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AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
TO THE BRAZILIAN COUP d'ETAT OF APRIL 1, 1964

BY

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by Sergio Maturana*

A. Introduction

Writing about the last coup d'etat in Brazil raises several questions of methodology and attitude about the information and the way it is handled.

The facts are received as recorded from the covering of several newspapermen, which, no matter how objective they might be (and in many instances they are not so) have to focus their attention on the political arena and on the immediate events as they become visible. The economic and social forces behind the phenomena are usually clouded, as well as many of the behind-the-scene facets of the political strife.

The analysis of the facts and an interpretation of them is quite a difficult task. The researcher very seldom can escape from his personal bias. The phenomena under study are connected with the action and interaction of powerful society forces. There are no simple theories which explain the way in which these interactions are connected.

The best that one could expect to do is to obtain some good insight through the vision of several observers. While developing this work we will introduce the contrasting opinions of several authors, although in many instances, the contrast might not be fairly represented because of biased selection or incomplete information. A large part of the ideas and hypothesis of this work come from the book Revolution in Brazil by Irving Louis Horowitz, who has put forth considerable effort in trying to understand Brazilian society and politics.

B. Brazilian Background

The recent coup d'etat can be placed in its proper perspective only after a brief inspection of the general economic, social, and political development of Brazil.

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From the point of view of economics, Brazil has been experiencing during the last decades a process of industrialization which has been strongly influencing the social and political processes. Along with it there has been a large demographic growth and population movements which have given more weight to the urban centers in the political structure. The economic growth in the cities and the agricultural prosperity in the southern part of the country has not yet reached the peasants and more traditional farming of the northeast. Celso Furtado has divided the opportunities in the Brazilian society into two: "open" ones for the industrial worker (and of course for the middle class and elite) and a closed society for the peasants.^{1/} He sees the problem as one devising viable political methods which will make a rapid social transformation possible.

In this changing Brazilian world, characterized by all kinds of tensions which are the product of this uneven development, we have to situate more particular groups and forces, some of them still highly influenced by pre-industrial cultural values.

In the first place, personalism plays an important role in Brazilian politics. It has been characterized as a maintenance and transformation of the feudal structure of rural areas and of old Brazil when slavery played a very important role. Also, it reflects the structure of the political parties which have a strong ruling class character. Finally, and not least important, personalism works well in Brazilian politics.^{2/}

Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares^{3/} has written about political sociology in Brazil. He blames illiteracy as one of the main causes which helps conservative politics. Illiteracy which is an aftermath of land inequality and prevailing subsistence income makes education a luxury. "Illiteracy favors apathy, an unquestioning acceptance of traditional values which immunizes the peasants against class organization and ideological rebellion."

^{1/} Celso Furtado, "What Kind of Revolution," Foreign Affairs, April, 1963.

^{2/} Irving Louis Horowitz, Revolution in Brazil, E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1964, p. 87.

^{3/} Ibid., pp. 164-195.

With respect to the middle classes, which usually are considered a positive force in structural change of society, Dillon Soares has a skeptical view: "The middle-class answer in Brazil is to make nationalism a political shadow lacking economic substance, to endow nationalistic phraseology with the mystique of Brazilian hegemony while leaving the nation in control of robust foreign interests working with an ingenious middle class."

American private interests are considered a new force which have an important role in internal politics through their economic activities: wages paid to labor, taxes paid to government, and the whole production and investment processes. This role is enhanced further by the political protection offered to them by the United States government.

With respect to the latifundists, the military and the church, he sees them as declining, being integrated into the civilian bureaucracy, and accommodating to the social change, respectively.

The former generalities convey an informal theory which could have a large number of modifications and even could breed contradictory opposing theories, but which is worthwhile exploring.

(1) The process of industrialization has caused and is producing economic, social, and political changes, with concomitant tensions which the Brazilian society is trying to overcome.

(2) An important sector of the Brazilian economy has been left out of this process, mainly the peasants and the Northeast, which further aggravates the picture. This fact is seen by Celso Furtado as the more dangerous long run cause of really violent revolutions.

(3) Playing important roles in the process of social action and reaction are several groups and forces which only could be listed, without pretending to make the list exhaustive:

- i. The military people.
- ii. The middle class.
- iii. Brazilian businessmen and foreign private investors.
- iv. United States foreign policy.
- v. The Church.
- vi. The latifundists.
- vii. The urban industrial workers, peasants, students and young radicals.

This list could be overburdened still more with references to nationalism, conservatism, inflation, and many other forces which usually cut across social, political, and economic divisions, but more than enough problems of semantics, methodology, and analysis are left to consider on the list as it is without enlarging it.

C. The Coup, Year: 1964

March 27. More than 700 marines and sailors took over the Metallurgical Workers Union Building, yelling, "We want reforms, We want food." When another group of sailors marched off to join the rebels, navy officers intercepted them, finally opened up with machine guns, wounding three. Brazil's Navy Minister, Admiral Silvio Borges de Souza Mota resigned after he failed to persuade the group of rebellious sailors to submit to arrest.

March 28. Sailors and marines surrendered to army troops and received amnesty from the president, "Jango" Goulart.

March 29. 2,000 officers and 30 admirals met in a closed session at the navy club. They approved two unsigned statements attacking President Goulart. They charged that the government had permitted a minority of enlisted men to force the ouster of one navy minister and dictate his successor.

March 30. Women in Brazil's towns had been organizing anti-communist demonstrations. In Belo Horizonte, in February, women carrying rosaries led a demonstration that broke up a leftist rally. Priests called the parishioners (mostly women) to march. Some priests' point of view was, we want liberty and democracy, we want reforms, but reforms within the law.

March 31. Goulart ordered an inquiry today into the decision of the previous Friday, to grant an amnesty to the sailors. At the same time, he ordered an investigation of the officers who had held the meeting to demand that the sailors be disciplined and the country defend itself against "communization." In a reply to the officers, Goulart urged the sergeants and lower ranking personnel in the armed forces to support him against the "reactionaries."

April 1. The armies with headquarters at Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Paraná, staged rebellions against the authority of President Goulart.

General Olimpo Mourão in Juiz de Fora, 80 miles north of Rio, made a proclamation:

"The enemies of order and democracy shielded by the President have been acting without respect for the institutions, scorning the armed forces and weakening the respect due to the public authorities in any civilized nation...

"Spurious organizations of political unions maneuvered by Brazil's enemies, confessed communists, have become more audacious under the President's stimulation and seek to make the world believe they speak in the name of the Brazilian workman when they speak in the name of a foreign state whose imperialist interests they serve...

"They seek to create rebellions among disciplined patriotic sergeants and demoralize and humiliate the Brazilian Navy."

April 2. Goulart flew from Rio to Brazilia, but told leftist followers that he would fight on. Brazilian rebels claimed victory and announced that presidency would go to the legislative head.

"Washington Sympathetic to Brazilian Rebel Cause:" The feeling was that Goulart, having led Brazil to the brink of economic collapse, had begun to move toward the destruction of her political institutions as well. He was believed to be planning with communist labor, peasant and student support, to disband Congress and declare a Syndicalist Socialist regime, perhaps as soon as May 1.

Thomas C. Mann, President Johnson's special adviser as well as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, was said to have indicated a desire to consider that governments in the Hemisphere at the time come to power without automatically punishing those that overthrow democratic regimes.

President Goulart on Monday (March 30) night spoke on television. He charged that:

"...The wave of propaganda was financed by illicit contributions by big foreign companies -- drug, manufacture, petroleum -- and by greedy landlords, dishonest merchants and big landowners."

Three weeks previously Goulart had signed a controversial land reform bill, authorizing his government to seize lands up to six miles on both sides of federal highways, railroads, and waterways. Landowners and political leaders of the center and right vowed to resist these expropriations. He wanted also to establish new price controls to prevent the cruzeiro from further depreciation.

April 3. Goulart was supposed to be bound for exile in Uruguay. The president of the Senate declared the Presidency of Brazil vacant and called on the next in line, Rainieri Mazzilli, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Rio hailed the victory; one million turned out for the "march of the family for God and Liberty." Washington sent warmest wishes to Brazil's new leader.

April 4. Minister of War, General Arthur da Costa e Silva, supported General Humberto Castelo Branco to serve the rest of the presidential term until January 31, 1966, "to help purge Brazil of the reds."

These brief communiques of the press, extracted from New York Times and Time magazine, point out the dramatic events which threatened for a moment to bring civil war to the ordinarily peacefully coexistent Brazilian society.

The questions which we would like to enter into in the next part of this paper are the following:

- (1) Did this coup d'etat follow a pattern, historically speaking?
- (2) Have the roles of some of the forces listed in the background section changed with respect to their historical behavior?
- (3) Why did the revolutionary forces with whom Goulart allied have a debacle?
- (4) After the coup, what is next?

In the outlined analysis it will be impossible to escape from time to time the consequences of judging the whole process as a struggle of interests between different social strata and other forces. The treatment of the different authors reviewed usually follows a moral and normative pattern generally judged as deviating positively or negatively from an "ideal" one, which is readily supplied by the personal opinion of the author reviewed. This in no way could be interpreted as

deprecatory to these opinions, many of which we personally share. The role of politics and especially of the President of the Republic is considered in many of these analyses as that of an arbiter among the colliding social forces, playing several political strategies which would enable the President to lead the country and survive without being caught by the strife.

D. Some antecedents and explanations.

Necessarily, after examination of the immediate causes of the coup, we need offer a more general explanation, because the restricted range of the immediate causes makes it impossible to have an understanding of the event without being caught by the emotional character of the information. However, we have to keep in mind the facts, as covered by the available reports, to try to discover whether they follow the historical pattern or not with particular reference to the social groups earmarked.

We will examine first some of the more outstanding or recent Brazilian political upheavals which could give us a clue as to the role of some social forces under conditions of strain.

The end of the Empire, according to Horowitz^{4/} was realized as a consequence of several facts. The Catholic Church refused to aid an Emperor who showed increasing respect for Protestants, Masons and other non-Catholic groups. The latifundists turned against his vigorous pursuit of slavery abolition. The army was mutinous and divided.

Thus, there was a reaction against too fast or too drastic political and social changes. The Republic was a great compromise between the latifundists and the bourgeoisie. The former kept the countryside with their semi-feudal barons appointing governors and generals. The latter, of a pre-industrial character, took the cities, opening the flood gate to the Dutch, the English, and the North American.

The explanation for the Vargas fall is different, according to the same author,^{5/} it was produced because of the conflicting ends of the Vargas administration with the emerging

^{4/} Ibid., p. 88.

^{5/} Ibid., p. 93.

middle classes over the destiny of the wealth which had piled up during the last world war. The Vargas administration wanted to follow a policy of structural changes which involved painful sacrifices, whereas the middle class was anxious to achieve fulfillment of the delayed consumption expenditures and the needs of "modernism" (investment upon external and sometimes of show-off character). In this conflict, the military people wanted to go back to power (Vargas was a civilian) and the President was only backed by a political organization which was separated or apart from the economic and social life.

Finally, we come upon the resignation of President Janio Quadros, which according to Horowitz, was the product of a lack of communication between the bourgeoisie and the President.^{6/} Quadros' sin was that he took at face value -- without discounting their rhetoric -- the bourgeois liberalistic views. The author maintains that the urban classes were the guardians of nationalism, of Petrobras and Electrobras, but that they are not willing to make the sacrifices necessary to make the nationalization of industry economically feasible. Helio Jaguaribe^{7/} gives a more detailed version of Quadros' fall which is in some respects relevant to our analysis.

He rejects at the outset any explanation based on the personality and psychology of Quadros as too shallow and inconsistent.

At the time the crisis took momentum, Quadros' determination to carry out a program of great reforms had become undeniable. The new foreign policy seemed dangerously revolutionary (diplomatic and commercial relations with the Eastern bloc, independent views about Cuba). The agrarian reform threatened to assail a traditional agricultural structure, instilling panic in the city-established interest groups who were more concerned with the status quo. This view coincides with that of Celso Furtado except that he explains the outcome of economic development as giving origin to the polarization of society into two sectors, the "archaic" one, and the "modern" sector (the last one formed by the rise of new classes and the decay of some of the old elite).

^{6/} Ibid., p. 97.

^{7/} Ibid., p. 139, "The Crisis in Brazilian Politics."

He points out the isolation of the political parties in this process. They had become simple electoral mechanisms, lacking social representation. In the election for the House of Representatives and in the Senate the oligarchy and the party machineries retained control, while in the election for President, ideology had become more important.

The last Presidents have had a dilemma: either living up to their compromise with the masses or betraying the essence of the mandate conferred upon them.

Quadros depended for support for his reform policies on the military wing of the extreme right. However, at the moment of the crisis, this military grouping had already transferred their solidarity and loyalty to Governor Jacerda. In military terms, Quadros was deposed before his actual resignation.

Deprived of organized social support, his government failed without substantial evidence of popular mobilization. "The crisis ended with a compromise, to avoid civil war... as a compromise, civil law had to tolerate that the conspirators would go scot-free, and what is more serious, that they would retain their strength and organization."^{8/}

Undoubtedly, the fall of Quadros only set up the stage for Goulart's next turn without changing basically the structure or the disposition of the contending forces.

We have seen from the former review of governmental overthrow that a vague pattern could be delineated.

The Presidents seem to become alienated at a moment from the organized social forces which could be considered their natural and most solid support: the political parties, the Church. The active forces which seem to favor or oppose more drastic social and political changes are the students, the young radicals, the urban industrial workers and supposedly the peasants, on the one hand, and the military people, the latifundists and the businessmen and foreign investors on the other side.

It is however interesting to speculate why the Presidents take a charismatic leadership, meaning to say that they feel themselves invested with the responsibility of carrying out

^{8/} Ibid., p. 147.

social and political transformations over and beyond the desire of very respectable bodies of opinion, including the army generals, with the perfect knowledge that their office term is at stake. As Jaguaribe says, this could not be explainable only because of psychological reasons which would be pertinent only to very special cases. Morowitz might be closer to a more reasonable explanation when he refers to the difference existing in what the middle classes talk about and what they really feel; but one hardly could expect of a President of Brazil, a cultured, shrewd and knowing politician, that basic lack of understanding which would cause him to be deceived by a fact that should be commonplace to any Brazilian sociologist who knows something about social psychology.

At any rate it seems evident that at least the last two overthrown Presidents have been guilty of a faulty judgment when assessing the strength, determination, and organization of their support and their opposition. This points out, perhaps, the existence of a dynamic and irreversible process which can not be explained simply taking a static view of the basic social values, beliefs, and estimate of the risks and benefits shared by any social group at a given moment.

To apply this method we would have needed information on a sequence of daily events over a reasonable length of time previous to the coup d'etat, knowledge which we did not have in Madison; nor would the time involved in preparing this paper have allowed the use of this information. The New York Times, when an important foreign development takes place, provides background information which unfortunately lumps together a series of events, creating the impression of simultaneity which really does not exist.

If we were to speculate about the chain of events we could assume that first a decision was taken to assume contacts with the Eastern bloc, which at the moment that was taken, was supported by the leftist and nationalistic groups and that it was not strongly resisted by other groups on account of possible economic advantages without a direct threat being involved to their local interests.

Next Francisco Julião and his Campones League appeared coupled with a sporadic upsurge of student unrest. We could guess that the apparent inertia of the government was not to the liking of the landed interests, which perhaps joined forces with the private foreign interests and certainly looked upon an unsympathetic United States foreign policy towards Brazil as a help.

The reaction of some of the closest supporting groups of the government was to clamp down on some foreign-owned public utility concerns, which indeed did not help to reduce pressure in the growing tension. There are some indications that the last coup d'etat was building slowly as shown by the fact that Adhemar de Barros, Governor of the state of São Paulo, is reported to have sold at cut rate a considerable number of submachine guns, rifles and pistols, to landowners all over Brazil, besides building up a private army of 40,000 men. It seems to me that this "golpe" besides following the general pattern which polarized the Brazilian society into two bitter extremes, had its own differential characteristics. As it is indicated by the press reports, the "danger" of Brazil becoming "communist" was believed or was articulately advertised. This, and the charges of corruption, inefficiency, on a galloping inflation provided the ammunition for the government opposition. The bitterness in this instance not only took a verbal expression but it was reflected in active organization and private armed reaction. The immediate reason might be thought to be the fact that Goulart was considered keen in disarticulating the traditional weapon of intervention, tampering with a highly cherished value of the army, its "discipline" (meaning that everybody in the army should obey orders, except of course the generals who are supposed to be free to intervene in politics). This might be the reason the mutiny of 700 sailors took on such a very dramatic importance. On the other hand, the followers of Goulart were certain that they could "totally paralyze the Brazilian armed forces."^{9/}

The more fundamental reasons of the opposition were listed by Horowitz^{10/} as the following proposed reforms by Goulart:

1. Distributing land along a six-mile strip on both sides of federal highways and waterways.
2. Nationalization of private foreign-owned oil distribution.
3. Legalization of the communist party

^{9/} Said by a representative of the enlisted men, Antonio Garcia Filho, in Monthly Review, April, 1964.

^{10/} "Revolution in Brazil: The Counter-Revolutionary Phase," New Politics, Spring, 1964.

4. Franchisement of illiterate persons.
5. Franchisement of soldiers, and privilege of running for political office for members of lower echelon.

In this whole process, it does not appear that any significant change has occurred with respect to the basic alignment of the social forces under analysis.

The military people, in this instance the generals, acted in the way they have done in the past. However, now they shoved away the politicians without much consideration for "formal appearance," or the legal political procedure, which might reflect, perhaps, the fact that they felt themselves threatened more directly.

The political parties seemed to have evaporated; even the powerful PSD (Social Democratic Party) could not lift a finger to defend its leader Juscelino Kubitschek when he was deprived of all political rights for the next ten years after the coup was successful.

It seems to me that although the other groups behaved according to their historic record, it is important to understand the behavior of the middle class. In the course of this paper, several charges have been levelled against this group of people, where the body of energetic industrial entrepreneurs is supposed to lie according to Schumpeter theories.

1. It has been blind to basic needs, and plugged into the happy life by Look, Life and Fortune (Horowitz).
2. They have made out of "nationalism" a make-believe phraseology, without solid economic meaning (Dillon Soares).
3. Although they are the main part of government bureaucracy, Petrobras, and maybe of the middle ranks of the army, they seemed to have been passive. In this instance, it is interesting to note that President Goulart addressed himself to the sergeants and enlisted men, while the opposition was playing to the generals; the people in between were not mentioned.

But perhaps this is only an artificial problem created in the minds of those who have realized the advantage which would accompany leadership by the middle class, in effecting stability of political and social institutions, and who are disappointed when they compare the actual performance with their expectations.

However, this is a very important issue in the future development, not only of Brazil, but of many developing countries. In this respect, Schumpeter has said:

"Classes themselves rise and fall according to the nature and success with which they -- meaning here, their members -- fulfill their characteristic functions, and according to the rise and fall of the social significance of this function, or of those functions which the class members are willing and able to accept instead -- the relative social significance of a function being determined by the degree of social leadership which its fulfillment implies or creates."^{11/}

The question would be then, whether it is necessary that the middle classes, in countries which are in the developing process, exercise effective leadership by taking full cognizance of the goals and sacrifices implied by this development and creating the necessary social values and behavioral patterns which will permeate and influence other social classes, if the political process is to go through normal channels, whatever they are.

Although this particular path, perhaps, does not necessarily ensure the fastest rate of economic growth it is a less painful and less expensive road, assuming that the present elite in power is not likely to assume a progressive leadership on account of the risks and losses in their present relative economic, social and political status. Also it assumes that the underprivileged mass of people is not prepared to take this leadership or its management.

At any rate, whether it was fear of nationalizing large foreign concerns, enfranchisement of peasant masses, and redistribution of large landholdings, whether it was a lack of responsible concern for the issue, or whether the influence of the women mellowed any active participation,

^{11/}Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (two essays), Meridian Books, 1964, pp. 159-160.

the facts suggest as Horowitz says, that there was a "collusion between the urban middle classes and the military."^{12/}

With respect to the actual activities and impact of the American businessmen and of the United States foreign policies, the picture is not very clear.

There was an open denunciation on television by President Goulart, of propaganda being financed by big foreign companies. It was not a secret that Washington, to put it mildly, was not satisfied with the handling of either the foreign or the domestic policy of President Goulart. There was a well-timed announcement by Thomas Mann about a change in U.S. policy including a passive approach toward military take-over in Latin America.

To top it off, the United States' tremendous mass media was filled with references to the Brazilian "communist" unions and student organizations, the "leftist" President Goulart, "Castroite" Francisco Julião, etc.

It is not surprising then that the Mexican magazine Siempre denounced the existence of a secret document sent by Thomas Mann to the Latin American U.S. embassies supposedly saying, "In the present year there shall be no other Cuba," and commenting on coups d'etat in Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and the need to isolate Mexico. This and other similar rumors could be believed without much questioning in Latin America because of several reasons:

1. Whether they are true or not, it is almost impossible to prove or disprove them. It is only possible to assert or deny them.
2. They provide a convenient scape goat.
3. As the right wing caters to nationalism by denouncing Russia and communist influence, the left wing counterattacks with references to North American imperialistic intervention.

It is impossible to know at this moment whether the big American investors, the Embassy and the State Department did directly play an active role in Goulart's

^{12/}New Politics, Spring, 1964.

deposition. The point has been made, not with the purpose of clearing it up, but to indicate the existence in Latin America, among different social groups, of a belief that the United States plays some role in important local political affairs.

The coup was not a surprise for the Brazilian people. It was forecast by Horowitz in his book The Revolution in Brazil, which appeared at the beginning of the present year. "Thus, Goulart's power must increasingly come to rest on an industrial working-class (which is relatively small) and the agricultural class (which is very large) if indeed it is to rest rather than tumble in the face of a right-wing coup d'etat."

We have seen that Brazilians were busy carrying out a duel of rhetoric and armament. Goulart, besides underestimating the strength of his party's enemies, did very little to organize their supporters. He even refused to arm union groups in the industrial centers which were being raided by armed elements of Governors La Cerda and Barros.

Given the fact that political organization did not have social backing or participation, the political leadership was in the hands of small intellectual groups which quickly succumbed under the threat of the armed forces.

The perspectives of the new government will depend on their short-run and perhaps also on their long-run behavior. It seems that already, following former patterns, the President of the Republic, General Castello Branco, has endorsed a mild package of reforms. Whether the "jeito" will recover its position and will permit peaceful compromises, or "the hard core of conservatism will continue their red-hunting and the morality-by-the-sword program,"^{13/} depends on too many variables.

To consider only one aspect of the new policies, we could take the anti-inflationary views and proposed measures of the new Minister of Economic Planning, Roberto de Oliveira Campos. It is reported by Time magazine that, alarmed by the rate of inflation of 40-80% a year, and by the amount of the foreign debt which is estimated at three billion dollars, he will undertake several measures to restore order:

^{13/} Francisco de Alencar Arraes, "April Fool's Day in Brazil," The Commonweal, May 8, 1964.

1. He will cut the budget by 30%. Commercial credit loans and wage boosts will also be cut.
2. Taxes will be increased by a half-billion cruzeiros.
3. The goal will be to reduce inflation to 10-20% a year.

In a recent article,¹⁴/de Oliveira Campos put forward his views on inflation, which are more or less orthodox according to economic theory and which in synthesis blame inflation on monetary and fiscal policies. Inflation is considered incompatible with economic development. The opposing view by those who endorse the so-called "structural" school, more or less considers inflation as a symptom of the real sickness, the "basic" factors which are the causal forces of inflation. They are related with rigidity in the supply side of the economy. They are the latifundist character of agriculture, the instability of the foreign trade and the distribution of income with a very low purchasing power of the masses.

We should also remember that inflation has been considered a bloodless form of resolving bitter social tensions, especially when none of the contestants is powerful enough to dictate the new terms of the income distribution.

To tame inflation will be one of the most difficult tasks of the new government. The difficulties do not lie only in the possibilities of committing technical or theoretical errors, but in the difficulties implicit in cutting credits and wages, aggravating important economic sectors with serious possibilities of creating unemployment. If, as Father Arraes says, discipline is forced by the sword, it is possible that the burden of the "shared" sacrifices will be absorbed by the less strong economically speaking. This will be more true if the labor unions are rendered powerless and the peasant movement is left without any legal or economic outlet. If this is the case, more serious troubles than simple coups d'etat will loom in the future of Brazil.

On the other hand, even if mild but efficiently carried out social and political reforms are made by the new government, perhaps with the assistance of a more far-sighted middle class, Brazil has good prospects of regaining the

¹⁴/Roberto de Oliveira Campos, "Two Views on Inflation," Latin-American Issues, edited by A.O. Hirschman, Twentieth Century Fund, 1961, pp. 69-73.

path of progress, no matter how painful or slow the progress may be.

It is my personal opinion that the social scientist, if he wants to become an effective aid in the process of social change, has to abandon his detached and "scientific" attitude and become more involved in the study of more important and meaningful economic, social and political forces and events, which usually are considered improvisable or subject to cause and effect laws out of the realm of serious social science. In this way all of us would share a little more social responsibility in the real making of society.