philadelphia industries had gained $25,000,000 in capital value since 1872, even during the depression, and showed yearly profits of $30,000,000 as well as total capital value of a half billion dollars.

Randall's committee appointments for the Forty-Fifth Congress showed that his ideas on protection had not changed, since he demoted Morrison in order to draw up a semi-protectionist Ways and Means committee with Fernando Wood as chairman. Wood presented a tariff which called for a general 20% reduction on the majority of items. Randall's home state would not stand for such a schedule and said so forcibly by means of various public demonstrations and protest meetings. At first Randall saw nothing wrong with the bill; he actually came out flatly with the statement that he would not oppose the bill. By the end of April Randall had begun to hedge on the question, and on May 7 found himself in a tight spot when a tie vote appeared on the question of consideration of the

2 World, December 11, 1876.
3 Record, July 28, 1876.
4 World, January 31, 1878.
5 Times, February 10, 1878.
6 Record, April 1, 1878.
7 Ibid., April 29, 1878.
Wood bill. Randall did not want to vote at all, so persuaded some of his friends to change their vote from "no" to "yes" thus providing for consideration of the bill. Later in May Randall attended the Democratic convention in Pittsburgh, and had lunch with some leading manufacturers. This group possibly gave him some elementary instruction on the vices of the Wood bill, since when he returned, he recognized Ben Butler on June 5 who moved to strike out the enacting clause of the bill. This vote was carried by vote of 134-121 with 8 Democrats from Pennsylvania voting aye.

Early in July 1878 Randall gave two public speeches on the tariff, the first in Philadelphia on July 1 and the other in New York on July 2. In Philadelphia he ended his words with a tirade against free trade, but in New York he was so much more friendly to the idea of reasonable tariff reform that he was accused of double-dealing. The Philadelphia Record even proposed to defeat him for renomination on the grounds that he was not sufficiently concerned with the industrial interests of the city.

During the remainder of Randall's speakership there was no attempt at complete tariff revision. Occasionally such schedules as sugar were considered, but the growing demands of some members of Randall's party went unanswered. The only

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8 Ibid., May 8, 1878; World, May 8, 1878.
9 Congressional Record, June 5, 1878.
10 Record, July 1, 6, 1878.
definite triumph for the reformers was the removal of the tax on quinine in July 1879. Randall's Ways and Means committee of the Forty-Sixth Congress had some "tariff-for-revenue" men such as Carlisle, Mills and Morrison, but Wood was retained as chairman to keep them from becoming too exuberant.

In March 1880 Townshend of Illinois tried quietly to slip in some changes in tariff laws on printing paper, type and salt by means of a routine request to amend certain sections of the Revised Statutes. He was successful in having his request referred to the committee on Revision of Laws. The next day, after the trick was discovered, Garfield moved to amend the journal so as to have Townshend's request referred to the committee on Ways and Means. An attempt was made to lay Garfield's motion on the table. Randall aided Garfield by his rulings and helped round up enough protectionists to carry Garfield's motion and have the motion of Townshend stifled.

This action of Randall caused a great howl from Carlisle, Blackburn and Company. In the spring of 1880 Senator Eaton of Connecticut introduced a bill to create a tariff commission composed of persons not members of Congress. This was passed by the Senate but the House refused to take any action. In November 1881 a

12 Record, March 24, 25, 26, 1880.
great tariff convention was held in New York composed mostly of manufacturers who wanted to revise the tariff by means of a commission. Such staunch protectionists as Joseph Wharton favored such a plan. In December President Arthur asked for some type of tariff commission and was echoed by his Secretary of the Treasury. Randall seemed to think that here was the answer to his dream of an ideal tariff. He became so interested in the plan that he spattered the pages of the Congressional Record with demands that the whole tariff be revised at once. On February 7 Randall cast the deciding vote in the Committee on Ways and Means in favor of reporting the Tariff Commission bill to the House, being the only Democrat on the committee who so voted.

On May 5 Randall, speaking to the House in favor of the bill, recognized that there was a pressing demand for the reduction of the tariff and revenue taxation due to the growth of the Treasury surplus. He came out strongly for total abolition of the entire internal revenue system and an "equalization of duties on imports," saying that no one who understood the present situation of the tariff laws could deny the justice of a revision. He did not favor a tariff for the sake of protection, because he doubted the existence of any constitut-

14 Tarbell, op. cit., 100.
15 Idem.
16 Congressional Record, January 6, 1882.
17 Record, February 9, 1882.
tional warrant for such a system, which would be class legislation. Free trade was not a question so long as the government financed itself by import revenues. He favored a commission to investigate all interests -- to establish a "judicious tariff." Congress had a choice only between no action and this bill, which would not mean delay. 18

Such tariff reformers as Mills of Texas opposed the bill on grounds that it was an excuse for delay in revision but it passed the House on May 6 by vote of 151-83 and the Senate on May 8 by vote of 35-19. President Arthur appointed an excellent commission of nine members, only four of whom represented special industrial interests. 19 He gave them instructions to "revise not destroy existing tariff laws on a scale of justice to all interests . . . for the good of the nation." 20 The commission worked throughout the summer and fall, visited many industrial centers, interviewed 604 witnesses and finally reported to Congress in December asking for an average cut of 25% in import duties. 21

Meanwhile the mid-term elections of 1882 were held with a distinct Democratic victory which gave that party a majority of 77 in the House. In the course of the campaign Randall attended a Democratic mass meeting at the Academy of Music in

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18 Congressional Record, May 5, 1882.
19 Tarbell, 101.
20 Stanwood, 11, 205.
21 Tarbell, 103-04.
Brooklyn. The main purpose of the meeting was the ratification of the nomination of Grover Cleveland as Governor of New York. Randall thus had an opportunity to praise a man of whom he knew but little, yet Randall's description of Cleveland as the heir to the Tilden-Robinson tradition was not far wrong. Randall's speech on this occasion has been considered one of his very best. He reviewed the expenditures of the past Congress. Again he called for abolition of the internal revenue system; he criticised the locking up of $300,000,000 of circulating medium by the continued existence of the surplus; he promised businessmen that they had nothing to fear from a Democratic Congress and pointed out that the last year had seen a $150,000,000 favorable balance of trade become an unfavorable $5,000,000. His cure for that was reduced government expenditures. He completed his discourse by reviewing the comparative records of the Republican and Democratic parties in the matter of acquiring and squandering public lands. He actually sounded a warning that the frontier lands could not last forever.22

Immediately after the election the New York World conducted a series of interviews with Democratic leaders who were in the public eye as the result of their good fortune in the elections. This list included Governor-elect Pattison of Pennsylvania, Governor-elect Cleveland of New York, Senator

22 World, November 4, 1882.
MacDonald of Indiana, Representative Carlisle of Kentucky, Senator Bayard of Delaware and Randall. Similar questions were asked each man in an attempt to get the opinion of the party on questions of finance and tariff. Carlisle promised a definite revision of the tariff laws in the interests of the consumers. He also admitted that he would probably be a candidate for the speakership and expected the support of the Western members. 23

Randall was interviewed at his summer home in Berwyn, Pennsylvania, just outside of Philadelphia. Most of his opinions were repetitions of his Brooklyn speech, but he went into greater detail on his animosity against the internal revenue system. His words on the tariff are of real importance in showing his beliefs at the time:

One important source of revenue was to be secured by a wise reform of customs duties and imports. He believed that a thorough reform and simplification of the tariff laws was necessary and should be proceeded with as speedily as possible. These laws were enacted during war times and are not adapted to existing conditions of our commerce and trade. "I do not favor a tariff enacted upon the ground of protection simply for the sake of protection, because I doubt the existence of any constitutional warrant for such construction or the grant of any such power. It would manifestly be in the nature of class legislation, and to such legislation, favoring one class at the expense of any other class, I have always been opposed. . . . After our public debt is paid in full, our expenditures can hardly be below $200,000,-000 and if this sum is levied in a businesslike and intelligent manner, it will afford adequate protec-

23 Ibid., November 11, 1882.
tion to every industrial interest in the United States. The assertion that the Constitution permits the levying of duties in favor of protection for the sake of protection is uncalled for an unnecessary. Both are desultory and not involved in any practical administrative policy. . . .” 24

When Congress met for the short session in December 1882 the tariff question was thrown into a great turmoil. President Arthur recommended an enlargement of the free list, a simplification of the schedules of duties upon cotton, iron and steel and a substantial reduction of duties on sugar, molasses, silks, wool and woolen goods. 25 A bill was drawn up and presented to the House based on the report of the Tariff Commission, but "Fig-Iron" Kelley, the chairman of Ways and Means cast it aside and had his own committee draw up a new bill with separate provisions for internal and import revenues, which was reported to the House on January 17, 1883. 26 This bill called for a reduction of approximately 10½ and thus was fought by the Carlisle Democrats as being insufficient. 27 The Senate, dissatisfied with the action of the House, decided to draw up its own bill. In order to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against such action by the Senate, that body had to take an old internal revenue bill and graft on their own tariff bill. 28

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24 Ibid., November 13, 1882.
26 World, January 18, 1883.
27 Tarbell, 118.
28 Ibid., 110, 112.
Randall began to realize that he was in an embarrassing position. Above all else he wanted to get the tariff debate out of the way since each additional day roused his home supporters more and also forced his friends in Congress to take a definite stand on the question. He attempted to explain his own position in an Associated Press interview on February 1, but succeeded only in making some vague generalities about the necessity of bridging the gap between foreign and domestic labor, and also making his own position weaker. He claimed to prefer the Commission bill to the Kelley bill but really liked the Senate bill best of all.29 A World editorial professed to be sorry for Randall's predicament but pointed out that his clinging to the needs of his own district would ruin him politically for higher offices.30

In the course of the debate Randall offered a few amendments calling for reductions as on earthenware and glassware, but with no success.31 When a real test came on the question of reducing the duty on iron-ore and pig-iron Randall and ten other Democrats opposed such reduction.32 He really took little part in the debates, since every time he opened his mouth to speak he was in danger of alienating some of his supporters. As the month of February wore on, talk of a special session

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29 World, February 3, 1883.
30 Idem.
31 Record, February 7, 1883.
32 World, February 8, 1883; House Journal, February 7, 1883.
grew with the continued deadlock on the tariff issue.\textsuperscript{33} Such a happening would be disastrous to Randall's speakership aspirations, since public opinion was lining up behind Carlisle, Springer, and Morrison as they fought each item of the Kelley Tariff and forced the Republicans to go on record as favoring the high rates.

On February 19 an attempt was made to separate the internal revenue sections from the remainder of the Kelley bill and pass them by a suspension of the rules. These sections abolished all internal revenue taxes on tobacco, snuff, cigars and cigarettes. Thus Randall was bound to favor such a plan. The motion was defeated by a vote of 162-97 since the necessary two-thirds was lacking. \textsuperscript{47} Democrats joined Randall in voting for this measure including Congressmen from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, West Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Ohio.\textsuperscript{34}

The next day the Senate tariff bill passed the Senate and was sent to the House.\textsuperscript{35} The Carlisle Democrats criticised it but figured that it was too good to obstruct. Kelley blocked every attempt to get it off the Speaker's table\textsuperscript{36} until Tom Reed brought in his peculiar rule which has been mentioned be-

\textsuperscript{33} World, February 8, 1883.
\textsuperscript{35} James A. Barnes, John G. Carlisle, Financial Statesman (New York, 1931), 59.
\textsuperscript{36} Tarbell, 123.
fore. Randall demanded the yeas and nays on Reed's new rule, but when appointed to the conference committee he refused to serve. His excuse was that he could do himself, his State, his party, and his country a better service by keeping out of such a muddle than by lending himself to such so-called deliberations. When the committee met, the House members presented the view of the constitutional rights of the House to originate revenue bills, whereupon the Democratic Senators refused to serve. After the appointment of two Republicans the conference committee hurried through a report which passed the House 152–116. In this vote 19 Democrats including Randall supported the bill. He was far from satisfied with it but did not want to force an extra session by defeating it.

The canvass for the speakership had really begun in November 1882 when a World reporter had squeezed from Carlisle the admission that he would be a candidate. In December 1882 and January of 1883 Blackburn of Kentucky raised a fuss because of the candidacy of his fellow Kentuckian but by September he was interested only in being the next Senator from his state. Cox of New York put in his perennial bid for the position but few people took him seriously. The issue in the canvass was clear cut. The Democrats had to decide whether they would follow Randall who considered the Kelley Tariff as

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37 World, March 1, 1883.
38 Stanwood, II, 216.
39 World, December 17, 1882, January 2, 1883.
final and was opposed to any re-opening of the question, or
Carlisle who wished unrestricted discussion and further action
on the subject.

Many new factors had entered the picture since Randall's
last election to the Speakership in 1879. First, the mass of
the caucus strength now lay in the South and West while in
1879 it was in the Northern states. Secondly, the new Con-
gress was to be composed of many new men who had never been
under Randall's personal spell or felt the sting of his party
lash. Thirdly, Randall's reputation as a Moses who would lead
the Democratic party to victory under the banner of Tilden had
been badly damaged by the events of 1880. Fourthly, most of
Randall's lieutenants in Congress who had aided him in the
canvass of 1879 had died off, been defeated, or gone over to
the Carlisle camp. Thus he had to depend on his friends from
Pennsylvania who were outsiders. Finally, Randall's sorry and
pitiful dodging on the tariff question had lost him many per-
sonal friends who had previously respected his intellectual
courage and determination.

The intimate details of events during the summer and fall
months are not necessary for an understanding of the result.
Randall gave a speech in Cleveland, Ohio on October 5 in which
he reviewed his position but making no new contributions. The
very statistics which he quoted were the same as those used in
his Brooklyn speech of the year before.\textsuperscript{40} Carlisle arrived in Washington some three weeks before the meeting of the caucus.\textsuperscript{41} Randall had a bad attack of the gout in his right leg which kept him home until November 17. He was interviewed by press correspondents at his Berwyn home, who reported him confident that the recent elections in Virginia and Pennsylvania had strengthened his chances of victory. He seemed little worried and very cheerful.\textsuperscript{42}

The last week before the caucus was a hectic one in Washington. Again all types of "interests" flocked to the Randall banner, some because they wanted to prevent any regulation of interstate commerce. Carlisle was elected on the first ballot by vote of Carlisle 104, Randall 53, and Cox 31.\textsuperscript{43} The first real test came in the defeat by 75-113 of Nicholson's motion to vote by ballot.\textsuperscript{44} This method would have given some of the time-servers a chance to vote for Randall, but an open viva voce vote prevented such.

Burr W. Jones, a Democratic Congressman from Wisconsin wrote W. H. Vilas a lengthy description of the speakership contest which very thoroughly summarizes the factors involved and gives the personal flavor of the scene. Jones' letter was as follows:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., October 6, 1883.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., November 12, 1883.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., November 15, 1883.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., December 2, 1883.
\textsuperscript{44} Idem.
\end{quote}
I was gratified to receive your letter for several reasons and especially pleased that you enjoyed so much our action in electing Mr. Carlisle. There was great pressure here from the so-called "business interests" in behalf of Randall, but the business interests seemed to be confined mostly to Pennsylvania, at least the men who filled the corridors of the hotels and talked loudly for Mr. Randall seemed generally to hail from Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. But although they came in crowds and although their talk was in turn boastful and threatening, their conduct seemed to only intensify the feeling on the other side. I noticed in talking with the various members one general sentiment which shows that the tariff question has come to stay. The idea was this and it was expressed by many of the old members: that the sentiment was such in their states that they did not dare vote for Mr. Randall although for many reasons they would like to do so. This idea was expressed by many who in former contests had been Randall's lieutenants and helpers and who were closely bound to him by ties of friendship and obligation. Carlisle received many votes from members who personally would have preferred Randall because in private conversation they admitted that they voted for Carlisle not because they thought it would be most likely to bring success in 84 but because they had to yield to the home feeling. Randall's hope lay in the expectation that the votes would be by ballot in the caucus and that the time servers would be thus relieved from responsibility. It was fortunate and pleasant to the friends of Carlisle that the motion for a viva voce vote was made by Dorsheimer and in the interest of Cox. It seemed to me at the time a very important matter for Carlisle's interests and the result proved this to be pretty nearly a test vote.45

Speaker Carlisle proceeded to appoint Morrison to the chairmanship of Ways and Means, with instructions to carry out the promises of the "tariff-for-revenue" reformers. Instead of dallying with extensive committee hearings to draw up a new schedule based on adjustments and simplification, this commit-

45 Vilas Mss., B. W. Jones to Vilas, December 9, 1883.
tee presented an absurd effort which is known as "the First Morrison Tariff." It called for a 20\% flat reduction on all schedules with the exception that no schedule should fall below the duty which was charged on it by the Morrill Tariff of 1861. Such a tariff was a confession of weakness and a real threat to business stability because of its patent unevenness. Here was a tariff bill which Randall could oppose with delight. It contained all the defects of which he had warned and was an easy target for any satirical orator.

Many leading Democrats early voiced their opposition to the bill, even such low-tariff men as Senator J. Sterling Morton recognized that it would probably be defeated on the floor of the House. Carlisle did not help his cause any by his address at the Free Trade Club in New York on March 17, 1884. Although his speech was conservative and intelligent, his very presence at such a gathering gave him and his supporters the appearance of being wild-eyed, British free-traders.

A Democratic caucus on the Morrison bill was held on March 25 with all but ten of the Democratic Congressmen present. It was decided by vote of 114-57 to take up the bill and pass it, but the members were considered only as morally bound to abide by the caucus decision. In other words those who op-

46 Barnes, 78.
47 \underline{Vilas Mss.}, J. Sterling Morton to Vilas, February 28, 1884; \underline{Ibid.}, J. Sterling Morton to Vilas, March 6, 1884.
48 \underline{World}, March 18, 1884.
posed the bill would not be subjected to party discipline. This loop-hole was a real victory for the Randall bloc which composed exactly one-third of the caucus vote. Morrison also promised in caucus that the taxes on tobacco and peach jack would be reduced as a gesture of friendliness towards those who opposed the internal revenue taxes.\textsuperscript{49} This offer of Morrison brought immediate fruit on March 27 when the Bonded Whisky bill was defeated by vote of 185-83. This bill proposed to give the largest distillers who had been unfortunate enough to produce an excess supply, a longer time in which to pay their taxes and thus still further reduce the immediate income from the internal revenue taxes.\textsuperscript{50}

On April 7 Converse of Ohio moved to restore the old rate on wool. This was a direct challenge to the low tariff Democrats and was just barely defeated by vote of 119-126 with the large number of 77 not voting. Again the Randall bloc showed considerable strength, totalling 39 votes as well as 13 more who were paired or absent. On this vote Pennsylvania, Ohio, and California voted solidly in favor of the restoration.\textsuperscript{51}

A continuance of such strength was liable to defeat even consideration of the Morrison bill. The vote on consideration was called for Tuesday, April 15. On the preceding Saturday\textsuperscript{52}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{49} \textit{Nation}, March 27, 1884.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Ibid., April 3, 1884.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Tilberg, 49.
\item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{World}, April 14, 1884.
\end{itemize}
Randall left for a trip to New York to visit Tilden. On his return trip he fell sick in Philadelphia and was unable to be in Washington until Tuesday morning. 53 His absence was fatal to his cause and Morrison succeeded in winning the consideration vote by a count of 140-138. 54 Some of the Ohio Congressmen who had voted with Randall on the Converse bill now left him. Also Morrison had the good fortune to receive 10 votes from mid-western Republicans. 55

Possibly by accident but more probably by design Randall managed to have his committee on Appropriations report the Pension bill to the House just two days later. 56 Such a move when followed by other appropriation bills placed many Congressmen at his mercy since many of them had pet interests in various appropriations which stood in danger of being blighted if Randall should turn against them. Very little has ever been produced to prove this charge that Randall’s handling of his appropriation bills was meant to be a threat but it cannot be denied that in the Forty-Eighth, Fortieth-Ninth, and Fiftieth Congresses he brought in his appropriation bills at just about the same time that tariff bills were under consideration.

Morrison was wise enough not to fight Randall on the question but waited over two weeks before seeking a final vote

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53 Barnes, 81; Tilberg, 51; World, April 16, 1884.
54 House Journal, April 15, 1884.
55 Tilberg, 51.
56 Congressional Record, April 17, 1884.
on his bill. On May 6 Morrison made his final bid for success. He spoke for forty minutes with no manuscript, cheeks flushed, in a rasping thin voice. Randall had preceded him with a masterly review of the problem. He read from a manuscript and had to keep his eyes rather close to the paper because of near-sightedness, yet received much praise for his effort. His arguments were definite and sensible. He warned that capital and business is very sensitive to any changes in the tariff. The bill under discussion was based on no principle but guessing and action for the sake of action. Such an issue should have been kept out of the picture during a Presidential year. He spoke out plainly of his fear that if this bill were passed the Democrats would be unable to carry the states of Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania with their working populations of 1,100,000.

When the vote was taken Morrison had lost by vote of 156-151 with 4 paired votes. Randall and his "Forty Thieves" voted with the Republicans to defeat the cherished plan of Morrison and Carlisle. Within a week Randall realized that the reform element had not given up all thought of discussing the question since Hewitt introduced a bill of his own which called for reductions running from 10 to 20%. Both groups

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57 *World*, May 7, 1884.
58 *Congressional Record*, May 6, 1884.
59 *House Journal*, May 6, 1884.
60 *Nation*, April 17, 1884.
turned their eyes towards the Chicago convention, Randall determined to fight for a non-committal plank on the question and the reformers sure that they could push through an unequivocal reform plank.

At the Pennsylvania Democratic convention at Allentown on April 9, a platform had been adopted which contained the "Ohio tariff plank," viz: Randall's idea of "incidental protection." The convention voted to cast its solid vote for Randall for President at the Chicago convention. William A. Wallace, Randall's old enemy, was made chairman of the delegation to Chicago with W. L. Scott and W. U. Hensel assisting him.61

The Morrison-Carlisle Democrats started a campaign to rouse the entire west and south to combat the Tilden-Randall influence in their party. Yet the fact remained that approximately one-third of their party seemed to disapprove of the idea of making the tariff an issue. The nomination of Blaine created a division in the Republican party and pointed very strongly to the necessity of the Democrats nominating somebody with a pure record of public service. After Tilden withdrew from the race, Randall's candidacy seemed to take on real proportions,62 but more and more each day the finger of fate was pointing at Grover Cleveland, Governor of New York. Tilden's close friend Daniel Manning was managing for Cleveland. He

61 Idem.
62 World, June 12, 1884.
had real difficulties in lining up the New York delegation but succeeded in doing so just before the convention met. Tilden and Manning were decidedly protectionists. Cleveland was not to make up his mind on the question for two years to come. Thus Randall's hopes for a "straddling" tariff plank in the platform looked to be well founded.

Randall's real struggle took place in the resolutions committee. His cohorts were so well organized and officered that their victory was won before Randall himself arrived at Chicago. On July 8 the committee met to organize. The reformers nominated Morrison and the Randallites, Converse. Two ballots each resulted in a tie vote, 19-19. North Carolina, Alabama, Georgia and Missouri unexpectedly voted protectionist, although Hewitt of New York was voting with the reformers. Finally the committee decided to make Malcolm Hay, of Pittsburgh, the temporary chairman, until after the platform was completed. A sub-committee of eight worked 24 hours on the tariff plank and finally reported a "straddle plank" which was pleasing to Randall's eyes. In the Resolutions committee itself this report was ratified after the extreme wings on each side had tried to offer substitutes. Morrison was then chosen chairman and given the opportunity to appear before the convention. The platform also contained some criticism of the internal

63 Tilberg, 60.
64 World, July 11, 1884.
revenue taxes as "war taxes," which again must have pleased Randall. In fact the entire platform reads like the Allentown platform which Randall had forced through his own state convention. Thus the Republicans were robbed of an issue which would have aided them tremendously in their coming campaign.

Randall's personal candidacy for President deserves some mention. Early in the convention A. K. McClure and Hensel talked things over with Manning and received enough promises to cause them to wire Randall, asking him to come to Chicago immediately. He arrived on the morning of July 11 and went directly to McClure's room where he had a secret conference alone with Manning.65 Within a few hours the word went out to Randall's supporters to vote for Cleveland on the second ballot. When the second roll-call began the Pennsylvania delegation asked leave to withdraw for conference. On their return they voted for Cleveland, thus starting the stampede which resulted in his nomination.66 The actual bargain struck between Randall and Manning is not known but the course of later events would seem to show that Randall was promised control of federal patronage in Pennsylvania.

Randall was used extensively by the Democratic National Committee for speaking engagements in the campaign of 1884.

65 A. K. McClure, Our Presidents and How We Make Them (New York, 1900), 293.
66 Denis T. Lynch, Grover Cleveland, A Man Four-Square (New York, 1932), 206.
He began his tour with a swing up New York State in late July and early August, then visited Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Boston, Narragansett, Rhode Island, then home to Philadelphia for a few days in September. He soon left for an extended tour of Ohio where he gave 13 speeches, many of them in the Congressional districts of some of his protectionist supporters. A short journey into Virginia in early October was followed by an appearance at another mass meeting in Brooklyn. He completed the battle by another swing into New York and Connecticut. Cleveland's margin of victory was slim enough but possibly would not have existed at all if the labor elements of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut had not been convinced that the Democrats would not take their jobs away from them or reduce their wages by tinkering with the tariff. Randall's speaking activity centered in those states and Ohio. The National Committee knew where to put such a man to do the most good. Nothing but estimates can be made of Randall's contribution to Cleveland's success but it was considerable. Comparisons may be made with the campaign of 1888 when Randall, sick and also disagreeing with Cleveland and his tariff stand, refused to do any speaking, even though some Democratic leaders asked him to talk to laboring groups. Cleveland's loss of

67 World, August 21, 1884.
68 Ibid., August 29, 1884.
69 Commercial Gazette [Cincinnati], September 4, 1884.
70 World, October 10, 1884.
71 Ibid., October 16, 1884.
New York by a small majority may have been due somewhat to Randall's absence as well as to the back-biting campaign conducted by Governor Hill.

After the election of 1864 Randall took two trips into the Southern States, the first a brief visit to Atlanta, Georgia on November 28, 1864 and the second a month later during the Christmas holidays through the new manufacturing States of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama. There was much speculation at the time as to his purposes in these trips. He always claimed publicly that there was nothing political in them although his opponents charged him with testing his strength for the speakership campaign of 1865. He said that he went in response to the invitation of his many friends. While on these trips he made quite a show about visiting the various gatherings of merchants at Board of Trade receptions, visiting new cotton mills, as well as new iron and coal mines. Northern capital was entering the Tennessee Valley district at just about this time. Randall may easily have been a disguised angel of mercy sent to look over the field for future exploitation.

Still another explanation of these trips is to be found in the idea that Randall was honestly puzzled at the fanatical zeal of the tariff reformers and wanted to visit their home stamping grounds to test public opinion to his own satisfaction.

72 Ibid., November 29, 1864.
tion, with the idea that he might better instruct President Cleveland as to the attitude of the whole country on the question. Finally, it might be admitted that Randall had always been a friend of the South, that he was due to get a royal welcome wherever he went and here was an opportunity to have a vacation trip which would be very pleasant while combining politics and business.

His second trip should be mentioned in some detail.73 Watterson of Louisville, Kentucky, was fanatical in his newspaper campaign against Randall's visit, but all other Democratic leaders of that State, including such "reformers" as Carlisle, Beck, Blackburn, and Turner welcomed him to the region. He was treated handsomely with receptions at way-stations, and huge parades and programs when he arrived in Louisville. In Nashville the natives went Louisville one better with a very extensive program, which included a visit to the widow of President Polk. Randall read the inscription on Polk's tombstone which could well be applied to Randall himself, vix: "His influence and his counsels tended to organize the National Treasury on the principles of the Constitution, and to apply the rule of freedom to navigation, trade, and industry." 74

In Birmingham, Alabama, Randall's reception was in the

73 See World, December 25, 1884 to January 4, 1885; and Commercial Gazette of same dates for details of trip.
74 Commercial Gazette, December 31, 1884.
hands of industrialists, such as J. W. Sloss, President of the Southern and Northern Alabama Railroad, as well as of the Sloss Furnace Company, also Enoch Ensley, President of the Pratt Coal and Iron Company. Randall visited the mines and dined at the Florence Hotel where he was visited by members of the "Jefferson" and "Randall" Clubs. 75 A short stop at Chattanooga on January 3 on the return trip completed his survey. 76 Randall's companions on this trip had been Mrs. Randall and Congressman McAdoo from New Jersey, the latter then holding the post of Randall's most active, responsible, and confidential lieutenant in Congress.

When Congress met again after the holidays, Morrison and Carlisle decided to do nothing about the tariff until after the inauguration of Cleveland. Randall continued his agitation by introducing a resolution which would reduce the duties on whisky and tobacco. 77 The "reformers" let Randall's resolution die in committee, thus pushing the whole question over to the next session of Congress. Randall wrote Cleveland in February asking him to weigh carefully the arguments of the protectionist Democrats. He suggested Converse of Ohio or some other "incidental protectionist" for the cabinet and warned that the last session of Congress as well as the Chicago platform showed very plainly that there were many in the

75 World, January 2, 1885.
76 Ibid., January 4, 1885.
77 Barnes, 85.
party who favored such a doctrine. In the same letter he again urged Manning for the Treasury post, although he was willing to have Vilas in the cabinet because of Cleveland's personal feeling towards Mr. Vilas.78

During the summer of 1885 Randall busied himself with matters of federal patronage in Pennsylvania and indeed in some other states. Early in the fall he announced that he would not oppose Carlisle for the caucus nomination as speaker, but was contented with his present situation. This was a very wise move since Randall was under double fire from the reform element at the time, both because of his tariff stand and his dictatorial handling of appropriations. When Congress met in December Randall and Morrison each continued to head their respective committees. All knew that the fight was not yet over but Randall felt rather confident with the support of 40 members of his party.

In February of 1886 Morrison introduced the so-called "Morrison Surplus Resolution" which was designed to do away with the surplus by requiring the Treasury to employ all of its money over $100,000,000 to buy and destroy government bonds at the rate of $10,000,000 a month.79 Such an idea was not agreeable to President Cleveland since it would cut down the amount of currency in circulation and also interfere with

78 Cleveland Mss., Randall to Cleveland, February 19, 1885.
79 Nevins, 273.
normal banking and credit operations. The measure was debated for four months, coming to a vote on July 14, when it passed the House 207-67 with Randall and 13 other Democrats opposed. Just a few hours before the vote Cleveland wrote Randall asking his help in defeating the measure. The incident is of some value in showing that although Cleveland approved of Morrison's tariff efforts, he recognized the shortcomings of the man and was willing to turn to Randall for assistance in attempting to prevent the passage of such a bill. 80

Morrison reported his second Tariff bill from committee on April 12, 1856. It called for some reductions on sugar, woolens and cotton, placed wool on the free list and was estimated to reduce the revenue by $25,000,000. 81 Cleveland interviewed doubtful Congressmen but made no converts on the subject. No caucus was held for fear of an open break in the party, so great was feeling on the subject. 82 Two months later on June 17, 1856, Morrison moved that the House go into Committee of the Whole to consider his bill. When the yeas and nays had been called Randall was victorious again by a vote of 157-140. 83 The Randallite bloc numbered 36 on this vote but W. L. Scott of Erie, Pennsylvania had left the Randall fold and began to wage a relentless war on the Philadelphia-

80 Ibid., 276.
81 Formarantz, 167.
82 Nevins, 287.
83 House Journal, June 17, 1856.
ian. Others of the reformers were bitterly disappointed and said so in language hardly fit to print.

Randall's practice of continually defeating the tariff recommendations of the Ways and Means committee forced him to offer some type of substitute. After consultation with Congressman McAdoo of New Jersey, and Warner of Ohio, as well as some industrialists, Randall introduced the first Randall bill on June 28, 1886. His bill would reduce the revenue by about $35,000,000, mostly by means of reductions in internal revenue but with a few insignificant tariff changes. It should be pointed out that by now Randall had strayed far from his "reform" stand of the early 1880's on the question. Having plunged into the defense of incidental protection, he now found himself well over in the camp of the complete protectionists. He was driven there by logic and the succession of Morrison bills which caused him to take a definite stand. Within a short time the first Randall bill was singled out by the Ways and Means committee for a scathing report.

In the election of 1886 Morrison was "retired" from Congress by means of some questionable electioneering tactics in his district. The American Iron & Steel Association conducted some very effective manipulation of the voters with the result

84 Idem.
85 Stanwood, II, 225.
86 Congressional Record, June 28, 1886.
87 Ibid., July 10, 1886.
that Morrison returned to the short session in December 1886 as a "lame-duck." He immediately tried to get his bill considered again but still found Randall and his bloc in the way. During the remainder of the short session all efforts at tariff reform were concerned with attempts to please the Randall element.

Randall drew up another tariff meant to catch the Southern Democrats by duties favoring the new industries of the South and by the abolition of tobacco and fruit distillery excise taxes. This tariff was drawn up by Warner, McAdoo, Randall, and Gay of Louisiana, which group came to be known as the Allunde Ways and Means committee. They met in daily conference during the middle of January and presented their bill on January 26, 1887. 88 The bill had a few features which allowed the Republicans to attack it as a "free-trade" measure. The next week was filled with conferences and communications between the Allunde group and Morrison and Carlisle. By February 5, Randall was convinced of the impossibility of a compromise and so with the added signatures of Congressmen Wise and Henderson he sent Carlisle a letter asking him to recognize some Democrat for the purpose of passing a bill to abolish the internal revenue tax on tobacco. These three gentlemen thought that they had made a bargain with Carlisle on the question but found on Monday, February 7, that such was not

88 Pomerantz, 184.
The entire question thus was carried over until the next session of Congress, but before that time Cleveland had practically broken with Randall and laid very excellent plans to push through a new tariff. Mills of Texas was made chairman of the Ways and Means committee and drew up a rather excellent schedule of rates from the standpoint of the tariff reformers. Cleveland's message of December 1887 had roused the people and Congress on the subject. Randall tried again to get his own tariff ideas considered by presenting the third tariff bill on March 12, 1888 as a counterweight to the Mills bill. It was much longer than the Mills bill and would reduce revenue $20,000,000 in tariff customs and $70,000,000 in internal revenue, but it still contained only a short free list and only slightly reduced items on the import list.

On May 18 Randall rose to read his last long speech on the tariff. Of course, he opposed the Mills bill, but his arguments were not new. He repeated the best of his own tariff points culled from speeches of two decades. He was a sick man when he spoke and was unable to attend the House on July 21, when the vote was taken. A fellow Pennsylvanian obtained permission to read a letter from Randall in which he paired his vote against the measure. The vote showed victory for the reformers by a margin of 162-149, with 14 congressmen not voting; ----------------

89 Congressional Record, February 7, 1887.
6 Republicans voted for it and only 4 Democrats, 1 from Pennsylvania and 3 from New York, were against it. The once powerful Randall bloc of 40 to 50 had been reduced to a pitiful 4. It should be noted that if as few as 7 more Democrats had voted nay, the bill would have been defeated. Randall had been home flat on his back for over a month with the dread disease of rectal cancer that was finally to cause his death. When he was forced to leave the floor of the House he still possessed a following of 15. It may not be far wrong to say that it was the absence of Randall's vital personality which allowed the reformers to seduce most of this number into their column.

The passage of the Mills bill meant that the days of Randall's power to prevent tariff legislation were over. He continued to worry about the whole question up to his last days. As he lay in his sick bed he told Representative Harmer of Pennsylvania that, "I would like to live long enough to see who is right on the tariff question, the President or myself." 91

91 *Press*, April 14, 1890.
CHAPTER TEN

RELATIONS WITH CLEVELAND AND PENNSYLVANIA

POLITICS IN THE 1880's

Mention has been made before of Randall's preference for the state of Pennsylvania as the arena of his political activities. To a certain extent he was not at home in the larger sphere of national politics even though he was three times elected Speaker of the House of Representatives. His loyalty to the interests of his home state forced him to forego the opportunity for the real leadership of his party in 1883 when he refused to respond to the pleas of the tariff reformers. Desire to attain complete control of Pennsylvania probably prompted him to his vigorous support of Tilden in 1880. As he once told Chauncey Black, he was the creature of friendship in politics. Thus he enjoyed the thrill of a personal following based on actual contacts. Such a situation was not possible in national politics because of the very size of the stage and the huge number of actors. Since Randall's heart was set on such control of his home state, a detailed analysis of the state political picture in the 1880's is necessary.

Randall came out of his 1880 feud with Wallace in rather fine shape. The defeat of Hancock and the retirement of Wallace from the Senate ended his spell of power over the Demo-

(255)
ocratic forces in the central part of the state. For over a decade his former province of power was fought over by a variety of leaders, thus giving Randall an excellent opportunity to take advantage of the confusion. Early in 1881 the fight between the "county" and "city" machines in Philadelphia was settled with the Randall forces winning their claims and left in a strong position for the future. McGowan, the leader of the regulars, was in such sad repute that resolutions against his action were voted by the Americus Club, a Democratic social club in the city. In September a free for all fight broke out in a meeting of the Democratic city committee over the question of the re-admission of McGowan to membership in the committee. Even though McGowan was successful, the incident showed that the Randall forces were running things in the city.

The State convention of that year was a very quiet affair, held at Williamsport on September 29. Many prominent men of the party were absent including Randall but his excellent friend W. U. Hensel was chosen temporary and eventually permanent chairman of the State committee, a position which he was to hold for a number of years.

Meanwhile the reorganization of the Philadelphia city committee was continuing. Randall's able henchman Squire McMullin was re-elected to the Common Council by a majority of

1 Record, August 4, 1881.
2 Ibid., September 6, 1881.
3 Ibid., September 29, 1881.
360 over John O'Donnell who ran as a representative of the committee of 100, a reform organization then trying to clean up the city. ⁴ This victory was a blow to those members of the Democracy who had seen fit to join hands with the "Reformers" and still further complicated the problem of controlling the city committee. In the midst of such furor Randall was suggested for the chairmanship of the committee, as the only man who could bring harmony. ⁵ Randall was chosen as the committee man from the 6th Ward and McMullin from the 4th, but Randall refused the chairmanship unless harmony were guaranteed before his acceptance. He received some abuse from the local press for such an attitude but his aloofness did serve to quiet the quarrel and allow for the coming of comparative peace and cooperation within the organization. ⁶

As early as January, Randall had boomed Pattison, the city controller of Philadelphia, for the office of Governor, claiming him to be the strongest man in the Democratic party. ⁷ At the Harrisburg convention in June Pattison was nominated for Governor and Chauncey Black for Lieutenant-Governor. Such would seem to be complete Randall victory yet it is difficult to evaluate his share in the convention. The Philadelphia delegation voted nearly solidly for Pattison, led by Ex-

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⁴ Ibid., February 22, 1882.
⁵ Ibid., March 7, 1882.
⁶ The American [Philadelphia], April 1, 1882; Record, March 30, 1882.
⁷ Record, January 17, 1882.
strict-Attorney John Head, Samuel Josephs and William Harrity. Yet Randall's two old friends from the county committee, Vaux and T. M. Pierce, voted for Hopkins who had the support of Malcolm Hay of Pittsburg, Hensel of Lancaster and Singerley, the editor of the Philadelphia Record. Eckley B. Coxe, an unofficial candidate himself, held the balance of power which switched to Pattison and nominated him on the sixth ballot over Hopkins by vote of $126\frac{1}{2}-119\frac{1}{2}$. Coxe then worked for Chauncey Black and had him nominated by vote of $175\frac{1}{2}-73\frac{1}{2}$ over Irwin of Dauphin. Ex-Senator Wallace was not at the convention, but Randall spent the three days closeted in his room at the Bolton House in numerous conferences. The platform called for "protection of the industrial interests of Pennsylvania." The evidence is not conclusive, but it would seem that since Randall had been working for Pattison since January, he possibly had much to do with the final outcome of the deliberations of the convention. 8

Hensel continued as State Chairman, 9 and Harrity was chosen chairman of the Philadelphia city committee. 10 These two gentlemen together with the candidates for the major offices of the State met in Philadelphia at the Girard House on September 19 for a conference with Randall. 11 This meeting of

8 See Record, June 28, 29, 30, 1882, for details of Harrisburg convention.
9 Record, July 12, 1882.
10 Ibid., August 16, 1882.
11 Ibid., September 19, 1882.
worthies was soon followed by Randall's renomination for Congress by acclamation and two personal ovations to Randall in the 6th and the 4th Wards. Election day saw Randall victorious by a majority of 4,000 and a general Democratic success throughout the state which swept Pattison into the Governor's chair. This result was bound to increase and solidify Randall's support, since he had been conspicuous in his support of Pattison for nearly a year. The Democratic party organization was soon changed to a new basis of representation for the coming State convention. Senatorial districts were abolished and each Representative district was given one delegate in the State convention for every 1000 votes cast for Pattison. By this new arrangement Philadelphia received a total of 67 out of 359 which was a much greater proportion than formerly.

Randall attended the Inauguration exercises of Governor Pattison on January 16, 1883, even spending the preceding evening with Pattison, Reed and Cassidy at the home of a mutual friend. Again Hensel was chosen to carry the duties of chairman of the State Democratic committee which now included William F. Harrity of Philadelphia. Pattison's cabinet in-

12 Ibid., September 19, 1882; October 10, 1882.
13 Ibid., October 17, 1882.
14 Ibid., November 9, 1882.
15 Ibid., January 12, 1883.
16 Ibid., January 16, 17, 1883.
17 Ibid., January 17, 1883.
cluded Stenger as Secretary of State, Cassidy of Philadelphia as Attorney-General, and 3. Davis Page as controller of Philadelphia. Randall's hand can be seen as a contributing factor in all of these choices.

The affairs of the Pennsylvania Democrats ran very smoothly during the remainder of the year of 1883, except for an attempt to gerrymander Randall's district which was vetoed by Pattison. In February Randall had complete control of the city machine, nominated Mayor King, secured his endorsement even by reform groups, but saw the Republicans triumphant in the election. Pattison conducted affairs so well that he became a real power in the state, enough so that Randall and his old enemy Wallace had to combine in order to stifle his growing power.

Randall's control of the Allentown convention in April has been mentioned. The adoption of his tariff plank and the complete co-operation of all the Democrats in the State except Pattison placed him squarely in the position of Democratic boss of Pennsylvania, at least during the Cleveland campaign. All the leaders whose names have been mentioned, such as W. L. Scott, Malcolm Hay, William L. Wallace, W. F. Harrity, Lewis C. Cassiday, Samuel Josephs and W. U. Hensel, climbed on the Randall band-wagon. Each may have seen that Randall would

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18 Ibid., January 17, 1883.
19 Fomerantz, 242.
20 Ibid., 140.
probably have the ear of whoever was nominated at Chicago and they wanted to be able to claim their share of the spoils after November.

Randall's share in the selecting of Cleveland's Cabinet was limited to the appointment of Daniel Manning of New York as Secretary of the Treasury. Although he called Cleveland's attention to Converse of Ohio, and to Hancock of Texas, he did not prosecute their claims with any great degree of zeal. Manning was one of the last of the old Tilden Democrats of New York State. Even though he had been Cleveland's manager at Chicago, Randall and Tilden felt called upon to work assiduously for his appointment to the cabinet. Randall wrote to Manning in December asking his presence in New York City for a conference with Tilden. Manning responded with a wire from Ft. Monroe, Virginia, which Randall immediately sent on to Tilden on December 16. The next day Randall felt worried over the size of the "Bayard" boom and fearing such an appointment sent another note to Tilden saying:

Unless you interfere at once & with determination -
I apprehend Mr. B - will be selected as Secy. of Treasury - That means an end of your friends.

Tilden was still somewhat lukewarm to Manning and suggest-

21 Cleveland Lss., Randall to Cleveland, February 19, 1885.
22 Ibid., Randall to Cleveland, January 24, 1885.
23 Tilden Lss., Randall to Tilden, December 16, 1884.
24 Ibid., Manning to Randall, December 16, 1884.
25 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, December 16, 1884.
26 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, December 17, 1884.
ed R. M. McLane of Maryland instead. Randall fell in with the suggestion for the moment but late in January Randall was called to Albany for conference with Cleveland. After spending a day or so with Cleveland Randall returned to Washington only to take another trip to New York City to be there when Cleveland made his visit to the City on February 7th and 8th. Tilden wanted to confer with Randall about the proposed repeal of the silver coinage amendment, as well as other matters. Randall was terribly busy with his appropriation bills, and extra duties due to Speaker Carlisle's sickness, but finally promised to come to Greystone and visit Tilden and Cleveland. Both Tilden and Randall wished to see each other before Cleveland's arrival, so as to properly arrange their case both on the problem on appointments and the question of repeal of the silver coinage act.

Their plans must have worked rather well since on Saturday, February 7, Randall received a wire from Manning "stating that everything was satisfactory and that he need not leave his hotel and go and see Mr. Cleveland again." On February 10 Randall wrote Colonel Lamont, Cleveland's secretary, again urging

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27 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, December 26, 1884.
28 Cleveland Mss., Randall to Cleveland, January 27, 1885.
29 Tilden Mss., Tilden to Randall, February 4, 1885.
30 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, February 4, 1885.
31 Ibid., Randall to Tilden, February 10, 1885.
Mr. Manning as the proper gentleman to be made Secretary of the Treasury. I know of no other man who will so fully meet public expectation and say to him again for me that he must accept is the place is tendered.

I am really in earnest about this matter because it is straight and safe - I fear, the only path through Mr. Cleveland's difficulties in this particular.  

Randall again urged Manning to Cleveland in his letter of February 19th. Manning's final appointment brought security to Randall in his desire to control the many revenue collectorships and deputies in his home state, thus giving him the skeleton on which to build a powerful machine.

On December 1, 1884, President Arthur reported to Congress that for the past six years, annually 27,000,000 silver dollars had been coined. The number now outstanding was reported by the Secretary of the Treasury to be nearly $185,000,000 whereof but little more than $40,000,000 or less than 22% were in actual circulation. Arthur called for immediate suspension of the coinage of silver dollars and issuance of silver certificates. Randall, Tilden and Hewitt became alarmed at this condition and at their conference on February 7 drew up a letter signed by Randall but in the handwriting of one of Tilden's secretaries as follows:

The wisdom and public necessity of a discontinuance of compulsory coinage of bullion into standard sil-

32 Cleveland Mss., Randall to Lamont, February 10, 1885.
33 Ibid., Randall to Cleveland, February 19, 1885.
34 House Journal, 16, 17.
ver dollars as authorized by the act of February 28, 1878 is under discussion in most of our commercial and trade organizations.

There is a wide spread apprehension that the continued coinage of standard silver dollars may bring about financial and trade embarrassment. Under these circumstances, I do not consider it inappropriate that I should ask an expression of your judgment in relation to this subject.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of an amendment which I propose to have inserted in the Bill for the legislative executive and judicial appropriations.35

Randall also sent Cleveland statistics on the total amount of silver dollars in circulation on January 1, 1883, 1884, and 1885, the total silver coin in the Treasury and the total coin to be transferred from the various Mints.36

Cleveland replied to Randall on February 9:

My Dear Sir, -- I have received your letter containing a copy of an amendment in relation to the coinage of silver, which it is purposed should be inserted in a bill now pending in Congress, and asking my judgment upon the subject.

I have some delicacy in saying a word that may be construed by anybody as interfering with the legislation of the present Congress. But so grave do I deem the public emergency that I am willing as a private citizen to say that I think some legislation of the character suggested is eminently desirable.

Very respectfully yours,

Grover Cleveland.37

By February 15 Randall had decided not to show this letter of Cleveland's and gave his reasons in a letter to the President-elect:

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35 Cleveland Mss., Randall to Cleveland, February 8, 1885.
36 Ibid., Randall to Cleveland, February 9, 1885.
I have surveyed the field here as to silver question and while I am willing to go to the front and take the responsibility of the proposition to suspend the coinage for a period, yet I have upon full due reflection - concluded to retain your letter to me and not show it. If I could see you I would explain more fully - but I am without doubt as to the conclusion, I have reached in this matter, that you ought not to be drawn - as you surely would be - if your letter was exhibited, into the public discussion now going on.

I hope you will approve my judgment and if you do I will return letter by Express-

Yours truly

P.S. No human eye has seen this letter - since it came into my possession.38

Randall wrote to W. L. Scott of Erie asking him to come to Washington to help with his proposed amendment to the Civil Appropriation bill which would repeal the silver coinage phase of the Bland-Allison Act.39 Yet by February 24, Randall had become convinced that the matter better be allowed to die since public discussion had placed Cleveland in an embarrassing position just before his inauguration. He promised Cleveland that he would keep his letter of February 9 until he saw him.40 Cleveland was approached by a Congressional delegation led by Warner of Ohio, asking his opinion of the Bland-Allison Act.41 Cleveland answered it about as he had answered Randall on February 9th, but this letter was made public. Within a day or so on February 26 the House handed down its answer, refusing to repeal the silver coinage provisions by a vote of

38 Cleveland Mss., Randall to Cleveland, February 15, 1885.
39 Ibid., W. L. Scott to Lamont, February 17, 1885.
40 Ibid., Randall to Cleveland, February 24, 1885.
41 Lynch, op. cit., 291.
Randall's belated attempt to protect Cleveland from public censure had been useless.

Randall's share in the distribution of the Federal patronage under Cleveland can well be studied in detail. His supposed bargain with Manning at Chicago surely materialized in the events of the first year or so of Cleveland's administration. He seems to have been given absolute control over the largest portion of the Eastern part of Pennsylvania, and at least an advisory share over the appointments in the remainder of his home state. He was not limited to Pennsylvania, since many bits of information come to light which show that he had considerable to say about some appointments in New York, in Louisville, Kentucky, in Iowa, in Washington, D.C., and especially in such federal territories as Utah and Alaska.

Randall used varied methods of approach in exercising his patronage power. During the first year he often wrote to Cleveland directly or interviewed him in person. More often he worked through Secretary Manning by letter and conference, occasionally bringing pressure to bear through Tilden. On matters involving delicate manipulations, he usually cleared the road by personal appeal to Colonel Lamont, the President's secretary. Especially after Randall's relations with Cleve-

42 House Journal, February 26, 1885.
43 Cleveland Leg., M. Muller to Randall, March 11, 1886.
44 Ibid., C. E. Sears to Randall, April 23, 1886.
46 Ibid., Randall to Lamont, July 1, 1887.
land were strained he worked through Colonel Lamont and thus was able to exercise some power over such matters until 1888.

Randall was content to fill the head positions himself and let his political henchmen pass out the smaller offices, under his rather sketchy supervision. He was concerned only with the postmasterships of the larger cities, the customs officials, the District-Attorneys and the United States Marshals. Complications early developed which caused postponement of the appointments to the positions of District-Attorney and United States Marshall of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. When they were finally settled by compromise candidates, Randall was weakened by the actual appointments. During the first year most of Randall's appointments were rewards to his old friends and invitations to new followers to flock to his banner. Especially in 1886 Randall's appointments were made entirely from men with protectionist leanings who were willing to follow "Sam" Randall and not ask questions. The result was a powerful following built on patronage and personal friendship. The appointments early came under the fire of the press, because of disgruntled office-seekers and also because of the alarming growth of Randall's power. Randall was forced to justify his handiwork and did so by sending Lamont a continual supply of favorable press clippings (whenever he

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47 Ibid., G. M. Vickers to Cleveland, July 11, 1885.
could find them), offering explanations in hurried notes. 48

Besides his concern with major appointments Randall was besieged by the usual mob of job hunters who wanted any employment the government had to offer such as architect, government printer, filing clerk, minister to Chili or Peru, army promotion, and laborer in government arsenal. Many of these pleas came from citizens not residents of Pennsylvania, thus showing the wide-spread belief that Randall was close to the throne.

The appointments in Western Pennsylvania were generally handled by W. L. Scott, who usually conferred with ex-Governor Curtin and Randall on the major positions. Malcolm Hay was made First Assistant Postmaster-General on the recommendation of Scott and his own record at the Chicago convention. 49 Ex-Governor Bigler was appointed collector of the 23rd District comprising Western Pennsylvania; Robert E. James of Easton became bank examiner due to recommendation of Curtin and Randall. 50 George W. Miller, former state chairman, was made United States Marshall for Western Pennsylvania on recommendation of Randall, Curtin, Sowden, and Scott. 51 The above appointments include men who had worked more or less with Randall in times past.

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48 Ibid., September 15, 1885; also July 12, July 30, 1885.
49 Ibid., Manton Marble to Cleveland, March 18, 1885.
50 Ibid., May 13, 1885.
51 Ibid., W. L. Scott to Manning, November 30, 1885.
Randall concerned himself with the postmasterships at a few cities outside of Philadelphia. He forwarded to Lamont James F. Barr's request for the removal of the postmaster at Allegheny but admitted that he knew little of the situation there. He conducted some negotiations on the problem of the postmastership at Susquehanna and sent his results on to Cleveland. Randall took a great interest in a similar appointment for the city of Carbondale. Here, he was the largest single factor in having Terence V. Powderly, head of the Knights of Labor, chosen for the position. This was a very clever move both for Randall and Cleveland since it gave them both the gratitude of a powerful figure in the labor world. Blairsville and Lock Haven each received some attention from Randall. The Wilkes-Barre postmastership was settled by communication with Postmaster-General Vilas, and the Harrisburg position, after being the subject of long disputes, was settled by Randall with the aid of Senator Don Cameron.

The appointments to offices located in Philadelphia caused

52 Ibid., Randall to Lamont, September 18, 1885.
53 Ibid., G. H. Post to Randall, May 10, 1885.
54 Ibid., Randall to Cleveland, September 28, 1885; Ibid., Randall to Cleveland, March 16, 1885.
55 Ibid., Randall to Cleveland, February 7, 1886.
56 Ibid., Randall to Lamont, January 23, 1886.
57 Vilas MSS., Thomas Lynch to Randall, February 25, 1887; Ibid., Randall to Vilas, February 28, 1887.
58 Cleveland MSS., Cameron to Randall, March 11, 1886; Ibid., Randall to Lamont, March 8, 1886; Ibid., Randall to Cleveland, December 21, 1886; Ibid., Randall to Lamont, February 23, 1887.
Randall no end of trouble. There were so many conflicting factions of Democrats in the city and so few positions to be filled that it was impossible for him to escape without censure. He put ex-Mayor Daniel Fox in as the Superintendent of the Mint, and was later to be richly rewarded by this appointment. 59 Randall's close friend, William F. Harrity, received the rich plum of the postmastership of Philadelphia as his share of the spoils; while Judge John Cadwalader became Collector of Customs at the port.

Randall was embarrassed in filling the post of District-Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania since John Read, State District-Attorney, and Dallas Sanders both wanted the job. Both were Randall supporters and had been for years. Manning wanted Read as did Tilden, 60 but Randall was afraid to make a decision. The position remained open because of an inability to settle the question. The United States Marshalship also caused Randall much trouble. He felt obligated to support Samuel Josephs but did not feel any too sure of the caliber of his man. Randall grew suspicious when it was seen that William L. Singerly of the Philadelphia Record was supporting Josephs. In October of 1886 Cleveland was about to appoint another to the position but Randall postponed action with the plea that since Josephs was the Chairman of the Demo-

59 Ibid., May 13, 1885.
60 Ibid., John R. Read to Lamont, December 8, 1885.
cratic City Committee it would be unwise to do him harm with an election only three weeks away. W. U. Hensel was offered the position but declined it, and praised Cleveland's subsequent appointment of A. H. Dill. Randall visited Philadelphia and told Josephs that he was sorry but he had done all he could for him. Josephs was very hurt, claiming that he alone had swung the Pennsylvania delegation for Cleveland at Chicago. Randall must have been laughing up his sleeve since he cut clippings of the incident from the Philadelphia Times and Press, and sent them to Lamont, with the cryptic comment that "These enclosures may interest you and perhaps the President."

The year 1885 saw the peak of Randall's power within the state. His control of the machinery of the city and state Democrats was unbroken. Early in January 1886 a definite proof of this power was offered by the victory of 63 out of 69 Randall-Cleveland delegates to the State convention and the endorsement and subsequent election of Hensel for another term as state chairman. The first revolt against Randall within his own city appeared on May 25, 1886 when the S. J. Randall Association of the 11th Ward held a special meeting and changed its name to the 11th Ward Democratic Club. The second

61 Ibid., Randall to Lamont, October 7, 1886.
62 Ibid., Hensel to Cleveland, May 21, 1887.
63 Ibid., Randall to Lamont, May 25, 1887.
64 Ibid., Randall to Lamont, January 18, 1886; Ibid., Randall to Cleveland, January 20, 1886.
Morrison Bill then pending was endorsed and Randall roundly criticized for his opposition to it.65

In April and May of 1886, Randall had some difficulties with Cleveland on questions of Civil Service policy. There was even a rumor afloat that Randall and Holman intended to omit the small appropriation necessary to carry on the work of the commission. Randall's actions were in the direction of forcing Cleveland to come out so strongly for the merit system in the civil service that Randall would be able to use that fact as an excuse to his friends back home, in explaining why they had not received appointments. Randall's definite recommendations were as follows:

"1. Strike out from the regulations the age bar from examinations at 45 years.
2. All names of persons who have passed the examinations and who by reason seem adapted for the duties of the place vacant, to go to the appointing power, so the range of selection may be more extended.
3. Those persons in office be examined, whose places if vacant for any cause could not be filled except under civil service law and regulations in like manner as those out and seeking appointments." 66

The State Democratic Convention at Harrisburg on August 18, 1886 was another demonstration of Randall's power. Ex-Senator Wallace attempted to return to the political arena, primarily to weaken Randall. Tentative steps were taken to obtain the support of both Randall and Scott for Wallace for

65 *Times*, May 27, 1886; *Barnes, op. cit.*, 100.
66 *Cleveland Miss.*, Randall to Cleveland, April 12, 1886.
governor thus providing him with no real opposition. At the last moment Randall shifted his support and rode rough shod over the convention to nominate Chauncey Black as governor. The platform refused to make any concessions to the tariff sentiment of the second Morrison bill, offering instead a replica of the Chicago platform.67

The fall of 1886 saw Randall's candidate, Chauncey Black, defeated at the polls by Beaver, the Republican who sought the position as governor. Also during the fall months W. L. Scott of Erie came out strongly as in open opposition to Randall and all he stood for in the state and nation.68 Scott was a millionaire industrialist and railroad owner who arranged the transportation details of Cleveland's western trip in 1887. He also came to be on terms of the closest friendship and intimacy with Cleveland, so much so that he was able to send Cleveland a "barrel of extract from one of the finest one-horse distilleries of Western Pennsylvania," as a present from a bosom friend.69 Randall's greatest loss was the physical breakdown and retirement of Manning in December 1886, which, added to the death of Tilden, left Randall without any personal hold on Cleveland. Manning, especially, knew how to handle both Randall and Cleveland and might have avoided much misunderstanding and many strained relations, if he had been able

67 Pomerantz, 176.
68 Nevins, 289.
69 Cleveland Mss., W. L. Scott to Cleveland, May 7, 1887.
to continue his duties.

February 1887 saw Randall's candidate for mayor of Philadelphia go down to defeat before a combination of Republicans, Reformers and independent Democrats, who supported Fitler. Samuel Josephs was the right-hand man of Keim, the Randall candidate. Although Josephs produced the votes in the "tougher" wards of the city, the combined vote of all the "better" elements contrived to slap Randall in the face for the second time in less than four months.70

In 1887 Randall had Robert S. Patterson, a Philadelphia banker, chosen to head the city committee.71 This seems a far cry from the Randall of the Pennsylvania Senate and Reconstruction years who continually berated all banking institutions. In 1887 he sought out a banker to head his organization, thus supposedly giving it respectability. Patterson began his work with a vim, issuing a call to arms to all Philadelphia Democrats to stop this surge of Republican victories.72 Dallas Sanders succeeded Hensel as state chairman, hence the nerve center of the party continued to be Philadelphia, where Sanders lived and co-operated with Patterson and Randall.73

During the Spring of 1887 Cleveland received a considerable number of letters from leading Democrats throughout the 

70 Ibid., B. F. Hall to Lamont, March 2, 1887.
71 Ibid., Randall to Lamont, April 23, 1887.
72 Ibid., May 10, 1887.
73 Ibid., Randall to Lamont, August 8, 1887.
State of Pennsylvania.⁷⁴ These gentlemen insisted that Randall's course was paralyzing the Democratic party within the state. They offered all manner of suggestions for remedy, but their steady complaint was that Randall's control of patronage made it impossible for any new leader to make any inroads into Randall's machine. One correspondent said:

In every county there are men, above the quarrels of faction, through whom the party could be reorganized and made a potential factor in national politics. If men like Coxe of Luzerne, Gov. Black, Senator Wolverton Ross, Congressmen Scott and Buckalew, Bul-litt and Cassidy of Philadelphia, and hosts of others were given reasonable encouragement, they could effect an organization which would unite the democracy, and remove the reproach that seems to attack Pennsylvania democrats.⁷⁵

Within a few months Cleveland received a vivid example of just what these correspondents were talking about, in the Allentown Convention of August 31. Randall fortified his forces by drafting a few delegates from the Philadelphia mint and other federal offices throughout the state, in direct violation of the spirit and the letter of the Civil Service law and the policy of President Cleveland.⁷⁶ W. L. Scott of Erie and William Singerly of the Philadelphia Record were conducting the fight against Randall, with Scott the actual floor leader. The result was what looked like a compromise or even a Randall

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⁷⁴ Ibid., M. F. Morris to Cleveland, March 8, 1887; Ibid., G. F. Baer to F. L. Stetson, April 15, 1887; Ibid., William Foyle to Lamont, April 30, 1887.
⁷⁵ Ibid., G. F. Baer to F. L. Stetson, April 15, 1887.
⁷⁶ Nevins, 371.
victory to the world, although such was not the case. Randall controlled the committee on Resolutions by a vote of 26-24 but the convention itself was really in sympathy with Scott and Singerly. This was proved by two test votes and Randall's surrender after the second vote, yet Scott was afraid to stand his ground and compromised on the platform which was a mixture of the Chicago platform and the new Cleveland policy of reduction of import duties. The clause calling for a similar reduction in internal taxation represented Randall's share of the victory. Singerly was very much put out and wrote Cleveland of Scott's surrender on the floor. Another correspondent also gave Cleveland a detailed story of the collapse of Scott's nerve and his fear of a "row." When Cleveland heard rumors of the political activity of some Mint employees, he wrote to Superintendent Daniel Fox, even before the convention, asking for an explanation. Fox replied that:

There will be no improper interference by any of the Federal officials or their subordinates, having connection with the Mint, in coming State convention. I understand three of the employees have been elected as delegates thereto said to be, because there were no candidates in their districts. I have reason to believe they will not serve.

The rumor soon appeared that Randall either had in his posses-

77 Cleveland MSS., S. S. Hammond to Cleveland, Sept. 2, 1887.
78 Nevins, 371.
79 Cleveland MSS., W. M. Singerly to Cleveland, Sept. 1, 1887.
80 See note 77.
81 Cleveland MSS., Daniel Fox to Cleveland, August 25, 1887.
sion or at least had seen the letter which Cleveland had writ-
ten to Fox. This, of course, gave Randall an opportunity to
pass sarcastic remarks about such activities by a "Civil Ser-
vice President." 82 Cleveland asked for more explanations
from Fox and received a long letter written on September 10
which offered a seasonable if somewhat shrewd explanation of
how some of the Mint employees just "happened to be on vaca-
tion and happened to attend the convention as private citizens
or as substitute delegates." Fox blithely asked Cleveland
what he should say to these men when they returned from their
vacations. 83 Complaints against the political manipulation of
Mint employees continued in November 1887 84 and April 1888 85
and even down to the last days of Cleveland's first adminis-
tration.

Immediately following the Allentown convention, the famous
Oak View Conference took place between Cleveland, Carlisle,
Scott, Mills and Fairchild. Although Randall was in Washing-
ton, he was not invited. However, Scott kept in touch with
him every day during the meetings of the group and thus may
have offered some suggestions. No definite announcement was
made but the press reporters knew that the tariff was being
discussed and that a possible compromise was in the offing. 86

82 Press, April 14, 1890.
83 Cleveland MSS., Daniel Fox to Cleveland, September 10, 1887.
84 Ibid., J. M. E. McNanus to Cleveland, November 24, 1887.
85 Ibid., R. S. Patterson to Lamont, April 12, 1888.
86 Nevins, 372.
A week later on September 16, Scott met Randall in New York. He had a long conference with him but found him very confident. Scott's extended report to Cleveland contains such a mass of valuable detail that it must be perused carefully:

On my return from Bethlehem N. H. on Tuesday evening of this week, I found Mr. Randall was registered at the Fifth Avenue Hotel; in fact, as I passed into the hall I saw him standing in the crowd. As this was a new departure for him, having for the last twenty years always put up at the New York Hotel on Broadway, I felt confident he had some object in view in coming to the Fifth Avenue. About eight o'clock in the evening I made up my mind that it was policy for me to leave my card for him in his box, as he was not in the hotel that evening. Wednesday morning about half past six o'clock I was awakened with a note from him stating that he would leave at eleven o'clock and would like to see me, and I met him about nine. The interview was not of any special importance, although it lasted an hour or more, except giving me an opportunity of judging what his policy is to be and where he thinks he stands. So far as his professions for the Administration go, no one could speak more favorably of it. He is, however, thoroughly impressed with the idea that he is master of the situation; that he can carry through the House his ideas of revenue reform, and he stated to me that he knew he could accomplish this for he had Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky with him. I did not dispute the fact with him, but when we came to discuss the policy of the future and I urged upon him harmony and united action of the party as an absolute necessity and endeavored to arrive at what his views were, I soon discovered that his plans were by no means matured. When I put it to him that the question was one of the reduction of the surplus revenue and not of protection or of free trade, and asked him if he proposed to take the internal tax off of whisky and beer and leave the duties on the necessaries of life, he immediately replied that more revenue could be obtained on whisky at 40¢ or 50¢ than at the present tax of 90¢, evidently proving to my mind that he has abandoned the idea of abolishing internal revenue, and that his scheme will be to take off all the tax on tobacco.
and reduce the tax on whisky and beer and thereby accomplish a reduction of about sixty millions of revenue, hoping thereby to catch not only the tobacco men of the South, but the moonshiners of North Carolina and Eastern Tennessee, and by such a policy to escape the hue and cry that would be raised against him should he favor free whisky. When I spoke to him about sugar and wool and salt, he virtually said he was opposed to any reduction of the present duties on imports. I suggested to him that I knew you would be glad to see him, and he said he intended to have called but you were out at Oak View and he could not very well go out there. The impression created on my mind, growing out of this interview, is that to-day Mr. Randall feels very confident of his position and believes in his ability to defeat any program which our party may bring forward in connection with revenue reform. It is possible he may not be as confident as he appears to be, but this is my impression. I have no doubt he has had assurances from Virginia and North Carolina that makes him more confident than he otherwise would be.

Now from my standpoint, there is but one policy to be pursued: - We have got to take Mr. Randall by a flank movement and if possible draw his supporters from him one by one. This can only be done by systematic work. Every one we get away from him will weaken him, and if he stands alone in the next house or only with a few Democratic supporters, his opposition will become a farce.

But this work should be taken in hand by some one man competent to do it, and whose position in public life would carry some weight with it. I don't know whether Mr. Carlisle is the man or not; being a candidate for the Speakership it might possibly interfere, but if he is elected Speaker he would have a powerful influence in bringing these Southern gentlemen into line, for a man don't amount to much in the House of Representatives with the Speaker against him, to say nothing about his powers in forming committees.

While in New York I met Gov. Green of New Jersey at Delmonico's. He and I sat together in the House and were quite intimate. My impression is he was not sound on revenue reform in the last Congress, but I had an hour's talk with him. I explained to him the situation from my standpoint of view and the necessity of conciliation and harmony within our
ranks, and I urged upon him to see Mr. McAdoo of his State, Randall's captain in the House, and try to prevail on him a conservative policy and, if possible to influence Randall. The Governor appeared to appreciate the situation and promised me that he would make it his business to see McAdoo and talk to him.

It appears to me that some one should take the members from North Carolina and Virginia in hand at once so that we would know where they stand and what they will or will not do. Governor Vance of North Carolina ought to be able to do this, and if Vance will not do, then Gen. Cox ought to be a good man to see the members from North Carolina individually: and you will excuse me for saying here that Cox lost his seat, as I understand it mainly through his advocacy of civil service reform and his opposition to Vance, and he ought not to be forgotten. Jno. S. Barber of Virginia, living in Washington, is unquestionably the best man to look after Virginia.87

Randall knew that the die had been cast and that his power in Pennsylvania was slipping. On October 4, he sent out a typewritten circular letter to all county chairmen asking them to

"... furnish me with the names of 5 or more Democrats and their Post office addresses, in each Township and Election District in your county. I expect to write all over the State, and urge activity, so as to secure the full Democratic vote being out. I know your power in this connection, and depend upon it, if we poll the Democratic vote we are sure to win the State in November. Let me have your immediate attention. After I have received the names and written, I will turn the same over to Mr. Sanders, State Chairman, for other purposes."88

After President Cleveland gave his famous tariff message of December 1887 the campaign to strip Randall of his power

87 Cleveland MSS., W. L. Scott to Cleveland, September 16, 1887.
88 Randall Papers, in Pennsylvania Historical Society, October 4, 1887.
continued apace. The Randall Club of Pittsburgh endorsed Cleveland's message as did similar organizations throughout the State. From December 1887 on, the applications for patronage reached Cleveland's desk by way of W. M. Singerly and W. L. Scott. This was especially noticeable in January and February of 1888, when some former recommendations which were still awaiting the President's signature, were withdrawn and new names sent in. Most of Randall's old supporters such as Hensel, Black, Josephs, Cassidy and Dill climbed on the new band-wagon and left their old chief with only Sowden and a few others for consolation. The men listed above soon have acquired the habit of writing directly to Lamont or Cleveland about party policies and issues.

The meeting of the State Democratic committee at Harrisburg on January 18, 1888 marked the actual downfall of Randall. He wanted Dallas Sanders to be re-elected State chairman. He was present at Harrisburg and worked to line up his forces, but Risner was chosen by vote of 42-35. A tariff plank endorsing Cleveland's policy was adopted to announce the victory to the country. The Harrisburg convention in May 1888, revealed the complete collapse of the Randall element. Only Sowden and Sanders with a few followers were present to represent their chief.

Randall's disease made him miss more and more days from 89 Nevins, 386.
Congress and finally put him to bed for the summer of 1888. In the fall of 1888 the Scott-Singerly forces were ungracious enough to oppose Randall's re-election to Congress but only 112 people could be found in his entire district who would vote for the Republican candidate. 90

Randall lingered on crippled in political strength and health for another year. In the early months of 1890, Philadelphia lost many of its leading citizens. William D. Kelley, the father of the House was carried off in January. Daniel Fox died on March 20, and G. H. Stuart, President of the United States Christian Commission during the Civil War died on April 11, 1890. 91 Although confined to his bed Randall was sworn into office by special consent of the House, and Tom Reed appointed him to the Rules and Appropriations committees. Randall followed the fight over the Reed Rules and was constantly visited by ex-Speaker Carlisle to plan party policies. 92 During the last days he was visited by both W. L. Scott and William A. Wallace each seeking his support in the coming Pennsylvania convention. He assured Wallace that he would work for him thus helping to start Scott on the road to political oblivion which was his lot within a few years. 93

In his last few days of life his home was visited by many

90 Pomerantz, 229.
91 Press, January 9, March 21, April 12, 1890.
92 Public Ledger, April 14, 1890.
93 North American [Philadelphia], March 31, 1890.
famous dignitaries and statesmen. Tom Reed, Postmaster-General Wanamaker, President Harrison, James G. Blaine, Carlisle, Mills and many others called at his little home at 120 C. Street S. E. The House of Representatives was unable to do much business as it labored under the strain of waiting for the end. Congressman O'Neill of Philadelphia was especially put out and incapable of anything but silence. 94

Randall died at dawn on Sunday morning April 12 just as the church bells were calling the communicants to early mass on a bright sunny day. His wife refused the request of Congress for a church funeral, instead holding a brief service in the little Presbyterian church which Randall had joined during his last year. A huge funeral cortege and burial in Laurel Hill Cemetery, Philadelphia, ended the career of this son of Pennsylvania. 95 Ex-President and Mrs. Cleveland sent a telegram of condolence to Mrs. Randall which is a fitting ending to his career:

Accept my sincere sympathy in your great affliction, and be assured that the American people will remember with gratitude the devotion of your distinguished husband to his public duties. 96

94 Press, April 11, 1890.
95 Ibid., April 18, 1890.
96 Ibid., April 17, 1890.
The following collections which are to be found at the Library of Congress are of most value for the study of Randall.

**Jeremiah Black Mss.** Contain many letters addressed to Judge Black's son Chauncey, who was a close friend and political supporter of Randall. There are many letters of Randall's especially in the years 1874-1881 revealing much of the political history of the Democratic party in Pennsylvania.

**William E. Chandler Mss.** Do not contain many letters written by Randall but some valuable bits concerning the electoral count of 1877 and Chandler's activities as Secretary of Navy under President Arthur when Randall was chairman of Appropriations and fighting the attempts of Chandler to secure large appropriations for the new steel cruisers.

**Cleveland Mss.** Very valuable for Randall's relations with Cleveland especially on matters pertaining to the federal patronage in Pennsylvania in the years 1885-1887. Many of Randall's letters to Manning and Lamont are in the collection. Very necessary to an understanding of the causes of the decline of Randall's power in his home state after 1887.

**Garfield Mss.** Contain few of Randall's letters but some letters which explain Randall's actions during the electoral count of 1877 and the attempts of the Democrats to repeal the Test Oath and Elections laws in 1878-1879.

**Johnson Mss.** Contain a few of Randall's letters sent to the President during Reconstruction.

**Daniel Manning Mss.** Most of Manning's letters from Randall are in the Cleveland Mss., but this collection has a few private letters which help to explain Randall's connection with the administration in 1885-1887.

The **Tilden Papers** are to be found at the New York Public Library. They contain more than 100 letters sent by Randall to Tilden, mostly during the years of 1878-1880, with a
few in the period 1861-1885. Very valuable for an understanding of Randall in the election of 1880.

The Pennsylvania Historical Society has possession of the Buchenau Mss., which contain a few valuable letters written by Randall's father in the decade before the Civil War. There may be found here also, a few private letters of Randall's in some private autograph collections, notably the Dreer Collection, the Coryell Collection and The Randall Papers of the Society. These collections are not of much value to the student of Randall.

The following collections are to be found at the Library of the Wisconsin Historical Society.

Edward S. Bragg Mss. Mostly letters to his wife during the Civil War but contain a few letters written while he was in Congress in the 1870's which offer some sidelights on Randall.

J. R. Doolittle Mss. Of some value in explaining Randall's actions during Reconstruction, since Doolittle was supporting President Johnson and thus had some contact with Randall. Also interesting to Randall's supporters since Doolittle and Randall agreed on the Tariff after Doolittle had become a Democrat.

Nils P. Haugen Mss. Very complete collection of the letters of a Republican Congressman in the 1880's. Hence has some valuable sidelights on the Republican attitude towards Randall's tariff activities.

W. F. Vilas Mss. Rather complete collection of Cleveland's first Postmaster-General. Contain a few letters of Randall. Vilas was a believer in tariff for revenue only, hence some of his correspondents delighted to take Randall to task, notably David Welles.

C. C. Washburn Mss. Contain a few sidelights on Randall's efforts towards economy in the 1870's and some opinions of Randall's opposition to proposed extension of land-grants to Wisconsin railroads.
Newspapers

The Philadelphia Record was an anti-Randall paper after 1878, before that date it was a mere compilation of events with no definite bias. This paper was followed 1874-1886.

The New York World was used during the same years, as the leading Democratic paper of the country which did not entirely approve of Randall but supported him on many occasions.

The New York Times, 1875-1885, contained the opinions typical of the Republican press.

Other papers which were covered at varying periods were:

Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, 1884, rabidly Republican, contains a good account of Randall's southern trip in 1884.

New York Tribune, 1875, for speakership contest of 1875. Extensive obituary notices were carried on April 14, 1890 by:


Harpers Weekly, 1875-1880, for cartoons, etc.

The Nation, 1875-1885.


Articles in Periodicals


Reed, Thomas B., "Party Battles in Congress," in Saturday Evening Post, December 9, 1899.
Unpublished Theses


Books


Brown, George Rothwell. The Leadership of Congress. Indianapolis, 1922. Very unreliable but suggestive of various lines of research.


Haworth, Paul L. The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Presidential Election of 1876. Cleveland, 1906. Excellent work considering that it was written a quarter of a century ago with much material not then available.


Lingely, Charles R. Since the Civil War. New York, 1926.
Lynch, Denis Tilden. <i>Grover Cleveland, A Man Four-Square.</i> New York, 1932. Interesting but not adding much to knowledge of Cleveland.

McCall, Samuel W. <i>Life of Thomas Brackett Reed.</i> Boston, 1914. An early work by one of Reed's worshippers.


Nevins, Allan. <i>Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage.</i> New York, 1932. Entirely worthy of the Pulitzer prize. Shows the growth of Cleveland the executive. Much new material used.

Oberholtzer, Ellis Paxson. <i>A History of the United States Since the Civil War.</i> 5 volumes, volume III, 1925. A routine presentation of the information to be gleaned from the Congressional Record, the Congressional Globe, Government Documents and some newspapers. Purely political and written by a man with a definite bias.

Paine, Albert Bigelow. <i>Thomas Nast, His Period and His Pictures.</i> New York, 1904. Newsy account.

Paxson, Frederic L. <i>Recent History of the United States.</i> Boston, 1929.

Robinson, William A. <i>Thomas B. Reed, Parliamentarian.</i> New York, 1930. Latest work on Reed; stresses Reed and the rules.

Smith, William Ernest. <i>The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics.</i> 2 volumes, New York, 1933. Second volume is not very detailed nor accurate.

Stanwood, Edward. <i>American Tariff Controversies of the 19th Century.</i> Boston, 1903. Excellent detailed study by a protectionist.

Tarbell, Ida M. <i>The Tariff in Our Times.</i> New York, 1911. Author is decidedly a believer in low tariff. Not documented.

Williams, Charles R. The Life of Rutherford Birchard Hayes. 2 volumes, Boston, 1919. Very eulogistic, but rather accurate as to general facts.

Memoirs and Other Collections


Hayes, Rutherford B., Diary and Letters of. Edited by C. R. Williams. 5 volumes, 1924.


Smith, Theodore Clarke. The Life and Letters of James Abram Garfield. 2 volumes, New Haven, 1925.

Watterson, Henry. Marse Henry. 2 volumes, New York, 1919.

United States Government Publications


Congressional Directories. 38th to 51st Congresses.

Congressional Globe. 1863-1872.

Congressional Record. 1873-1890.

House Journal. 1863-1890.


Revised Statutes. 1878.


State and City Government Publications


Pennsylvania Senate Journal. 1858-1859.