

University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire

“The Fire is in Rhodesia”: Jimmy Carter’s  
Response to the Rhodesian Bush War

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### **Abstract**

Over the course of the mid-twentieth century, American foreign policy in Africa centered on containing the spread of communism. When Jimmy Carter was elected, he sought to change the Cold War-driven policies in Africa and focused on a regional approach toward the continent. He made war-torn Rhodesia a high priority in African relations and led the first administration to play a major role in negotiations for peace in the country. Throughout his term as president from 1977 to 1981, Carter and members of his administration continued to pursue peace in Rhodesia. From developing a proposal for peace with British officials to refusing to lift sanctions on the country until free elections were held, Carter did not falter in his position for majority rule. While his efforts to invoke a moral and regional approach to African affairs were not always supported domestically, Carter's policies were different from those of previous presidents. His efforts resulted in the United States playing a major role in negotiating the end of the armed struggle.

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## Glossary

Anglo-American Plan	A proposal developed by the United States and Great Britain in an attempt to bring an end to the military conflict in Rhodesia by invoking majority rule.
Byrd Amendment	An amendment added to the 1971 Defense Procurement Bill which allowed the United States to import chrome from Rhodesia despite UN sanctions. After it was passed, the US continued break sanctions by importing chrome until it was repealed in 1977.
Byrd, Harry	Senator from Virginia who proposed the Byrd Amendment and was a strong supporter of repealing sanctions on Rhodesia during the late 1970's.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew	Security Advisor during the Carter Administration.
Carrington, Peter	British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who succeeded David Owen in 1979.
Case-Javits amendment	An amendment on the Security Assistance Authorization Bill of 1978 which required the President to remove sanctions on Rhodesia when two stipulations had been met; an all-parties conference and universal elections under impartial supervision.
Hayakawa, S.I	A Republican Senator from California who supported the removal of sanctions against Rhodesia during the late 1970's.
Helms, Jesse	A Republican Senator from North Carolina who supported the removal of sanctions against Rhodesia during the late 1970's.
Internal settlement	The agreement reached between Smith, Muzorewa, Jeremiah Chirau and Sithole in 1978 which was meant to bring about an end to the war and minority rule. After a one-year interim government, a general election was to be held that included the entire population. The agreement still maintained several vestiges of white rule and no members of the PF took part in it.
Lancaster House Agreement	An agreement reached after a four month-long all-parties conference was held in London to end the Rhodesian Bush War and bring about majority rule. After the agreement was signed on December 21, 1979, the British government supervised elections in Rhodesia and granted the country independence in 1980.

Mugabe, Robert	African nationalist leader of the ZANU organization and political party. Mugabe's ZANU party won an absolute majority in the 1980 Zimbabwean elections and he has been the head of government since.
Muzorewa, Abel	African nationalist leader and Methodist bishop. Muzorewa founded the UANC and became the Prime Minister of Rhodesia during the transitional period immediately following the internal settlement. He was succeeded by Mugabe after the 1980 elections.
Nkomo, Joshua	African nationalist leader of the ZAPU organization and political party. Nkomo also was one of the founders of the Patriotic Front.
Nyerere, Julius	President of Tanzania during the Rhodesian Bush War.
Owen, David	British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1977 to 1979.
Patriotic Front (PF)	The political and military alliance between ZAPU and ZANU, forged in 1976, with the common goal of achieving majority rule in Rhodesia.
Salisbury	The capital city of Rhodesia, later renamed Harare after independence in 1980.
Sithole, Ndabaningi	One of the founders of the ZANU organization and an African nationalist. He lost the 1980 election to Mugabe under a separate ZANU faction party.
Smith, Ian	First Prime Minister of Rhodesia and member of the Rhodesian Front political party. Smith remained in power from 1964 to 1979.
Soames, Christopher	British representative sent to serve as Governor in Rhodesia and oversee the elections during early 1980.
Solarz, Stephen	Democratic congressman in the House of Representatives who supported maintained sanctions on Rhodesia during the late 1970's.
Unilateral declaration of independence (UDI)	Refusing to accept majority rule as a prerequisite for independence as a colony, Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front party declared independence from the United Kingdom on November 11, 1965.
Vance, Cyrus	Secretary of State during the Carter Administration.
Vorster, John	South African Prime Minister when Young and Owen introduced the Anglo-American plan to southern African leaders.
Young, Andrew	Ambassador to the UN during the Carter Administration.

United African National Council (UANC)	Political organization which was founded by Muzorewa and was in opposition to minority rule in Rhodesia. The party won an absolute majority of seats in Parliament in the first elections after the adoption of the internal settlement.
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)	The military wing of the ZANU organization.
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)	Nationalist organization which later turned into a political party that fought for national liberation and majority rule in Rhodesia. ZANU was banned in Rhodesia but continued to run underground and in neighboring countries, mainly Mozambique.
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)	Nationalist organization which later turned into a political party that fought for national liberation and majority rule in Rhodesia. Founded in 1961, ZAPU was banned by the Rhodesian government in 1962 and later based many of its operations out of Zambia.
Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)	The military wing of the ZAPU organization.

## Introduction

On November 11, 1965, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith declared unilateral independence from the United Kingdom as he decried its refusal to grant independence to the Southern African country without constitutional reform that facilitated majority rule.

International opinion, especially in neighboring African countries, strongly opposed his actions and quickly a war broke out between African black nationalists and Smith's white minority government. While the United States government denounced Smith's declaration and the war that ensued, no administration made Rhodesia a higher priority over the course of the war than that of Jimmy Carter. While not everyone at home and abroad supported Carter's actions, he sought to end the Cold War-driven policies of his predecessors and his administration played a major role in negotiations that brought an end to the armed struggle.

As the fighting escalated in the late 1970s, Carter brought a new outlook on foreign policy to Washington. In recent administrations, foreign policy had been driven by efforts to contain communism and control the influence of the Soviet Union worldwide. Carter, however, was determined to focus instead on human rights and moral principles by reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation, ending minority rule, encouraging racial equality and reducing tensions with the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> While events such as the Iran hostage crisis frequently overshadow memories of Carter's foreign policy, his diplomatic aspirations and successes in Southern Africa are often disregarded. Many previous presidents in the mid- 20<sup>th</sup> century viewed African policy as only necessary to gain resources and prevent the Soviet influence; Carter's approach was to view Africa as a distinct region and to promote "African solutions to African problems."<sup>2</sup> Over

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<sup>1</sup> Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> Paul E. Masters, "Carter and the Rhodesian Problem," *International Social Science Review* 75 (June, 2000), 24.

the course of his presidency, Carter and his administration made it clear that ending the white minority rule held by less than four percent of the overall population in Rhodesia was a high-priority goal of US foreign policy.<sup>3</sup>

This study examined a variety of primary and secondary sources to emphasize the divergence in Rhodesian policy between Carter and his predecessors. Primary sources included news media from the United States, such as *The New York Times* and *Time Magazine*, newspapers and magazines from Rhodesia, namely, the *Chronicle* and the *Sunday News* of Bulawayo and the *Herald* and the *Sunday Mail* of Salisbury, and US government records<sup>4</sup>. Notable secondary sources that proved invaluable were Andrew DeRoche's *Black White and Chrome* (2001), Gerald Horne's *From the Barrel of a Gun* (2001), Paul Master's article "Carter and the Rhodesian Problem" (2000) and Nancy Mitchel's article "Tropes of the Cold War" (2007). The use of these sources help call attention to the differences of Carter and his administration from predecessors and the response he received domestically and abroad.

Born in Georgia and having experienced American racial discrimination firsthand, Carter's sympathy for Africans was demonstrated by the integral part the Civil Rights Movement played in his career as a politician and his personal experiences with African Americans.<sup>5</sup> Carter hoped to promote human rights abroad during his presidency and he viewed Rhodesia as an opportunity for the implementation of this policy. Along with members of his administration, the president sought to bring about peace while invoking majority rule. However, while many thought his hopes were admirable, the opinions of numerous politicians and members of the media did not always agree with him.

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<sup>3</sup> Harold D. Nelson, ed., *Zimbabwe: a country study* (Washington, DC: The Studies, 1983), xxvii.

<sup>4</sup> The name of Salisbury, the capital of Rhodesia, was changed to Harare after the 1989 elections.

<sup>5</sup> Douglas Brinkley, *The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter's Journey Beyond the White House* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1998), 182.

## History of the Rhodesian Bush War

The explanation of Carter's role in ending the Rhodesian Bush War, or the Zimbabwean War of Liberation, requires a short history of the country and war itself. Named after Cecil John Rhodes, who ran the British South Africa Company during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the territory known as Southern Rhodesia officially became a self-governing colony of Great Britain in 1923. This gave the colony the right to run its own legislature and many of the daily activities of government. On August 1<sup>st</sup>, 1953, Southern Rhodesia, along with the bordering territories Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, joined together to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland<sup>6</sup>. However, the territories were still run by white politicians and by the early 1960s the British government could no longer ignore the black African opposition to the federation. As Southern Rhodesia steadfastly held on to minority rule, by 1962 both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia had instituted changes that brought majority governments to power. By June 1963, both territories had officially seceded from the federation and became independent members of the British Commonwealth, effectively dissolving the federation.<sup>7</sup> Southern Rhodesia, however, refused to accept several stipulations for independence required by the British (which centered on eventual majority rule) and negotiations came to a standstill.<sup>8</sup>

Shortly after the collapse of the federation, internal dissent among the ruling political party in Southern Rhodesia led to a change in leadership that had a profound effect on the future of the country. The ruling political party, the Rhodesian Front, lost faith in their leader, Winston Field, when he failed to make any gains during independence negotiations in London. As a

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<sup>6</sup> Commonly known as the Central African Federation. The federation was still under the control of the British, but each federated territory had its own parliamentary government.

<sup>7</sup> After gaining independence, neighboring countries Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were renamed Malawi and Zambia, respectively. For a map of modern Africa and the territory that encompasses Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), see Appendix A.

<sup>8</sup> Nelson, *Zimbabwe*, 34-36.

result, the party called for his resignation and in April 1964 he stepped down. The party's deputy chairman, Ian Smith, took his place as party leader and the head of the government.<sup>9</sup> In a country of over seven million black Africans, Smith sought to keep government control in the hands of a population of roughly 200,000 whites and he moved quickly in efforts to strike down the majority rule stipulations of the British.<sup>10</sup> After general elections in May 1965 showed he had broad support from white Rhodesians, he was confident that his plans of declaring independence were viable. On November 11, 1965, Smith and his Southern Rhodesian government presented the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson with a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI).<sup>11</sup> Although the UDI was considered illegal internationally, Southern Rhodesia formally adopted the name Rhodesia and sought official recognition.<sup>12</sup>

Shortly after the UDI, the Rhodesian government proclaimed a new constitution which guaranteed minority rule for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the United Nations and Great Britain began imposing economic sanctions on Rhodesia in an effort to weaken the government and enforce majority rule. Even after the UN mandated compulsory sanctions on Rhodesia, the sympathetic minority ruled South African government continued to trade with its northern neighbor, lessening the effect of the sanctions dramatically. By the early 1970s, the British government attempted to propose settlements which would be agreeable to the Rhodesian government, but the Rhodesians continually refused to accept majority rule as a possibility and eventually they withdrew their efforts.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Robert Blake, *A History of Rhodesia* (New York: Knopf, 1978), 356-360.

<sup>10</sup> Nelson, *Zimbabwe*, xxvii.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 44-46.

<sup>12</sup> The British government never officially recognized the new name of "Rhodesia" and maintained that the true name was always Southern Rhodesia. After the internal settlement, the UDI government changed the country's name to Zimbabwe Rhodesia, and back again to Southern Rhodesia between the end of the Lancaster Agreement and the first official free elections. After independence in 1980, the name of the county was then changed to the Republic of Zimbabwe. For the purposes of this paper, the name of Rhodesia will be maintained throughout.

<sup>13</sup> Nelson, *Zimbabwe*, 47-53.

Meanwhile, opposition among black Africans was steadily growing. Joshua Nkomo, a social worker who became a labor union leader, organized several African groups demanding representation and voting rights. Nkomo eventually became the leader of the nationalist Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU); however he was chastised for seeking support abroad. His former colleague, Ndabaningi Sithole, broke away and formed the more militant Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) with several others, vowing to focus on the internal fight for African rights. Robert Mugabe, another black nationalist, joined soon thereafter. While ZANU was banned in Rhodesia, it continued to operate underground and in neighboring countries. Sithole, Mugabe and many of their associates were arrested in 1964 and detained for ten years. After their release, Mugabe, a publically proclaimed Marxist, slowly phased out Sithole and came to be the clear leader of ZANU.<sup>14</sup> He and Nkomo of ZAPU continued to be the major leaders in the nationalist movement.

Both ZAPU and ZANU also organized guerilla warfare with violence breaking out in 1964 as they established bases in neighboring countries and made violent raids into Rhodesia. ZAPU and ZANU were supported by military arms and training from China and the Soviet Union, respectively, and the first military engagement between the Rhodesian government forces and guerilla fighters occurred by the spring of 1966. The two military arms of the organizations, ZANU's Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and ZAPU's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), continued to fight separately. Although they sought similar goals, the two organizations could not set past differences aside and work together against the Rhodesian government. Without having any clear military organization, the guerilla warfare died down considerably by 1968.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 38-39, 53-55.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 55-56.

Over the course of the 1970s, fighting again began to escalate and negotiations faltered. In 1972, guerilla fighters had again began making raids into Rhodesia from neighboring countries but avoided direct conflict with Rhodesian security forces. While ZANLA guerillas targeted remote white farms and African villages they assumed were guilty of cooperating with the white government, security forces actively attacked nationalist bases in bordering countries. By the middle of the decade, South Africa attempted to bring Smith and the African nationalists together, but negotiations continuously stalemated. In 1976, a peace conference was planned in Geneva and African leaders urged Mugabe and Nkomo to work together in the upcoming negotiations. The two leaders agreed, and they combined ZAPU and ZANU to form the Patriotic Front (PF) as the representative of the militant nationalists.<sup>16</sup> However, after a break in the Geneva conference, Smith returned to Rhodesia stating that he was more interested in seeking an internal settlement and the conference never reconvened. It later became known that Smith had never wanted to reach an accord with the PF, but he was rather seeking a settlement that would bide time and remove sanctions as he worked on developing a more agreeable option.<sup>17</sup>

While Smith was becoming weary of war and began seeking an internal agreement and the nationalist PF increased its military efforts, the end of the war appeared distant. During this same time period, America's interests in the entire continent were changing. Over the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, American presidents realized the strategic and economic importance of Africa, including the danger of Soviet influence, and foreign policy toward Africa reflected these new "Cold War" motives.

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 56-72.

<sup>17</sup> Blake, *A History of Rhodesia*, 408.

## History of American Foreign Policy in Southern Africa

The importance of Africa first became truly apparent to the United States during World War II. Over the course of the war, American officials realized the potential that Africa could hold for the United States, especially in regard to raw materials and as a location to build military bases. When President Harry Truman came to power in 1945, he strengthened American ties throughout Africa, especially with South Africa. In addition to economic interests, the desire to contain communism worldwide also directed US interests in Africa. As tensions grew between the United States and the Soviet Union, many American leaders feared that African nations that converted to majority rule too rapidly could fail and then be easily infiltrated by the Soviets. Consequently, Truman adopted a “middle-road” strategy in African affairs as he supported economic growth and containment policies and strengthened relations to nations with strong European ties.<sup>18</sup>

The United States continued to seek raw minerals during Truman’s administrative era, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War. Southern Rhodesia was an important exporter of chrome to the US, and thus when worker unrest and the poor railroad system became apparent in the early 1950s, America was quick to respond in the form of aid. By grants and loans to improve mining and transportation and increase chrome exports the United States tried to encourage further economic development in order to bring Africa closer to the West.<sup>19</sup>

President Dwight D. Eisenhower continued Truman’s policy toward Africa. He supported European interests in the continent, which helped maintain trade with African countries, and did not confront South African apartheid, the legal and cultural system that kept the black majority in

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<sup>18</sup> Thomas J. Noer, "Truman, Eisenhower, and South Africa: The ‘Middle Road’ and Apartheid," in *Race and US Foreign Policy during the Cold War*, ed. Michael L. Krenn (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), 131.

<sup>19</sup> Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 183-184.

an inferior position underneath a white minority. As Cold War tensions grew, the United States chose to overlook apartheid in favor of maintaining a good relationship with the anticommunist South African government.<sup>20</sup> However, during his second term, the civil rights movement at home forced the US government to be more sensitive to race in its foreign policy, especially in South Africa. US officials found it increasingly difficult to maintain support for a racist regime when civil rights were winning at home, and therefore in 1958 the United States reflected its new perspective by denouncing apartheid in the UN.<sup>21</sup> In addition, tensions were growing between the United States and the Soviet Union as the Cold War continued, and Eisenhower's actions in African relations were often driven by the desire to prevent Soviet influence on the continent. President John Kennedy pursued a similar pattern in African relations by primarily focusing on countries in which the United States had economic or security interests.

Southern Rhodesia's international importance increased during Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency from 1963 to 1969. The Johnson administration attempted to deter Ian Smith from declaring unilateral independence (UDI) and repeatedly voiced that the United States would not recognize any Rhodesian government not elected by the majority. However, American threats were vague and the US was unwilling to take action against Rhodesia without the British. American opinion was made clear in the UN, as Ambassador Adlai Stevenson said that as Rhodesia was a former colony, the British should take the largest role in negotiations.<sup>22</sup> After the UDI in November, an oil embargo led by the United Kingdom was imposed on Rhodesia by mid-December of 1965.<sup>23</sup> Although the effectiveness of the embargo was greatly lessened by

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<sup>20</sup> Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power*, 143.

<sup>21</sup> Andrew DeRoche, "Relations with Africa since 1900," in *A Companion to American Foreign Relations*, ed. Robert D. Schulzinger (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003), 109-110.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas J. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968*, (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 191-192.

<sup>23</sup> DeRoche, "Relations with Africa since 1900," 112-113.

South Africa stepping in to provide oil to Rhodesia, the effort was viewed favorably by black African nations who pushed for a strong Western response.

When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, he viewed Africa as a low priority. With foreign policy objectives elsewhere in the world, including the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union, he had little time or patience for African issues. This domination of foreign policy by Cold War motivations allowed Senator Harry Byrd Jr., a Democrat from Virginia, to add an amendment onto the 1971 Defense Procurement Bill which allowed for strategic minerals to be imported from any country as an alternative to doing so from a communist state. Commonly called the Byrd Amendment, section 503 of the bill allowed for the United States to import chrome from Rhodesia rather than the Soviet Union, breaking UN sanctions against the country. The United States continued to support sanctions imposed against Rhodesia in the UN, but used the Byrd Amendment to import chrome regardless. However, chrome had been the biggest import from Rhodesia and the amendment therefore negated the effectiveness of the US participation. Although Smith championed Byrd for his efforts on behalf of Rhodesia, black Africans in the liberation struggle denounced the amendment as proof the United States did not care about Southern Africa.<sup>24</sup> After the bill was signed into law by Nixon, the United States continued to import chrome from Rhodesia until 1977.

The United States' next foreign policy action in Southern Rhodesia came when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, during Gerald Ford's administration, attempted to negotiate an end to the armed conflict and introduce majority rule to the country in 1976. Kissinger had suffered a recent embarrassing episode where he sided with the white minority Southern African government in conflicts over independence in Angola. While this was an attempt to promote

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<sup>24</sup> Andrew DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome: the United States and Zimbabwe, 1953 to 1998* (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 2001), 170-171.

Cold War initiatives, his coordination with the South Africans caused many black African nations to condemn the United States as racist and the secretary therefore changed tactics on the continent. Rather than fighting communist power directly, he attempted to remove the threat of future influence in Africa. By helping nationalists come to power, the US could prevent the Africans from looking to communist nations for help. Thus, in April 1976, Kissinger announced American support for majority rule and entered negotiations with Southern Rhodesia and surrounding countries, eventually meeting with Smith in September.<sup>25</sup> However, Kissinger ignored the African nationalist leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe during negotiations, and although Smith proposed a settlement to his Parliament after meetings with Kissinger, both Nkomo and Mugabe rejected it. Subsequent talks in October at a conference in Geneva between African nationalists and Smith's regime resulted in little progress.<sup>26</sup> In the end, Kissinger was able to convince Smith to accept majority rule, an unprecedented feat, but he disregarded the importance of nationalist leaders such as Mugabe and Nkomo and consequently no settlement was reached.

While Kissinger's breakthrough was impressive, he was still following a Cold War agenda in Africa. In contrast, President Carter brought about a new era in American foreign policy on the continent. Rather than focusing solely on preventing an increased communist influence, Carter wanted to help Africans solve their own problems diplomatically with regard to human rights. Focusing on the Rhodesian Bush War, Carter's policies changed the American role in Southern African negotiations.

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<sup>25</sup> Masters, "Carter and the Rhodesian Problem," 24.

<sup>26</sup> DeRoche, "Relations with Africa since 1900," 116.

## **The Carter Administration and Rhodesia**

### **I. Carter's Diplomatic Team and the Repeal of the Byrd Amendment**

When Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976, he pursued a decidedly more active role than his recent predecessors in regard to African affairs. Carter's policy on Rhodesia was constructed from a blend of moral ideology committed to ending majority rule and establishing US ties with African nationalist forces to cut off the potential for Soviet influence. He wanted to stop viewing Africa only in the terms of the Cold War, as his predecessors had done, and instead use a more regional approach. By treating Southern Africa as a unique region and responding accordingly, Carter believed US actions would prove more successful than viewing it as only a peripheral arena of Cold War politics. Additionally, Carter thought that African American interest in African affairs was a sign that further concentration in the region was important.<sup>27</sup> Over the next four years, he and members of his administration were integral in negotiating an end to the conflict in Southern Rhodesia.

Carter began his efforts for peace in Southern Rhodesia while choosing several members of his administration as well as his chief UN ambassador. Carter's choice for National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was a Columbia University scholar familiar with foreign affairs. Cyrus Vance, a lawyer who agreed that Rhodesia should be an important part of United States foreign affairs, was then named Carter's Secretary of State.<sup>28</sup> Brzezinski fervently argued the importance of maintaining policies that would prevent Soviet and Cuban connections in Africa, a threat which he thought Vance underestimated. This accusation led to initial fears from others in

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<sup>27</sup> Donald R. Culverson, "From Cold War to Global Interdependence: the Political Economy of African American Antipartheid Activism, 1968-1988," in *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988*, ed. Brenda Gayle Plummer (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 231.

<sup>28</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 244-245.

Washington that Brzezinski and Vance would not hold the same position in Rhodesian policy.<sup>29</sup> However, Vance dispelled these rumors in early 1977. Over the course of the next two years, both made it clear through continued dedication to promoting peace in Rhodesia that they felt American response to the war was important to the strategic interests of the United States and a moral obligation.<sup>30</sup>

In addition, Carter chose Andrew Young, a congressman and former aid to Martin Luther King Jr., as the United States chief ambassador to the UN. Along with Brzezinski and Vance, Young stated that aiding with the negotiations was both morally right and a good move for US foreign policy, as it would help prevent future Soviet influence in the region.<sup>31</sup> Additionally, Young was an avid civil rights activist and thought ending minority rule in Africa needed to be a goal of the administration. Although South Africa was also a major culprit of minority rule, in February 1977 Young told Congress, “South Africa, while it is boiling, is not quite on fire yet. The fire is in Rhodesia.”<sup>32</sup> Carter and his advisors quickly began responding to the crisis in Southern Africa that was left unsolved by previous administrations.

The Carter administration first responded to the “Rhodesian problem” by proposing to repeal the Byrd amendment in order to end to Rhodesian chrome imports in opposition to UN sanctions. Carter sent Young to Africa to assess the African nationalists’ demands in the coming months, and he returned with an overwhelming response to continue efforts to repeal the amendment. Young introduced a bill in January 1977 to the House of Representatives with a purpose to “amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to halt the importation of

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<sup>29</sup> Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War Against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 161.

<sup>30</sup> Nancy Mitchell, "Tropes of the Cold War: Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia," *Cold War History* 7 (May, 2007), 269.

<sup>31</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 244-245.

<sup>32</sup> Mitchell, "Tropes of the Cold War," 266.

Rhodesian chrome,” and he quickly began garnering support.<sup>33</sup> Senator Byrd attempted to defend the importation, but the tide was rapidly turning the other way, especially in lieu of technological advances that lessened United States steel industry’s reliance on chrome. In March, Congress passed the bill with strong support from the UN and black African leaders.

The repeal of the Byrd Amendment changed the face of American-Rhodesian relations for several reasons. It not only stopped trade that broke UN sanctions, but it also produced domestic awareness, as Congress had once again debated African foreign policy and therefore raised public discussion and opinion on the matter. In addition, Young had been successful in fostering good relations on his initial trip to Africa, which would prove useful in future negotiations. In doing so, he established a strong rapport with a variety of African leaders, and most importantly leaders of the so-called Frontline States, or the countries surrounding Rhodesia. Finally, as a result of complete US compliance, the sanctions had begun to take a toll on Rhodesia’s economy. Although Smith and his government had strong support from South Africa, increased sanctions encouraged him to seek a settlement sooner. With the amendment successfully repealed, the Carter administration and the United Kingdom began talks with African nationalists and Smith.

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<sup>33</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 245.

## II. The Anglo-American Plan

In early 1977, the United Kingdom was struggling to establish a settlement in Rhodesia, and as Carter took office it was apparent that the British were more than willing to seek assistance from the United States. The new British Foreign Secretary David Owen summed up this new perspective by stating that “the time of pussyfooting around over Rhodesia’s independence was past,” and he “actively sought US support” in the matter.<sup>34</sup> In March, Carter met with British Prime Minister James Callaghan in Washington and they agreed to actively pursue a Rhodesian settlement that respected the demands of all involved parties. This task was delegated to Vance and Owen, who began by attempting to organize an all-parties conference. Smith expressed that he was willing to attend talks, but the leading nationalists, Mugabe and Nkomo (now leading the Patriotic Front, or PF) were not willing if the United States was a leader, likely due to American affiliations with South Africa. In response, Vance and Owen developed a “consultative group” in May 1977, led by British Foreign Office diplomat Johnny Graham and the American ambassador to Zambia Stephen Low, which traveled around Southern Africa to discern what kind of settlement would be agreeable to all parties.<sup>35</sup>

Graham and Low first met with Smith to persuade him into accepting a settlement plan. However, when they said that universal suffrage would be a necessary component of the resolution, Smith refused. An upsurge of violence in June further complicated efforts to convince Smith to agree to a plan including majority rule. Negotiations in July were again halted by Mugabe’s concerns that the new draft did not specify who held power during the proposed transitional government, an issue which continued to be controversial in future drafts. While little progress had been made in regard to developing firm settlement terms, Young still felt

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<sup>34</sup> Mitchell, “Tropes of the Cold War,” 266-267.

<sup>35</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 249.

confident that Smith's time was running out. In early June, he predicted in a United Nations conference that the Rhodesian government would collapse within eighteen months without a settlement that ended sanctions and he emphasized the need for the United States and Great Britain to continue assisting in the development of a peace agreement.<sup>36</sup>

The efforts of Graham and Low, though unsuccessful, were useful in formulating an Anglo-American plan for settlement late in the summer of 1977. Although there were disagreements over the necessity to include all of the members of the PF in a final settlement, the Americans and the British did agree that excluding any of the foremost nationalists would prolong the war and could damage relations with the PF and other sympathetic African nations. In addition, construction of a workable settlement was complicated by Carter's promises to Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. When Nyerere, a key member of the PF, made a diplomatic visit to Washington in early August, he explained that he desired a settlement which would replace the Rhodesian military with one that was based on liberation, rather than Rhodesian, forces. Carter promised similar wording would be included in the settlement, causing uproar among British and American diplomats alike, and created a situation in which any plan developed by the Anglo-American initiative would be rejected outright by Smith, who was capable of destroying many of the negotiation efforts made by the team in the months prior. However, Carter's agreement with Nyerere could not be disregarded, and Owen and Young traveled to Africa in late August to introduce what came to be known as the Anglo-American Proposal, hoping to settle the "Rhodesian Problem" once and for all.<sup>37</sup>

Owen and Young's proposal asked more from the white Rhodesians than any previous plan. For one, the proposal removed Smith from power and developed a provisional government

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<sup>36</sup> *New York Times*, 10 June 1977, 9.

<sup>37</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 250.

under British control with a UN peacekeeping force. During this transitional period, a new constitution would be written that included free, universal elections, leading to majority rule and the internationally recognized independence of Rhodesia by 1978.<sup>38</sup> To alleviate the complications that had risen with Carter's earlier promise, the controversial integration of guerilla forces into the army was included in the plan, but it left out the specification that the army be completely based on liberation forces. Carter was convinced that an army which included nationalist forces was a necessary component to the plan, but Owen was certain that Smith would never accept any plan with such direct phrasing.<sup>39</sup> The pair agreed to introduce the proposal as planned and negotiate any disagreements with the various parties as necessary.

Over the course of several days after their arrival, Owen and Young met with PF leaders, the South African Prime Minister John Vorster, and Smith. Initially, members of the PF pointed out the missing clause specifying that liberation forces would make up the new army. Young convinced them that eventually the Rhodesian military would fall apart after minority rule ceased to exist, resulting in a new army composed of liberation forces and thus they could avoid the explicit statement likely to be rejected by Smith. Nyerere was still unsure of this decision, telling reporters after their meeting, "I want to be sure that when the proposals are made public it will be clear that the British and Americas are intending to help us to remove Smith and his army to be replaced by forces being trained by Africans on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe [Rhodesia]."<sup>40</sup> Before meeting with Smith, Young needed to return to Nyerere to further emphasize the necessity of leaving the phrase out of the proposal before the Tanzanian President would give his support.

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<sup>38</sup> Mitchell, "Tropes of the Cold War," 267.

<sup>39</sup> Masters, "Carter and the Rhodesian Problem," 26.

<sup>40</sup> *New York Times*, 31 August 1977, 2.

When the team traveled to South Africa, Prime Minister Vorster was unwavering in his belief that Smith would reject any plan that even alluded to an army that did not consist solely of Rhodesian security forces and vowed that he would not attempt to sway Smith toward the agreement. The diplomatic mission was further threatened by a Rhodesian electoral campaign that was surely to result in landslide victory for Smith. In his closing campaign speech, the Prime Minister reiterated his rejection of “any dismantling of the Rhodesian army, and ... that the retention of the white-led armed forces and police was one of three considerations his Government would insist upon.”<sup>41</sup> The situation continued to look bleak as the team of diplomats prepared to meet with Smith, but they knew their efforts were necessary to head him off from making an internal deal to develop majority rule on his own terms.

Young and Owen detailed the Anglo-American Proposal to Smith on September 1<sup>st</sup> and listened to him unfalteringly declare that he “was not committed to anything in the plan.” It was clear that Smith was likely to pursue a different path toward peace. His disposition worsened when the Anglo-American Proposal was officially released to the public later that day with a separate Law and Order statement providing for an “army based on liberation forces.” Smith and his allies agreed to negotiate the proposal but not the Law and Order statement.<sup>42</sup> More worryingly, in the coming months it became clear that Smith was pursuing the development of an internal settlement without the British or American diplomats. If passed, an internal settlement would derail the Anglo-American Proposal and undermine efforts to include the nationalists in negotiations. Smith found this option more appealing as he could control large aspects of the agreement, which allowed him to maintain white influence even if Rhodesian had all inclusive elections, and he began negotiating with several black leaders.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 252-255.

### III. The Internal Settlement

As 1977 came to a close, it seemed that the Anglo-American Proposal would fall on the wayside without further negotiations, especially as fighting between the Rhodesian forces and nationalist guerillas intensified. While Owen and Young knew of Smith's refusal to attend an all-parties conference, they convinced Mugabe and Nkomo, who were beginning to fear an internal settlement that would decidedly leave the nationalists out of any power-sharing, to meet on the island of Malta in late January 1978. While progress during the three day conference was negligible, Young and Owen did report that rapport with the Patriotic Front had progressed as a result of the talks, with Young describing the time as "more of a seminar than a bargaining session" that improved relations.<sup>43</sup> Regardless, the Malta conference was unable to stop Smith's development of an internal settlement.

Smith's settlement developed swiftly. Shortly after the conference in Malta, he and three black Africans, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Jeremiah Chirau and Ndabaningi Sithole, announced a plan that would finally bring an end to the war and majority rule in Rhodesia. The plan, calling for a one-year interim government before a universal election could be held, was supported by Smith and his colleagues because it still maintained many aspects of white control in government. For one, the new parliament included 28 white seats out of 100, which still maintained white veto power over constitutional changes. Additionally, white influence was maintained in "civil service, judiciary, military and other levers of power."<sup>44</sup> When the announcement was released on February 15, 1978, Smith hailed the successful agreement, stating, "It's been a victory for moderation. Instead of fighting and killing people, we've shown

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<sup>43</sup> *New York Times*, 1 February 1978, 3.

<sup>44</sup> Masters, "Carter and the Rhodesian Problem," 26.

patience that has helped us to solve our problem toward bringing peace.”<sup>45</sup> In contrast, Carter and Young deemed the internal settlement unacceptable as it had been agreed upon without any members of the Patriotic Front. Response among other American and British politicians and ambassadors was mixed.

The announcement surprised the Americans and British, who were unaware a settlement was so close in Salisbury. When Young heard of the settlement, he immediately stated that “any Rhodesian settlement that did not include the black nationalist guerrillas of the Patriotic Front opened the way to a ‘black on black civil war,’” as he did not believe that the nationalists would stop the war if they had not participated in the agreement.<sup>46</sup> However, many other politicians in the United States viewed the internal settlement more positively. Opposition was growing in Congress over Carter’s insistence on including the PF in negotiations, especially as many Congressmen viewed the nationalists as terrorists. Senator Harry Byrd tried to convince Carter that the internal settlement should be supported, arguing: “There is every indication that [the] settlement signed by Prime Minister Smith and Black Rhodesian leaders can lead to a rapid transition to majority rule within a constitutional framework.”<sup>47</sup> In response to growing tension in Congress, Carter instructed both Young and Vance to neither promote nor denounce the agreement publicly. British response was also unenthusiastic, convinced that the settlement had little chance of international recognition without guaranteeing the cessation of Rhodesian hostilities in Southern Africa. Owen proved to be more accepting than Young, however, as he was unwilling to rule out an agreement with any vestige of hope to finally bring majority rule to the country.

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<sup>45</sup> *New York Times*, 16 February 1978, 7.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>47</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 262.

As the transitional period of the internal settlement began and the war continued despite the fact that Muzorewa had been named head of the interim government, conservatives in the United States strengthened their fight against Carter's foreign policy in Southern Africa. Republican Senators Jesse Helms of North Carolina and S.I. Hayakawa of California led an effort to remove sanctions on Rhodesia that had been reinforced by the repealing of the Byrd amendment. Their perception was that Smith's agreement with black Africans showed an effort to develop majority rule in the country and the continued compliance with the Patriotic Front was against American interest, especially as the PF was quickly becoming viewed as a Marxist organization. In June, Helms introduced an amendment on new legislation to end sanctions in Rhodesia, but it was narrowly defeated in Congress. Undaunted, he attempted again quickly thereafter, and only with intense lobbying by the Carter administration was the second attempt defeated.<sup>48</sup> However, on the same day as the second defeat, the Senate passed the Case-Javits amendment which compromised the competing interests of the conservatives and the administration.

The Case-Javits amendment, named after Republican Senators Clifford Case of New Jersey and Jacob Javits of New York, was added to the Security Assistance Authorization Bill and passed into law in July 1978. It required that when the President determined that the Rhodesian government had met in an all-parties conference and held universal elections in which the entire population was allowed to participate under impartial supervision, the sanctions were to be repealed. Although Carter was able to thwart Helms and his supporters from completely removing sanctions, the Case-Javits amendment did show the changing American disposition in light of the internal settlement.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 266-268.

<sup>49</sup> Masters, "Carter and the Rhodesian Problem," 27.

In the last few months of 1978, the efforts of the Anglo-American plan waned and the PF continued to reject the internal settlement. Smith persisted that the settlement was the best option, stating: “It is incomprehensible to me. We are offering them a genuine settlement to produce a democratic system which will truly reflect what they’ve always asked for, majority rule, but they seem to be turning their back on this toward a solution which will end up with a dictatorship in Rhodesia, a Marxist dictatorship.”<sup>50</sup> In October, Smith and Muzorewa agreed to meet with PF leaders, but no specific dates were determined. Smith was also granted a visa to visit the United States as he sought to garner American support for the internal settlement. Although Carter did not meet with Smith during his visit, Smith did talk with several Senators, including Harry Byrd, who criticized the president for refusing to meet with him. Even though Carter did not meet with Smith, the PF saw the visit as reason to believe the Anglo-American plan was being put on hold and they escalated fighting. No conference was arranged by the end of the year and Carter was becoming distracted by other priorities, such as the Panama Canal and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.<sup>51</sup> As 1979 began, the elections of the internal settlement approached and it appeared that the Anglo-American Proposal was destined to dissolve.

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<sup>50</sup> *New York Times*, 24 February 1978, 1.

<sup>51</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 270.

#### IV. Rhodesian Elections and Carter's Fight to Maintain Sanctions

Although the internal settlement had planned that elections be held by the end of 1978, they were delayed several times and not held until April 1979. Prior to the Rhodesian vote, it became clear that British Prime Minister Callaghan was likely to be defeated by Margaret Thatcher in the upcoming election. Thatcher said that she might be willing to recognize the new "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" if the voting was deemed free and fair. While Thatcher sent five observers to the election, the United States government sent none. Despite support for sending them among conservatives in Congress, Carter's administration feared that observers would anger the PF and blocked a Senate resolution from doing so. Low also agreed, contending that judging the elections was nearly impossible due to intimidation of voters prior to observer arrival.<sup>52</sup> However, two pro-settlement American groups, the American Conservative Union and Freedom House, did send observers. Both groups supported the elections and argued that American sanctions should be lifted from the country. On the other hand, Americans critical of the settlement argued that the elections took place with no voter registration and when most of the country was under martial law in an effort to develop a façade of majority rule.<sup>53</sup> Well after the election was complete the debate continued over the legitimacy of the results.

In the end, the election results closely aligned with expectations. Muzorewa won easily with 67 percent of the vote and he gained 51 seats in Parliament, becoming the first black Prime Minister of Rhodesia. Power passed from Ian Smith to Bishop Muzorewa at midnight on May 31<sup>st</sup>, ending 88 years of white minority rule.<sup>54</sup> The passing of power was quiet among the population. Since whites still retained many powers in the new government, Rhodesia was yet to

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 273-274.

<sup>53</sup> Masters, "Carter and the Rhodesian Problem," 28.

<sup>54</sup> "Salisbury: The Power Passes," *Time Magazine*, 11 June 1979, 26.

be internationally recognized and sanctions had not been lifted.<sup>55</sup> In addition, although Muzorewa called for the end of the war, the PF was still standing firm in opposition.<sup>56</sup> It was widely conceived by the press that the election had been fair, and this strengthened the cause of sanction opponents.<sup>57</sup> Regardless, the Carter administration stressed that the PF refused to recognize the election, as Young stated that the settlement “does not address the issues that have some 40,000 people fighting.”<sup>58</sup> Though Rhodesia was seemingly ruled by majority, the country was still in the midst of a guerilla war.

With the election complete, Congress pushed Carter to uphold the Case-Javits amendment. The President had to declare if he felt the elections had indeed been free and fair after Muzorewa officially took office as prime minister in late May. While the Rhodesians hoped Carter would lift sanctions, Vance made it clear that a large part of Carter’s decision still hinged on whether or not the new government was willing to attend an all-parties conference.<sup>59</sup> As the time for Carter’s decision grew nearer, support for both sides of the debate worked feverishly. The Senate, led by the efforts of Harry Byrd, Hayakawa and Helms, passed a non-binding amendment to a bill which overwhelmingly supported the lifting of sanctions. On the other hand, opponents of the internal settlement tried to convince Carter to uphold his principles. Many African American leaders wrote to him urging him to maintain sanctions, while Representative Stephen Solarz, a Democrat from New York who had considerable knowledge of Rhodesian affairs, wrote a report detailing the necessity of the sanctions and lobbied his strong beliefs to Vice President Walter Mondale. In an interview portraying his point of view, Solarz attested: “I

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<sup>55</sup> *Herald* (Salisbury), 1 June 1979, 1.

<sup>56</sup> In many cases, the government tried to convince the Rhodesian population that the new regime would bring peace to the country. See Appendix B for a newspaper ad featuring Muzorewa calling to the people to help bring about peace.

<sup>57</sup> Mitchell, "Tropes of the Cold War," 271.

<sup>58</sup> *New York Times*, 18 February 1978, 3.

<sup>59</sup> *Herald* (Salisbury), 1 June 1979, 1.

think the internal settlement in Salisbury does represent significant progress. But I think we have an overriding concern in bringing that war to an end. Once we lift sanctions, thereby forfeiting our credentials as an honest broker, the opportunities for a negotiated settlement will have gone down the drain.”<sup>60</sup> The efforts of both sides of the debate would come to a head when Carter finally released his analysis on the elections.

On June 7<sup>th</sup>, Carter announced that he would not lift the sanctions on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, voicing that support of the internal settlement and the removal of sanctions was not favorable for the United States or Rhodesia. The President pointed out that the elections were held under a constitution that was decided on by a vote that excluded black Africans. “The black citizens,” he argued, “who constitute 96% of the population of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, never had a chance to vote for or against the Constitution under which elections were held.”<sup>61</sup> In addition, a key point of the Case-Javits amendment stipulated that universal participation would be required in an election deemed to be free, and opposing parties, most importantly the PF, had been banned from the election. “No other country on Earth has extended diplomatic relations or recognition to the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government,” Carter continued, maintaining that he would be firm in his principles and would only remove sanctions when he deemed that progress had been made toward a legitimate majority-ruled government.<sup>62</sup> His administration stood strongly behind Carter’s decision as its spokesmen continued to publicize his reasoning. Young indicated that he felt lifting sanctions would accomplish little, as even without them the United States and other Western countries were unlikely to provide financial or military aid to help the new

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<sup>60</sup> *New York Times*, 13 May 1979, E5.

<sup>61</sup> Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Sanctions: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Decision Explained*, President Carter’s Statement, Washington, DC: Current Policy No. 70, June 1979, 1.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-2.

government.<sup>63</sup> After the decision, the House of Representatives showed support by passing an amendment that left the decision of lifting sanctions solely to Carter. Although the Senate and the new Rhodesian government were dismayed at the decision, Carter continued to refuse to lift sanctions until progress had been made that was more likely to end the fighting.<sup>64</sup>

In the meantime, Margaret Thatcher replaced Callaghan as Prime Minister and replaced Foreign Secretary Owen with her own choice, Lord Peter Carrington. Although Thatcher did view the elections to be fair, she realized that the success of the internal settlement hinged on whether or not it was successful in bringing peace to the country. With the Patriotic Front condemning the new government and promising to continue the war, it was clear that peace was unlikely. Looking to the Carter administration for advice and after being urged to maintain sanctions and organize a new all-parties conference, Thatcher did not recognize the settlement as legitimate.<sup>65</sup> However, Thatcher did express that the British government was to take a leading role in solving the continuing conflict. American opinion also leaned toward a stronger leading role for Great Britain. In early June, even Young showed support for this changing policy, stating that it was “essentially a British problem... Anything that they agree to ought to be fine with us. But the British ought to work out the details.”<sup>66</sup> While Thatcher continued to rely on the Carter administration for advice, the Americans were gradually being moved to the side.

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<sup>63</sup> *Herald* (Salisbury), 28 June 1979, 1.

<sup>64</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 278-280.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 276.

<sup>66</sup> *Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 5 June 1979, 1.

## V. The Lancaster House Agreement and the Role of the United States

As the summer continued, the British realized that they were unable to fulfill Thatcher's campaign promise of recognizing Muzorewa's government. The Carter administration was clearly against the internal settlement and without the removal of sanctions there was little hope of ending the war. Violence had increased dramatically throughout Rhodesia and in surrounding countries and it seemed that Muzorewa had accomplished little to quell the fighting. The first real progress toward improvement in Rhodesia was made during the annual Commonwealth Conference in early August.<sup>67</sup> Thatcher was able to establish a common ground with African leaders, especially Tanzania's Nyerere, and by the end of the convention plans were established for an all-parties conference among Muzorewa's government and the PF. Although Thatcher was reluctant to be too optimistic about the upcoming conference, the Commonwealth countries had recognized the need for further action in Rhodesia and this could not be ignored. When he heard about the decision, Carter praised the move by Thatcher wholeheartedly, pleased that the British were again taking the reins.<sup>68</sup>

The role of the American government continued to diminish with the sudden resignation of Andrew Young as the United States Chief Ambassador to the UN. On the same day that Muzorewa accepted the invitation to talks in London, Young announced that he was quitting amid accusations of breaking the U.S. agreement with Israel not to meet officially with Palestinian representatives. Carter was reluctant to let Young go; the *New York Times* described the situation by pointing out that "by all indications, the President found it difficult to dismiss someone who had been such a longtime, close, important political ally."<sup>69</sup> However, after being encouraged by Vance, Young felt that he should take action before the President dismissed him

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<sup>67</sup> *Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 4 August 1979, 1.

<sup>68</sup> *New York Times*, 7 August 1979, 8.

<sup>69</sup> *New York Times*, 16 August 1979, p. 14.

personally, therefore saving Carter further embarrassment and difficulty. Young's resignation ended his ability to continue endeavors with Rhodesia, but his previous efforts had helped the United States and Great Britain make significant strides toward the objectives sought by both.

Simultaneously, several members of Congress continued their efforts to end sanctions in Rhodesia. Carter signed the State Department Authorization Bill into law on August 15<sup>th</sup>, which included an amendment that required Carter to make another decision over sanctions on Rhodesia by November 15<sup>th</sup>. Carter hoped that by that time the conference in London would be complete and the outcome would allow him to lift sanctions. In a final effort Senator Harry Byrd tried once again to add an amendment that would lift sanctions to another piece of legislation, the Defense Authorization Bill. Nevertheless, Carter, with the assistance of Solarz, was able to negotiate a deal which would remove the Byrd amendment from the legislation.<sup>70</sup> Once again Carter maintained a strong position in terms of Rhodesia and was successful in preventing the removal of sanctions before the planned all-parties conference in London.

The all-parties conference at Lancaster House began on September 10<sup>th</sup> between British representatives, delegates from the Rhodesian government, including Muzorewa and Ian Smith, and Mugabe, Nkomo and other representatives from the Patriotic Front. The American government did not attend officially, and Lord Carrington emerged as the clear leader of the conference. The importance of the conference were accentuated by Muzorewa's demands that the talks were the Patriotic Front's only chance to be reasonable, warning that if it failed he and the Rhodesian government would "go on as we are and continue to bring peace in our own way."<sup>71</sup> Each concern, such as the constitution, white authority, the military and the transitional government, were taken up one by one as the conference continued. In early October,

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<sup>70</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 282-283.

<sup>71</sup> *Sunday News* (Bulawayo), 2 September 1979, 1.

Muzorewa's government finally accepted that a new constitution would be necessary. By a vote of 11 to 1 (with Ian Smith being the only delegate against the measure), the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government agreed that if sanctions were lifted by Britain, a new constitution would be allowed and the seat held for whites in the Parliament would be reduced from 28 to 20.<sup>72</sup>

Later in the month, in a fashion that one US diplomat called "masterful," Carrington convinced Nkomo and Mugabe to accept a British-drafted constitution. Once they received the promise of financial aid provided by Western countries, the two PF leaders finally ended a deadlock that was holding up the conference.<sup>73</sup> After the constitution, the transitional period was debated. The largest concern of both African parties was that of military control during the transition, and after weeks of negotiations it was agreed that a British governor was to control both the Rhodesian and nationalist forces leading up to the elections.<sup>74</sup> When the details of the transitional period were finally agreed upon in late November, one British diplomat commented: "To those of us who have been trying to solve this problem for the past 14 years, it seems like a miracle."<sup>75</sup>

Even though Carter or any other American official did not attend officially, United States policy did play a key role in the outcome of the Lancaster agreement. Over the course of the three months, Carter offered aid to the Zimbabwean government to assist in the compensation of white landowners who would lose their property and to help resettle 200,000 Zimbabwean refugees in surrounding countries, helping push along discussions left at stalemates.<sup>76</sup> In addition, Carter held off lifting sanctions in November. Before his new November 15<sup>th</sup> deadline,

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<sup>72</sup> "Edging Toward Each Other," *Time Magazine*, 1 October 1979, 23.

<sup>73</sup> "Breakthrough in London," *Time Magazine*, 29 October 1979, 48-49.

<sup>74</sup> Jeffrey Davidow, *A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 75.

<sup>75</sup> "It Seems Like A Miracle," *Time Magazine*, 26 November 1979, 26.

<sup>76</sup> Masters, "Carter and the Rhodesian Problem," 29-30.

the president announced that it was still in the national interest of the United States to maintain the sanctions and he feared that lifting them could also endanger the outcome of the conference by encouraging Muzorewa to drop out.<sup>77</sup> In a December hearing for the House Committee of Foreign Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for State for African Affairs Richard Moose reiterated the position of the administration, arguing that lifting sanctions in the midst of the conference would have a “serious deleterious effect on negotiations.”<sup>78</sup> Everyone hoped that the final agreement in Lancaster would involve British control over a free and fair election.

As the Lancaster House conference continued into December, the last dispute over the terms of ceasefire was discussed. Lord Christopher Soames was sent to Salisbury as the British governor to oversee the transitional government, and the British encouraged Carter to lift sanctions in an attempt to push the last few days of the conference along. On December 16<sup>th</sup>, Carter finally lifted sanctions on Rhodesia as he agreed that the presence of Soames and the progress made in the conference in London were clear signs that true independence was imminent in the country.<sup>79</sup> On December 17<sup>th</sup>, the PF agreed to a ceasefire pact, and on the 21<sup>st</sup> all of the parties signed the final accord, which came to be known as the Lancaster House Agreement. With the ceasefire beginning on December 28<sup>th</sup>, the war that had started over 14 years prior was officially over, though only time could tell if peace would last.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 284.

<sup>78</sup> Congress, House of Representatives, Committee of Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations, *Rhodesian Sanctions: Should the United States Lift Them?: Hearing Before the Committee of Foreign Affairs*, 96<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 5 December 1979, 24.

<sup>79</sup> *New York Times*, 16 December 1979, 11.

<sup>80</sup> *Herald* (Salisbury), 21 December 1979, 1.

## VI. The End of the Rhodesian Bush War

Shortly after the Lancaster House conference was complete, Mugabe, Nkomo and the rest of the African nationalists returned to Rhodesia. Mugabe, who had been in exile for over 16 years, and Nkomo were welcomed with crowds as they reentered the country. With a ceasefire supposedly in order, the population prepared for a new election.<sup>81</sup> However, in the two months leading up to the late February election, violence and intimidation plagued the countryside.

With the removal of bans on Mugabe, Nkomo and their fighting forces, thousands of nationalist fighters streamed into Rhodesia from surrounding countries. On the evening the ceasefire began, within only a few hours violence broke out in various areas of the country. Muzorewa was quick to condemn the violence, telling a Salisbury newspaper, “I want everyone to know that since banning orders were lifted a wave of diabolical violence has erupted throughout our land.”<sup>82</sup> As January began, it was repeatedly reported that ZANLA and ZIPRA forces were ordered to make it appear that they were adhering to the ceasefire. By sending only portions of nationalist forces to chosen check points, developing weapon caches and infiltrating civilian villages, the nationalists were avoiding putting down their arms unconditionally.<sup>83</sup> Angered by the continued violence, Muzorewa demanded that Soames bar any party that failed to comply with the ceasefire from the election.<sup>84</sup>

In addition to continued violence, Mugabe chose to split the PF for the election shortly after their return. While Nkomo chose to cooperate with Soames, Mugabe made it known that he wanted to run separately from the PF under the name ZANU-PF. This alarmed Nkomo, but

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<sup>81</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 285-286.

<sup>82</sup> *Sunday Mail* (Salisbury), 30 December 1979, 1.

<sup>83</sup> *Sunday Mail* (Salisbury), 6 January 1980, 3.

<sup>84</sup> *Sunday News* (Bulawayo), 6 January 1980, 1.

Mugabe promised that the Front would continue to work together closely.<sup>85</sup> However, over the course of the election, Mugabe continued to ignore Nkomo's attempts to contact him.<sup>86</sup> This split was the first signs of Mugabe's desires to avoid sharing power, which he continued after the elections. In the end, Nkomo chose to run under the name of the Patriotic Front instead of ZAPU.

As the elections approached, violence and intimidation continued. Muzorewa repeatedly voiced his distrust for Mugabe's ZANU party and in many areas his United African National Council (UANC) party and Nkomo's supporters abandoned holding election rallies in fear of violence.<sup>87</sup> "I think the Governor should be firm and implement the ceasefire to the letter... I would say the PF have not fulfilled the conditions and should therefore be penalized," Muzorewa stated. "They should be barred from the peaceful elections we are now looking for."<sup>88</sup>

Eventually, Soames reprimanded the ZANLA forces (of Mugabe's ZANU-PF party) for continued border crossings, sending civilians to guerilla checkpoints instead of genuine combatants, and violence after the ceasefire. Nick Fenn, the governor's chief Press aide, admitted, "It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that their objective is to carry out intimidation during the election campaign."<sup>89</sup> In response to a threat by Soames to ban the ZANU-PF Party from the election, Mugabe fought back by threatening to return to war. "If Lord Soames bans us from one electoral district we will pull out of the election entirely and go back to war," stated Mugabe's election director, Eddison Zvobgo, "There will be a bloodbath."<sup>90</sup> In light of these threats, Soames condemned the violence, but included Mugabe in the final poll.

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<sup>85</sup> *Herald* (Salisbury), 31 December 1979, 1.

<sup>86</sup> Martin Meredith, *Black Mugabe: Power, Plunder and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 38.

<sup>87</sup> *Sunday News* (Bulawayo), 10 February 1980, 1.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 6 January 1980, 1.

<sup>89</sup> *Herald* (Salisbury), 16 January 1980, 1.

<sup>90</sup> *Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 11 February 1980, 1.

In addition to intimidation and violence, another factor that hindered free voting was that most of the Rhodesian population had no idea how an election worked. Most blacks, who had never had the opportunity to vote before, had to be taught how the democratic process operated. Newspaper ads and posters appeared throughout January and February which explained how to vote. In addition, in an attempt to hinder the consequences of continued intimidation by various political parties, the ad campaigns informed voters that their ballots were secret and no one could punish them for voting for any particular party.<sup>91</sup> Regardless, many voters continued to fear retribution in the time leading up to the elections.

In the end, Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party won a landslide victory in the February elections, gaining 63 percent of the total vote and a strong majority in the new Parliament. He quickly attempted to comfort the surprised Nkomo by appointing him the Minister of Home Affairs and promised to not forget the coalition of the Patriotic Front.<sup>92</sup> On April 18 he officially assumed power, and promised in the coming months to bring change to the war-stricken country amid high hopes from much of the black population. Mugabe first met with Carter in August 1980, when Carter congratulated him on his victory and Mugabe thanked Carter for his continued efforts to bring peace to his country. Although Carter had not indicated that he supported any particular candidate in the elections after the Lancaster House Agreement, he felt that he achieved what he had hoped for in Rhodesia.<sup>93</sup> As the Rhodesian Bush War had finally ended and a free election had occurred, Carter felt victorious in his efforts to bring peace and human rights to country, regardless of what was to come in the future.

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<sup>91</sup> See Appendices C and D.

<sup>92</sup> Tinos Guvi, "Power for the People," *Prize! Africa*, April 1980, 6.

<sup>93</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 286-287.

## **Carter's Legacy and Response to His Policies**

Over the course of his presidency, Jimmy Carter brought a new outlook for African relations in the United States. Unlike his recent predecessors, Carter chose to abandon the common policy of using the Cold War as a determinant of African policy and instead viewed Africa as a distinct region. Above all, Carter championed morals in his African foreign policy, stating: "I don't ever want to do anything as president that would be a contravention of the moral and ethical standard that I would exemplify in my own life as an individual."<sup>94</sup> This outlook would define his progress in Southern Rhodesia. However, Carter's moral hopes were not always viewed favorably in terms of the "Rhodesian Problem" as many would voice their opposition to his opinions and actions.

Shortly after his election, Carter began his efforts to encourage majority rule in Rhodesia and continued to further these efforts throughout his term. He felt that by pushing for majority rule through diplomatic means, he was promoting what the United States stood for. He reiterated these sentiments in his statement explaining the continued sanctions in June 1979, stating: "It means a lot to our country to do what is right, and what is decent, and what is fair, and what is principled. And in my opinion, the action that I have described fulfills these requirements."<sup>95</sup> Statements such as these highlight Carter's underlying purpose as he refused to back down due to political pressure from supporters of the Rhodesian government.

Many of those who supported Carter continued to voice their agreement in his policy. Vance maintained that the administration's continued efforts in Rhodesia were the "most positive single element shaping our relations with virtually all African nations."<sup>96</sup> Several members of

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<sup>94</sup> Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power*, 29.

<sup>95</sup> Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Sanctions: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Decision Explained*, President Carter's Statement, Washington, DC: Current Policy No. 70, June 1979, 2.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

Congress, and especially Stephen Solarz, championed the efforts of the President and his administration. After traveling to southern Africa in April 1979, Solarz emphasized the importance of maintaining sanctions, promoted the need for further negotiations for peace and downplayed the belief that the PF was simply a Soviet “Trojan Horse” in Africa. In response to the April 1979 elections, Solarz wrote in a committee report “it is... by no means clear that the recent elections constitute a clear and convincing demonstration of support for the internal settlement” and he remained convinced that the majority still did not have unhindered rule in Rhodesia.<sup>97</sup> Solarz and other members of Congress fought to maintain sanctions on Rhodesia until it was absolutely clear that the British government would be holding free elections in Rhodesia after the Lancaster House Agreement. While in reality few of the American public knew or cared about events in Rhodesia, many African American leaders, such as Jesse Jackson and Coretta Scott King, heralded Carter and his Rhodesian policy.<sup>98</sup> This was particularly important to Carter, as he felt much of his success as a politician was due to strong African American support.

Perhaps no one else supported Carter as strongly as Ambassador Young. In the months after Carter’s inauguration, Young eagerly began diplomatic talks with the Rhodesian government, African nationalists and leaders of the Frontline states. In June 1977, he optimistically predicted the Smith regime would fall within 18 months.<sup>99</sup> Even when diplomacy proved more difficult, Young continued to be firm in his desires to bring about a majority-ruled Rhodesia through elections that included the PF. Even after Young stepped down from his position he continued to speak for a free Rhodesia. After Mugabe’s election, Carter even joked

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<sup>97</sup> House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Rhodesia: Where do we go from here?*, report prepared by Stephen Solarz, 96<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., June 1979, Committee Print.

<sup>98</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 278.

<sup>99</sup> *New York Times*, 10 June 1977, 9. In reality, it took almost three years for true majority rule to be achieved.

that Young “never let me forget” Rhodesia over the course of his service to the Administration.<sup>100</sup> Although Young was often chided for his outspoken nature as a diplomat, he never faltered in his support for Carter’s position on Rhodesia.

In spite of his supporters, Carter’s good intentions were not always met favorably. After the 1979 elections in Rhodesia, many were eager to see the end of sanctions and several congressmen began working on legislation to push the president to make a decision about lifting them. “It would be especially tragic if the United States were to give less than full support to a fledgling constitutional democracy, on a continent where individual national governments were predominantly autocratic,” stated Republican Senator Richard Schweiker in response to Carter’s delay in removing sanctions.<sup>101</sup> Senator S.I. Hayakawa, once of Senator Solarz’s most prominent opponents in his fight to maintain sanctions, argued that the Administration favored the Patriotic Front over other Africans vying for power in Rhodesia. “We cannot judge the feelings of Africa’s ‘untelevised majority’ on the basis of the behavior of the elitist revolutionary leaders,” he told the *New York Times*. “I don’t believe those leaders speak for a majority of black Africans.”<sup>102</sup>

In light of the April 1979 elections, American opinion quickly surged in support of the Rhodesian government and many began to rebuke the strong support the Carter administration gave to the Patriotic Front. Widespread judgment upon the elections called them free and fair, and many Congressmen made it clear that the removal of sanctions against Rhodesia was both necessary and right to do in light of the successful elections. Some even argued that it was clear that the administration had favored the Patriotic Front throughout the last several years, even in the light of Smith agreeing to one-man, one-vote elections. “We routinely deal with other

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<sup>100</sup> DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 287.

<sup>101</sup> M. Stanton Evans, “Sanction in Rhodesia,” *National Review* 31, no 23 (June 8, 1979): 743.

<sup>102</sup> *New York Times*, 13 May 1979, E5.

African states which have no elections at all and/or maintain themselves through blatantly rigged plebiscites,” one writer expressed as he emphasized the overwhelming response from those who observed the election (including himself) that the voting was free and fair.<sup>103</sup> After Mugabe’s election, some supporters of internal settlement feared that the proclaimed Marxist would have a profoundly detrimental effect on the region. One South African writer blamed the continued sanctions by Western countries for the results of the election, and particularly those of the United States.<sup>104</sup> In the belief that the correct policy was to remove sanctions, many felt the actions of global leaders like Carter prevented Muzorewa’s government from having a chance to succeed.

As a prominent member of Carter’s staff, Young was also often reprimanded by politicians and the media alike in regard to Rhodesia. In 1978, members of Congress accused Young of wanting the Rhodesian government to be handed over to the sole control of the PF, which was a direct attack on the work of the Carter Administration itself.<sup>105</sup> Later that year, New York Times journalist John B. Oakes blasted Young, stating, “Once again there have to be explanations, retractions, apologies or excuses to cover the self-indulgent comments of this disarming *enfant terrible* of the Carter Administration.”<sup>106</sup> Young also had some opponents in Rhodesia. Pro-white Rhodesians in Salisbury were known to call the ambassador over-zealous in his efforts to further black power and looking to gain black votes in America, and on several occasions African nationalists were wary of Young’s diplomatic advances.<sup>107</sup> Though Young played a major role in Carter’s policies in Rhodesia, he was not universally supported in his actions in Africa and elsewhere.

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<sup>103</sup> Evans, "Sanction in Rhodesia," 743.

<sup>104</sup> Julian Amery, "Mugabe’s victory a major defeat for the West," *To The Point* 9, no 11 (14 March, 1980): 14.

<sup>105</sup> *New York Times*, 27 February 1978, 10.

<sup>106</sup> *New York Times*, 3 August 1978, 21.

<sup>107</sup> Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun*, 160.

Additionally, opponents to sanctions on Rhodesia argued that by refusing to lift them, Carter prolonged the hostilities. After Muzorewa's election, violence still continued as the PF refused to recognize the elections of the internal settlement. Letters to the editor of the Bulawayo *Chronicle* pleaded to Muzorewa's government to do more to stop the war. "It is very true that what the eyes don't see the heart don't grieve. If these gentlemen stopped flying all over the world talking rubbish and came to the bush with us, only then they would know why we are crying... for peace in this country." Another letter accused Muzorewa of having only economic worries, writing: "All he seems to be interested in is trying to get sanctions lifted instead of trying to arrange an all-party conference to help bring about an end to the war."<sup>108</sup> Although these sentiments were not a direct attack on Carter, they did make a statement about the toll that continued sanctions were having on the Rhodesian people. Carter demanded that an all-parties conference occur before he would lift sanctions and perhaps if he had lifted sanctions immediately Muzorewa's government could have brought about peace. However, in light of the Lancaster Agreement the success or failure of the government under Muzorewa will never be known.

In spite of the opinion of others, Carter chose to seek principals in his Rhodesian foreign policy and maintained that stance throughout his term as president. While his Rhodesian policy may not be what Carter is known for, his actions in Southern African foreign policy were unique among his precursors and changed the role of the United States in Rhodesian affairs.

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<sup>108</sup> *Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 28 June 1979, 10.

## **Conclusion**

When Carter was elected, he vowed to move in a new direction in terms of foreign policy. Rather than allowing the fear of communism and the Soviet Union to drive policy, he hoped to promote human rights and morality while reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and easing Cold War tensions. Southern Africa was a region where Carter felt that this new outlook could be achieved as he advocated the majority rule and racial equality, and especially in response to the ongoing conflict in Rhodesia. Regardless of his critics, Carter maintained his firm beliefs in Rhodesian policy. Convinced that an election without the PF would never bring peace to the country, Carter only lifted sanctions when he deemed free elections to be inevitable. In this way, he was the first American president to take such an unyielding stand in African foreign policy. No other president had taken on such a prominent position in the Rhodesian Bush War, and therefore it can be attested that Carter and many of members of his administration played a major role in negotiating the end of the warfare.

Carter was not alone in his actions. The continued support of Young, Brzezinski and Vance aided him greatly, in addition to other members of his administration and Congress. In addition, Carter continually saw the importance of his growing African American constituency as a motivation to improve relations with black Africa. His southern background and experience with fellow Americans struggling to achieve social justice encouraged him to seek similar justice in Africa. Although Carter had supporters in his pursuit of diplomacy in Rhodesia, there were many who saw his actions as harmful to southern Africa. Those who felt the internal settlement was sufficient movement in the right direction toward majority rule or who had an aversion to importing chrome from the Soviet Union fought against Carter and in many cases almost

succeeded. Regardless Carter achieved his goal of maintaining sanctions until the British guaranteed a “one man, one vote” election in Rhodesia.

In the end, Carter altered the Cold War motivations that had driven previous American foreign policy in Africa and shifted toward a new strategy that promoted Africa as its own distinct region, a feat unmatched by his predecessors. While Carter may be remembered largely for his diplomatic failures, he followed through on his promises in Southern Rhodesia. He never faltered in his principles as he encouraged majority rule in the country and maintained his convictions until free elections were achieved in 1980. Whereas many may only take into account the foreign policy disappointments of Carter’s administration, his response to the Rhodesian Bush War helped bring about an end to an armed conflict that had lasted for 15 years.

## Appendices

### Appendix A: Map of modern day Zimbabwe<sup>109</sup>



<sup>109</sup> Note that Salisbury was renamed Harare after independence in 1980, among other changes of cities and geographical areas. Source: CIA World Factbook. "Zimbabwe." <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html> (accessed 8 November 2009).

Appendix B: Newspaper Ad featuring Muzorewa (Salisbury Sunday Mail, 15 May 1979).

THE SUNDAY MAIL, MAY 13 1979 Page 1

Prime Minister-Elect Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

**We voted**

Each and every one of us has a task to work first and foremost for PEACE. We can achieve this by striving to serve the interests of the country first. We must aim to create a prosperous society by working hard. By working to gain international recognition and the removal of sanctions. This will help to create jobs for all employable men and women and help in our work on re-settlement programmes and the opening of schools, clinics and hospitals.

**We must work for peace and prosperity**

Inserted on behalf of the Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

Appendix C: Newspaper ad explaining the democratic process prior to the February 1980 elections (Salisbury Sunday Mail, 24 February 1980).

**ZIMBABWE NEEDS YOUR VOTE**  
**INDEPENDENCE ELECTION 1980**

## WHAT HAPPENS AT THE POLLING STATION

1. A man and his wife arrive at the Polling Station.

2. Then they are checked to see that they have not voted before.

3. Then their fingers will be placed in a harmless liquid.

4. Then they will be given a voting paper each.

5. They go to separate voting booths.

6. In secret they will mark the paper with their own choice.

7. Then they fold the voting papers and place them in the ballot box.

8. Everything is done in private so no one knows who they have voted for.

9. Happy that they have voted with many other people in the country, they leave the Polling Station.

## YOUR VOTE IS YOUR RIGHT. USE IT.

Placed on behalf of the Election Directorate

EC15719

Appendix D: Newspaper ad encouraging voters that ballots cast in the upcoming election would be secret (Bulawayo Chronicle, 18 February 1980).

Page 2  
ADVERTISEMENT

ZIMBABWE NEEDS YOUR VOTE  
INDEPENDENCE ELECTION  
1980

# YOUR VOTE IS SECRET.

You are the only  
one who will ever know  
for whom you voted.  
Your vote is completely secret.  
But it is vital that you use your vote to  
choose a black majority Government.  
DO NOT BE AFRAID TO VOTE.

**YOUR VOTE IS YOUR RIGHT.  
USE IT.**

Placed on behalf of the Election Director

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Amery's article commented on what the Rhodesian election of 1980 would mean for Western countries. The article gave particular insight on viewpoints against Carter's continues sanctions, as Amery stated that sanctions should have been lifted in April 1979, and with Mugabe's election the Soviet Union could develop influence in southern Africa.

*Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 5 June 1979-18 February 1980.

The Chronicle is a newspaper published out of Bulwayo. This collection covers several months over the course of the Lancaster House Conference and the following elections.

*New York Times*, 10 June, 1977-16 December 1979.

This newspaper was used to provide American perspective on Rhodesian events and the Carter administration.

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Stanton's article was a commentary on Carter's policies in Rhodesia and provided American opinion that disagreed with the President and his administration.

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The Herald is a newspaper published out of Salisbury. This collection covers several months over the course of the Lancaster House Conference and the following elections.

*Prize! Africa*, April 1980.

A news magazine for black Africans published out of Salisbury, Zimbabwe. The April issue covers the election results and provides socio-economic predictions for the country. This magazine provided an African perspective on the election and portrayed what was expected of the new government.

*Sunday Mail* (Salisbury), 15 May 1979-6 January 1980.

The Sunday Mail is a newspaper published out of Salisbury. This collection covers several months over the course of the Lancaster House Conference and the following elections.

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