THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD AS THE TURNING POINT IN
WORLD WAR II THE SOVIET "STALINGRAD" GENERALS'
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE BATTLE
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION.** .............................. 1

**CHAPTER I. MILITARY HISTORY IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM.** .................. 1

  - History Writing under Stalin
  - Military History Breaks the Stalinist Hold, 1954-1955
  - Results of the 20th Party Congress: the "Thaw" and Refreeze, 1956-1957
  - Military History and Strategic Doctrine
  - World War II Regains Its Place in History, Soviet Style

**CHAPTER II. THE STALINGRAD GENERALSA.** ........................... 35

  - The Writers
  - The Silent Generals

**CHAPTER III. THE GENERALS' INTERPRETATIONS OF THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD AS THE TURNING POINT IN WORLD WAR II, 1957-1962.** ..................... 66

  - The Turning Point in World War II
  - The Significance of Stalingrad as a Turning Point in Soviet Internal Affairs
  - The Soviet Generals' Views of the Turning Point in International Affairs
  - The Turning Point for the Allies' Coalition

**CHAPTER IV.** .................................. 93

  - The Role of Political and Ideological Forces in Soviet Military Historiography, 1957-1962
  - Soviet Military Historiography 1957-1962

**BIBLIOGRAPHY.** .................................. 116
INTRODUCTION

The initial aim in writing this study of Soviet military historiography was to determine the Soviet Stalingrad generals' views on the Battle of Stalingrad as the turning point of World War II. After the materials were read, it was found that the generals' views provided an excellent vehicle with which to examine the changes in Soviet military historiography during the 1957-1962 period. This paper thus combines an analysis of the Soviet Stalingrad generals' views of the battle as the turning point of the war with an examination of the changes in Soviet military history writing.

The first chapter traces the changes in the Soviet military history of the war, and the forces making for the changes, from Stalin's time through 1962. This chapter is primarily concerned with an examination of Soviet policies in regard to military history and also history in general. The various forces which acted upon Soviet historical sciences are pointed out in this chapter. Military historiography remained the main center of attention and analysis throughout.

The second chapter is a biographical and historiographical study of the Soviet generals whose works were utilized in
this paper. Brief analyses of the generals' works are included here to prepare the reader for the description of the generals' views on the battle as the turning point of the war.

The third chapter deals directly with the various aspects of the generals' interpretations of Stalingrad. Some examination of the possible reasons for certain views is attempted, but the third chapter is composed of excerpts from the generals' works for the most part because it was thought that their own words best showed their views.

The first part of the conclusion deals with the role which political and ideological forces play in the generals' interpretations as they were described in chapter III. The second section of the conclusion attempts to examine the changes and progress which Soviet military historiography of World War II made in the period under discussion.
CHAPTER I

MILITARY HISTORY IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM

History Writing under Stalin

Under Stalin's rule, history was a mere lackey at the command of the all-powerful dictator; its sole reason for existence seemed to be to glorify Stalin, his genius and the Communist Party as it operated under Stalin. History in the Soviet Union was, and still is to this day, not written for the sake of knowledge or for the seeking of historical truth; it was to serve the practical needs of the regime.¹ These practical needs were textbooks, the inculcation of proper socialist ideas, and the extolling of the leader's great goodness to his people and in his guidance of the state.

The work of any historian was severely limited under Stalin because of the restrictions which were placed upon access to sources, but especially hindered were those historians who worked on subjects relating to the period since 1917.² Any sources which might even cast a slightly unfavorable light upon the leadership of Stalin were unavailable.

for the historians' use.

Stalin was his own best historian par excellence, and there was no room in his historical monolith for 'archive rats' who might come up with discoveries which challenged his own.  

Under these conditions, the study of the contemporary history of the Soviet Union after the 1917 Revolution became not only a difficult, but also a dangerous, profession due to the frequent shifts in the Party line. The study of the events of World War II was probably one of the most restricted subjects in Soviet historical science in the post-war years of Stalin's rule.

World War II became virtually an untouchable historical period while Stalin was alive. The events of the war in Russia were a particularly great embarrassment to a regime which claimed foresight into history and also infallibility as Stalin's did.  

Because of the subject's sensitivity, Stalin restricted the study of the war period to his own speeches and military formulas as set forth in his O velikoi otechestvennoi volne sovetskogo soiuza (Concerning the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union). Stalin's book became the basis for the majority of historical works.

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on the war. The Soviet historians believe that the works on the war's history published during the time of Stalin's rule "Certainly, ... still were not historical analyses in the academic sense." Nevertheless, the works produced under Stalin were considered a beginning of the historiography of the war and, therefore, had the correct ideological development. However, "the cult of the personality of Stalin hampered the creative development of historical science in these years."  

The official Stalinist policy in the post-war histories was either to reject or ignore any factors which diminished the achievements of the Soviet leadership and the armed forces in defeating the Germans. The role of Stalin as a great military leader and genius had been promoted since the Battle of Stalingrad. It had been


6 ibid.

7 ibid.

Stalin's genius which had conceived and planned the entire series of events which led up to Stalingrad. For the first one and a half years of the war, the plan had been operated on the idea of 'active defense'. This theory contended that the course of the war up to Stalingrad was deliberately planned as a defensive action that culminated in the great November counter-offensive of 1942 and the German defeat at Stalingrad. The theory of the 'strategic counter-offensive', a more elaborate and militarily sound concept than the 'active defense', though quite similar to it in nature, was officially made part of Soviet historiography of the war in the late 1940's. This new elaboration was designed not only to enhance Stalin's military genius but also to become the official doctrine for the history of the war. Stalin's interpretation of the war and his military doctrines tended to distort the true picture of the war experience and led directly to a stagnation in Soviet military thinking because of the restriction of discussion to his pronouncements only. Stalin had become in his last years more unwilling than ever to entertain any major proposals for change unless he thought, or was made to think, that he himself had initiated the changes.

Stalin believed, and Soviet military doctrine and thought concurred, that transitory factors of warfare, such as surprise and nuclear weapons, could not determine
the final outcome of war. What determined the results of armed conflict were the 'permanently operating factors', namely (1) the stability of the rear areas; (2) the morale of the army; (3) the quantity and quality of the divisions; (4) the armament of the army; (5) the organizational abilities of the army commanders. These five factors were derived by Stalin from his analysis of war as a massive social phenomenon in which two or more societies were pitted against one another. The war became a contest in which all the strengths and weaknesses of the societies played an integral part. Since war was thus a social condition, the laws of society were applicable to it. This meant that skill and accident played no role in war's final outcome. The special social context of warfare, the 'permanently operating factors', would determine the final result of the war.

These five 'permanently operating factors' of war as Stalin saw it became the basis not only for military doctrine up to 1955, but also for any historical studies

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10 ibid., 6.
11 ibid.
of the Great Fatherland War. Both military history and doctrine thus were encased in this rigid, axiomatic system of ideas derived mainly to promote the myth of Joseph Stalin's genius but also to prevent any serious discussion of the history and problems of World War II. As with all history in the USSR, military history existed simply to serve Stalin's needs and not for a realistic evaluation of past military events. It became increasingly apparent to the military in the early 1950's that the development of nuclear weapons necessitated a revision in strategic as well as tactical doctrine. This revision would necessarily involve the re-evaluation of the past war and, therefore, the rewriting of the war's history. Under Stalin’s control this could not happen, but with his death, the revisions movement would take its first halting steps in 1953 before it broke out of its encumbering irons in the years 1954 and 1955.

Military History Breaks the Stalinist Hold, 1954-55

With Stalin's death in March, 1953, and then Beria's ouster in mid-1953, the role and influence of the military

12 World War II in Soviet terminology is divided into: (1) the Second World War which is the war from 1939 to 1945 as it took place before the Soviet Union's entrance and outside the USSR; and (2) the Great Fatherland War which is the war as the Soviet Union fought it, that is namely the events on the Soviet-German Front from 1941 to 1945. The term World War II will be used to refer to both of these concepts in this paper.
were greatly increased in the Soviet system. With the degrading of the secret police after Beria's death and the succession struggle between Malenkov and Khrushchev in progress, the military leaders came to command more influence in political affairs than they had before. Side-by-side with the growth of the military's power, and probably because of it to some extent, came the debate among military theorists concerning the formation of a modern military strategy. The military's support was sought by those engaged in the struggle for succession, and the military was more than happy to side with that group which promised it the most and whose ideas coincided most closely with their own. The group in the Party which espoused the ideas of a strong military and defense program and increased stress on heavy industry was the one with which the military sided, and that group turned out to be the faction led by the First Party Secretary, Nikita S. Khrushchev.

The years 1954–1955 set the groundwork for the achievements which military history was to attain in later years. The rudimentary basis for a new strategic doctrine was worked out. The preliminary changes in military history which finally began to come about in 1955 were stimulated by the need to remove the retarding influences that the

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Stalinist doctrines had placed on the progress of Soviet military art and science. New interpretations of the last war were necessary for the elaboration of new military doctrines because the actual events of the war had been so distorted under Stalin as to make them almost useless for reference until they were more accurately treated. A meaningful and accurate appraisal of the factors and events which had made the Soviet Union's victory in the war possible was necessary before a realistic approach could be made to the formulation of new military doctrines. "The military leaders thus favored, and even sought, the devaluation of Stalin's military role to facilitate certain developments in military thought," but they also desired this "to recover due prestige denied them by Stalin." 15

Leading the way in the cracking of the old doctrinal mold was General Talenskii's article in Voennaia mysli (Military Thought), a Soviet staff journal, in 1953. Talenskii rejected Stalin's 'permanently operating factors' and emphasized armed conflict as the crucial aspect of warfare, not social laws. This article touched off the military discussion of new doctrinal approaches and of the continued relevance of the 'permanently operating factors' concept. The debate on the topics raised by

14 Keep, Contemporary History, 224.
Talenskii was continued and expanded in 1954. With Khrushchev's theoretical and political victory over Malenkov in February, 1955, the military became more pointed in their criticisms of the old concepts. In March, 1955, Marshal of Armored Forces, Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov finally followed up Talenskii's article with a deep criticism of those who rejected surprise as an essential element in nuclear war. Rotmistrov still retained some of the Stalinist views, however. He maintained that the 'permanently operating factors' concept was sound in general because the factors definitely played an important role as pre-requisites for the successful conduct of warfare of any type. He believed, however, that this theory had become a hindrance in dealing with the element of surprise and with the employment of nuclear weapons. The 'permanently operating factors' theory lacked the ability to provoke discussion on military doctrine and to solve the problems of nuclear warfare because by its very nature it prevented any discussion of the real issues facing the Soviet military leaders.

Following the example of Rotmistrov, another of the old doctrines which came under criticism in 1955 was the concept of the 'active defense'. The Stalinist treatment of the first period of the war, up to the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, came in for the heaviest criticism as being an extremely faulty representation of the actual facts. This re-evaluation

16 Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, 51.

17 ibid., 7.
of the early part of the war was pertinent to the discussion being carried on in the military circles in 1955 on the elements of surprise and preparation in nuclear warfare. The gains that were made in military history in 1954-1955 seem to be directly connected with the necessity to view more realistically past military experience in order to formulate new and more sound military concepts for the nuclear situation. Without a basis from which to move toward more modern ideas of war, theorizing would be groping in the dark. Since the Soviet military leaders considered military history as an integral part in the conceptualization of military doctrine, it was only natural that military history would play a significantly large role in the formulation of the new doctrines. Military history and doctrines are intimately connected in Soviet military thinking; therefore, advances in one field yield advances in the other.

It was in the year 1955 that the basic ideas espoused at the 20th Party Congress of February, 1956 were first seen arising. The fact that the regime’s attitude toward historical writing was undergoing a transition at this time can be seen in its approval of Soviet participation in the Rome International Congress of Historical Science in September, 1955. 18 Military history, as much as any other single field, and possibly more than most,

18 Brumberg, Russia Under Khrushchev, 471.
showed the revisionary changes in 1955 that were to be made for all of historical science after February, 1956. The military's new position in the system in 1954-1955 seems to have made it possible for the military historians to break the Stalinist chains more readily than most due to the necessity for revisions in military thought. These revisions arose from the unique conditions which were created by the demands of warfare in the nuclear age and by the military's desire to evaluate more accurately its history and role in the war.

The Results of the 20th Party Congress: The "Thaw" and Refreeze, 1956 - 1957

The 20th Party Congress of February, 1956 marked the beginning of the so-called policy of de-Stalinization, first in the USSR and then in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. The Congress singled out history as the most backward of the social sciences and called for its revision.19 Thus, the revisionary trends which had begun in military history in 1955 would now be applied to the rest of historical science to meet the new needs of the new leadership and to eliminate the more harmful aspects of the 'cult of the personality of Stalin'.

The open criticism of Stalin which marked the 20th Party Congress was necessary to (1) further emphasize the principle of collective leadership to prevent the emergence

19 ibid., 472.
of a new autocrat; and (2) destroy the myth of Stalin's infallibility so the new leaders would not be bound by Stalin's policies. In his secret speech to Congress, Khrushchev used Stalin's wartime errors and mistakes not only to damage his opponents' positions and reputations by associating them with Stalin's errors, but also to degrade the dead leader's image as a military genius. This speech created a situation which opened new avenues of research on the history of World War II while at the same time setting down the new guidelines for the interpretation of the war.

Not only military history profited from the changes wrought by the 20th Party Congress, but history writing in general profited from the atmosphere of general security and relaxation that arose following the Congress and from the regime's desires to secure historical legitimacy. The direct result of the changes introduced into the writing of history was confusion in historical circles. After the first changes, the historians sensed that there was a great need to conduct a more thorough-going revision and rewriting of the past; but they were beset by doubts about how far they could go in their studies due to the vague limits set by the Congress. Some of the very significant changes that were put forward in this period of 1956 were the more factual treatment of material, less superficial idealizing, the

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greater usage and availability of archival sources, less slavish quoting of passages from works by Lenin and Stalin, and more truly socialist interpretations of history.

Military history benefited also from these innovations in official policy brought about by the 1956 Congress. The Congress launched numerous new studies and interpretations of the history of the war by its treatment and discussion of historical and military matters. The re-evaluation of all phases of the war was called for by the Congress to cleanse the history of the war of the harmful effects of the 'cult of the personality of Stalin' in order to show the true roles of the Party, the Soviet people, and the Armed Forces in achieving victory. Due to Party doctrines which could neither be denied nor questioned, not all the responsibility could be shifted to Stalin or his associates for the wartime failures. Those which could not be shifted or transferred had to be covered over or rewritten. The de-Stalinization movement which was launched by the Congress had more impact upon the military historians' revision than upon most because of the large role which Stalin played in the war and also in the post-war fabrications of the war's history. Stalin's denunciation left large gaps in the history

22 A. V. Karasev, "Kratkii obzor literatury po istorii velikoi otechestvennoi voiny" (A Concise Review of Literature on the History of the Great Fatherland War), Voprosy istorii, XXXVI (June, 1961), 120.
23 Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin, 130.
of the war which had to be filled by the historians on the bases of the new precepts presented during and after the 20th Party Congress. In their quest for re-interpretation of the war, the military historians as well as the other historians pushed the concessions of 1956 further than the Party had ever intended. Whatever innovations had been made in history, the Party still firmly held the view that history, regardless of what type it happened to be, was a weapon to be wielded and controlled by the political authorities and not by the historians' desire for accuracy.

The events of the fall of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, plus the ferment of the "Thaw" in the Soviet Union itself, convinced the Party that it had gone too far in its revisionary policies of the 20th Party Congress and had become too lax in its enforcement of controls. Therefore, in the winter of 1956 and the spring of 1957, the old ideological straightjacket was put back on again in all affairs; the Party had reasserted its control over thought and expression. This reassertion of Party control was forced upon Khrushchev to some extent by the more conservative Party elements who were led by what was to become the 'anti-Party group' after their ouster in 1957 — Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Molotov. The first six months of 1957 were "almost completely devoid of significant military-historical works or even utterances

24 Brumberg, Russia Under Khrushchev, 478.
25 ibid., 483.
due to the struggle within the Party and the troubles of de-Stalinization. The reimposition of controls over history, as in other fields, was due mainly to the struggle being fought out in the Party Presidium between the old line Stalinists and Khrushchev's supporters. In this struggle, the military's influence came to play a crucial and deciding role, especially the power of the Minister of Defense Georgii K. Zhukov — the most powerful figure in military circles. The ouster of the 'anti Party group' in June, 1957 by the Khrushchev faction, with the aid of Zhukov, reaffirmed the Party's control and settled the struggle for power in the Party itself. The conclusion of the struggle presented a menacing new problem for the Party leaders — the increased power of military leader Zhukov. The leaders would not be worried as long as Zhukov and the military backed the faction in power, but what if the military should support another group and use its obvious influence against the faction then in control? The only answer for the Party leadership lay in the removal of the focal point of the army's power, Zhukov, and in the reaffirmation of Party control over the military. All this had to be accomplished without losing the gains that had been made in military thought since 1954. Zhukov was removed from his post in October, 1957 because he pursued

"a line of separating our armed forces from the Communist Party, of weakening the Party organizations and essentially of liquidating the political organs in the Soviet Army. His work was quite clearly marked by a tendency to regard the Soviet forces as his own domain...." Following Zhukov’s removal, the Party was once again in complete and unhindered control; the causes for the crackdown on history in late 1956 and early 1957 had largely been remedied. The Party was now willing to resume the sponsorship of revisions in history, but this time under its precisely stated guidelines. Before dealing with the developments in military history between 1957 and 1962, an assessment of the involvement of military history in the formulation of Soviet strategic doctrine must be made to gain a fuller insight into the place of military history in the Soviet system.

Military History and Strategic Doctrine

The revisions in military history, especially of World War II, could not but affect and be affected by the changes in Soviet military doctrine which occurred between 1954 and 1957. The revision in the history of the Soviet experience in World War II most certainly affected the continuing debate in Soviet command circles concerning the then present state

27 "Kommunisticheskaia partiia - rukovodiashchaia sila sovetskogo obshchestva" (The Communist Party — the Leading Force of Soviet Society), Kommunist, XXXIV (November, 1957), D.
of military strategy. This inter-action between military history and military doctrine derives from the relationship between the two in Soviet practice. Changes in Soviet military doctrine affected military history because the doctrine was encased in the existing Soviet accounts of the war...."  

The Soviet Union's lack of a modern strategic doctrine in respect to nuclear weapons before 1954 can be linked to the sterile approach to military thought and history that prevailed under Stalin. The method for evolving a strategic doctrine was by discussion and criticism among the military theoreticians and the military leaders. These conditions did not exist in Stalin's time due to his promotion of his own military doctrines and their inherent sterility in dealing with new ideas and technological advances.

With the advent of nuclear weapons and Stalin's death, the search for a unified military doctrine responsive to the evolution in military technology took on a new importance, and again became a dominant object of military-theoretical discussion.

The push for revision in military history was conditioned largely by the military's own needs to formulate a realistic and effective doctrine for nuclear warfare. Only by studying their past experience could the Soviet

29 Keep, Contemporary History, 236.
military hope to derive new approaches to the problems confronting them, and thus new doctrines. Of course, there was no unanimity on this particular method of devising a new strategy. Two somewhat distinctive, yet similar, schools of military thought grew up at this time. The first group were the 'modernists', or the radical innovators, who believed that doctrine should be based upon technology and not upon experience. This school has often come under attack from members of the more conservative 'traditionalist' group who were more inclined to look to the past for lessons to apply to the formation of doctrine. Writing in Voenny-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military-Historical Journal), General P. Kurochkin criticized the 'modernists'; "Some of our comrades, under the influence of great technical advances, show a tendency to underestimate and even ignore the experience of past wars." The 'traditionalist' school, which has the most influence in the high military circles, generally favors a historical approach tempered by technology for the formulation of the theory of future war. They urged that the development of new concepts should be combined with a careful study of the past, particularly, the pertinent lessons of World War II. These various schools of thought within the military can and do affect the writing of military history in the Soviet Union.

31 ibid., 20-21.
Through the revisions of 1954-1957, the regime wanted to encourage the military to develop a more imaginative and self-reliant approach to their own specific problems. This movement toward more imaginative thinking in military doctrine led to a greater initiative and interest in the field of historical writing and research by the military professionals. The works of the military writer "showed that the military officers felt some disdain for the idealization of World War II history in which they were required to express their experience of wartime events." The Party had opened the door for the military historians in order to stimulate discussion for a new doctrine which would meet the requirements of the nuclear age. By 1956-1957, the Party had discovered to its displeasure that once the revisions had begun they could not be contained so easily within the limits prescribed by the Party. Contrary to the Party's desires, the revisionary movement had either penetrated, or wished to penetrate, into most aspects of World War II and even further back into Soviet military history.

The necessity for a modern strategy and doctrine led to a revision in military history based on a more truthful analysis of the wartime experience. At the same time, the revisions in military history spurred and stimulated the discussion on military doctrine which had arisen in army circles. Military history and doctrine were complementary, each

33 Keep, Contemporary History, 236.
34 Gallagher, Soviet History of World War II, 64.
assisting the other to progress. Military history in the
Soviet Union is designed to serve the needs of both the
military and the Party; and this need was mainly doctrinal
in the middle 1950's. History has lately assumed a larger
role in Soviet military thought, but it is always aimed
toward the requirements of the regime. This concept can
best be seen in the following statement from a recent
Soviet publication Voennaia strategiia (Military Strategy).

In accordance with the political aims of war,
one of the problems of military strategy is the
study of the laws of armed combat by means of a
theoretical analysis of military experience on a
strategic scale, giving due consideration to the
state of the military art.35

World War II Regains Its Place in History
Soviet Style, 1957-1962

The void which was created in military history at
the end of 1956 with the re-affirmation of Party controls
continued through the first half of 1957. The struggle
for power in the Party Presidium and in the Party itself
was not resolved until June, 1957. With the control of
the Party resting firmly in the hands of Khrushchev's
faction, the political control of all aspects of Soviet
life was once again secured. The re-imposition of Party
authority led again to a relaxation in the historical
sphere, promoted by the regime's desires for legitimacy

35 Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii (ed.), Voennaia strategiia
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), 15.
and its freer approach to matters once the issue of control of the Party had been settled. It was impossible for the Party to return to the pre-1956 mold in military history after June, 1957; the gains that had been made in the history of World War II were very significant and only needed the proper direction. In September, 1957, a turning point was reached in the Soviet historiography of the war. This was the decision by the Central Committee of the Party and its Presidium to sponsor a new multi-volume history of the war. The writing of the new history would be directed by a specially created section of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism which was directly responsible to the Central Committee. The new history would, of course, give the roles of the Party, the people, and the Soviet Armed Forces their proper significance in the achievement of victory in the war. Besides producing a reliable new interpretation of the Soviet participation in World War II, the new history would also channel the efforts of historians in directions that were defined, approved, and supervised by the Party. The decree of the Presidium for the creation of the new history opened many sources to the historians of the war. Archives, documents, memoirs, and many other previously restricted

36 Gallagher, Soviet History of World War II, 155.
sources were made available to the historians for their utilization and study. This fact alone made a fuller, more factual presentation of the wartime events possible and showed the change in the regime's policy toward history since Stalin's time. The editorial commission of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism which was responsible for the writing of the new history of the war was to coordinate the efforts of all historians working in the war and on military-historical topics and also to mobilize all possible resources for the use of these historians. 38

The change in the Party's attitude toward the history of the war which was manifested in the September, 1957 decree was a major turning point in the creation of a new treatment and interpretation of the war. This attitude was advanced further with the ouster of Marshal Zhukov from his post as the Minister of Defense in October, 1957. The Army had become very influential in Party affairs by 1957, but the ouster of the 'anti-Party group' in June, 1957 cleared the way for a solution to the problem presented by the growing power of the Army. The Party leadership had decided that the Army had to be re-harnessed to the Party's team, and the method of doing this was the removal of Zhukov. Zhukov's replacement by Marshal Rodion Iakovlevich Malinovskii reaffirmed the Party's control and formed the second significant

38
E. A. Boltin, "Vazhnaia zadacha sovetskikh istorikov" (An Important Task of Soviet Historians), Voprosy istorii, XXXII (November, 1957), 222.
cause for the Party's more open attitude toward military history after 1957. Military history was now encouraged by the regime because "the new interpretations were worked out to adjust the history of the war more adequately to the regime's image of itself and the world around it." 39 The Party and its Central Committee now assumed the entire credit for having been the inspiring and directing force which created the victory of the armed forces and the people in World War II. 40 The changes which were made in the second half of 1957 showed that the Party was emphasizing the fact that its role in World War II was the key to the Soviet Union's victory in the war. The Party's wartime role, as represented in all post-1957 studies of the war, was determined by the Party from its reasserted position of preeminence.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the Party had its way completely; a compromise had been reached between the Party and the military. The Party could not think of rechaining military thought because the continuation of the developments that had been made since the removal of the old Stalinist restrictions was necessary to the regime. Military doctrine and history could continue to discuss and reinterpret the war provided that they treated the Party's role in the officially prescribed manner and remained within

40 Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin, 257.
41 Keep, Contemporary History, 225.
the Party's broad guidelines.

By the end of 1957 the official attitude towards the history of the war had been relatively stabilized. Having eliminated or tamed the internal forces which might impede the adjustment it was seeking, the regime was now in a position to reach a settlement with its Stalinist past. The settlement was a compromise reflecting the conflicting needs of the regime, for while seeking to re-harness history to the requirements of the Party, it did not wish to shackle the progress that was being made in military thought — progress closely connected with, and partly dependent upon, the historical revisions of the past few years. Thus the new line combined a concern to retain and develop the gains made in 1955 and 1956 with the desire to bolster and refurbish the Party's historical reputation and ideological credentials.\textsuperscript{42}

The Soviet military historians took the hint that was presented in these changes and called for correct ideological interpretations of the war based on examined facts — they thought that fifteen years was sufficient time to evaluate the data.\textsuperscript{43} There has been significant progress in Soviet history of the war since 1957, and the connection of the army with the political leadership could be one of the reasons for it. The advances have been confined mostly to the purely military aspects of the war and have been counter-balanced by political propaganda which is designed to justify the Party and its wartime policies and actions.\textsuperscript{44} This political orientation of history can best be summed up by citing a Soviet historian who describes the basic Soviet view of history while discussing the reasons for studying

\textsuperscript{42} Keep, Contemporary History, 225-226.
\textsuperscript{43} Boltin, "Vaznaia zadacha", 219.
\textsuperscript{44} Keep, Contemporary History, 222.
World War II: "The study of the Great Fatherland War has enormous political and educational significance for the Soviet people and for all of progressive mankind." 45 History, even though it has undergone vast changes since 1953, still serves the practical political and educational needs of the regime for the advancement of Soviet society and world communism. The political and ideological overtones still remained dominant in Soviet historiography between 1957 and 1962.

Besides the Central Committee's decree on the multi-volume history of the war and Zhukov's removal, another main force encouraging publication on all aspects of the war was the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. The ministry of Defense was most interested in a restudy of the events and experiences of World War II. The influence which was exerted by the high army circles had from the beginning given the revisionary movement in military historiography its impetus and direction. 46 The majority of the military works published under the tutelage of the Ministry of Defense in the period 1957-1962 were usually of better quality than the Party or academic works on similar subjects, though some of the best works have been published by the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. These academic studies are usually written by former Soviet

45 Boltin, "Vazhnaia zadacha", 219.
46 Gallagher, Soviet History of World War II, 158.
officers such as Samsonov. The overwhelming influence of the Ministry in military historiography was no doubt due to the military's greater concern for learning from past experience and for increasing not only their professional competence but also their military prestige. Definitely the military profession was more interested in a realistic presentation and study of its own history than most of the historians could have been. The professional military men have exerted a consistently strong influence on the re-interpretation of the war's history because of their interests and aims. Military history's development toward greater accuracy as compared with other fields of history could be possibly explained to some extent by the interest and influence of a special group among the highest political levels of the system; a group with objectives and requirements distinct from those of the Party. Such a special interest group could be the military leadership and establishment of the Soviet Union.  

After 1957, the military historians in the Soviet Union began to deal with many new subjects in their studies. This can be accounted for in large measure by considering the small amount of accurate material that was produced on any aspect of the war prior to 1955. The Istorija, the new multi-volume history of the war, states that from 1945 to 1956 there were only 1200 books, brochures, and journal articles published on World War II while from 1956 to 1961

47 Keep, Contemporary History, 236.
over 2000 were published. This quantitative change in published material on the war, in the five years from 1956 to 1962 almost twice the amount of the previous ten years, shows that military historians have finally opened a rich vein in history for their exploration and working. In this flood of material since 1956, the military historians have shown themselves to be impatient and disturbed about the way in which propagandists have handled the history of the war. One of the many complaints against propagandistic works which have been voiced by historians in Voprosy istorii (The Problems of History) was that "the wide use of quotations was a harmful influence of the cult of the personality on the theoretical level of works...."

The greater accuracy of Soviet war histories recently has been due to the stress on more detailed accounts; the more frequent usage of foreign sources; the citation of sources used in the studies; better and more available archival materials; and the rejections of past fabrications. These innovations have all led to important improvements in the Soviet military history of World War II. The military historians seem to have learned the value of a realistic and factual approach to their subject material because of the particular requirements of their readers and field.

49 Keep, Contemporary History, 231.
50 Karasev, "Kratki obzor", 120.
The new approach after 1957 seemed to indicate that Soviet military history was at last beginning to recognize the need for a more plausible presentation of its interpretations of the war. The trend in military history began to move toward the utility of truth as understood in the Soviet context after 1957; historical truth is what the Party decrees it to be because history must ultimately serve the goals of the political leadership and the Party.

The foregoing has set down the basic pattern which Soviet military history assumed following the revisions period of 1954 through 1957, and the consolidation of these revisions into a viable framework from 1957 to 1959. By 1959, the basic patterns of study and work had been extensively concretized by the military historians and the flow of publications on the war was beginning at last to reach significant levels. Alterations were made in the field of military history in the next three years, mainly in the form of changes introduced by the 21st and 22nd Party Congresses. A further refining in the history of the war came about with the appearance in 1960 and 1961 of the first three volumes of the new history, *Istorìia velikoi otechestvennoi voiny sovetskogo soiuza — 1941-1945 gg.*

After the 21st Party Congress in 1959, the collective leadership concept disappeared in practice from Soviet political life, though not from theory. Khrushchev was
now in almost sole control,\textsuperscript{51} though he was never able to approach the one-man rule of Stalin. Accordingly, Khrushchev's role became more inflated in the history of the war, though enterprising writers had long since been paying due homage to him. The 22nd Party Congress in 1961 marked a further alteration. One of the leading Soviet military historians, A. M. Samsonov, states that, "The 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU marked a return to the Leninist principles of objectivity in science, the many-sided discussion of the role of the people in history, and the role of the CPSU in Soviet society—all this made for a broader approach to the elucidation of the history of the war."\textsuperscript{52} Samsonov thought that a more concrete approach had been achieved after the 22nd Party Congress due to the attainments of the preceding few years and the increased availability of more documents, memoirs, and archival holdings.\textsuperscript{53} The 22nd Party Congress was a very significant event in the development of Soviet historical science and in the elaboration of the history of World War II according to the editors of \textit{Istoriia}.\textsuperscript{54}

In 1961, Volumes II and III of \textit{Istoriia} appeared containing the new official interpretation of the Battle

\textsuperscript{51} Leonhard, \textit{The Kremlin Since Stalin}, 334.
\textsuperscript{52} Samsonov, "Izuchenie", 57.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{ibid.}, 58.
of Stalingrad. The general changes resulting from the revisions as they affected the interpretation of the Battle of Stalingrad prior to the appearance of Volumes II and III, and as the volumes themselves affected the interpretation, must be described for an understanding of the context in which the Soviet 'Stalingrad' generals wrote their studies of the battle. For this purpose, the Soviet sources provide the best overall view.

Samsonov discussed the general revisionary trends which affected the views on the Battle of Stalingrad in the period 1957 to 1963 in the following manner: "In this period, which is also continuing now, the Communist Party created favorable conditions for a deep, scientific, and all-sided study of the Volga battle, for the restoration of the historical truth, for the wide illustration of the deciding factors, which determined the heroic victory of the Soviet forces in February, 1943 on the Volga, and first of all for the role of the people." As can be noticed, nowhere is the reference to the Battle of Stalingrad or even to Stalingrad the city, not to mention Stalin himself. The withdrawal of all reference to Stalin during the period of de-Stalinization had finally resulted in the renaming of Stalingrad to Volgograd at the 22nd Party Congress and the subsequent renaming of the battle as the Great Battle on the Volga. In Orwellian terms, Stalingrad had become an un-city and the battle had become an un-battle. In one of the typical works of this period on Stalingrad, Alexei

55 Samsonov, "Izuchenie", 50.
Ilich Rodimstev's, Tvoi, Rodina, sinovia! (Your Sons Are the Country!), the sections pertaining to the Battle of Stalingrad can be searched in vain for mention of either Stalin or Stalingrad. This was one of the more marked results of de-Stalinization which has only recently been, or is in the process of being, changed by Brezhnev-Kosygin's regime.

Samsonov continued in his discussion of the historiography of the battle by describing the changes brought about by the 22nd Party Congress.

In the light of the decisions of the XXII Congress of the CPSU an important task for historians became the final overcoming of the consequences of Stalin's cult of the personality for the statement and analysis of the facts. This also applies equally to the elucidation of the events of the Battle on the Volga.56

With the 22nd Party Congress and the publication of the second and third volumes of Istorija, a new approach to the Battle of Stalingrad can be seen evolving. Samsonov writes that "The elucidation of its events in Volumes II and III of Istorija velikoi otechestvennoi voiny sovetskogo soiuza was an important achievement in the elaboration of the scientific history of the Battle on the Volga."57 The idea that the new history had changed the interpretation of the war, and therefore of the Battle of Stalingrad, was not restricted to Samsonov alone. Colonels Vorobev and Kravtsov in the Foreward to the second edition of their work on the

56 ibid., 64.
57 ibid., 57.
on the war, *Velikaia otechestvennaia voina sovetskogo soiuza, 1941-1945gg. Voennno-istoricheskii ocherk* (The Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. A Military-Historical Study) gave the same impression as Samsonov that a new interpretation would result from the official history.

In working over the second edition of the book *Velikaia otechestvennaia voina sovetskogo soiuza, 1941-1945gg. Kratkii voennno-istoricheskii ocherk*, the authors on the basis of additional documentary material which came to light in 1960-1961 with Volumes I and II of the Marxist-Leninist work of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, *Istoriiia velikoi otechestvennoi voiny sovetskogo soiuza, 1941-1945gg*, and of the reviews and remarks received from the discussion of the book, corrected errors committed in the first edition, defined more accurately the line of principle positions, developed separately from these, those subjects which had not earlier received a sufficient interpretation, and eliminated some secondary matters.⁵⁸

The implications provided by the Vorobiev and Kravtsov foreword and the resolutions of the 22nd Party Congress as interpreted by Samsonov seemed to indicate the distinct possibility that new interpretations of the war would be evolving after 1962. These new views would seem to differ from those of the revisions' period on the basis of new documentary material and the new official line which were presented in the *Istoriiia*. Even if this were not necessarily the case, the appearance of the *Istoriiia*...

alone marked a definite change in Soviet military historiography. Certainly no other work on World War II ever published in the Soviet Union contained such a wealth of subject matter, reference material, and the combined knowledge of so many reputed experts on the war as did Istoriiia. These facts alone made the impact of the new history very great upon the Soviet views of the war.

Equally important with these factors, and possibly more so, was the simple fact that this was the Party's interpretation of the war which had taken four years to write and was considered the definitive history of the war from the Party's viewpoint at that time. All this leaves the impression that any work published after 1962, the last year in which the majority of materials would as yet be largely unaffected by the new history, would have an outlook significantly different from those published during the period 1957-1962.

The revisionary periods, and the changes resulting from them, have now been summarized in some detail. The general trends and some of the specific achievements have been dealt with, particularly in military history, to give a clearer understanding for the basis upon which the Soviet generals constructed their works on the Battle of Stalingrad. An elucidation of the underlying causes of the revisionary movement in Soviet military historiography from 1954-1962 sets the stage for the presentation of the
Soviet Stalingrad generals and then their views on the
Battle of Stalingrad as the turning point in World War II.
CHAPTER II

THE SOVIET STALINGRAD GENERALS

Since the Soviet general's views are mainly contained in their memoirs, it will be of value to describe the role of memoirs in the Soviet military historiography of the war and in the history of the Stalingrad battle. Memoirs are subjective presentations, but the very subjective nature of these works often reveals valuable information on the relations between the generals, their particular grievances and criticisms, their association with political leaders, and the like. One problem is that inference must be read into much of the material, but without carrying this to the point of fantasy. Generally, there is more contained in the material than meets the eye; therefore, inference plays an important role in dealing with any Soviet histories of the war.

The value of memoirs, in the Soviet view, is that they are important sources for the creation of generalized works on the history of the battle of Stalingrad. Some of the first works to be published after the consolidation of the period of revisions were

fragmentary memoirs of generals who had participated in the battle. Such memoirs give a close-up picture of the battle and the command decisions from the viewpoints of the men who were there. This closeness to the events of the battle, although written with a certain amount of hindsight, provides many insights into the actual happenings; something which had been lacking in Soviet military history for many years prior to 1957. Wartime acquaintanceships which might influence the present-day relationships, both military and political, are more clearly seen through the generals' eyes. Of course, of extreme interest and importance were the relations of the military leadership with the political leadership at the battle front. Since Khrushchev was a member of the Military Council of the Stalingrad and South-Eastern Fronts and was also in power when these works were written, these relations take on very significant meanings.

Some of the first memoirs to appear were written by Generals Eremenko and Chuikov. These early memoirs were particularly important for the elucidation of the battle's events and for the formulation of the history of the battle. The data, maps, documents, the role of Khrushchev, and the theoretical problems which were

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presented in these works had largely never been published before this time. These reminiscences of the more important military figures of the battle are essential for assessing the true situation that existed for the Red Army during the battle. Not only are the leading generals' remembrances significant, but also the memoirs of the lesser commanders in the battle provide some interesting comparisons and facts.

The generals' memoirs can provide an inside look at many of the personalities and events of the battle through their descriptions. They can supply more importantly an indication of the real influence of the military in the Soviet power structure today by the manner in which they write. By this, by their criticisms, and by the study of their political relations, the Soviet generals provide numerous indications of the relative position of the military in the society and the successes of the revisions in Soviet military historiography.

Not all of the Red Army general officers who participated in the battle have written memoirs or books on their experiences. Of those who have written about Stalingrad, not all have produced top-notched works of military history. Two of the generals who participated in the battle on the higher command level died before 1957 and thus produced no usable memoirs. These military leaders

3 Samsonov, "Izuchenie," 56.
were Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin (1901-1944), Commander of the South-Western Front in the battle of Stalingrad and Marshal Fedor Ivanovich Tolbukhin (1894-1949), Commander of the 57th Army of the Stalingrad Front. Some of the most significant men involved in the battle did not publish any memoirs on the Battle of Stalingrad in this period. The generals are thus divided into two groups, those who have written memoirs on Stalingrad in the period 1957 to 1962 and those who have not — the silent generals. Marshal Rodion Iakovlevich Malinovskii occupies an intermediate position in respect to the two former groups of generals since he has written no memoirs on the battle but has made speeches concerning the battle of Stalingrad which can be used to compare his opinions of the battle to the opinions of the other generals. Memoirs, no matter who writes them and no matter where in the world they are published, are subjective works which must be handled carefully.

THE WRITERS

Marshall of the Soviet Union Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko (1892- ) was the Commander of the Stalingrad Front during the battle and thus was directly responsible for the defense of the city. Eremenko has been a member of the Communist Party since the Civil War (1918-1920) when he joined the Red Army. Before World War II, he was an infantry division and corps
commander. He was promoted to Lt. General in June, 1940 during the mass promotion of Red Army officers to generals' ranks. After the war broke out in 1941, he became an army commander under General Georgii K. Khukov on the Western Front. He was made commander of the Briansk Front in August, 1941, but did not distinguish himself during the Battle of Kiev of August-September, 1941.

In October, 1941 the German drive on Moscow crushed Eremenko's Briansk Front; and he had to be flown out of the ensuing circlement after being severely wounded. In late summer of 1942, Stalin especially assigned Eremenko to the command of the Stalingrad Front to prepare the defenses of the city and its outer regions against the approaching German 6th Field and 4th Armored Armies. During the course of the battle, he worked closely with N. S. Khrushchev, at that time a Member of the Military Council of the Stalingrad Front, a Politburo member, and the Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. After Stalingrad, Eremenko commanded the Smolensk flank of the Western Front before becoming the commander of the Second Baltic Front in late 1943. In 1944, he was transferred to the command of the Detached Maritime Territory Army in operations against the German forces in the Taman Peninsula and the Crimea. Eremenko ended the war as the commander of the 4th Ukrainian

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Front in Czechoslovakia.

Following the war, Eremenko commanded the Western
Siberian Military District (1946-1954) and then the North Cau-
was promoted to the highest Soviet military rank, Marshal of the
Soviet Union. In 1956, he was appointed Deputy Minister of De-
fense under Zhukov. Since 1958, he has been Deputy Commander-
in-Chief and Inspector of Combat Readiness, Forces of the Warsaw
Pact Countries.

Eremenko was rewarded for his wartime services, as were
most of the high-ranking generals, by election as a deputy to the
was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the 20th Party Congress
in February, 1956. He has been re-elected at both the 21st and 22nd
Party Congresses in 1959 and 1961 respectively. Eremenko, like
most wartime military leaders, only emerged from Stalin's shadow
with Khrushchev's ascendency to power in 1953. In 1958, Eremenko's
first works began to appear in print. One of his initial works

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6 The Communist Party of the Soviet Union will be referred to as the CPSU hereafter.
Protiv falsifikatsii istorii vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Against the Falsification of the History of the Second World War), was first published in 1958, and republished in a second, revised edition in 1960. The first work, while providing some extremely significant insights into Soviet views of Western historiography of the war and the Battle of Stalingrad, gives some important information on the battle in the form of arguments against the so-called 'falsifications' by Western writers. Eremenko's main targets are the German generals and their memoirs of the war in Russia. (This topic will be discussed in more detail in a following chapter.)

Eremenko's main work Stalingrad: zapiski komanduiushchego frontom (Stalingrad: The memoirs of a Front Commander) was published in 1961. It had first been published in 1958 in a smaller and more elementary edition. According to the author, "This book was written mainly as a personal memoir of the author - though archival material, military-historical works of Soviet and foreign authors and the front press are also used." The work deals mainly with the events of the battle and the planning of the counter-offensive as they were seen and experienced by Eremenko. As with a number of these works, and more than most, Eremenko's book is liberally spiced with political overtones, reconstructed conversations, and praises of Khrushchev. The author has written several other books.

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on his wartime experiences, _Na zapadnom napravlenii_ (On the Western Front, 1959) and _V nachale voiny_ (At the Beginning of the War, 1964) which dealt with his experiences before and after Stalingrad and, therefore, are of little value for this paper.

Marshal Vasilii Ivanovich Chuikov (1900 - ) commanded the 62nd Soviet Army in the defense of the city of Stalingrad proper. Chuikov joined the Red Army in 1918 and the Party in 1919. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in the mid-1920's and later graduated from its Far Eastern Faculty. From 1927-1937, he was military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek. He then returned to the Soviet Union and commanded the 4th Army of the Belorussian Military District from 1938 through the occupation of Eastern Poland in autumn 1939-1940. In 1940, he returned to China as military attaché and chief military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek until March, 1942. He was given the command of the 62nd Army at Stalingrad in September, 1942. His army took the brunt of the incessant German attempts to seize the city from September to November, 1942. After the surrender of the 6th German Army, Chuikov remained as the commander of the 62nd Army which was renamed the 8th Guards Army for its heroic stand at Stalingrad.  

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9 Merzalow, _op. cit._, 124.
He retained command of this army until the end of the war. The 8th Guards Army under Chuikov participated in the operations of the 1st Ukrainian Front in 1943 and the 1st Belorussian Front in 1944. His army was also involved in the storming of Berlin in April, 1945. By the end of the war, he held the rank of Colonel-General.

Following the war, he was the Commander of Soviet Occupation Forces in Thuringia (1945-1949) and then Commander, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany from 1949 to 1953. He was promoted to full General in 1950. In 1953, he was appointed commander of the Kiev Military District. He held this post until 1960 when he became Deputy Minister of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Army Ground Forces. 10 He has held these positions since 1960.

Chuikov was elected a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR four times since 1946. At the 19th Party Congress, he became a candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU along with all the other military district commanders. He was re-elected to the Central Committee as a candidate member again in 1959, then became a full member in 1960 and has been one since. He was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1951, 1955, and 1959. Chuikov was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union in March, 1955.

Chuikov has written a number of works on the Battle of Stalingrad. The first two of his works were short, more-or-less propagandistic productions extolling the **heroism** of his forces in the battle. His first book, *Armiia massovogo geroizma: iz zapisok o boevom puti 62-î armii.* (The Army of Mass Heroism: From the Notes concerning the Battle Route of the 62nd Army, 1958) was mainly derived from an article which appeared in the February 1958 issue of *Oktiabr'* under the same title as the book. The second short book, *Legendarnaia 62-ia armia.* (The Legendary 62nd Army, 1958) was very similar to the previous work. Following these minor and fragmentary memoirs, after some delay, his major work *Nachalo puti* appeared in 1959. It was extensively reworked by the author and published in a second, enlarged edition in 1961. He deals mainly with his own experiences and problems in defending the city, quite explicitly presenting his criticisms. The work is valuable for an understanding of the real situation which faced the Soviet troops in the city. As with most of these works, Chuikov relies on long conversations and descriptions of individual deeds of heroism to carry his narrative along. In 1962 *180 dnei v ogne srazhenii: iz zapisok komandarma 62-î armii.*

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(180 Days in the Fire of Battle: From the Notes of the Commander of the 62nd Army) was published. The last work, as well as the first two is basically contained in the major work Nachalo puti. (1961). It seems that the three smaller works were all taken directly from the 1961 Nachalo puti or simply combined to form the major work. 12

12 A textual comparison was made between 180 dnei v ogne srazhenii and Nachalo puti (the 1961 edition) to determine the extent of duplication that existed in the two works. Only a rough comparison was made for the basic study of the texts because they do not directly apply to the materials used in this paper. This comparison revealed general and very extensive usage of the text of Nachalo puti for the production of 180 dnei. A brief comparison was also made between the Oktiabr' article and Nachalo puti with the same conclusion. A very careful comparison of the sections of the texts relevant to the subject matter of this paper was made. It was found that the introduction to the 1961 edition of Nachalo puti, Ko vtoromu izdaniyu (To the Second Edition) (pages 3-30), and the last section of 180 dnei, "Otvet fal' sifikatorom istorii vtoroi mirovoi voiny" (An Answer to the Falsifiers of the History of the Second World War) (pages 151-167) were virtually similar word for word. Of the 70 paragraphs which constituted the 180 dnei section, 64 came directly from 66 paragraphs of the Nachalo puti introduction. These paragraphs were occasionally combined or divided differently in one or the other of the works. Words were also sometimes altered, but the body of the wording of 180 dnei came directly from Nachalo puti. The selections were taken from various pages of Nachalo puti, but the borrowing tended to run into a number of consecutive pages almost paralleling paragraph to paragraph.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>180 dnei</th>
<th>Nachalo puti</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pages 151-154</td>
<td>Pages 4 - 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pages 154-155</td>
<td>Pages 13 -15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pages 156-161</td>
<td>Pages 16 -22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pages 161-164</td>
<td>Verbatim Pages 22 -25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pages 164-167</td>
<td>Pages 27 -30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chief Marshal of Artillery Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov (1899- ) was one of the Representatives of the Staff of the Soviet Supreme High Command who planned, prepared, and conducted the Soviet counter-offensive of November 19, 1942 against the German forces at Stalingrad. Voronov was an artillery officer in the Civil War and during the 1920's; he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1930. He was appointed head of the Leningrad Artillery Training School in 1935 and then Chief of the Main Artillery Administration of the Red Army in 1937. In this post, he was responsible for the development of new artillery tactics, strategy and equipment. In 1939-1940, he

This textual comparison reveals that the body of 180 dnei is merely a reduced and edited, virtually word-for-word, version of Nachalo puti. 180 dnei is a DOSAAF (a paramilitary training organization) publication of Nachalo puti sufficiently reduced in scope for a wider audience but covering the same material almost entirely. The main organizational theme of the DOSAAF work is taken from several of the Nachalo puti chapters that deal directly with the events of the fighting for Stalingrad within the city. A similar comparison could be made between Eremenko's "Istoricheskaia pobeda pod Stalingradom" from the journal Kommunist (January, 1958) and sections from his book Stalingrad (1961). Certain sections of these two works bore almost the same wording. There was no textual comparison made between the two; however, the similarity was noticed during the translation of these two works.

The practice of borrowing seems to be a common characteristic of some Soviet works which are published by the same author under different titles or articles pertaining to the same subject. The object of this divergence from the theme of the paper is simply to show that the works are basically the same and that what is written in one can be held true for another work under a different title. This pertains mainly to Chuikov's works because a matter of methodology was raised concerning the almost exclusive use of Chuikov's Nachalo puti in this paper. This methodology must be justified and the textual comparison is designed to serve that purpose.
directed the artillery on the Karelian sector of the Russo-Finnish War. In 1941, Voronov became Commander-in-Chief of Artillery and Chief of the Main Artillery Administration. He directed the artillery operations on the Leningrad Front in the fall of 1941. He was then instrumental in the reorganization of the Soviet artillery forces following their disruption and poor utilization during the first six months of the war. 13

Voronov was the Chief Representative of the Soviet High Command with A. M. Vasil'evskii at the Battle of Stalingrad. During the battle, he was mainly concerned with the preparation and operation of the artillery forces. He was one of several generals who accepted von Paulus' surrender at Stalingrad. As a result of his actions in the Stalingrad operations, Voronov was made Chief Marshal of Artillery. He remained a member of the Staff of the High Command throughout the war, often coordinating operations as he had at Stalingrad. He was also the Chief of the PVO (Anti-Aircraft Defense) for the entire Soviet Union during the war.

Voronov remained the Commander-in-Chief of Artillery until 1950 when he was made the President of the Artillery Academy which was formed after World War II. He retired in the mid-1950's and has been engaged in research work on artillery weapons since that time.

13 Erickson, Soviet High Command, 614.
Voronov also received numerous political rewards for his services to the state.

Voronov's works are his life memoirs, *Na sluzhbe voennoi* (On the Service of a Soldier, 1963) and *Predstavitel' Stavki* (Representative of the Staff). The first work, even though published in 1963, has been used due to Voronov's significance and the lack of another work by him covering the Stalingrad material. Voronov devoted a large amount of space to Stalingrad for a book which covered his entire life in the military. He was mainly concerned with the development and usage of artillery in the Battle of Stalingrad.

Marshal Sergei Semenovich Biriuzov (1904- ) was the Chief of Staff of Marshal Rodion Ia. Malinovskii's 2nd Guards Army which participated in the later stages of the Battle of Stalingrad. Biriuzov joined the Red Army in 1922 and graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in the early 1930's. In 1936, he graduated from the Voroshilov Higher Military Command School and since has mainly been a staff officer. In 1941, he served on the staffs of the South-Western and then Briansk Fronts. In late 1942, Biriuzov was appointed Chief of Staff for Malinovskii's newly formed 2nd Guards Army. The 2nd Guards Army moved into the ring of Soviet forces encircling Stalingrad in December, 1942. This army was instrumental in beating off Field Marshal von Manstein's attempt to drive a relief wedge into
the German forces encircled in the city. In late December, 1942 and early January, 1943, the 2nd Guards Army pushed the Germans back towards Rostov-on-the-Don and ended permanently any German hopes to relieve the 6th Army at Stalingrad. Biriuzov developed and carried out most of these operations. 14 In 1943, Biriuzov became the Chief of Staff for F. I. Tolbukhin's Southern Front (later renamed the 2nd Ukrainian Front) and participated in the Mius and Molochnaia River operations. In 1944, he was given command of the 37th Army which operated in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia in 1944-1945. After his return from Yugoslavia, Biriuzov was made Deputy Commander of the Far Eastern Military District. He remained in this post until 1954 when he became Commander of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Austria. Later in 1954, he was called to Moscow and given the post of Commander-in-Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defense and Deputy Minister of Defense. He was promoted to General of the Army in 1954 and Marshal in March, 1955. Since 1957, he has been Chief of the Main Administration of Anti-Aircraft Defense of the USSR.

He was elected candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee at the 20th, 21st, and 22nd Party Congresses. He has been a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR since 1954.

Biriuzov has written or edited three books on his wartime

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Merzalow, Biographic Directory, 83.
experiences, only one of which deals partly with Stalingrad. Kogda gremeli pushki (When the Guns Thundered, 1962) is a general wartime memoir which treats Stalingrad only as far as Biriuzov himself was involved. The commentary mainly concerns the formation of the 2nd Guards Army and then its operations against von Manstein. Biriuzov writes a factual and quickly moving narrative of the closing phases of the battle and then moves on to the subsequent operations that he was involved in. His only other book, Sovetskii soldat na Balkanakh (A Soviet Soldier in the Balkans, 1963) deals exclusively with his experiences as the commander of the 37th Army during 1944-1945. He has edited two other works, Belgradskaia Operatsiia (The Belgrade Operation, 1964) and Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily v bor'be za osvobozhdenie narodov Jugoslavii (The Soviet Armed Forces in the Struggle for the Liberation of the People of Yugoslavia, 1960).

General of the Army Pavel Ivanovich Batov (1897- ) was the Commander of the 65th Army-of-the-Don Front under General K. K. Rokossovskii during the encirclement and liquidation of the 6th German Army. Batov graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1928 and was a divisional commander during the Russo-Finnish War. He was a deputy army commander in 1941 and rose to the command of the 65th Army at Stalingrad. His army formed part of the northern pincer of the encircling movement during the Soviet counter-offensive
in November, 1942. His army then was assigned, with the rest of the Don Front plus the elements of the Stalingrad Front, to the liquidation of the encircled German troops. He took part in the Kursk-Orel operations in the summer of 1943 under Rokossovskii. Later in 1943, he participated in the Dniepr River battles. He was involved in 1944 in the Bobriusk operation of the 1st Belorussian Front and in 1945 in the Pomerian and East Prussian operations under Rokossovskii again.

After the war, Batov was commander of the army in Germany.

In 1949-1950, he was appointed Commander of Soviet Forces on Kaliningrad Oblast\(^1\) (Region). He became the Commander of the Ciscarpathian Military District (1955-1958) and then of the Baltic Military District (1958-1960).\(^{15}\)

Batov has been a deputy to the Supreme Soviet since 1937. He became a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. He was a delegate to the 20th and 21st Party Congresses. He is one of the most experienced and honored of the Soviet commanders of World War II.

Batov's book, *V pokhodakh i boiakh* (In Campaigns and Battles, 1962), devotes a number of pages to the Battle of Stalingrad. His treatment of the events is seemingly accurate and independent of political interpretations. He is mainly concerned with the military


operations and their results from the point of view of this army.

Batov seems to have written one of the most solid military memoirs as far as Stalingrad is concerned.

Marshal of Artillery Vasilii Ivanovich Kazakov was the Chief of Staff for Artillery of Bokossovskii's Don Front during the Battle for Stalingrad. Kazakov's prewar training was as an artillery officer and his posts corresponded to his specialty. In 1939-1940, he was a corps artillery officer during the Russo-Finnish War. He was a frontal artillery officer at Stalingrad and then for the 1st Belorussian Front in the Battle of Berlin.

Following the war Kazakov was artillery officer for the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany before being assigned to the Chief Artillery Administration, Ministry of Defense in the early 1950's. In March 1955, he was promoted to Marshal of Artillery and appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Army Artillery and also of the Main Artillery Administration. 17

Kazakov's work, Na perelome (At the Turning Point, 1962), is mainly a military memoir with little political treatment of the turning point or the battle. Kazakov describes the battle from the point of view of an artillery officer. He again, as with Voronov, deals particularly with the problems and usage of artillery during the battle.

17 Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin, 95.
Lieutenant-General Alexi Ilich Rodimtsev commanded the 13th Guards Division under Marshal Chuikov in the September 1942 battle for the city of Stalingrad. Rodimtsev served as a Soviet advisor in the Spanish Civil War from 1936-1938. In 1941-1942, he commanded an infantry division which was distinguished for its bravery in the fighting for the Ukraine. In September, 1942, his 13th Guards Division moved into the city of Stalingrad at a time when the city was about to fall to the massed German assaults. His division's appearance stemmed the German attacks, but only at the cost of its operational effectiveness. Rodimtsev and the 13th Guards Division were given much of the credit for saving the city from the Germans. He commanded the 32nd Guards Infantry Corps on the 1st Belorussian Front under Zhukov in 1944-1945.

After the war, Rodimtsev attended the Voroshilov Higher General Staff School and graduated in 1949. He has been elected a deputy to the Supreme Soviet and also a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party since 1950. In 1956 he was military attaché in Albania and in 1957 was made the Deputy Commander of the Northern Military District.

Rodimtsev’s work, Tvoi, Rodina, Sinovia! (Your Sons are the Country, 1962), has little of value concerning the battle. This work deals mainly with the first eleven months of the war in the Ukraine.
Only at the end does the author discuss Stalingrad and his role in the battle. Rodimtsev's work is highly political in this treatment of the battle even though he devotes only a few pages to it.

Marshal of Armored Forces Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov (1901- ) commanded the 7th Tank Corps on the southern wing of the Stalingrad Front during the defeat of von Manstein in December 1942-January 1943. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1930 and during the 1930's he was assigned to mechanized and armored units. He commanded tank units in the Baltic Military District in the summer of 1941 before being transferred to an armored command near Moscow in the fall of 1941. At Stalingrad he commanded the 7th Tank Corps under Malinovsky's 2nd Guards Army. At the Battle of Kursk he led the 5th Guards Tank Army. Rotmistrov's forces later saw action at Belgorod, Kharkov, and in the Dniepr River battles in 1943. As a result of the Soviet victory at Korsun-Shevchenko in 1944, Rotmistrov was promoted to Marshal of Armored Forces. In 1944-45, he was Deputy Commander of Soviet Army Motorized and Armored Forces.

After the war, Rotmistrov commanded the armored forces of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany (1945-1947) and then the Motorized and Armored Forces of the Far Eastern Command (1947-1948).

18 Erickson, Soviet High Command, 633.
19 Merzalow, Biographic Directory, 539.
In 1948, he was called to Moscow to administer the training of command personnel for the Main Administration of Soviet Armored Forces. In 1952, he graduated from the Voroshilov Higher General Staff Academy and was appointed director of the Stalin Armored Forces Academy. Rotmistrov became commander of Soviet Armored Forces and Chief of the Main Administration of Armored Forces in 1955. Since 1958, he has been the head of the Order of Lenin Armored Forces Military Academy. Rotmistrov is the outstanding Soviet Army specialist on armor and armored warfare.

Rotmistrov has written no memoir on his specific activities during the Battle of Stalingrad, but he has written a general work on military art and science — Istoriia voennogo iskusstva (The History of Military Art: two volumes, 1963). This work deals in part with Stalingrad and is a general survey of World War II from a tactical, strategic, and doctrinal viewpoint. Rotmistrov was important in Soviet military thought for his groundbreaking article in March 1955 concerning the value of surprise and the state of Soviet doctrine. His position as a leading figure in Soviet military thought and his role at Stalingrad necessitate his inclusion in the list of writers on the Battle of Stalingrad even though his work did not appear until 1963. Rotmistrov has also written Tankove srazhenie pod Prokhorovskoi (The Tank Battle at Prohorovska, 1960).
The work of these eight Soviet military leaders and participants in the Battle of Stalingrad form the core of published material used as the basis for the following sections of this paper. Equally important with those who have written on the battle are those who have remained silent on their respective roles in the battle. Two of the Soviet generals who occupied high command posts during the battle died well before the revisions period ever began. The lack of any materials from these men is a significant loss to Soviet military historiography. There are five other Soviet generals who were involved at the battle who have not produced any memoirs of the battle. One of these generals has had silence enforced upon him and others have simply not written; but it is necessary to review them also because of their silence and their significance during the battle.

The Silent Generals

Marshal Rodion Iakovlevich Malinovskii (1898-), probably one of the most significant of the participants of the Battle of Stalingrad who has not written any memoirs, has been the Minister of Defense of the USSR since October 1957. Malinovskii was a latecomer to the battle since his 2nd Guards Army was being formed during the defensive stages of the battle, that is up to November, 1942. Malinovskii had been an army commander on the Southern Front in 1941
and in the Northern Caucasus before being transferred to the command of the new army. His 2nd Guards Army moved into the southwestern sector of the encirclement in December 1942. His units took the final force of von Manstein's operation from the southwest and then went over to the offensive. Following the last phases of the Winter 1942-1943 Offensive, Malinovskii commanded the South-Western Front in the Donets Basin and then the 3rd Ukrainian Front which had Khrushchev as political advisor. He then led the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the renamed 3rd Ukrainian Front, in the seizure of Rumania and signed the Rumanian peace treaty for the Allies. Malinovskii captured Budapest in 1944, then Vienna in coordination with Marshal Tolbukhin in April 1945, and Prague at the end of the war. With the end of the war in Europe, Malinovskii was transferred to the Far East where under Marshal Vasilevskii he commanded the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts which composed the western striking force in the destruction of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria during August-September, 1945. After the war, Malinovskii became the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, a post which he held until being called to Moscow in 1956 to become Commander-in-Chief of

20 Merzalow, Biographic Directory, 374-375.
Soviet Army Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense. He replaced Zhukov as Minister of Defense in October, 1957 and has held the post ever since then.

Malinovsky has been a member of the Party since the Civil War. He has been a deputy to the Supreme Soviet since 1946, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU since 1956, and a member of the Council of Ministers of the USSR — highest governmental ruling body in the USSR — since 1957.

Malinovsky has written several articles on his wartime experiences, but they do not deal with the Battle of Stalingrad. He occupies an intermediate position among the generals because some of his views on Stalingrad are available in the form of speeches. These speeches can be used to gain a partial understanding of Malinovsky's interpretation of the battle. He has not yet produced any significant memoirs on the battle in the form of a published work. Malinovsky has edited two works on wartime operations, Iassko-Kishinevskie kanny(The Jassy-Kishinev, 1964) and Budapesht Vena Praga - istoriko-memuarnyi trud. (Budapest, Vienna, Prague - Historical Memoir Work, 1965). The reason for his lack of works

21 Rodion Ia. Malinovsky, "Iz vospominanii o Iassko-Kishinevskoi operatsii(avgust-sentiabr 1944 goda) (From the Memoirs Concerning the Jassy-Kishinev operation (August-September 1944), Voennoo-istoricheski zhurnal (1959), 25-34. Also "2-1 Ukrainskii front v bor'be za osuobozhdenie chekhoslovaki" (The 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Struggle for the Liberation of Czechoslovakia), V-I Zhurnal, II (1960), 11-25.
could be linked to the sensitive position which he presently holds and its responsibilities. Malinovskii is one of the more politically significant participants of the battle who remains to be heard from.

Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskii (1896- ) is one of the old hands of the Soviet military who was an associate of Marshal Tukhachevskii in the 1930's. He was arrested in 1937 by the NKVD but released the next year. He commanded a mechanized corps during the occupation of Eastern Poland in 1939. He was an army commander on the Western Front in 1941 and the Commander of the Briansk Front in 1942. He commanded the Don Front during the Battle of Stalingrad and his forces formed the northern pincer of the Soviet counter-offensive in November, 1942. Rokossovskii's troops were assigned the task of liquidating the Germans at Stalingrad along with the 62nd, 64th, and 57th Armies. Rokossovskii accepted von Paulus' surrender at Stalingrad with Eremenko and Voronov. In 1943, he commanded the Central Front in the Battle of Kursk. He was promoted to Marshal for the successes of his 2nd Belorussian Front's actions at Bobriusk and Minsk in early 1944. Later in 1944, he entered East Prussia and seized Danzig and Gydnia before occupying Stettin and Swinemünde in 1945. His forces also participated in the storming of Berlin in April-May 1945. After the war he commanded

22
John Erickson, Soviet High Command, 492.
Soviet occupation forces in East Prussia and Konigsberg. Rokossovskii was transferred to Poland at the 'request' of the Polish government in 1949 to serve as the Polish Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army. He was elected a member of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party and a member of the Sejm (Polish Parliament). In 1955, he became a deputy commander of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces. He was forced out of his Polish positions by the Polish uprisings of 1956 and was recalled to the Soviet Union at Gomulka's request.

Rokossovskii was reappointed Marshal of the Soviet Union and given the post of a Deputy Minister of Defense when he returned to the USSR. In October, 1957 he was made Commander of the Trans-Caucasian Military District only to be recalled to Moscow in January 1958 and reappointed Deputy Minister of Defense. Rokossovskii has not produced any memoirs on Stalingrad and his role in the battle. Undoubtedly, his involvement in Poland until 1956 prevented him from producing anything during that time, but he has written only one work since his return to the USSR. His only works are articles on his wartime experiences, and "V boiak za osvobozhdenie Belorussii. Iz istorii velikoi otechestvennoi voiny" (In the Battle for the Liberation...

23 Merzalow, Biographic Directory, 533.
24 ibid., 533
ation of Belorussia. From the History of the Great Fatherland War).

He has not produced any writings on his part in the events at Stalingrad according to the bibliographical index of Volume VI of Istoriiia.

Marshal Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896– ), the most renowned of all World War II Soviet military commanders, has produced nothing in the way of writings on his wartime experiences. Zhukov's career is well known for its frequent changes of course; now hero, now scapegoat. He was one of the General Staff and High Command Group which formulated the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad. He commanded armies in Poland in 1944 and seized Berlin in 1945. After being the Soviet Commander in Germany for a year after the war, he was transferred to the command of the Soviet Army Ground Forces in 1946, then to the Odessa Military District and also to the Urals Military District. Zhukov remained out of view until the end of 1952. He returned to prominence as 1st Deputy Minister of Defense following Stalin's death in 1953 and was elected to the Central Committee of the Party in June, 1953. He became the Minister of Defense in February, 1955 with Khrushchev's consolidation of power. He played one of the most significant roles in the Army's rise to power from 1953 to 1957. At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, he

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was elected as a candidate member to the Party Presidium. With his great influence, he was the first professional military man ever to become a member of the Party Presidium (June, 1957), he became a potential threat to the Party. His removal, exile, demotion, and expulsion from the Party in October, 1957 resulted in his disappearance until last year when he appeared at the 20th Anniversary of the Soviet Victory over Germany. It was rumored several years ago that he was preparing his memoirs, but thus far they have not appeared. This is undoubtedly due to the delicate position he holds in Soviet military history of the war, his former popularity with the people and the Army, and his former powerful influence. It is highly doubtful that Zhukov will be heard from on his role in the Battle of Stalingrad in the near future.

Marshal Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasilevskii (1895— ) was a member of the Staff of the Soviet Supreme High Command who along with Zhukov and Voronov helped to plan the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad. He was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Army General Staff in 1941. He was made Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Commander-in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces under Stalin in 1942.

28 Pravda, May 10, 1965 (Moscow); Izvestiia, (Moscow May 9, 1965).
30 Merzalow, Biographic Directory, 697.
After his activities at Stalingrad, he was made Marshal in 1943 and commanded various operations until 1945 on the Belorussian and East Prussia fronts. In the summer of 1945, he was given the overall command of the Soviet Far Eastern Forces for the seizure of Manchuria, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. In 1946, he was appointed the Chief of the General Staff once again and also made 1st Deputy Minister of Defense. He became the USSR War Minister in 1950. In 1953, he was 1st Deputy Minister of Defense under Bulganin and headed the combined army and navy ministries within the Ministry of Defense.

Since 1946, he has been a deputy of the Supreme Soviet and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU since 1952. From his retirement in mid-1956 to July, 1958, Vasil'evskii was Chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Association. He has not contributed any publications to the Soviet history of the war or of Stalingrad.

Colonel-General Mikhail Stepanovich Shumilov (1898- ) commanded the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front on the immediate southern flank of the city during the entire course of the battle. His army formed one of the main breakthrough units in the counteroffensive which was launched from the south of the city. His forces took part in the liquidation of the 6th German Army in January and February, 1943. The 64th Army was renamed 7th Guards Army
in 1943 after Kursk, and Shumilov continued to command it in the Belgorod, Poltava, and Kharkov operations of 1943. Later in 1943 he saw action with his army in the Dniepr River battles near Dniepropetrovsk. Shumilov's 7th Guards Army then participated in the Southern Ukrainian, Rumanian, Hungarian, and Austrian operations in 1944-1945 as a part of Malinovskii's 2nd Ukrainian Front. From 1945-1956, he commanded the Voronezh Military District. He has been a member of the Supreme Soviet since 1946. Presently, he holds the rank of Colonel-General and is a member of the Staff of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. He has produced no memoirs on the war or the Battle of Stalingrad.

These then are the main figures of the Battle of Stalingrad, all of whom were participants on the higher command levels during the course of the battle and the war. Only eight have written memoirs pertinent to their combat experience at Stalingrad. It is not the task of this paper to attempt to find out an answer to the question of why the remaining five generals have not written, but that they have not is in itself significant. There are important views of the battle missing from Soviet military history due to the silence of these generals. This

\[31\]
\[ibid., 595.\]

\[32\]

Pospelov, Istoriiia, III, 266.
fact alone hinders a complete understanding of the battle itself. Those who have written on the battle present a representative cross-section of the Stalingrad generals, however, from Staff Representative (Voronov) to Front Commander (Eremenko) to Army Commander (Chuikov) to Divisional Commander (Rodimtsev).

The following chapter will deal directly with the generals' own views on the Battle of Stalingrad and its role as the turning point in World War II, with all the connotations and inferences that this term had for those who wrote in the years 1957 to 1962.
CHAPTER III


The Turning Point in World War II

The term 'the turning point' can have numerous connotations in the history of World War II; each based upon a specific event or merely upon a particular aspect of some event. In general, the turning point of the war in military history has been considered as that point at which the previously winning side suffered a military setback that turned the course of the war for them from impending victory toward ultimate defeat. There are no specific conditions which can be used to determine whether a particular battle is the definite turning point of a war. It would seem that no single battle of World War II was the turning point; rather, it was a combination of battles which eventually turned the war against Germany and Japan. However, certainly more than military defeat alone decided the outcome of the war.

There were at least as many turning points in World War II as there were Allied powers. The United States had Midway and Guadalcanal in the Pacific in 1942. The British had the Battle of Britain in 1940 and El Alamein in North Africa in 1942. The Soviet Union had more turning points than the other Allies; it had three — Moscow, Stalingrad,
and Kursk. Each victorious nation, of course, tended to rate its turning point as one of the most significant victories of the war. This condition arose from the fact that much of each nation's efforts and hopes for eventual victory, if not its very existence, depended upon the final outcome of its respective battles. It seems natural, therefore, that each nation should give proportionally more attention to its own great victory than to the others as being a determining influence on the final Allied triumph in the war.

Only in the Soviet Union, however, do the military historians subordinate all other Allied victories to the great Soviet victory at Stalingrad. To Soviet historians, and to the Soviet generals, Stalingrad is the one great turning point in World War II. National pride no doubt plays as much a role in the continued existence of this viewpoint as do the Party line, military prestige, and personal reputation. While the Soviet military writers like to expound repetitiously about the great turning point in the war, virtually nowhere in the Soviet material can there be found any definition of precisely what they mean by the turning point. There are a few analyses which touch upon more than several of the standard topics of the battle as the turning point. Normally, the simple statement "The Stalingrad battle signified the decisive turning point in the course of the Great Fatherland War
and the Second World War in general,\(^1\) followed by significant praising of the Soviet and socialistic victory, is all the definitions that the turning point merits. The external political effects of the battle are better treated, in most cases, than the internal repercussions of the battle upon the Soviet Armed Forces and the Party.

Basically, the turning point as seen from the Soviet vantage point reduces itself to a number of subpoints. First, there is the military turning point, the change in the war's course to the USSR's favor. This point gains most of the generals' attention. Second, there is the political turning point within the Soviet Union with respect to the political treatment and position of the Soviet Army. This subject is only sparsely treated in the historiography of Stalingrad, and when dealt with it is usually by political writers.\(^2\) Third are the international implications of the German defeat as the Soviet authors view them. This subject is again more in the domain of the political writers, the Soviet propagandists,\(^3\) and, of

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1 A. I. Eremenko, "Istoricheskaia pobeda pod Stalinogradom," (The Historic Victory at Stalingrad), Kommunist, XXXIV (January, 1958), 38.


the more politically oriented generals than of the military historians. The fourth subpoint is the Soviet consideration of Stalingrad as the turning point for the entire Allied war effort.

The Soviet generals in their works on Stalingrad can be divided among the following groups: those who deal specifically in the military events with little side-slipping into discussions of the turning point—Batov, Kazakov, and Biriuzov; those who deal mainly with the battle's military events but who also delve into the implications of the turning—Voronov, Rodimtsev, and Rotmistrov; and those who are more concerned with the repercussions of the battle as the turning point than are the other writers—Chuikov and Bremenko.

The first group—Batov, Kazakov, and Biriuzov—were lower on the ladder of command, or less personally involved, at the Battle of Stalingrad than all the other generals but Rodimtsev. These three generals agree that the Battle of Stalingrad was the turning point of the war and that it had a rather decisive effect on the further course of the Soviet-German conflict. They leave their discussions of the turning point at this, and they then proceed on to the military operations which followed the battle. These works are primarily military memoirs which deal little with the political implications of the events which they describe.

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The second group - Voronov, Rodimtsev, and Rotmistrov - bring the discussion of the turning point of the war into sharper focus. Though concerned with the military operations and their own experiences in the battle, these generals find sufficient time and space to treat the turning point more deeply than the first group. Rodimtsev's discussion of Stalingrad comes at the end of a book which is devoted to his activities in the Ukraine during the first eleven months of the war. In his concluding section, Rodimtsev only superficially deals with the deeper aspects of the battle in what amounts to a highly political treatment of the battle and its role as a turning point in the war. They all still voice unanimity of views upon the battle's role in the war.

Voronov:
The victory of the Volga was the fundamental turning point in the war - it began a new phase in the war - victory.... The Battle at Stalingrad began an important turning point in course of the war in favor of the Soviet Armed Forces.  

Rodimtsev:
In its strategic significance the battle on the Volga should have proved and actually did prove the deciding influence on the course and outcome of the struggle of the battling sides in 1942-1943.  

Rotmistrov:
The victorious conclusion of the counter-offensive

5 Nikolai N. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi (Moscow: 1963), 282, 351.

on the Volga laid the beginning for the fundamental turning point in the course not only of the Great Fatherland War but also of the entire Second World War.\(^7\)

These generals expand their views from a simple statement of the Soviet victory to the inclusion of the international political effects of the battle upon Germany's allies in Eastern Europe, the resistance and national liberation movements, and to a lesser extent, the role of the Allies in the war. The space each author devotes to a specific subtopic of the battle varies according to the length of each work and the respective emphasis of the author.

The third grouping of generals — Chuikov and Eremenko — contains more material concerning the turning point than any of the other six generals who have written on the battle. Chuikov is very explicit in his interpretation of the battle as the turning point.

Fighting for almost a year and a half against the Germans, for whom the industry of the whole of Europe was working, the Soviet people dealt the Nazi war machine a crushing blow and shattered the enemy's plans.\(^8\)

Who does not know that the battle at Stalingrad was the turning point of the entire war, that after the defeat at Stalingrad — ... — the whole Hitlerite war machine could not recover and its collapse was only a matter of time.\(^9\)

Eremenko deals, more than any other general, with the fuller implications of the Battle of Stalingrad as it

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\(^7\) Pavel I. Rotmistrov, *Istoriia voennogo iskusstva*, II (Moscow: 1963), 224.

\(^8\) Vasilii I. Chuikov, *Nachalo puti*, (2nd ed. rev; Moscow: 1961), 259.

\(^9\) *Izvestiia* (Moscow), February 22, 1959.
affected the Soviet Army, the international situation, and the political controls of the military. He treats many topics which none of other generals even touch upon in their works. He has devoted an entire work to the denunciation of the Western history of the war and the Battle of Stalingrad.\textsuperscript{10} His opinion of the battle is the same as that of the rest of the generals: "The Battle of Stalingrad was the greatest event in the history of the past war, which marked the turning point in the course of the Great Fatherland War and the entire second world war."\textsuperscript{11}

Marshal Malinovskii in his 1960 Victory Day speech expresses the same opinion concerning Stalingrad as do the other generals.

The crushing victory of our forces in the Battle of Stalingrad, which knowing no parallel in history, was the beginning and decisive event of the second period of the Great Fatherland War.... The tide not only of the Great Fatherland War but also of the entire Second World War began to turn radically.\textsuperscript{12}

There can be no question of the generals' view of Stalingrad as the turning point in the World War II; the above references demonstrate this fact. The distinction

\textsuperscript{10} Andrei I. Eremenko, \textit{Protiv fal’sifikatsii istorii vtoroi mirovoi voiny} (Moscow: 1960).

\textsuperscript{11} Andrei I. Eremenko, \textit{Stalingrad}, 446.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Pravda} (Moscow), May 10, 1960.
between the generals arise only in how deeply they deal with the subject of the turning point and in what aspects they emphasize. Virtually all of the generals' interpretations were somewhat determined by the political forces in power in the USSR when they wrote. This common condition in Soviet history writing is of vital importance for understanding why the generals wrote some of the material they did and emphasized certain subjects while barely mentioning others.

Soviet historians who have worked on Stalingrad, such as A. M. Samsonov, follow the same basic pattern in dealing with the battle as do the generals. The historians, while having less personal involvement in the battle and thus greater accuracy in their accounts, lack the influence of the generals — influence that may allow them to write more independently and more critically than most historians in the Soviet Union. The historians' accounts are valuable for use as models to which the generals' various views can be compared to see in what direction and aspects the generals vary in subject matter or emphasis.

There are numerous implications which can be drawn from the generals' writings between 1957 and 1962 — indications of the state of Soviet political-military

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13 Samsonov, Stalingradskaia bitva, 6, 572, 575, 576; B. S. Telpukhovskii, Velikaia otechestvennaia voina sovet-skogo soiuza, 1941-1945 (The Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945) (Moscow: 1959), 191; Andreev and Telpukhovskii, Partila, 71.
relations, of official and unofficial influences on the writing of history, of the political atmosphere in the USSR, and of the trends of Soviet foreign and internal policies. Thus, there is much that may be learned about the Soviet Union by an analysis of the Soviet Stalingrad generals' views of the Battle of Stalingrad as the turning point in World War II. Most important for the purposes of this paper, however, the generals' interpretations give many indications about the progress that was made in Soviet military historiography between 1957 and 1962 and especially about the forces which acted upon military history writing during this time.

The Significance of Stalingrad as the Turning Point in Soviet Internal Affairs.

Some of the more significant and noticeable omissions of the Soviet generals in their treatments of the turning point are those aspects which deal with the changes in the Party's policy towards the Army, the people, and political propaganda in 1942-1943. After Stalingrad and the turn in the war's fortunes to the Soviets' advantage, Party and socialist themes returned to the wartime propaganda partially replacing the more nationalistic themes of 1941-1942.14 'Mother Russia' was set to the side to make way for 'father' Stalin

and the revived inspirational role of the Communist Party.

As the final result of the Battle of Stalingrad became more apparent to the Soviet leadership in late 1942, the Party changed its military commissar policy in the armed forces. This change was basically a reward to the army for its services to the Party and the state, but it was also a realistic appraisal by the Party. The Party realized that the Army operated more effectively under the single leadership of the military rather than under the old dual military-political command structure. A Vysshaia Partiinaia Shkola (The Higher Party School) publication by Andreev and Telpuhovskii supports this action by the Party as being the result of Stalingrad; the change came so as to bring the Party organs in the Army more into the picture of victory, once it was assured.\(^{15}\) In 1943 following the consolidation of the Stalingrad triumph and the virtual assurance of eventual victory, the Party's political work in the Armed Forces was turned towards inspiring and educating the soldiers in the Leninist ideals.\(^{16}\) and away from Russian national patriotism.

The change in the Party's policy in regard to propaganda themes and in respect to the Army is hardly ever

\(^{15}\) Andreev and Telpuhovskii, *Partiya*, 79.

\(^{16}\) ibid., 81.
mentioned by the generals, except for Eremenko. He clarifies some of the changes made in the Party's attitude towards the Army after Stalingrad. Besides the end of the Commissar system and the return of the unity of command structure (edinonachalie) in the Army, Eremenko believes that the restoration of the Soviet officer corps with all the traditional, pre-Revolutionary honors and privileges was proved to be the correct step by the rest of the war. This is another of the more significant turning points for the Soviet Army which resulted from the victory at Stalingrad; but it is barely even mentioned by the principal recipients of these honors, the Soviet generals. The reasons for the generals' sparse treatment of such an important change for the officer corps possibly can be found in the conditions prevailing in the USSR in the late 1950's. Undoubtedly the example of Zhukov's dismissal in 1957 provided an object lesson and a warning to the generals of what would possibly happen if they praised excessively changes which enhanced the Army's power and prestige at a time when the military was under close Party surveillance.

Much of the historiography of the Battle of Stalingrad as the turning point in World War II has to do with

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17 Eremenko, Stalingrad, 25.
the lessons which the Soviet Army learned from the battle. The battle was not only a turning point in the professional prestige and incentives for the Soviet Armed Forces, but it was also the turning point in the Soviet military strategy for the war. The lessons learned at Stalingrad played a determining role in the course of Soviet military operations on the Eastern Front from 1943-1945.\footnote{18} The experience gained by the Soviet generals at Stalingrad was utilized for the planning and conduct of later Soviet operations.\footnote{19} The battle was thus the turning point in the evolution of Soviet military doctrine from a losing to a winning strategy in the war.

The Stalingrad counter-offensive became the model for the Soviet Army after 1942, and all large offensive operations conducted by the Soviet leaders thereafter used this basic conception. Many technical and tactical military problems were solved by the Stalingrad operations.\footnote{20} The generals are very explicit when they voice their opinions on the effect of the battle upon the development of Soviet military art. The evolution and content of Soviet military art was very deeply influenced by the events of the battle according to Eremenko.\footnote{21} Voronov

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnotetext{18} Eremenko, \textit{Stalingrad}, 12; Voronov, \textit{Na sluzhbe}, 351.
\item \footnotetext{19} Eremenko, \textit{Stalingrad}, 20.
\item \footnotetext{20} ibid., 20-21; Telpukhovskii, \textit{Velikaia}, 195-201.
\item \footnotetext{21} Eremenko, \textit{Stalingrad}, 19.
\end{itemize}
writes that not only was Stalingrad an important phase in the development of their military art, but that it also provided an educational experience for the growth of the military abilities of the armed forces' command components. This educational experience concept is expressed also by Eremenko, Chuikov, Malinovskii, and Rotmistrov — those who have dealt with the battle in some detail. Malinovskii explained and clarified the basic idea which Voronov put forward when he spoke on the 20th Anniversary of the battle in February, 1963.

The Battle on the Volga was an important stage in the development of Soviet military art. It demonstrated the combat maturity of Soviet fighting men and increased the organizational capabilities of command cadres who had learned to combine personal bravery and courage with the ability to lead troops on the field of battle. Chuikov sums up the battle's value in Soviet military doctrine in the last paragraph of his Nachalo puti; "There on the banks of the Volga, we went through a stern school of courage and military skill. The experience can still stand our soldiers in good stead." The generals realize that Stalingrad changed their basic military doctrine, and they state this fact clearly and firmly. It can be seen from Chuikov's statement that the generals consider past experience as an important

22 Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 396.
23 Pravda (Moscow), February 2, 1963.
24 Chuikov, Nachalo puti, 396.
factor in present Soviet military thought.

Another of the wartime changes resulting from the Germans' defeat at Stalingrad was the marked increase in Soviet partisan activity in the German-held regions of the Soviet Union. It is in respect to the partisans that some apparent disagreements arise between several of the generals. Basically, the generals seem to treat the partisans lightly as far as their contributions to the Soviet victory. Rotmistrov, however, contends that the partisans played an important role in the success of the November counter-offensive by their disruptions of German communication lines and destruction of supplies. 25 Countering this opinion, Chuikov believes that the partisans became more active in German-controlled areas due to the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. 26 Samsonov concurs with the view expressed by Chuikov: "The victory at Stalingrad affected the anti-fascist struggle very greatly — in occupied Soviet territory the German loss became a symbol for increased partisan activity and for the formation of many new partisan units." 27 This disagreement between the Soviet generals demonstrates that there is not complete harmony in their views on the battle.

25 Rotmistrov, Istoriia voennogo iskusstva, II, 194.
26 Chuikov, Nachalo puti, 259.
27 Samsonov, Stalingradskaya bitva, 575-576.
The change in the partisans' activity after Stalingrad is another turning point of the battle which is not, however, sufficiently treated by the generals. The partisan movement certainly took on a more aggressive disposition after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, largely on account of the heavy German losses in the battle and the resulting scarcity of high quality front line troops for anti-partisan operations. The generals, however, spend very little space discussing the partisans' effect on the battle or the battle's effect on partisan activity; even though the battle marked a significant change in Soviet partisan warfare.

The Soviet Generals' Views of the Turning Point in International Affairs

In a discussion of the generals' views of the turning point's effects in international affairs, it must be understood that it is in this area of the battle's interpretations that ideological overtones and political influences are very great. Much of what was written by the generals from 1957 to 1962 was deeply conditioned by the regime's prevailing foreign policies and its ideological orientation. Soviet history is written on the premise of the projection of present politics into the past, and the generals' works very well point this out in respect to their treatment of international relations. This basic conception of Soviet history must be constantly kept in mind while dealing with the Soviet generals' interpretations of the wartime effects

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of the Battle of Stalingrad. It should be pointed out that
these international affairs are not those between wartime
Allies; but those of the Soviet Union in regard to the Axis,
occupied, and neutral countries of Europe and Asia.

To Chuikov and Eremenko, the victory at Stalingrad was
a victory of socialism over fascism and, therefore, a symbol
to the people of the world of socialism's power. The
triumph at Stalingrad spurred the development of the anti-
fascist movements in Europe and the national liberation move-
ments in Asia. Not only did the victory spur on the liber-
ation movements, but it also raised the morale of the entire
anti-German coalition. According to Malinovskii, "The victory
of the Soviet troops on the banks of the great Russian river
was the beginning of a radical change in the course of the
Great Fatherland War and of the Second World War in favor of
the states of the anti-Hitler coalition." Eremenko carries
this attitude further when he writes that "The Battle of
Stalingrad was the turning point in the course of the great
struggle of all progressive mankind against the deadly threat
of fascist barbarism." These views are heavily tinged with
ideological overtones, but it is essential to see that ideolo-
gy deeply permeates most of the writings on international

29 Chuikov, Nachalo puti, 29-30; Eremenko, Stalingrad, 469.
30 Pravda (Moscow), February 2, 1963.
31 Eremenko, Stalingrad, 6.
affairs in the historiography of World War II.

The Soviet historians think that the struggle of the oppressed peoples to free themselves during World War II was intimately connected with the course of the military operations on the Eastern Front. 32 Most intimately associated with the salvation of "humanity and its civilization from Nazi barbarism"33 was the Soviet defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad.34

One of the most important international results of Stalingrad was the great upsurge in the national liberation struggle of the people against fascist tyranny.35 The Soviet victory initiated the upsurge in these liberations in occupied Europe, especially in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, and France. Prior to Stalingrad, there were no viable resistance movements in the whole of occupied Europe in the Soviet analysis. It was only with Communist leadership that the resistance movements became an effective weapon against the Nazi aggressors.36 The reasons for this are clearly

33Samsonov, Stalingradskaja bitva, 577.
34
Viktor L. Israeliian, Diplomattcheskaia istoriia velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, 1941-1945gg(The Diplomatic History of the Great Fatherland War, 1941-1945) (Moscow: 1959), 93.
35
ibid.
36
Rotmistrov, Istoriia voennogo iskusstva, II, 225.
stated by a Soviet historian.

In all countries, the peoples' struggle against fascism was directed by the Communist Parties. This was not an accident. The crucible of war showed the peoples that they would achieve their national aspirations and secure freedom and independence only under the guidance of Communists. 37

The European resistance movements took their encouragements and example from the Soviet Front according to Malinovskii.

Under the influence of the successes of the Soviet troops, there was an intensification of the national-liberation movements, guided by the Communist and Workers' Parties, in the countries that had been enslaved by fascism. 38

This struggle of the people against their oppressors had serious repercussions in Europe and Asia. It was only after Stalingrad that the Polish Communist Party and the Yugoslav partisans under Tito could take new hope in their operations against the Germans. 39 After Stalingrad, "the liberation struggle in the occupied countries passed to a new stage. Real guerrilla armies developed from separate partisan units." In Asia, "the armed struggle of the patriotic forces of China, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines against the aggressors." 41 came to life

38 Pravda (Moscow), February 2, 1963.
39 Arakelian, Podvig, 33.
40 Deborin, Second World War, 283.
41 Arakelian, Podvig, 40.
only after the Battle of Stalingrad. These Asian movements were not only fighting the Japanese, but they were also preparing for the struggle against Western imperialism when it would return after the war.⁴² Even in Nazi Germany itself, only the Communist Party played a significant role in the development of resistance to Nazi terrorism and rule.⁴³ Chuikov lends a more purely contemporary ideological interpretation to the international significance of Stalingrad in the following statement.

As a result of this great victory and the national liberation movements which had sprung up, a number of countries in Europe and Asia were able to break away from capitalism and, setting out to build socialism, established a powerful world socialist system under the leadership of the Soviet Union.⁴⁴

Chuikov, Eremenko, and Rotmistrov have dealt heavily in their works with the role of Stalingrad as the inspiration for national liberation movements. It is not only these generals who have dealt with this aspect of the battle's repercussions, but most historians of the war who published works at this time also handled these movements in a similar manner. In searching for a cause for the emphasis upon the national liberation struggle as a result of the battle, the political and ideological temperament of the times in which

⁴² ibid.
⁴³ Deborin, Second World War, 272-274.
⁴⁴ Chuikov, Nachalo puti, 5.
the generals wrote must be examined. The emphasis on these movements in the generals' works came at a time when the problems of the "development of Communist movements in other countries and especially the emergence of the new states in Asia and Africa"\(^{45}\) were main centers of attention of Khrushchev's regime. It was only after 1956 that "Soviet historians gave a significant place to the study of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe, Asia, and Africa against imperialist aggressors."\(^{46}\) Thus, the emphasis of the generals and the historians on the national liberation movement can be seen to correspond to the ideological background of the time when the works were written. The influence of current ideological policies is very obviously reflected in the emphasis and content of historical works.

Another turning point which is indicated by Eremenko, Chuikov, and Rotmistrov is the effect of the German defeat at Stalingrad upon Germany's allies — Italy, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.\(^{47}\) The German losses at Stalingrad, plus those suffered by the Rumanians, Hungarians, and Italians


\(^{46}\) Pospelov, Istoriia, VI, 406.

\(^{47}\) Eremenko, Stalingrad, 10-11; Rotmistrov, Istoriia voennogo iskusstva, II, 225.
there, deeply affected the alliance of the fascist states and sparked serious internal crises in these minor allies. Eremenko claims that "The defeat of the Italian forces on the Soviet-German Front precipitated the exit of Italy from the war on the side of Germany." It is significant that there is barely, if any, mention of the role which the Anglo-American forces played in the eventual withdrawal of Italy from the war. It was solely the effects of the Italian losses on the Soviet Front, and especially those suffered during the Stalingrad operations of 1942-1943, which finally forced Italy to capitulate in the fall of 1943 in the Soviet interpretation. Thus, the turning point for Italy in the war was also the Battle of Stalingrad; or, at least this is how the Soviet historians view Italy's surrender.

Rotmistrov concurs with Eremenko's opinion on Hitler's allies and concludes that the German satellites lost faith "in the possibility of the achievement of victory" following Stalingrad. Germany's influence on its allies, and also upon neutral countries, dropped very sharply after the loss at Stalingrad; it never did recover. The disaster of Stalingrad

48 Samsonov, Stalingradskaiabitva, 576.
49 Eremenko, "Istoricheskaiapobeda", 38.
50 Rotmistrov, Istoriiavoennogoiskusstva, II, 225.
51 Pravda(Moscow), February 2, 1963.
took on such great proportions in the fascists' minds that Germany and its allies tried to make a separate peace with the Western Allies.\textsuperscript{52}

That a crisis had arisen in the fascist camp was evident from the fact that the Nazis started thinking of how to end the war. They hoped for a deal with the ruling circles of the USA and Britain. The same tendencies also appeared in the latter two countries. The imperialists were frightened by the Volga victory, for it reduced to nought their hopes of weakening the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{53}

This quotation from a Soviet historian indicates the basic Soviet view of the Allied participation in the war and of the Allies.

The turning point takes upon itself more meanings in the Soviet mind as the battle recedes into history. Much of the Soviet historiography of the war is plagued by the deep, almost neurotic, fears which had played upon the minds of the Soviet leaders during the early years of World War II. It seems that these fears remain set in Soviet history and become truisms embedded in the Soviet mentality long after the threat has passed or proved to be non-existent in the first place. This is one reason for the bitter Soviet treatment of Western actions during the war. This characteristic of Soviet historiography, and of their thinking in general, is vividly demonstrated in the Soviet consideration of Turkish and Japanese intentions against the

\textsuperscript{52} Arakelian, \textit{Podvig}, 22.
\textsuperscript{53} Deborin, \textit{Second World War}, 274.
Soviet Union during the years 1941-1943. Eremenko portrays this characteristic when he writes that "The capture of Stalingrad was the first objective of the German plan and was to be a signal for the invasion by Japan and Turkey."\(^5^4\) Rotmistrov thinks, and most Soviet historians agree with this view, that Japan and Turkey were only dissuaded from attacking the USSR by the German defeat at Stalingrad and the resultant confusion in the fascist bloc. Malinovskiš commented that "Turkey and Japan became more cautious in their foreign policy and abandoned their pledges to aid Hitlerite Germany because of the Soviet victory at Stalingrad."\(^5^5\) Deborin puts the Soviet view much more bluntly.

The Volga victory induced an acute crisis not only in Germany, but in the fascist bloc as a whole. The Soviet Army frustrated the plan of cooperation between the Wehrmacht and the Japanese army. Japan was to have attacked the Soviet Far East and Siberia after the Germans seized Volgograd. The Japanese and the German armies were to have met somewhere in Siberia and the Middle East. But now, the Japanese imperialists abandoned this plan and no longer entertained any hope of German success.\(^5^6\)

Due to the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, Turkey and Japan turned away from any aggressive designs on the USSR. Another turning point resulting from the Battle of Stalingrad has been uncovered, but this one goes much deeper in its implications than just the frustration of aggressive Turkish and Japanese intentions. Some Soviet authors contend that

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\(^5^4\) Eremenko, *Stalingrad*, 10.

\(^5^5\) *Pravda*(Moscow), February 2, 1963.

\(^5^6\) Deborin, *Second World War*, 277-278
the battle also changed the course of the war in the Pacific.

Having massed its elite troops, one-half of its artillery and two-thirds of its tanks on the Soviet border, Japan fell back on the defensive in the Pacific theater after Stalingrad, relinquishing the strategic initiative to its enemies. The Volga victory altered the military and strategic situation...

The Soviet generals make little or no comments on the battle’s effect on the war in the Pacific, except that they probably mean the war in the Pacific was changed when they write that the battle was the turning point in the entire Second World War. In all the interpretations of the effect of Stalingrad upon Japan, there is very little mention, if any at all, of the fact that Japan was deeply involved in fighting on the Chinese mainland and also in the Central and Southwestern Pacific. These facts enter very infrequently into the Soviet narratives concerning the effect of Stalingrad on the Japanese war effort.

The Turning Point for the Allied Coalition

As has been shown above, the victory at Stalingrad made the Allied victory in the Pacific much easier because it threw the Japanese on to the defensive. However, most of the generals are interested in the effects of the battle on the North African operations and not of those on the Pacific war. The generals' attention is centered on the North African theater because it was there that the Battle of

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ibid., 278.
El Alamein took place. El Alamein is the main Western contender for the turning point in World War II, thus the generals spend some time in discussing it.

Due to numerous Western assertions on El Alamein as a turning point in the war, the Soviet generals and historians are particularly concerned with this battle and its denunciation. El Alamein cannot compare to Stalingrad in the Soviet interpretation; "They are altogether incomparable in scale and severity of the struggle, and also in their importance." 58 Any attempt by Western historians to compare El Alamein to Stalingrad is met by a chorus of derision—and charges of 'falsification of history', 59 by the Soviet historians and generals.

58 Samsonov, Stalingradskaja bitva, 574.
59 The 'falsification of history' is a common denunciation used in Soviet historiography to deny any Western "bourgeois" statements that run counter to the official ideology or history. See Eremenko, Protiv falsifikatsii istorii vtoroi mirovoi voiny (2nd ed. rev.; Moscow, 1960); and Gurov (ed.), Protiv falsifikatorov istorii  vtoroi mirovoi voiny. (Against the Falsificators of the History of the Second World War.) (Moscow: 1959).
60 Chuikov, Nachalo puti, 16; Eremenko, Protiv, 142-143; Rotmistrov, Istorii voennogo iskusstva, II, 193; Biriuзов, Kogda, 102-103; Derevenko, Protiv, 323; Andreev, Partiia, 72.
Seeking to belittle the importance of the victory of the Red Army, West German and other reactionary historians of the Second World War [such as Churchill, J.F.C. Fuller, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Montgomery] put on the same plane the Stalingrad battle and the offensive of the English from El Alamein to Tunis...61

The Soviet interpretation is that the victory at Stalingrad made possible the successes of the Allied operations in North Africa and at El Alamein in October-November 1942. These Allied operations, the North African landings on Nov. 8, 1942 and El Alamein, "Were not able to exert a vital influence upon the course of military operations on the Soviet-German front," even though they took place before the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad on November 19, 1942. It was the Soviet forces on the Stalingrad front that made the Allied operations in North Africa victorious because these forces tied down the German forces and drew off their reserves.6

Thanks to the defeat of the German-fascist forces on the Soviet-German front, the USA and Britain were able to intensify their operations against the Italian and German forces in North Africa...6

There can be little doubt that the Soviet historians regard Stalingrad, and only Stalingrad, as the turning point in the course of the entire war. It was the turning point for the Allies as well as for the Soviet Union, and it caused

61 Samsonov, Stalingradskaja bitva, 574.
63 Biriuзov, Kogda, 103.
64 Pravda (Moscow), February 2, 1963.
the Allied victories. Thus, there can be no question of a comparison between Stalingrad and El Alamein. If such a comparison is attempted by Western historians, most Soviet authors simply deny the comparison on the basis of the relative scale of the operations and the size of the forces involved. Colonel Zhilin in Derevianko's Protiv falsifikatorov istorii vtoroi mirovoi voiny provides an example of this.

The victory of the English at El Alamein, where 13 Italian and German divisions resisted them, had only a local character and did not exceed the limits of the North African theater of military operations, at the same time the crushing defeat of the fundamental groups of the Hitlerite forces on the Soviet-German front played a deciding role in the further course of the Second World War and had a determining political and military importance.65

Chuikov sums up the Soviet view of the entire El Alamein-Stalingrad controversy very succinctly: "But the facts show that the turning point in the war came not in Africa, but on the Volga,..., when Hitler Germany was pushed to the brink of disaster."66 Thus another repercussion of the Battle of Stalingrad as the turning point in the war is set forth by the Soviet generals and historians.

65 Colonel P. Zhilin, "Protiv iskazhenia roli SSSR vo vtoroi mirovoi voiny" (Against the Distortion of the Role of the USSR in the Second World War), Derevianko and Gurov (ed.), Protiv falsifikatorov istorii vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: 1959), 86.

66 Chuikov, Nachalo puti, 312.
CHAPTER IV

The Role of Political and Ideological Forces in Soviet Military Historiography, 1957-1962

A study of the Soviet generals' interpretations of the Battle of Stalingrad as the turning point in World War II revealed certain important indications of the role which political and ideological forces played in Soviet military history writing during the 1957-1962 period. The presence and degree of political and ideological interpretations in the generals' works was an indicator of the extent to which such forces influenced Soviet military historiography as a whole. Although the generals' works formed only a small part of this historiography of the war during the period, they were representative of military history writing and of the trends which prevailed in it. By the evaluation of the impact of the political and ideological forces on the generals' interpretations, and by the consideration of the changes in the Soviet military history of the war, certain conclusions could be derived concerning the progress which was made in Soviet military historiography in this period.

The generals' interpretations of the turning point showed definite differences in the degrees to which political and ideological forces affected them. It was noted
in the preceding chapter that three of the generals — Batov, Kazakov, and Biriuzov — dealt very scantily with the turning point question. In fact, Batov and Kazakov in their works almost completely ignored the implications of Stalingrad as the turning point of the war. Batov was primarily concerned in his book with the relation of his personal experiences during the war and Stalingrad was only one of the numerous battles in which he was involved. Kazakov, although he devoted his entire book to the events of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, was also only concerned with the description of his own experiences. Batov and Kazakov can be cited as excellent examples of the real progress that Soviet military history writing made after 1957. John Erickson, one of the leading Western authorities of the Soviet military, considered Batov's book one of the best and most accurate military memoirs written during this period, and it was easy to see why.

The absence of political and ideological overtones in the works of Batov and Kazakov was one of the most marked differences between these works and those of the other generals. The works of Chuikov, Eremenko, Rodimtsev, Rotmistrov, and Voronov, and the speeches of Malinovskii, abounded with political and ideological interpretations.

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1 John Erickson, "Sources", 262.
The differences between these did not necessarily affect the accuracy of the latter generals' studies as far as the descriptions of the military events were concerned; however, they provided important implications. It seems that the more politically oriented works were those which were written by the generals who were most deeply involved in the battle. These six generals owe much of their present reputations to their participation in the Battle of Stalingrad. Chuikov, Eremenko, and Rodimtsev made their military reputations at Stalingrad while Malinovskii, Rotmistrov, and Voronov definitely profited very greatly from their participation in this battle. Of the six, only Rodimtsev does not hold, or has not yet held, a crucial high military post. The other five were, or have been in the past, occupants of the most influential positions in the Soviet military establishment. A direct connection could be made between their positions in 1957-1962 and their participation in the Battle of Stalingrad. Of course, one of the reasons for this situation could also be deduced from the close association of these generals with Khrushchev during the war and the battle.

Those generals who seem to owe most to the battle were the very ones who saturated their works most heavily with politically and ideologically inspired interpretations of the

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2 Leonard Shapiro, *History of the CPSU*, 571.
4 Shapiro, *History of the CPSU*, 571.
turning point. It was hard to determine whether they did this because of their militarily and politically important positions or because of the dependence of their reputations upon the preservation of the battle’s significance in Soviet history. Both of these factors seemed to play a role in influencing the generals’ treatment of the battle, but to exactly what degrees it was difficult to determine, if not impossible. Thus, as with most memoirs, it can be seen that there were many intangible personal and political influences which significantly affected the generals’ works. The specific reasons for the different ways in which the generals dealt with the battle’s effects could be found as much in their contemporary environments as in their past experiences.

The preceding analysis of the possible reasons for the differences in the generals’ interpretations of the turning point indicated two of the trends which were present in Soviet military historiography in the 1957–1962 period. The first trend, which was shown in the works of Batov and Kazakov, and to some extent Biriuzov, was toward a more technically accurate and factual account of the military events without significant political or ideological overtones in the descriptions of interpretations. A second trend, which was demonstrated by the other six generals in their works or speeches, combined an accurate and factual approach to the military events with more politically and ideologically
inspired interpretations. Certainly, these two distinct trends were not the only ones in existence at this time, but they indicated two approaches to military history writing which were representative of the general trends in this field during this period of 1957-1962.

The most preponderant influence which affected the generals' interpretations of the battle were the political forces in power at the time of the writing. The very political nature of the Soviet system, combined with the Party's domination in all aspects of Soviet life, made the degree of political influence shown by these works a particularly good barometer from which to determine Soviet military historiography's position in relation to the Party. More importantly for this paper, the degree of political influence in these works also indicated the extent to which military historiography was utilized by the military establishment for its own interests. In this respect, an analysis of the manner in which the generals treated the Party and its current leadership in their works and interpretations was of great significance. Before turning to this subject, however, it is necessary to discuss the political influences that were shown in the generals' interpretations of the Battle of Stalingrad as the turning point in the war.
The generals' interpretations of the various aspects of the turning point showed not only political influences but also ideological influences. This fact arose from the omnipresence of ideological forces in every aspect of Soviet life. Politics and ideology were tightly interwoven with each other and had to be considered simultaneously in their impact on the generals' writings. One or the other may have been predominant in some particular aspects of the generals' interpretations, but these two forces were usually so closely associated in the generals' views as to have made it impossible to deal with them separately. The political influences which affected Soviet military historiography were conditioned by ideological conceptions, and vice-versa.

The division of the generals' views of the turning point which was made in the last chapter was used, with the exception of the strictly military aspects, as the basis for the following analysis of the political and ideological influences on Soviet military history writing between 1957-1962.

The first politically significant points which were described in the text were the generals' views of the effects of the battle upon internal politics, mainly the effects upon military-political relations and the position of the military in the system. On this topic, as it was pointed out in the last chapter, the generals were very silent.

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5 See Chapter III, 74-76.
Only one of the generals, Eremenko, wrote anything which even approximated an interpretation of the effect of the battle upon internal politics or the army's political position. It seems that the generals preferred to leave this matter to the Party historians and propagandists. The reasons for this attitude had to be found in the political context of the time in which the generals wrote.

The period after 1957 was a time of reasserted Party control over the military. Zhukov's dismissal in October, 1957 was intended by the Party as a lesson to the military that it should adhere to its own affairs and leave political matters to the Party leadership. The majority of military historians seem to have decided, and probably correctly, that this meant for them to leave the more politically sensitive subjects to the Party historians and to deal only with the military events of the war. This turn of events could have been a blessing in disguise for military historiography because it may have turned the military historians toward a more accurate and exclusively military consideration of past events. For the generals, Zhukov's dismissal was an example of what not to emulate. Thus, they too remained away from the politically more sensitive topics such as the changes in the military's relations with the Party and the position of the military in society. The

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6 See Chapter III, 68.
generals either simply ignored such topics in their works or treated them in the way that the Party demanded. This was probably the reason for the generals' strange silence on the internal political implications of the turning point. The political influences which acted upon the generals during this period could definitely be seen very clearly on this point.

A second point in the generals' interpretations of the turning point was the effect of the battle upon the liberation movements in Europe and Asia. On this point, the political and ideological atmosphere in the Soviet Union at the time of the generals' writing played an extremely crucial role. It was noted, when dealing with this topic previously, that the regime was stressing the problems of formation of communist movements in the developing countries of the world during this period. Soviet foreign policy was also oriented in this direction during this time since Khrushchev's policy was one of penetration into the non-aligned nations. The fact that in their works the generals gave the Battle of Stalingrad a determining role in the inspiration of national liberation movements showed the effect that contemporary political and ideological policies could have upon Soviet historiography. The generals seemed to have been simply

7 See Chapter III, 80-84.
8 Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin, 338.
following the Party's current 'line' when they wrote their interpretations of this particular effect of the turning point. The problem in this subject, as with all ideologically tinged topics, was that there was absolutely no way of telling whether the generals were adhering to the current 'line' because they truly believed in it or because they thought that they had to follow it. It has to be assumed from the high positions which they occupied at the time that the generals did believe in the Party doctrines to a large extent and that they thus truly believed much of what they wrote. However, it could be inferred from the manner in which they treated the ideological topics that these subjects were certainly not the primary interest of the generals in their works or in their attitudes. The generals often seemed only to be paying lip-service to the ideology when they dealt with matters that were strongly influenced by it. This entire problem of the generals' degree of interest in the ideology, nevertheless, remains in the twilight zone of comprehension because there simply was no way of knowing the answer to it with any degree of certainty.

The generals' treatment of the effect of Stalingrad on the Allies' role in the war showed definite political and ideological influences. The generals' consideration of Allied wartime motivations were deeply influenced by the
state of relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers during the time when the works were written. The ideological coloration of the works on this point was very obvious from the unfavorable manner in which the Western Allies were treated. This treatment of the Allies' intentions and role during the war was determined as much by ideological and political forces as by the military. Certainly it was not favorable to the Soviet image of the history of the war to give the Allies any more credit for the achievement of victory than was absolutely necessary. The contemporary internal Soviet policies of derogatory and critical treatment in regard to Western powers played a large role in this interpretation. By claiming that Stalingrad turned the entire war in favor of the anti-German coalition, the Soviet military historians and generals automatically claimed for the Soviet Union the leading role in the destruction of Germany and fascism. The acknowledgment of any Western assistance in this victory would have resulted in a diminished Soviet prestige.

The generals' certainly followed this line in the interpretations of the battle, but these views have a significant implication. The generals in their works either knowingly mis-interpreted the wartime role and power of the Allies or they were underestimating the Allies' importance in final
victory because they had become victims of their own pro-
paganda. This last possibility could certainly be inferred
from the generals' works, and this politically and ideolo-
getically conditioned underestimation could have grievous
consequences if it is projected into the present.

The generals' treatment of the battle's effect on the
Allies' war effort showed one of the more dangerous results
which politically and ideologically prompted interpretations
could have — underestimation of the enemy. This character-
istic of Soviet military historiography declined partly in
significance during this period because of the military's
and also the regime's desires to realistically evaluate the
military potential of the Western powers.

Thus, it can be seen that the generals' interpretations
were affected very much by the political and ideological
forces in existence in the Soviet Union during the period
from 1957-1962. The most pronounced influences on the generals'
works in their entireties were those generated by Khrushchev
and his policies. Khrushchev's position as the leader of
the Soviet Union had a profound effect upon the generals'
treatment of the battle. However, it was not only Khrush-
chev's role in the battle and the war that affected Soviet
military historiography; his policies during the time also
played a large part in the rewriting and re-interpretation of the Soviet military history of World War II.

Khrushchev's presence as the political leader of the Soviet Union during this period led directly to the rewriting of his role in the Battle of Stalingrad and in the war. In this respect, works of the generals showed very clearly the Soviet historiographical practice of projecting present politics into the past. The two generals most closely associated with Khrushchev at Stalingrad, Chuikov and Eremenko, were perfect examples of this process. It must be understood that Khrushchev really played a significant part in the battle since he handled all political affairs at the Stalingrad front and had great political influence which was often very helpful to the military commanders. However, Khrushchev's role is definitely presented out of proportion to reality by Chuikov and Eremenko. Or if it is in proportion, then Khrushchev deserves most of the credit for the victory there. Chuikov very frequently commented on how Khrushchev inspired the soldiers, solved supply difficulties, resolved command problems, and generally made himself indispensable to the victory. Eremenko, who was even more closely associated with Khrushchev during the battle than Chuikov was, outdid himself in his praises of Khrushchev in his book.

10 John Erickson, "Sources," 60.
12 Eremenko, Stalingrad, 26, 472, 496-497, 500.
Eremenko has been severely criticized in *Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal* for this political boot-licking and inaccurate description of the true events. Eremenko ended his book with the following statement which is indicative of his general tone toward Khrushchev: "I am proud also of the fact, that I was allowed to fulfill this difficult task hand-in-hand with Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev."

Certainly, the position of Khrushchev as the top political leader in the USSR during the time had a profound influence on the writing of Soviet military history just as Stalin's once had. Khrushchev's new role, however, never could approach the proportions which Stalin's figure had once assumed in the Soviet military history of the war. Erickson best sums up this whole re-evaluation trend concerning Khrushchev's new role in the war.

There are political reasons which are obvious even at first superficial glance — or is it mere battle-front accident that many firsthand accounts find numerous occasions on which to single out the wartime work of N. S. Khrushchev?15

Khrushchev's new role in the battle and in the war was another of the political influences which acted upon


14 Eremenko, Stalingrad, 500.

Soviet military historiography of the war. Besides Khrushchev's new role, the Party also received a new and larger role of importance in the war during this time. Both of these newly formed roles in the history of the war were intricately involved in one of the most significant political policies of this period—de-Stalinization. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program played an extremely important part in the promotion of changes in the Soviet military historiography. Begun at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, the policy of de-Stalinization fluctuated in intensity and direction until 1959. With Khrushchev in complete and unquestioned power by 1959, the de-Stalinization movement was more fully emphasized and vastly expanded. The Soviet military history of the war was particularly affected by this policy because of the position which Stalin had formerly occupied in it. With Stalin's denunciation, Soviet military history was changed radically. The old interpretations of the war had to be changed to remove Stalin's role, and this led to many re-evaluations and re-interpretations of the war and also of the Battle of Stalingrad. De-Stalinization provided the means by which the military historians could more accurately investigate the history of the war under official inspiration and auspices. The

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military historians certainly did not miss the opportunity which was presented to them to develop a more factual and accurate approach to military history. It seems that the only bad effect of de-Stalinization in military history, as was also true in many other fields, was that the policy was carried out too well and too far. Stalin's role in the war was reduced so drastically that it failed to correspond even minutely to what it had actually been. Nevertheless, de-Stalinization was the spark that set off a significant explosion in Soviet military historiography. As much as any other single factor, this policy provided the means

17 In Volumes IV and V of Istoriia, which pertains to the years 1944-1945, Stalin's name is mentioned only 37 times in 1297 pages of text. Stalin is referred to mainly in passing (IV, 630; V, 461) or in criticism (IV, 629; V, 478, 479). In comparison, Khrushchev, who was a much less significant figure during the war, is mentioned 32 times. The State Committee for Defense (GKO), which Stalin headed during the war, is mentioned 36 times, mostly without reference to Stalin's position on it (IV, 304). In Chuikov's Nachalo puti Stalin receives one direct reference in the body of a quotation of a German general's work (page 240) and three indirect references, once in the form of unfootnoted quotation (page 256), and twice as the unnamed Supreme Commander (pages 29, 315). Stalin's role in the war surely merited more than this meager number of references.
by which military historians could secure further improvements in military history and finalize the progress that had been made during the revision period of 1954-1957. Soviet military historiography had "proved to be a responsive instrument of 'de-Stalinization'" mainly because this was in its and the military's own best interests.

The analysis of the role of political and ideological forces revealed the very prominent effect which these forces had on Soviet military history writing from 1957 to 1962. The extent and nature of their effect on the general's interpretations disclosed that these forces were only a secondary importance. The Party still determined to some degree the manner in which certain topics were interpreted. While these political and ideological influences to a certain extent formed a braking effect on the changes in Soviet military historiography, other forces promoted changes which led to progress.

Soviet Military Historiography 1957-1962

From the foregoing analysis, it can be seen that ideological and political forces indeed formed a significant influence upon Soviet military historiography between 1957 and 1962. However, they were not the only influence which acted on military history writing at this time. The most

18 Erickson, "Sources," 263.
important force which had influenced and supported the changes in Soviet military historiography from the beginning of the revisions period was the Soviet military and its leadership.¹⁹

One of the military's main aims during this period was the continuation of the progress that was being made in the re-evaluation of its own past history. The military seems to have promoted this aim as much for the progress that was being made in military doctrine as for the increased status and prestige that it would provide for the military profession. The influence of the military thus played a significant role in securing the greater credibility which military historiography had after 1957.

Another factor which played no small role in the increased accuracy of military history was that it was not an easy task to apply the precepts of Marxism-Leninism to the description of purely military events. In other fields of history, such as social, intellectual, diplomatic, and economic history, the principles of Marxism-Leninism can easily be applied to the subject matter while this is not necessarily so in military history. Certainly doctrinal interpretations can be applied to some specific topics in military history such as the results of a battle or war,

the causes of a war, the inspiration for victory, and so on. However, when it comes to the actual description and evaluation of concrete military events, a doctrinal approach cannot produce anything but propaganda or wasted paper. The course of military events or of a battle must be set out as they actually happened and not as doctrines interpret them to have happened. How else can the lessons of a tank battle, street fighting, or of artillery usage be related to the professional readers except by detailed, factual descriptions of the actual events? The particular technical nature of the events which military history must consider necessitates an accurate and reliable approach in military historiography.

The generals all treat the military events of the Battle of Stalingrad with accuracy and in detail. They seem to have no qualms about leveling severe criticisms at each other, at present or former political and military leaders, or at command decisions when they believed that there were grounds for such criticism. This fact itself indicates the significant progress that had been achieved in Soviet military historiography by 1962. Prior to the revisions period, the only criticisms that were leveled against anyone by the military historians were those directed at fallen or former leaders who had been purged or were already dead. The

20 See Chuikov, Nachalo puti, 31-64, 147, 246-247; Eremenko, Stalingrad, 12, 14.
Ivanov review of Eremenko’s book,\textsuperscript{21} which was mentioned earlier, took an admittedly indirect slap at Khrushchev’s role during the Battle of Stalingrad; but such a thing could never have occurred under Stalin’s rule without severe consequences for the author. This review article seems to show the self-assurance that the military historians had gained by 1962.\textsuperscript{22}

Though much progress had been made in Soviet military historiography by 1962, some of the old patterns still remained. An example of this was the treatment of Zhukov’s role in the Battle of Stalingrad as it was described by Chuikov. When Chuikov was discussing the arrival at the front of the Staff Representatives who had come to coordinate the planning and conduct of the November counter-offensive, he mentioned both Vasilevskii and Voronov, Zhukov’s presence, however, was significantly replaced by the phrase, “and other representatives of the Staff.”\textsuperscript{23} The “other representatives” had to be Zhukov because he was the only other Representative of the Staff who played a leading part in the development of the counter-offensive. Throughout Chuikov’s book, Zhukov’s importance in battle was never dealt with and his name was not even mentioned. This particular Soviet characteristic of creating an un-person from a significant

\textsuperscript{21} See Chapter IV,
\textsuperscript{22} Keep, Contemporary History, 231.
\textsuperscript{23} Chuikov, Nachalo puti, 237.
figure still living, but in disrepute, still besmudges much of Soviet military historiography as well as Soviet historiography. There are other such characteristics which could also be pointed out, but they are very minor compared to this de-personalization process of Soviet historiography judging by the works cited in this study.

Soviet military historiography has developed very much since the days when it was limited to only Stalin's speeches, formulas, and interpretations. The developments that were made between 1957 and 1962 were particularly impressive when viewed against the background of Stalinist military history. Most of this progress has been made in the history of World War II because the victory in this war was definitely the single greatest achievement and event in Soviet military history, and ranks second only to the Great October Revolution of 1917 in Soviet history. Certainly during this period there still remained areas of the war's history which were poorly treated, but these were most often areas which were not of primary interest to military historians or which were politically dangerous to study. There were still people, topics, and events which were subjected to the more old fashioned historical methods such as de-personalization and outright omission. Political, ideological, and personal influences still played a major role in determining the interpretations of certain aspects of the war such as the Battle
of Stalingrad. The Party remained as the supreme law-giver and law-enforcer in the system, but within the sphere of military affairs the Party and its leadership had to share these roles with the military and its leadership.

The single, most decisive influence on Soviet military historiography between 1957 and 1962 was the military establishment. Though there is no direct proof of this, military historiography may have become more reliable and accurate during this time than the other fields of history because it was represented by a special interest group with great influence at the highest levels of the regime and with purposes distinct from those of the regime.24 This special interest group was the military and its leadership. If true, however, this fact was not, and is not, the only reason why military historiography has made such advances since 1957. By its very nature alone, the subject matter of military history requires a reliable and accurate approach if the purposes for which military history exists are to be served. The distinctive nature of the subject matter and objectives of military history, plus the influences of the Soviet military, combined between 1957 and 1962 to very significantly increase the credibility of Soviet military historiography. The situation created by this fact and the other changes seems to have made Soviet military history

24 Keep, Contemporary History, 236.
one of the most reliable and accurate fields of historical science in the Soviet Union during this period. There were shortcomings present in Soviet military historiography of this time when it is viewed from the standpoint of Western historical science, and the generals' interpretations of Stalingrad as the turning point in World War II were designed to point out these shortcomings and the reasons for them. The Soviet shortcomings as seen from Western historical standards should not be used as the sole criterion for the evaluation of Soviet military history writing. The successes and achievements, as well as the progress even in the negative aspects of Soviet military historiography, should be utilized for a true evaluation of the change in the Soviet policies and practices in military history writing. The shortcomings have to be shown and analyzed to put the achievements in the proper perspective, just as the old first had to be explained and examined before the new—the real progress and changes that have been made in Soviet military historiography—could be distinguished. The differences between pre-1957 Soviet military historiography and that of the 1957-1962 period were certainly very significant. Soviet military historiography developed a more reliable and accurate approach to the study of the war in this period, but the spurious and retarding effects of the political and ideological influences remained as a restricting force
upon this development. Though Soviet military historians had learned the utility and necessity of truth and more, in their studies; these new approaches could only partially be put to use because of the very nature and requirements of the system in which they lived.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Bibliographies and Reference Sources


This bibliography was the only one that has been published in the Soviet Union covering the Soviet materials on World War II. It was very useful, but it has some significant omissions. It does include numerous references to articles.


Current Digest of the Soviet Press. New York: Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, 1949-


This article was especially useful for its treatment of the Soviet sources and for its evaluation of them. The footnotes contained many informative points concerning publications which had not been known to exist until this article was read.


Karasev's article contained references and evaluations of many Soviet works on the war and a periodization of the Soviet literature on the war.


This work was very valuable for the biographic materials on the Soviet generals backgrounds.


The bibliographic section of Istoriia is very valuable for researching the Soviet materials used in the writing of the entire Istoriia. This section was very useful for the materials published in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1964. It can be used as a supplementary bibliography to Kumanov; however, it does not list many articles at all.


This biographic work brings the Merzalow work up to 1962.


This source was very valuable in the compilation of a bibliography of Soviet sources because it listed all the books and journals received by the Library of Congress. The listing of journals was particularly useful because it contained the articles in each issue of the journal.


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Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia.


*Knizhnaia letopis* was used as a check on other more specific bibliographies. It is a catalog of all books published in the Soviet Union during each year.

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*Letopis' zhurnalkh statei* (Chronicle of Journal Articles). Moscow: Izd-vo vsesoiuznoi knizhnoi palaty, 1936-

This source was very useful because it is the only complete listing of Soviet journal articles that is available for use.

II. Soviet Sources


This work is one of the better histories of the Party during the war.

Arakelian, Colonel M. A. *Velikii internatsionalnii

This book was almost purely a political and ideological work, but it was of value because it showed the more ideological interpretation of the war.


This work has to be classified as one of the best Soviet military memoirs. It has very little political or ideological overtones.


Biriuzov's book was very similar to Batrov's in its emphasis upon the military events, but he brought more political and ideological implications into his work.


This work was completely politically and ideologically oriented in its consideration of European and Asian resistance movements.


Chulkov's work was one of the most important books used in the research for this paper. It is heavily filled with the events of the fighting in Stalingrad. The introduction to this edition is also very strongly flavored politically and ideologically.


This work was largely a rehash of Nachalo puti, it a vastly reduced version of the latter work.

Deborin provided a good example of the more politically inspired historiography of the war.


This work was another of the denunciations of Western historiography of the war, but it is better than Eremenko's similar work because it presents more views and topics.


This book is basically a diatribe against Western works on World War II which Eremenko considered to be falsifications of history. This work provided a good insight into the Soviet mentality on this point.

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This is the English language version of the 3rd edition (1963) of Eremenko's above book.

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Eremenko's book was a very significant work which formed a large part of the basis for this paper. The is very heavily loaded with references to Khrushchev, but it also deals with many topics that the other generals' books did not treat.

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Kazakov's work was mainly a military memoir.

Istoriia is the culmination of the Khrushchev period interpretation of the war, and it is invaluable as a reference work.

Rodimtsev, Aleksei I. Tvoi, Rodina, sinovykh let (Your Sons are the Country! Memoirs of the war years). Kiev: Gosizd-vo politicheskoi literatury, 1962.


Rotmistrov's work is mainly a survey of the war from the theoretical point of view, but it is very informative and useful because it is by a leading Soviet military theoretician.


This work is probably the best monograph on the battle of Stalingrad yet published in the Soviet Union. Samsonov deals with all phases of the battle. He is one of the leading Soviet military historians.


This book is a theoretical presentation of the modern strategy of the Soviet military. It contains several chapters on the history of Soviet military strategy.


Telpukhovskii is one of the older and more well-known Soviet military historians; but he leans toward the older, Stalinist interpretation of the war. The work was basically used to gain background materials.


This is the second edition of this work, but it was very extensively rewritten. It is significant for seeing the influence of the new multi-volume history of the war and for background material on the Battle of Stalingrad.

Voronov's memoir covers the entire period of his military service in the Soviet Army. It provides a good look into the activities of one of the most important men in the development of the Soviet Army.

III. Western Sources


This book covers a number of subjects that the Soviet historians have either rewritten or have interpreted differently on the years of their control. It provides many informative points on the Soviet methods of writing history.


This work is particularly important for the view that it gives of the role which nuclear weapons formed in the re-evaluation of Soviet strategy and also military historiography.

Erickson's work contains some very good material on the pre-war and early war period activities of the Soviet
Stalingrad generals. It also contains a good bibliography of sources on the subject he deals with— "Source Materials and Bibliography," 809-834.


Gallagher's book was essential to the preparation of this paper because it is one of the very few Western works that have been written covering this particular topic. He covers the material very superficially in some respects and leaves out some important points. The bibliography was used as a starting point for the bibliography of this paper.


Garthoff's work deals mainly with the content of Soviet strategy as it developed under the impact of nuclear weapons.


The collection of articles edited by Keep in this work all contribute to a greater understanding of the motives and forces which operate behind Soviet history writing. The articles deal with many phases of Soviet historiography, and they form an important source for the research done for this paper on the patterns in Soviet historiography since Stalin's death.


Leonhard's study of the Soviet political scene up to the 21st Party Congress of 1959 gave many significant details of the position of the military in the Soviet system after Stalin's death and also of the Party's motivations for its actions in regard to the military during this period.


This work provides very valuable background material not only on the Battle of Stalingrad, but also on the history of the Soviet Army and some of its key leaders.


Shapiro's work is probably one of the best available in the West on the history of the Communist of the Soviet Union. Mainly the sections on the war and the Party's actions during the war were used.

Shchepka's work gives a very informative and clear account of the actions of the Soviet state in relation to historians. Especially interesting was his chapter on historiography under Stalin in the post-World War II years.

The Analytic Introduction to the English version of Marshal Sokolovskii's *Voennaia strategia* was very informative concerning the Soviet practices in formulating military strategy and doctrine.

Werth's work was used mainly for background material on the battle as he saw it take place, and also for his later observations on the Soviet generals' views of the battle at Stalingrad.
IV. Articles, Journals, and Newspapers


Boltin's article is significant since it presented the objectives toward which Soviet historians were to work in the production of the new multi-volume history of the war. It also showed signs of the repercussions which Zhukov's dismissal had on Soviet historiography of the war.

Chuikov, Vasilii I. "Armiiia massovogo geroizma: iz zapisok o boevom puti 62-i armii" (The Army of Mass Heroism: From the Notes concerning the Battle Road of the 62nd Army), Oktiabr', XXXV (February, 1958), 3-43.

This memoir article by Chuikov was one of the first memoirs of the Battle of Stalingrad to appear in the period after the revisions and Zhukov's dismissal.

Eremenko, Andrei I. "Istoricheskaia pobeda pod Stalingradom" (The Historic Victory at Stalingrad), Kommunist, XXXIV (January, 1958), 26-40.

Similar to Chuikov's memoir, this article was one of the first of the generals' memoirs to appear after 1957 and the revisions period. It is very superficial but contains some interesting points and critical evaluations. This article can easily be traced in Eremenko's Stalingrad.


Ivanov's review of Eremenko's book was very interesting due to its very critical framework.


This article explains the reasons for Marshal Zhukov's dismissal.


Samanov's article is a historiographical study of the Battle of Stalingrad from 1943-1962. His periodization of the works is particularly important, as is his explanation of the current policy in historiography. The work provided many references and was of bibliographic value.
Telpukhovskii, Boris S. "Korennoi perelom v khode velikoi otechestvennoi voiny" (The Fundamental Turning Point in the Course of the Great Fatherland War), Voprosy istorii, XXXIV (April, 1959), 23-45.

This article was mainly of value for background material on the battle and the Soviet view of the turning point.

Voprosy Istorii, Institut Istorii, Akademiia Nauk SSSR. Moscow.

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