LAND REFORM AND RESETTLEMENT IMPLEMENTATION IN ZIMBABWE:
An Overview of the Programme against Selected International Experiences

By
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Abstract

Land Reform is a world-wide phenomenon aiming to achieve social, political and economic objectives of particular localities and contexts in which it is implemented. In spite of peculiar geographical, and socio-economic differences, global land reform contexts have historically been motivated by the twin-pronged goal of restructuring the land-based production systems, and achieving equity (social justice) in resource access and ownership.

Introduced at Independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean land reform programme aims to redress historical social imbalances in land ownership and enable the majority indigenous black population to play its commensurate role in the country’s agricultural production. Due to the socio-political motivation of the programme, the state has assumed a predominant and central role in the implementation process, from policy design, through land identification and acquisition to land development and distribution. Specific models and approaches have been adopted for allocating acquired land and enabling its utilization and management by beneficiaries

Key Words

Land reform; land acquisition; willing-buyer, willing-seller; resettlement; redistribution; Model; fast track
1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
Land reform has spatially and temporally occurred throughout the world as a result of a need to change patterns of land ownership or land use (King, 1977; Hume, 1978). Moyo (1995) states that land reform has been undertaken in Africa, in America, in Asia, and in Europe over the last seven decades. Table 1 indicates the position of land reform in the broader framework of agrarian change. History informs us that successful land reform entails change of government legislation to facilitate conversion of part or all of large-scale estates or farms into co-operative farms or subdivisions of the farm into medium and small sized holdings (Pacione, 1984). Where land reform has been successful, this has been achieved through government compulsory acquisition of land by purchasing land from large scale farmers at lower than market prices in order to redistribute or resale to estate workers and smallholder farmers at subsidised prices and on installments basis (Hume, 1978; Moyo, 1995). Putzel (1992) identifies three basic approaches to land reform in all the countries where it occurred, namely: conservative, liberal and revolutionary or radical reforms.

Table 1.1: Components of agrarian reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agrarian Reform</th>
<th>Land Reform (Land tenure reform)</th>
<th>Land redistribution (also including consolidation and collectivisation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform of tenancy</td>
<td>Reform of complementary institutions (including: credit, co-operatives, marketing, taxation, labour legislation, price supports, settlement schemes, extension services, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: King, 1973

The specific objectives of land reform policies differ between countries, but in general, motives can be classified as social, political or economic. According to Pacione (1984), most land reforms have occurred in situations where there were great social, political or economic inequalities and disparities in income and power in agriculture. Such disparities have tended to set the reform agenda throughout the world.

1.2 International Experiences
The rigid two-class social structure as identified above, was characterised by concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few, accompanied by a high proportion of landless agricultural workers and insecure tenancy arrangements. In pre-reform Bolivia, for example, the 1950 census revealed that 4.5% of the rural landowners possessed 70% of all private landed property (Pacione, 1984). In such circumstances the landowners’ control over land and capital meant that the peasants’ possibility for self improvement and social mobility were remote. Gandalla (1962) has described how in Egypt in 1947 the capital required to buy five acres of land was equivalent to an agricultural labourer’s wages for 60 years. Sharp social disparities in the countryside played a significant role in the 1917 Russian Revolution and the rise of communism, and the success of the 1949 Chinese Revolution (Meisser, 1997).

The political motive can also be a decisive force for land reform. Many governments have used land reform or the promise of it to gain or retain power. Land reform was used as a means to power by peasant revolutions in Mexico (Hodges, et al., 1979), Bolivia (1950s), Venezuela (1958), Peru (1960s), Ecuador (1970s) (Bromely, et al., 1982) and the communist uprisings in Russia (1917) and China (1949). The land reforms in Italy (1950) and Taiwan (1953) were also in part a political response to increasing Communist activity in rural areas. In such cases the motive for social equality was strongly tinged by motives of political self-preservation.

The major reforms in the inter-war period were enacted in Eastern Europe largely for political considerations rather than for reasons of social and economic policy. This therefore managed to achieve land redistribution but no supporting measures regarding credit, technical assistance or marketing facilities. As a result, production in some areas decreased (Pacione, 1984). In Eastern Europe after the second world war, the incoming Communist Governments promulgated land reform laws making it illegal for any individual to hold more than 50 ha in former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Rumania; 35 ha in Yugoslavia; and 20 ha in Bulgaria. In total 12 million hectares were distributed to 3 million peasants. As King (1973) observes, however, in Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia, the land reform had minimal impact, as most land holdings were already below the ceilings set; in the former East Germany, Poland and Albania about 25 percent of the land was distributed and in Czechoslovakia about half. The most radical change was in Hungary where land reform affected the bulk of the land, leading to a switch from large estates to small farms.

The economic motive is based on the premise that land reform is necessary to maximise the productivity of an otherwise under-utilised or unutilised agricultural sector, to provide a surplus to earn foreign currency and to serve as capital to build up industry. Johnson and Mellor (1961) note five ways in which agricultural improvements due to land reform can aid general economic development. First, this is done by satisfying an increased demand for food supplies; second, by exporting agricultural products to earn foreign currency; third, by providing labour for the manufacturing and other expanding sectors of the economy; fourth, by investing profits in industry; and fifth, by raising agricultural incomes which increases demand for consumer goods, thus stimulating industrial expansion. One may add that improved agricultural production may increase demand for agricultural inputs and farming machinery and implements thereby creating more employment in the production of these agricultural capital goods and inputs.

In South America, policy makers faced the challenge of balancing efficiency of production and social injustice (Bromely et al., 1982). Modern large-scale plantations with high level production lie in the hands of a few wealthy people, while the masses of landless people
provide labour. Because of this specialised production by a few wealthy individuals, export production, which attracts foreign currency earnings expanded at the expense of food crops which would achieve national food security. A case in Brazil is presented of a landowner with several vehicles, a well built double storey and tile-roofed house as opposed to his workers with straw thatched single roomed mud huts and no means of transport other than their two legs (Bromely et al., 1982). These social and economic contrasts have been a recipe for land reform activities in Latin America.

The major land reform in the post-war capitalist world took place in Italy in 1950 (Pacione, 1984). Since the problems of a backward agricultural structure were most severe in the Mezzogiorno the land reform was essentially a southern measure with most of the region designated as a reform area. The harsh physical environment, semi-feudal rural social structure, polarised land ownership, and the problems of overpopulation, underemployment and poverty all help to explain the background to the Italian land reform (King, 1973). The Italian land reform was concerned essentially with taking land from the large estates (latifundia) and redistributing it among the peasantry.

In South Africa, the colonial and apartheid eras implemented a deliberate process of dispossession and forced removals black, communities were driven into Bantustans and Homelands according to ethnic groups. The homelands were characterized by high population pressure, overgrazing, soil erosion and general poverty and the resident indigenous people were prohibited from holding freehold title to land. By 1994 the 2.3 million African rural households were concentrated on 13% of the national land, under customary tenure or Permission to Occupy (PTO) certificates, while the remaining 87% of the country was held by the white settler farmers and the state. Colonial dispossession also created labour tenants. These are people whose land was taken over by white occupiers to whom they were forced to provide labour for permission to be allowed to remain on the land.

The objectives of the Land Reform Programme in South Africa are to: redress the injustices of apartheid, foster national reconciliation and stability, underpin economic growth, and improve household welfare and alleviate poverty.

The Programme comprises 3 principal components namely land restitution, tenure reform and land redistribution. Land restitution involves the restoration of land rights lost since 19 June 1913 as a result of racially discriminating Apartheid laws. Restitution can take the form of restoration of the land that claimants were dispossessed of and/or moved from; provision of alternative land; payment of financial compensation; provision of alternative relief comprising a combination of the above; or priority access to government housing and land development programmes. Landowners whose land is expropriated to make way for the restitution process are paid a fair compensation.

Under land redistribution, landless people (as individuals or in groups) apply for land and are assisted by the state to acquire it through a number of state financed land purchase schemes. Beneficiaries of this programme include the urban and rural poor, farm workers, labour tenants as well as emergent black commercial farmers. The Programme aims at redistributing 15% of the Large Scale Commercial Farm Sector over 5 years. The Department of Land Affairs acts as facilitator and general programme manager, while the actual planning and project documentation is done mostly by consultants paid for out of programme funds, and project implementation is done by respective sector Ministries and Departments, Municipalities and other local authorities. Redistribution projects give priority to the
marginalized and women in need, with squatters and land occupiers not necessarily granted preference.

Land Tenure Reform refers to a planned change of title of the land held, operated or transacted by users. A major goal of tenure reform is to enhance people’s rights with a view to affording them security of use, control and ownership. The major issues to be tackled under Tenure Reform in South Africa include resolving the over-lapping and competing tenure rights of people forcibly removed and resettled on land to which others had prior rights; strengthening communal tenure systems and extending security of tenure to those who live on land that legally belongs to other people (e.g. farm tenants). The target areas for tenure reform are the farm areas and peri-urban areas, the former homelands and former “Coloured Areas”.

The Commission on Restitution of Land Rights is a statutory body established by Act of Parliament. Its main function is to facilitate the returning of land rights and land to those communities who were disposed after 19 June 1913, through the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994. When the Restitution Programme was launched, it took a wholly judicial approach with the Land Claims Court adjudicating on all land claims. This proved extremely costly and slow. The enabling legislation was then amended to allow for an administrative and judicial approach to the process.

It is estimated that 20% of the claims are rural based, projected to benefit some 4 million people. About 80% of the claims are urban based, which in most cases will result in financial compensation or offer of alternative land.

The major challenges facing South Africa’s restitution programme include the following:

- The Programme is costly to implement. For example, by the end of November 2000, some R44 million had been spent on financing the restitution programme and a supplementary budget of R50 million had already been made available by government. Overall programme costs are clearly not sustainable under a single national budget.
- Verification and processing of claims is slow. For example, a national total of 63 000 claims were filed between 1 May 1995 and December 1998. The total number of claims filed to date has risen to 67 000. By June 1999, only 41 claims had been settled. The number settled, however, quickly rose to 3 916 by March 2000 after the administrative approach was adopted.
- Communication among stakeholders and participants is problematic.
- Monitoring and evaluation of successfully transferred lands is yet to be started.
- The long periods over which communities were disposed of their land resulted in the loss of skills on the management of the land.
- The land and improvements on it have to be evaluated for compensation purposes. The majority of land valuers are largely white officials who tend to inflate land and physical development prices in order to unduly benefit former farmland owners.
- There are sometimes problems of two or more ethnic groups/communities filing a claim for the same piece of land.
- Some communities spend a lot of money hiring lawyers, indicating that they do not trust the government system.
- The “go-betweens”, in the form of lawyers, land-valuers, surveyors, etc are reported to be making excessive profits at the expense of the communities.
2.0 ZIMBABWE’S EXPERIENCES IN LAND REFORM AND RESETTLEMENT

2.1 Historical Context

The colonization of the country by the white settlers in 1890 signalled the systematic subjugation of the indigenous black population and dispossession of its land resources. The process started with the Vincent Lands Commission of 1894 which was followed by the formation of Southern Rhodesia in 1898 through the introduction of the so called Cape Clause. The Native Reserve Commission of 1915 and the Morris Carter Commission of 1925 further alienated more land from the natives for white settlement. The alienation of more land from the blacks was more sharply accentuated by various statutes, including the Land Apportionment Act (1930), the Consolidated Land Apportionment Act (1941), the Native Land Husbandry Act (1951), the Land Tenure Act (1969), the Land Tenure Amendment Act (1977) and the Tribal Trust Lands Act (1979).
As a result of this series of legislation, together with direct other state action, the black population was restricted to (reserved) Tribal Trust Lands (Communal Areas) that, by the 1970s, were to emerge as the overcrowded, degraded, poverty stricken domicile of the majority of the indigenous population. The total effect of the restriction from land ownership and utilization was that by 1980

- 42% of the land in Zimbabwe (being marginally productive and drought prone land) was reserved for blacks, while
- 51% (being the more fertile, better watered, more productive and better serviced regions of the country) was technically if not explicitly reserved for whites.

Due to the discriminatory and inequitable land ownership laws of the Rhodesian state, it was to be expected that a popularly elected Independence Government would adopt a redistribution policy to address the question of access and control of the nation’s fundamental yet highly emotive asset – land.

In fact by 1979 when it appeared clear and obvious that the liberation movement would in the event of an outright military victory institute a radical land redistribution and agrarian reform policy, several options were put forward which aimed at deflating and obviating such an eventuality. Riddell (1978) has shown that proposals for land use and agricultural development of different shades were put forward in the late 1970s by white political parties, aspirant African parties, and international interest groups that all had the common aim of achieving some change in land policy while ensuring stability and continuity in the agricultural system.

The most significant of such proposals was, however, the Kissinger Plan of 1976 which was formulated and presented as a basis upon which the War of Liberation could be concluded and a liberation movement – settler regime agreement reached. The Plan suggested that an amount of US$ 3.0 billion be set aside for land resettlement, development and compensation for those white farmers wishing to emigrate.

2.2 Rationale for Land Reform

Historical inequalities in Zimbabwe demanded action by the government and its citizens. Policy shifts have, over the years since 1980, however, been necessitated by the need to achieve a reasonable balance between equity objectives and efficiency of production through various approaches to land acquisition and redistribution. Initially, the Government of Zimbabwe implemented the intensive package approach which entails provision of adequate basic support services such as access roads, water and sanitation facilities, dip tanks, clinics, schools and rural service centres before or as soon as settlers occupy redistributed land (Moyo, 1995; Z.F.U, 1995). Due to increased pressure for land by landless citizens in the face of limited financial resources and inadequate institutional capacities in government, however, accelerated approaches and eventually fast track programme were adopted to speed up the process. This recent approach entails that settlers move to their new settlement areas before basic social services and infrastructure are put in place (Land Reform Task Force, 1999).

Land Reform in Zimbabwe seeks to address three key issues, namely: inequitable land distribution, insecurity of land tenure and unsustainable and sub-optimal use of land in communal areas and large-scale commercial farms respectively (Ministry of Lands and
Agriculture, 1999). The broad policy aim is to redress historical imbalances in access to land between the races and the creation of opportunity for alleviating the economic plight of some of the poorest rural people (ZFU, 1995). Specific objectives include alleviation of population pressure in communal areas, extension of agricultural production base, rehabilitation of war victims and ex-combatants, national stability and optimal utilisation of under-utilised land owned by large-scale commercial farmers (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 1985). The policy thrust is therefore one of growth with equity.

In order to achieve the above, there is a wide range of land reform models that can be implemented. The term “land reform models” is used to refer to physical land use and settlement plans which set a fixed number of hectares per household or co-operative depending on the type of production to be undertaken (Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 1999). However, most of these models can result in conflicts between equity objectives vis-a-vis production objectives (Hume, 1978). According to Hume’s (1978) five land reform models (Table 2.1 below), the extreme case would be for government to take total farming land in the country and divide it equally among all farming citizens. Such a radical reform model would achieve the equity objective since per capita income for the target group, which previously did not have any means of production, would improve with allocation of land. However, aggregate production of the nation could fall by approximately 50% because economies of scale for the large farmer would have been eroded and small pieces of land would be in the hands of many small inefficient farmers. Experiences of the performance of smallholder farmers during the 1980s in Zimbabwe, however, seem to disprove this assertion (Rukuni and Eicher, 1994). The other model that tries to strike a balance between equity and economic efficiency would be to take a significant portion of large-scale commercial farm area for redistribution to marginal groups for intensive resettlement and irrigation development wherever possible. This land would be distributed to proven competent farmers only while the rest remains under large and medium scale commercial farmers, with the rest of the population remaining without land but offering their labour at government approved wages.

Table 2.1: Hume’s (1978) Land Reform Models and their major attributes
## Reform Model and Characteristics / Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Model</th>
<th>Characteristics / Attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Radical reform: equal farm size; no large scale commercial farming; no intensive settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II and III</td>
<td>Major reform: 10 million hectares from white land to African Purchase land type settlement; no intensive settlement, Model II assumes a lower African Purchase land productivity, while Model III a higher productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>As with Model III, but with 200 000 hectares of intensive settlement under irrigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Mixed reform: about 5 million hectares from white land to African Purchase land type farming under the high productivity assumption; plus 200 000 intensive settlement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from Zimbabwe’s experiences (and indeed those of other countries) that for its efficacy, the land reform process ultimately needs to aim to achieve social equity, economic efficiency, political acceptability as well as long term social stability in resource access and utilization among nations’ constituent social groupings.

### 2.3 Land Identification and Acquisition

Zimbabwe’s land reform programme essentially represents the transfer of agricultural farmland formerly owned or run by large-scale white commercial farmers and corporate establishments to black farmers operating at all levels, small, medium and large scale. State-owned agricultural land formerly leased to private individuals and institutions or operated by state organizations has at various stages in the programme, however, also been included in the transfer to black farmers. In both cases the state has occupied centre stage in the process, identifying, acquiring and distributing the land required. Central government has managed the process while rural local authorities ensured its delivery through the identification and organization of beneficiaries at local levels and relevant sites. Given the state’s interventionist goals of redressing colonial imbalances in access to and ownership of land and (as emphasized later) indigenising commercial agriculture, the implementation of the programme has necessarily remained highly centralized, particularly at the acquisition stages, with non-state and other stakeholders playing complementary roles in the distributive stages.

In spite of the interventionist goals, experience shows that for the larger part of the two decades of redistribution implementation the state’s decisions over the identity, extent and cost of land to be transferred were seriously constrained by legal considerations and other limitations that it had to observe. For example, for the entire duration of Phase I resettlement land acquisition had to be based on the principle of *willing seller-willing buyer*, which on many occasions restrained the state from designing and implementing the form and extent of programme that it desired. In contrast Phase II of the programme witnessed the state adopting
much more active interventionist overtures – either itself directly and deliberately or by
default through endorsing actions of other interested players – that in effect speeded up
identification, acquisition and utilization of land for the programme.

While the need for land redistribution in Zimbabwe was acknowledged at the Lancaster
House Conference that negotiated and ultimately sanctioned the country’s Independence in
1979, the ensuing Constitution imposed conditions that effectively limited the new state’s
latitude and decision-making in implementing a land reform programme of its own designs.
In particular, changes in land laws or other provisions in the Constitution could only be made
after a ten year period of entrenched protection of white farmer interests1 and land
identification and acquisition for resettlement had to be based on market availability of such
land through voluntary expression of offers that the state could respond to. The state’s role
was thus effectively reduced to that of a buyer responding to the inherent irregularity of the
market in terms of when, where and in what amounts land was on offer. It was only out of
fear of living under a black government and the imagined outcomes of the War of Liberation
(which by 1979 engulfed over 90% of the country’s rural areas) that the market appeared
awash with large tracts of land purchasable for redistribution in the early 1980s. The reality
of the situation was, however, that the bulk of this land constituted the “liberated zones” of
the war period, or simply land abandoned by farmers retreating in the face of the advancing
war2. In keeping with the Lancaster House Agreement the Government of Zimbabwe
undertook negotiations and made payments for these farms buoyed by the unequivocal
participation in cost sharing by the British Government. It is pertinent to note in this context
that no tangible participation in resettlement funding ever came from the American
Government in spite of its pledge at the 1979 Lancaster House Conference to contribute
towards a suggested target of 3.0 billion dollar programme to buy off white settler farmers
and support the resettlement and reconstruction programme; this effectively left the burden of
funding the land redistribution programme on the Zimbabwe and British Governments,
together with non-government institutions that felt obliged to participate3.

In effect the period 1980 to 1985 was to prove the most active in terms of land acquisition,
largely due to the relative “abundance” of the resource on the market as outlined above, a
situation which enabled the emplacement of greater numbers of beneficiaries during this
period than any other in the history of the redistribution programme (except during the
dramatic era of Fast Track – see later).

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1 In terms of the Lancaster House Constitution (1979) 20 Parliamentary seats (representing 20% of the total
elected complement) were reserved for whites for a minimum duration of 10 years – even though the whites
constituted less than 5% of the country’s population. The absurdity of this entrenchment was accentuated by the
fact that colonial and settler administration legislation (including the 1930 Land Apportionment Act; 1951
Native Land Husbandry Act; 1969 Land Tenure Act, and 1977 Land Tenure Amendment Act) had progressively
carved out all high value land for white ownership; the provision thus ensured that for at least the first decade of
Independence land acquisition for resettlement could only affect farms that sellers chose (or were forced by
circumstances) to dispose of first – invariably low value, peripheral or abandoned land.

2 It is significant to note in fact that a large proportion of the land purchased in the first half of the 1980s was
already directly or indirectly occupied by villagers and war veteran communities and the state had to grapple
with either formalizing their settlement or negotiating their relocation to approved resettlement locations – see
Herbst (1990); Moyo (1990) among others.

3 Such participation in land redistribution funding by non-government agencies was in practical terms restricted
to infrastructural development and farmer productivity support as virtually all involved shunned away from land
acquisition costs

(GOZ 1996; 2000; and 2001).
Table 2.2 summarizes the annual land acquisition profile for the period 1979 to 1989, clearly illustrating the “bulge” of the first half of the 1980s in terms of the acquisition activity.

The requirement of acquiring resettlement land on the basis of market conditions directly affected the cost, quality as well as quantity of the resource that was ultimately purchased. As a result of speculation in the land market, land price inflation and the significantly dwindled land availability position following drastic improvements in national stability and confidence in the new black government, land purchases for the programme plummeted in the second half of the 1980s, reaching their lowest ebb in the 1998-2000 period - see Table 2.2 and also Table 2.3 below. As shown in the latter Table nearly 70% of the land acquired over the specified 19-year period was purchased during 1980 to 1984. State action in swiftly or resolutely containing or dealing with unauthorized land occupations (“squatting”) - Marongwe (2000), Moyo (1990) - also reduced the amount of land that could be converted to resettlement schemes by ensuring that no widespread illegal occupations precipitated government incorporation into formal schemes.

After the virtual exhaustion of the land supplies from the war period, only reduced purchases were realized – about 70% of these involving agro-ecologically marginal lands located mainly in the four provinces in the drier south of the country (namely, Midlands, Masvingo, Matebeleland North and Matebeleland South (Moyo, 2000))\(^4\). Where land acquisition occurred in the wetter regions of the country this took place largely as small and isolated pieces that proved costly and grossly inadequate in terms of programme implementation, infrastructure provision and farmer support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Land Purchase (Ha.)</th>
<th>Cost (Z$)</th>
<th>Average Land Cost per Ha.</th>
<th>Constant 1980 S terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>162 555</td>
<td>3 104 380</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>326 972</td>
<td>3 616 172</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>819 155</td>
<td>15 414 248</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>807 573</td>
<td>21 414 248</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) It is largely for reasons of the relative abundance of this class of land that Model D resettlement (and later Three Tier) had to be designed in the mid-1980s as an applicable land use approach to deal with the purchased land here as the earlier models were designed for wetter agro-ecological conditions – see the discussion on these models elsewhere in the current Report.
### Table 2.3: Land Acquisition for different Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Hectarage Acquired</th>
<th>% Of Total Land Acquired</th>
<th>Average Ha. per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1983/84</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>74,848</td>
<td>4,062,930</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>86,187</td>
<td>3,444,610</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>133,515</td>
<td>389,335</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88</td>
<td>80,554</td>
<td>2,889,328</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988/89</td>
<td>78,097</td>
<td>7,431,575</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Purchase</strong></td>
<td>2,743,304</td>
<td>65,362,904</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Resettlement Land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980 – 1984</strong> (Under Constitutional constraints)</td>
<td>2,147,855</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>429,571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Gonese (1990)*
In an effort to improve the land acquisition process, the Government of Zimbabwe made a series of amendments to the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the Land Acquisition Act. As Moyo (2000) observes, even with the laws passed after 1990 (when it became possible in terms of the Lancaster House Agreement restrictions) to allow for compulsory purchases, the most dominant land acquisition approach used under the redistribution programme between 1980 and 1997 remained market-based\(^5\).

Table 2.4 highlights the major legislation that governed land acquisition for resettlement during the period 1979 to 2000, summarizing the transition from the Lancaster House Agreement-imposed provisions to the compulsory acquisition stance adopted by the Government of Zimbabwe under the *Fast Track* programme to ensure the desired flow and availability of the land resource for redistribution.

### Table 2.4: Key Legislation Governing Land Acquisition for Resettlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Period Applicable</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Major Provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1979                     | Constitution of Zimbabwe (Section 16.1) | - No Property of any description to be acquired compulsorily  
                           |                           | - Land to be purchased on willing-seller willing-buyer basis |
| 1981-1984                | Land Acquisition Act (No. 21) | - Enforced constitutional provision to acquire land for resettlement  
                           |                           | - Land purchased on basis of willing-seller willing-buyer |

\(^5\) Moyo (2000) describes the approach as “*state centred market-based*” to distinguish the experience from uninfluenced market processes assumed by the willing-seller willing-buyer condition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Act</th>
<th>Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-90</td>
<td>Land Acquisition Act (1985) Amendment</td>
<td>• Introduced Certificate of No Present Interest (or Right of First Refusal by Government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Constitutional Amendment Act 30 (11th Amendment)</td>
<td>• Denied powers of the courts to declare unconstitutionality in declaring compensation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1992-93 | Land Acquisition Act, Chapter 20:10 Constitution of Zimbabwe (No. 12:4) | • Allowed for compulsory acquisition  
• Right of First Refusal abolished  
• Designation of targeted areas introduced |
| 2000    | Constitutional Amendment No. 16 Land Acquisition Act Amendment using the Presidential Emergency Temporary Powers (later formalized into relevant Act of Parliament) | • Absolved Government of Zimbabwe in payment of compensation for land unless funds provided for by the British Government  
• Government of Zimbabwe to pay only for land and farm improvements  
• Eliminated the dual designation route  
• Allowed payment of compensation through bonds spread over 3 to 5 years  
• State may refuse to purchase land deemed too expensive  
• Allowed for time delay in actual acquisition |

**Source:** Adapted from Moyo (2000)

In the wake of compulsory acquisition, the Government of Zimbabwe has specified criteria that are to guide the identification and purchase of land for the redistribution programme. Principles defining these criteria identify the target land to include:

- Derelict land
- Under-utilized land
- Farmland under multiple ownership
- Foreign owned land, and
- Land contiguous to Communal areas.
Even with compulsory acquisition, the actual purchase process remained a central government responsibility undertaken by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement although with inputs from Provincial and District structures at the identification stage.

The land identification and acquisition framework outlined above was operational into Phase II resettlement starting in the period 1998/99. Following Constitutional Amendment No. 16 of 2000 the Land Acquisition Act was amended accordingly to reflect the new changes and introduce new procedures for land acquisition. In terms of the new provisions, an objection to the acquisition of a farm can still be followed by an acquisition order, which effectively vests the title of the land in the acquiring authority, subject to confirmation of the order by the Administrative Court. While these developments allowed the state greater latitude in determining the form and pace of the redistribution programme in terms of land acquisition than under the Lancaster House restrictions, the new provisions involved legal processes that made actual purchases inherently slow, cumbersome and expensive (Marongwe, 2000; Moyo, 2000; GOZ, 2001, 2002), accounting for the virtual standstill in the activity during the period leading to 2000 (see Table 2.4) as Government painstakingly followed the legal process in spite of the frustrating experience.

Table 2.5 shows the total hectarage of land acquired for resettlement by financial year 1999 – 2000⁶.

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**Table 2.5: Provincial Distribution of Land Acquired for Resettlement in Zimbabwe: 1980 - 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Area (Hectares)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Cost (Z$)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>487 896</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>75 759 498</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>255 106</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>48 894 650</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>151 952</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48 373 118</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>378 632</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24 422 381</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁶ That is, prior to, or excluding land from, the Fast Track programme.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1998 Area</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>1999 Population</th>
<th>Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>232 266</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30 213 083</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>527 720</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>130 014 040</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland North</td>
<td>533 255</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>59 038 252</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland South</td>
<td>571 144</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>62 804 313</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 137 971</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>479 519 335</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Moyo (2000)*

The 1998 Donors’ Conference convened by the Government of Zimbabwe sought to enlist international support and financial resources to reactivate and hasten the land reform and redistribution programme. Land acquisition targets were specified for implementation in the projected Inception Phase Framework Plan (1999 – 2000)\(^7\), based on expectation of contributions by various International agencies and donors. Under the IPFP, it was envisaged that a total of 1 million hectares of land would be redistributed over a period of two years, with 70% of the land being redistributed through government resettlement approaches whilst the remaining 30% was expected to be distributed through civil society–led resettlement approaches. At the end of the two years, only 168 263 hectares of land had been redistributed whilst most of the initiatives by non-state actors started but ended as mere proposals. As international pledges of contributions towards funding the programme failed to materialize, and the programme was viewed as failing to satisfy expectations among the rural populace in terms of pace and effectiveness of land transfers from the minority white farmers, widespread politically instigated land occupations erupted in farming areas during 1999 and 2000 that forced Government to adopt a more interventionist approach to hasten land acquisition. As a result Government introduced the *Fast Track* approach to land acquisition, which entailed

“……an accelerated implementation of existing Government approaches on compulsory acquisition rather than focusing on land offered under the willing seller- willing buyer principle. Furthermore, this approach focuses on the identification of the targeted land for acquisition and resettlement of the land hungry in order to decongest the Communal Areas.” (GOZ, 2001)

The adoption of accelerated resettlement under the *Fast Track* entailed the mobilization of more actors and levels of operation in land redistribution than previously experienced. The process was subsequently decentralized to Provincial and District levels where Land Identification Committees comprising respective Government functionaries, interested groupings, civic organizations and local authorities were constituted to undertake and expedite the identification of farmland in terms of the specified criteria. Actual acquisition of land however remained the responsibility of central Government (through the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement) which undertook the legal procedures and

\(^7\) This Plan was intended to be the first stage of the second Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP-2) and projected to redistribute 1 million hectares (benefitting an estimated total of 118 800 families) through a combination of state and non-state (“complementary”) initiated approaches to redistribution (GOZ, 2001). The LRRP-2 was, in all, expected to acquire and redistribute 5 million hectares of land from the Large-scale Commercial Farming sector over the 5-year period subsequent to 1999/2000.
processes, including gazetting the listed (identified) farms; negotiating for the compensation to be paid in terms of Constitutional Amendment No. 16 of 2000, and effecting the actual payments involved. Given the areal scope and pace of the accelerated programme, land identification effectively outstripped actual purchases and change of title over the land, resulting in many beneficiaries occupying or being emplaced on gazetted land prior to the conclusion of the purchase process, and prompting legality questions over tenure status of both the former commercial owners and the resettled farmers.

Official GOZ figures show that some 160 340 households were resettled on some 6 200 000 hectares of land under Model A1 between July 2000 and November 2001. Under the revised Model A2, some 11 423 subdivisions were planned and demarcated in the same period and more were expected to be allocated thereafter. On the face of it, Fast track resettlement made tremendous progress, perhaps unmatched in history, entailing, however, an extensive stretch of government's capacity to plan and demarcate plots and provide physical and social infrastructure in the resettled areas.

To protect those occupying or settled on farmland prior to formal acquisition (and also facilitate land development in the meantime) the Rural Land Occupiers Act was promulgated in 2001 to effectively exempt from eviction those occupiers who were settled on the land by March 1, 20018. Similarly, the latest amendments to the Land Acquisition Act (2002) accord the acquiring authority, upon issuing the land acquisition order in terms of Section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act, the right to start surveying, demarcating and allocating the land.

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**Box 1. The stated Objectives of the Fast Track Resettlement Programme**

*Fast Track* "is an accelerated phase where activities which can be done quickly, shall be done in an accelerated manner" (GOZ, 2001).

The objectives of the programme are stated in policy documents as:

- The immediate identification for compulsory acquisition of not less than 5 million hectares for Phase II of the Resettlement Programme, for the benefit of the landless peasant households
- The planning, demarcation and settler emplacement on all acquired farms
- Provision of limited basic infrastructure (such as boreholes, dip tanks and scheme roads) and farmer support services (such as tillage and crop packs)

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8 The main conditions outlined by the Rural Land Occupiers Act for the purposes of protecting occupiers from eviction are that
- one was occupying the land on the first of March 2001 and was still occupying the land at the date of commencement of the Act;
- one occupied land in anticipation of being resettled by an acquiring authority on that or any other land for agricultural purposes in terms of the Land Acquisition Act [Chapter 20:10]; and that one qualifies for settlement on that or any other land in accordance with the relevant administrative criteria fixed by an acquiring authority for the resettlement of persons for agricultural purposes (GOZ 2001).
The ultimate goal and effect of the current land acquisition laws – at least as relevant to the resettlement and redistribution programme – have thus been to expedite the process of identification and settlement of farmland by Government and the protection of those emplaced on or granted access to it. Given the contestations encountered in the reform experience with regard to legalities of ownership, access rights and legitimacy, the Government of Zimbabwe has clearly accorded less attention to issues of tenure security (and productivity?) over the affected land and emphasized more ensuring the physical transfer of the resource to the black majority. While a major condition for effective operation and maximizing utility of the land resource, the former priority (tenure security) appears a logical sequel to the latter (physical transfer), which must first be achieved to effect structural changes in previous land ownership and operation relations.

The land acquisition process has proved a major thorn throughout the duration of the land reform and redistribution programme in Zimbabwe. From the Constitutional restrictions imposed at Lancaster House at the negotiation for sovereignty in 1979 to the highly legalistic and procedural requirements in force two decades later – even at the height of the rural public outcry manifested by the land occupations – the Government of Zimbabwe was consistently hamstrung in efforts to substantially or effectively redistribute commercial farmland from the white minority farmers to the black majority. The incrementalist approach taken prior to 2000 to amend land acquisition legislation did not help much in unlocking the programme from the inherent vicious circles of the legalities over land ownership. As the central political factor in the history and socio-economic fabric of the country, the resolution of the long outstanding land problem logically required more drastic political actions and decisions than legal action per se could assure. In this respect the dramatic events of the land occupations and Fast track period of 1999 – 2002 did underline the need for the country to design land legislation that safeguards the interests, aspirations and welfare of the majority and not the minority at the expense of the majority. To many observers these events were a clear manifestation of the inevitable momentum of the land reclamation process that appeared to have been aborted in the early 1980s through deliberate action under the guise of Constitutional protection in order to neutralize effective or substantial transfers of high-value land.

**Box 2. Some Challenges Emerging from the Fast Track Programme**

Further to issues of legality of the land resettled under the programme, several challenges of financial, governance and resource management nature also arose, including:

- Government’s capacity to assist the newly settled farmers with necessary infrastructure and social services;
- Defining the tenure rights of the resettled farmers and communities, particularly to enable them to access financial and capital credit and support for their development and growth;
2.4 Land Redistribution Models

Zimbabwe adopted several land redistribution models which define the planning parameters, implementation procedures, tenurial arrangement, resource organisation, type of beneficiaries and their selection criteria etc. Some of these models have been transformed over time on the basis of operational experiences. The main land redistribution models implemented under the programme include the following:

- Model A and its variants (i.e. accelerated schemes, A1 and A2);
- Irrigation Model;
- Model B (Collective Cooperative);
- Model C (with Co-estate and Out-grower components);
- Model D and related three tier Scheme (for livestock development);
- Communal area re-organisation;
- Commercial Farmer Settlement Scheme, and
- Peri-Urban settlement model.

Model A1 was later split into self-contained and villagised models whilst the Commercial Farmer Settlement Scheme became the A2 model which is divided into small-scale, medium scale, large scale and peri-urban resettlement models.

2.4.1 Irrigation Model

According to the national master plan for dam construction, for all government-constructed dams, people should be settled for irrigation farming with the provision for communal grazing land (Ministry of Agriculture, 1989). Policy objectives of resettlement irrigation models are stated as:

- To increase irrigated area at minimum environmental adverse impacts;
- To ensure efficient water and soil utilisation;
- To provide drought mitigation measures in low rainfall areas; and
- To ensure community and national food security and increased household incomes

Under Phase I of the Land Resettlement Programme, the irrigation model was seen as a way of resettling more people on smaller units of land while at the same time guaranteeing settlers reasonable levels of income (Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 1999). GOZ provided financial and technical support for the rehabilitation and re-planning of existing schemes while on the other hand developing new ones on acquired land. Through this model government intended to redress imbalances access to water between large-scale commercial farmers and smallholder farmers.
This model was implemented at three levels, that is, small, medium and large scale in order to meet different needs of diverse groups of citizens who contribute to GDP differently.

2.4.1.1 Small Scale Irrigation Schemes

Until very recently, irrigation in Zimbabwe was viewed as a European introduction with no irrigation tradition having existed in pre-colonial times. However according to Manzungu et al. (1999), the Manyika people of Manicaland Province practiced irrigation farming before the coming of the Europeans. These informal farmer-initiated schemes were disrupted during the colonial era by the Water Act of 1927, which heralded state control of water resources. Thereafter, a number of formal irrigation schemes were established in the Save River Basin by the mid 1930s to supplement dry land farming (Jackson, 1997).

The policy objective of pre-independence smallholder irrigation development was initially to enhance food supply particularly in dry regions of the country (Manzungu and Van der Zaag, 1996). However by the 1960s, there was a policy shift towards the need to resettle black farmers who were displaced by white commercial farmers who needed vast and fertile pieces of land in high rainfall areas to facilitate large scale agricultural production (Hughes, 1974). The low rainfall in the areas where they were resettled consequently necessitated irrigation development for smallholder farmers. Afterwards, additional smallholder irrigation schemes were established in the 1970s with the view to create employment in rural areas so as to discourage rural-urban migration. Despite the establishment of these additional smallholder irrigation schemes, white commercial farmers received greater support for irrigation development compared to black farmers (Makadho and Rukuni, 1994) – a situation that persisted until Independence in 1980.

With the start of the Land Reform programme at Independence, the irrigation model of resettlement was also introduced for small-scale producers, along the same lines as communal schemes to supplement dry land farming (Madziva, 2000).

These small-scale resettlement irrigation schemes were initially run by the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE). The GOZ provided financial resources for development of irrigation infrastructure, with the Ministry of Water Development supplying water from the dam up to the edge of the field. Operating and maintenance costs were met by DERUDE while settlers paid a token amount towards maintenance and water rates. These schemes were heavily subsidised by the GOZ., with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) providing extension and farmer training services. DERUDE gave farmers a four-year probationary period within which settlers were assessed (Z.F.U, 1995)

Within irrigation schemes each household is allocated an irrigable plot of 0.1 to 0.5 ha., though in some farmers get up to 1.5 ha each. Selection of settlers is done by Rural District Councils (RDCs) from completed application forms. Pre-Independence selection depended on the provision of labour during construction as well as proven successful experience in any field. Potential settlers were thus chosen from people who had been successful in farming or any other field of specialization. The have-nots were left out (Hume, 1978).

However, in 1980, the policy was revised to include the “have-nots” but

- with good health
- were effectively landless, or having inadequate dry land plot
- were Zimbabwean citizens
displaced by development
not formally employed
aged between 18 to 30 years,
not engaged in any other business enterprise, and
came from the local area of resettlement

(DERUDE, 1983).

Similarly to communal areas, customary land tenure exists in small-scale irrigation schemes. While farmers can access short-term loans for annual inputs, they cannot access long term loans for implements and other developments due to lack of collateral (Madziva, 2000).

AGRITEX has always had an important role to play through the provision of farmer training and extension services. In the early 1980s, an itinerant irrigation manager was often appointed to oversee several irrigation schemes up to a maximum of 50 schemes. Government subsidised electricity and water payments in view of the fact that crops grown in these schemes are low valued. Holdings were small and far removed from marketing centres with no efficient transport network. The social objective of equity and household food security was the motivating factor (Rukasha, 2001). After 1985 government policy changed from highly subsidised schemes towards farmer management concept. Under this approach, GOZ acquires land, develops irrigation infrastructure and settles people to do irrigation farming. During the first five years, AGRITEX assists with management and general organisation of the scheme as a way of training management committees. Crop pack and free tillage is provided for 0.5 ha during the first season only. Farmers are responsible for operations and management of the scheme with little government assistance (Madziva, 2000).

After five years, the farmers take over total management of their schemes. Recent developments through the formation of the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) require irrigators to pay for water at market rates although water pricing is still highly controlled by Government to protect vulnerable groups. Water user associations have been formed for effective monitoring of water use. The recent environmental policies hold that Environmental Impact Assessment should precede irrigation development and ensure that all mitigation measures are in place (Rukasha, 2001).

2.4.1.2 Medium Scale Schemes
Under this model, settlers are allocated plots from 1.5 –5 ha and have to give up dry land plots in order to be fully committed to the development of the irrigation scheme. The model was designed in such a way that the government provides infrastructure, while the settlers are responsible for the procurement of farm implements and inputs under loan financing. DERUDE provided an irrigation manager, maintenance man and other technical support staff while AGRITEX provided extension services (Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 1999).

Under the LRRP2, medium scale resettlement irrigation schemes involve increased beneficiary participation in terms of both management and funding, reflecting a clear movement from highly subsidised schemes like Mushandike, to minimize direct government contribution. Settlers depend more on loan financing (Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 1999).
2.4.1.3 Large Scale Resettlement Irrigation Schemes

This model was designed to operate under freehold tenure or long-term lease with land to be purchased at some future date. Hectarage ranges from 10 ha upwards of irrigable land. The policy objective is to remove imbalances in land ownership (Z.F.U, 1995).

Under the LRRP2, the objective is to increase the contribution of agricultural production to GDP and expansion of employment opportunities in line with Zimbabwe Programme of Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) objectives. Principles to be adhered to include gender balance, transparency in land redistribution, increased stakeholder participation, economic viability and environmental sustainability (Madziva, 2000).

Farmer selection is therefore based on an individual’s capacity to operate commercially at large scale in terms of agricultural expertise, management skills and availability of resources to meet basic farming requirements. Settlers are expected to have the potential to develop viable farming enterprises that maintain or surpass the previous LSC farming performance. Failure to do so would result in food shortages. Specialised farming in basic food crops such as wheat, or export-oriented production of crops like sugar or tobacco is encouraged (Rukasha, 2001).

2.4.2 Model A and its variants

2.4.2.1 Model A

This model constituted the main form of land resettlement at the inception of the national programme in 1980. Targeted mainly for the rehabilitation of returning refugees (both extra-territorial and internal) as well as creating greater agricultural opportunities for households in the overcrowded rural areas, the model derived its design largely on the Communal area set-up in terms particularly of resource allocation, settlement configuration and overall development goals. Villagized settlement has consequently been a central component of the model, providing the major basis on which government sought to achieve social development in the rural landscape. The settlement design has been, however, progressively modified to allow for greater individualization in the operation and management of the allocated land resources.

2.4.2.2 Villagized Model A1

Villagized Model A settlement provides for

- a 0.5 hectare individual residential plot within a defined village block;
- a 5 hectare individual arable land holding;
- communal grazing land (25 to 60 hectares, depending on village size and natural region of settlement), as well as communal infrastructure based on village water points, access roads, woodlots and other social services.

Selection under the Model was based on identification and application through, as well as approval by, local administrative authorities (Rural District Councils and local village heads), with landlessness; relative “poverty”; eagerness to relocate and age as the main criteria for actual allocation to land.

2.4.2.3 Self-contained Model A1

This model has been implemented as a variant of the original villagized settlement pattern specifically intended to address social concerns from centralized resource utilization as well
as the economic demands of individual households in development practices and priorities. Thus, instead of communal allocation and provision of resources, the Self-contained model provides for composite allocations for households’ residential, arable and grazing requirements – generally estimated at 25 to 50 hectares depending on land characteristics and natural region.

### 2.4.2.3 Model A2

Under this model, land is acquired and subdivided into self-contained small-scale commercial farming units designed to achieve efficiency and indigenisation objectives. Settlers are required to possess agricultural qualifications or technical competency in farming. These settlers should have a proven record of farming capacity and should be prepared to permanently reside on the farm or employ a competent manager (Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 1990). Those from communal areas should have Master Farmer Certificates.

Farms under model A2 are advertised through the press inviting applicants. Interested applicants submit completed application forms (which are issued at a minimum administrative fee) together with a five-year investment plan for the production enterprise envisaged. Ownership of basic farm implements is an added advantage for consideration for land allocation when the short-listed candidates are interviewed. After resettlement, the farmers are availed of credit facilities for capital development and operations during initial years (Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 1999).

Under LRRP Phase II women are allowed to apply in their own rights. Selection still emphasises competency and capacity to undertake commercial farming. Each settler gets a consolidated farm unit ranging from 50 ha in Natural Region I to 300 ha in natural Region V. Settlers have to mobilise own resources to cater for their training and other requirements. As a result, private sector participation will be encouraged under this scheme. NGOs and church organisations will be encouraged to offer refresher courses for enterprise development and specialised farm management skills (Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 1999).

Settlers can undertake either crop production or livestock farming, depending on the ecology of the area and as recommended by AGRITEX. The farmers are also expected to produce high levels of output for national food security and the production of specialised crops like wheat, paprika and tobacco is encouraged under this model. Strict monitoring of land utilization is expected to ensure that all allocated land is efficiently used; failure to utilize the land effectively within a period of five years will result in repossession of the land by Government for redistribution to more efficient farmers.

### 2.4.3 Model B

This model was originally designed to facilitate possible pooling together of production factors so that collective farming could be done (Ministry of Lands Resettlement and Rural Development, 1983). The idea of collective farming co-operatives derived from the government of Zimbabwe’s socialist, egalitarian and democratic political ideology adopted at Independence (Mukora, 1984). Collective farming was regarded as an economic activity which could enable farmers to meet their economic and social needs while at the same time contributing towards development of the national economy. This model derives from the
philosophy of the Chinese communes (Aziz, 1978; Meisser, 1997) and the former Soviet Kolkhoz (Newbury, 1980).

As set out in the Government policy paper (Department of Cooperative Development, 1984) the objectives of the model as originally designed can be summarised as:

- To develop viable agricultural production which contributes towards national food security, increased employment creation and economic growth;
- To mobilise limited resources of poor citizens in order to promote farming skills, spread overhead expenses to reduce unit cost, to achieve a degree of specialisation which an individual cannot achieve outside co-operative farming, and
- To facilitate transformation of socio-economic system through dynamic efficiency in resource allocation and equitable distribution of proceeds.

Model B entailed group settlement composed of people with strong motivation and potential to form a cohesive social unit (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 1985). Group size was designed to range from 50 to 200 members with all adults (including wives and children above the age of sixteen years) eligible for full membership. Land, equipment and other resources were held cooperatively and not as individual assets. Each resettlement co-operative must be registered with the Registrar of Co-operatives as a legal entity (Mukora, 1984).

**Box 3. Resettlement and Crop Production Organization under Model B**

For co-operatives dealing with crop production:
- There is a common plot managed by members through an elected committee
- Acquisition of inputs and marketing of outputs are done cooperatively, organised by the management committee.
- Each individual member is allocated an additional 0.5 hectares or some such agreed size of land for individual cultivation.
- Where possible, irrigation facilities should be developed for the co-operative


For a co-operative based on livestock production, each ranching settler should have the equivalent of 20 livestock units (LUs), including five small stock. While individuals can hold a few livestock units for domestic purposes, the major proportion is group owned and run for commercial purposes. Where possible, wildlife management can be done (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 1985).

When selecting farms for model B, focus was placed on those farms that still had relevant production infrastructure intact at the time of purchase from the former owners. This facilitated specialised farming ideal for co-operative production, with whole enterprises run as single units. Subdivision of such farms would make it difficult for various small settlers
dealing with different farming activities to access a common facility like tobacco barns (Mukora, 1988).

Under the model, land could be acquired anywhere in the country except Matabeleland North Province which is ecologically unsuitable for collective crop farming. Funding for the co-operative resettlement was generally expected to come from the Government of Zimbabwe (through annual capital budgets), NGOs, and beneficiaries’ own assets which form the basis for co-operative farming. The then Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development worked with DERUDE, the Department of Co-operative Development and Agritex to support and service the resettled cooperatives (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 1985)

Each co-operative was expected to sustain pre-purchase levels of production on the resettled former commercial farms. To facilitate achievement of this expectation, the Government of Zimbabwe provided a resettlement package that capacitiated the co-operatives, including an Establishment grant that financed the procurement of farm implements and development funds for land preparation, together with financial resources for the construction of roads, bridges, dip tanks, clinics, schools, marketing depots, rural service centres, credit facilities, farmer training and extension services (Department of Cooperative Development, 1984)

Farmer selection under the model was initially based on social and political considerations. This was, however, subsequently modified by a shift from random method to the identification of people from the same community to ensure group cohesion. The social and political criteria emphasised refugees, landless people, war-displaced individuals, ex-freedom fighters, ex-farm workers and needy people irrespective of age, literacy levels, farming experience and management capacity. With the policy shift in selection criteria starting in 1985 local authorities began to consider applicants with Master Farmer certificates and previous farming experience. The cooperative organisational structure was also modified to separate administrative from technical functions such that two distinct management committees existed. A total of 12 technical advisors were employed by the GOZ to assist the resettled groups and increase viability for the collective cooperatives (Mukora, 1988).

2.4.4 Model C

This entails a combination of intensive villagised settlements and a core estate run by the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) or owned by a co-operative (Ministry of Lands Resettlement and Rural Development, 1985). Farmers in village settlements own individual holdings averaging about 10 hectares of arable land and also communal grazing land along the lines of Model A.

In addition to its own farming operations, ARDA under the model is expected to demonstrate potential land productivity to farmers settled around the core estate. Such a model is suitable for those who do not have experience in commercial farming (ZFU, 1995). The operations of Model C Schemes are similar to those of the Chisumbanje and Middle Sabi Irrigation Models operated by ARDA.

On their part settlers provide labour to both their arable lands and the core estate. ARDA also provides, on a cost recovery basis, seedlings in cases of specialised crops; training and mechanical tillage operations; transport for inputs and marketing of outputs and related other
technical services depending on the nature of production on the individual holdings. Settlers gain experience and expertise through working with ARDA. The small plot serves to foster individual effort and innovativeness while the core estate demonstrates the benefits of cooperative effort which is instilled among the farmers for eventual take over and cooperative operation of the core estate in the wake of a handover by ARDA. Settlers adopt a cropping schedule similar to ARDA’s to enable them to apply the lessons learnt from the core estate. The ARDA estate manager monitors their activities with assistance from settlement officers (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 1985). Through the model ARDA is expected to impart practical training that transforms subsistence farmers into commercial farmers. In addition, people who do not have previous farming experience can also benefit from this model, provided they hold an interest in learning and adopting new farming methods.

Besides this approach, ARDA also implements a sub-component of commercial farm settlement schemes under which settlers are selected on the basis of agricultural professional qualification particularly graduates from national agricultural training colleges and allocated 30 to 50 ha. of land. Credit funds are made available through Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) for capital development and the settlers are attached to ARDA for technical assistance for five years. ARDA has less management input on this component and settlers are in charge of their means of production (Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, 2000).

ARDA assists in the mobilisation of loan funds particularly for mechanisation because a high level of mechanisation is encouraged under this scheme. These farmers are expected to produce high quality of products which can be exported. A major activity from the model should therefore be horticulture for which ARDA also assists in establishing export markets. Because of their technical expertise as agricultural graduates, the vision is that these farmers should at some point in future use advanced post harvest techniques for preservation of their produce and develop processing plants for added value (ARDA, 1999).

2.4.5 Model D

Guided by a “willing-buyer-willing-seller” land acquisition approach, translocation resettlement encompassed beneficiaries selected on the basis of individual households deemed to qualify for land allocation based on set conditions and criteria, with the spatial distribution of resultant schemes directly dependent on sizes and location of farms offered for purchase. By 1983/84 nearly 60% of unsettled purchased land fell under Natural Regions IV and V whose agro-ecological characteristics at best support extensive livestock production (based on woodland vegetation or irrigation-supplemented / drought-resistant fodder crops) and game ranching (Murphree and Cumming, 1993). This land was generally unsuitable for use under models A, B and C that were operational or applicable elsewhere in the country; a land use approach had to be designed which recognized local production potentials and constraints, responded to local needs as expressed or preferred by the surrounding farming communities, and as well sought to achieve greater integration of development planning and implementation among contiguous land under resettlement, communal areas and large scale commercial farms.

Model D resettlement is a land use approach formally adopted by Government of Zimbabwe in the 1983-84 period in order to utilize resettlement land for grazing by neighbouring
communal area communities on a rotational basis while the land remained state-owned (GOZ, 1985). Instead of trans-locating human population onto the acquired farms, the approach essentially extended livestock grazing to the communities affected while promoting optimal use of the semi-arid land on both acquired farms and the neighbouring communal areas which otherwise has limited dry land arable potential.

A proto-type of this model exists in Gwanda District, encompassing the Doddieburn and Manyoli ranches and nearby Guyu Communal area. Grazing on the ranches started unofficially during the War of Independence but became formalized after the acquisition of the land for resettlement in 1981-1882. Three Wards (14, 15, and 18) participated in the pilot project, starting in 1983. Ward 17 was included in 1987 when Ward 14 was reassigned to participate in the Tuli Breeding Station ranch.

While conceptualized and initiated in 1984 as providing “relief grazing” and utilizing idle purchased farm ranches, the model has progressively been subjected to organizational modifications aimed at improving operational relations between the communal land farmers as users of the land and the state agency managing the state land as well as enhancing the commercialization of the livestock resource on which the model is based.

2.4.6 The Three tier model

This is an improvement on the conceptual framework of the Model D Pilot scheme of the mid-1980s which seeks to consolidate the integration of acquired commercial farms with the communal area villages, and streamline commercial livestock production based on the animals from the latter. The Three tier model reinforces the non-translocation principle in Model D by providing for the annexation by government of commercial farms adjacent to the communal areas, with grazing managed by village committees (chaired by traditional leaders but backed by civil servants for technical assistance) responsible for allocating grazing rights to households (Rukuni Commission, 1995).

The new model entails the reorganization of communal area villages’ residential and arable lands (including social services), which constitute the 1st tier in the model. The 2nd tier involves the development of village paddocks (also referred to as the “near grazing area”) in the communal areas where all traditional and breeding stock are reared – up to the carrying capacity assessed for the particular locality. The 3rd tier involves the development of the annexed neighbouring farm(s) into a commercial ranch (es); all animals grazing in this tier are not allowed to go back to the communal area but instead leave directly for the market.

<table>
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<th>Box 4. Major Elements of Model D Resettlement – based on the Doddieburn – Manyoli Scheme, Gwanda District</th>
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<td>• The Model entails the use of resettlement land (particularly in Natural Regions IV and V)</td>
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The model emphasizes the importance of integrating communal area and resettlement planning and subsequent other development planning. Its application is, thus, envisaged to transcend Natural Regions IV and V in the long run.

The internal resettlement process is envisaged to take place under the authority of Rural District Councils.
agricultural enterprises established by the settler population, in terms of land resource quality, livelihoods and level of infrastructural development.

According to Brand (1994) and others, colonial administrators viewed the conditions in the communal areas and prospects for their rectification in terms of land use planning, which they regarded as the means by which communal areas could be made to cope with growing populations as well as improve small-scale agriculture. The first colonial Director of Native Agriculture, Alvord, championed this approach and in the 1930s and 1940s (in the wake of the Land Apportionment Act promulgated in 1930) and implemented a policy of “centralization” (Brand, 1994) that institutioned block demarcations of arable and grazing lands and residential sites, with the latter reserved for linear human settlement. This strategy was bolstered by the compulsory de-stocking of cattle and the granting of individual tenure to arable parcels of land which were introduced and extended under the Land Husbandry Act of 1951. Yudelman (cited in Murphree and Cumming, 1993) asserts that the Act proposed to ‘replace tribal-communistic system of allocating land according to need with a hybrid tribal-capitalistic system of individual holdings and communal grazing’. The authorities found spontaneous settlements, cultivation and any other agricultural operations outside “planned” lands unacceptable under the strategy, and unauthorized settlement within both the established communal areas and the “frontier” zones like Gokwe and the Zambezi valley were viewed as posing serious threats to the formal provisions and finesse of planned land use.

As part of the “land use blocking” approach Communal area settlements have undergone considerable continual consolidation into residential blocks to facilitate formal planning for and provision of cost-effective infrastructure and social services. Brand (1994) argues that this has been an outcome of conceptual “villagization” designs that have consistently featured in communal area development policy in both pre- and post-Independence periods.

In addition to land use planning, conservationism was also a major factor in the colonial state’s policies and development strategies for the communal areas, aiming largely at achieving a balance between population and natural resources through such conservation and management measures as preventing land subdivision or degradation, and controlling in-migration and new settlement. This was particularly the case in those areas where population pressures on land were perceived to threaten livelihoods and environmental sustainability. At the same time it was considered important to relieve some of the social and political pressures generated by land shortages and land use conflicts through measures aimed at redistribution – mainly in such “frontier” zones as Gokwe and the northern regions of present-day Midlands and Mashonaland West Provinces, and areas along the Zambezi Valley in moves that may in some respects be considered a prelude to the nation-wide post-Independence resettlement programme.

Conservationism, formal land reallocation and registration through the Land Husbandry Act thus constitute notable features of pre-Independence communal land development policies. It has been argued in this context that Alvord’s approach and the conservationist emphasis emanating from the 1930s were prompted by the thinking or philosophy that the communal lands had to become, and remain, self-sustaining (Brand 1994).

Reserves” were renamed Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) in 1962 and Communal Lands twenty years later with the advent of Independence, while the white reserves remained characteristically identifiable as large scale commercial farms.
Post-Independence policies have sprung from this colonial foundation, though strongly leaning on measures to improve agricultural productivity, social services and infrastructure, as well as on land redistribution based on large-scale resettlement of acquired former white commercial farmland. Under the broad goal of rural development, the focus of state policies in dealing with communal area livelihoods centred on the provision and extension of agricultural advice and credit, marketing facilities and services, and output pricing to communal farmers, leading to the improved agricultural performance and increased incomes – even though these measures may have become de facto substitutes for fundamental (internal) reforms (Mumbengegwi, 1987). As a result of increasing population pressure, degenerating soil fertility as well as a general resort to agriculture and land cultivation in the first two decades of Independence communal areas experienced widespread unauthorized/planned settlements, including encroachments on otherwise ecologically fragile lands, a situation that many researchers and policy observers have argued warranted more radical policy intervention in terms of restructuring national land relations and general resource ownership beyond Communal area confinements.

A significant response to the encroachments and land degradation of the 1970s and 1980s were the scattered but discernible local initiatives in several Districts (e.g. Mwenezi, Mutoko, Chipinge) that aimed at internal communal area land reforms and settlement reorganization. Though initiated at local levels under the auspices of local District (later renamed Rural District) Council authorities and with the participation of respective affected communities, the initiatives transcended very little the centralization and conservationism approaches that characterized previous communal area development plans and programmes. The new internal reorganization experiences were, in essence, centred on land use planning; landscape reclamation; arable and settlement land consolidation and reallocation intended to accommodate the increasing population.

A streamlined Communal area reorganization programme was adopted in Zimbabwe in the mid 1980s and incorporated in the land reform and resettlement activity implemented as the major rural development thrust seeking to enhance rural livelihoods and the provision of infrastructure and social services. Although introduced as a framework for fundamental communal area development in terms particularly of infrastructure provision and re-organization and management of natural resources, the programme also derives its origin from the decentralization thrust initiated by the Prime Minister’s Directive of 1984 which provided for institutional structures for development in the rural landscape, based on identified (delineated) villages and wards. The village, ward and district delineations which may have originated from political motivation (for purposes of local level voting and community mobilization) thus ended serving as crucial structures for development (Land Tenure Commission 1994). Brand (1992) contends that the reasons for Communal area reorganization lie in the fact that land use planning is seen by the key responsible agencies as an indispensable tool for rural development; yet considerably more is at stake than merely land use planning. Formal agrarian land use and settlement planning or control beyond the level of the dwelling and household plot or individual farm is the state’s responsibility and is usually motivated by a variety of economic, social, political, and environmental considerations (Brand 1994).

The reorganization intervention has essentially provided for a realignment of land resources and settlement patterns in a manner that enhances agricultural productivity and facilitates the provision of infrastructure and social services in order to improve the economic viability of the rural areas. Land use and settlement planning are in this context seen to be instrumental in
ensuring rational locational distribution of more adequate and cost-effective infrastructure and social services – this constitutes the major justification of villagization designs that are characteristic of Re-organization policy pronouncements.

The major objectives of the reorganization programme are enunciated in the *Communal Lands Development Plan* document compiled by the (then) Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development during 1984/5, but rooted in the principle of village consolidation based on land use re-planning arising from

> “the need to restructure and reorganize the existing dispersed and isolated peasant settlements, to make for cost effective provision of social and physical infrastructure and services and to release additional land for agricultural development, in effect (implying) more resource (rather) than just settlement consolidation” (GoZ, 1985).

In the context of communal area reorganization, villagization is, for all intents and purposes, an agrarian reform strategy which results in more clearly defined land use patterns and more intensive use of land, thus resulting in higher productivity (GoZ, 1986). Documented objectives list the following major planning elements as guidelines for implementing the re-organization programme in any location:

- production of a comprehensive agricultural land use and management plan based on resource capacity assessment and indications;
- assessment and evaluation of total potential arable and its existing use;
- estimation of available grazing land
- assessment of possible alternative land uses such as irrigation, forestry and wildlife;
- outlining production and management plans suggesting appropriate crop rotation, tillage and conservation requirements, target yields, schemes for managing grazing resources, and development of appropriate alternative uses;
- demarcation and layout of a consolidated village residential site or sites, and
- identification of already existing and needed / additional infrastructure such as roads, drainage, fencing, schools, health, shopping and other community facilities, cattle dips, etc.

### 2.4.8 Peri-urban Settlement

Zimbabwe’s land policy has of late realised the importance of a peri-urban resettlement model (GOZ 1998). For instance, the Inception Phase Framework Plan proposed, among other things, to develop mechanisms for monitoring urban growth and the demand for and supply of urban land both within and outside existing towns and cities. One of the aims of the policy document is to manage peri-urban areas as zones of transition that maximise the enjoyment of positive elements of both town and country. The rural – urban nexus is therefore an important area for policy analysis and research. It is commonly understood that urban development can only occur at the expense of rural land. The changing land-uses, policy environments, land ownership patterns and land administrative mechanisms that occur in such transitional zones require special analysis before a model suitable for peri-urban areas can be developed. Under the Fast Track resettlement programme which was adopted in the year 2000, the government introduced a Model A2 variant for the redistribution of land in the peri-urban areas. Under the peri-urban model, farm sizes are expected to range between 2 and 50 hectares. Peri-urban farmers are expected to intensify production with a bias towards
horticulture, market gardening or crop farming. However, due to the rushed manner in which it was executed, the programme has the potential of creating implementation problems with long-term implications for both the land resource and the urban environment.

Studies world-wide have shown that small farms almost always produce far more agricultural output per unit area than large farms for both industrialised and developing countries (Ellis 1993, Berry and William R.C. 1979, Feder 1985, Prosterman and Riedinger 1987, Cornia 1985). For example, various studies have shown that the smallest farms have greater dollar output per acre than larger farms. There are many reasons that explain this situation, including

- Specialization of smaller farms in high value crops like vegetables and flowers;
- Application of more labour and inputs per unit area, and
- The tendency of using more diverse farming systems (Strange 1988).

Peri-urban areas, in principle, provide the greatest opportunity and environment for the implementation of small-farm based resettlement models as they generally facilitate intensity of land utilization. The experience of urban allotment gardens in developed countries provides a useful insight on how urban and peri-urban farming can be modelled. It is within this context that a peri-urban settlement model is considered important for Zimbabwe’s land reform.

CONCLUSION

Within the framework of global land reform experiences, the Zimbabwean programme was thus over the first two decades of implementation propelled by social, economic as well as political motivation. With the onset of political Independence in 1980, it was inevitable that land redistribution activity be adopted which aimed at redressing historical imbalances in resource access and ownership and instituting greater participation by indigenous black households in agricultural production. In view of the role of the land resource in the country’s social context, political imperatives have provided the major direction in programme implementation, with the state playing the central function in policy design and land identification and acquisition. Specific models and approaches were adopted for allocating acquired land and enabling its utilization and management by beneficiaries.

Effective implementation of this policy, however, encountered serious constraints in the second decade of Independence onwards, largely in terms of inadequate land for the programme, given constitutional and other legalistic restrictions on restructuring existing land relations. The programme was subsequently beset with major challenges arising from heightened demand for land at a time of its marked unavailability on the market; grossly inadequate funding, as well as the need to enhance agricultural productivity and general land performance. Demands for revitalizing the implementation pace prompted the fast track programme which sought to hasten the land acquisition process.

11 The historical evolution of the allotment gardens has its roots in the desire to eradicate urban poverty. In Germany for example, the success of the allotment gardens is centred on a number of parameters, chief of which include the facilitatory role of municipalities which availed clusters of plots ranging in size from 200-400m² to the urban poor, organisation of urban farmers into associations or garden clubs which manage the affairs of the farmers, including the management of leasing contracts, the levying of contributions from members for the purpose of financing the association's activities and provision of support infrastructure including water, transport, health and hygiene (drinking water and toilets) (Drescher 2001)
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