Beneficiary Selection, Infrastructure Provision and Beneficiary Support

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ABSTRACT

On attainment of Independence in 1980 Zimbabwe implemented a major land redistribution and resettlement programme whose main goals were to restore land rights to the majority indigenous black population and extend livelihood opportunities to hitherto disadvantaged sectors of the population. The immediate objectives of the programme included the resettlement of war-displaced families and returning refugees, the provision of infrastructure and social services in areas devastated by war, as well as providing population relief in over-crowded communal areas. A clearly defined organisational framework for implementing the programme facilitated coordination and interaction among participating stakeholders during the first decade (Phase One) of programme execution.

Phase Two (the second decade onwards) of the programme experienced greater stress in resource availability and implementation organisation and accountability as well as heightened beneficiary demand for improved outputs from the redistribution process. With these increased pressures the programme has been unable to deliver expected outputs as operational parameters have exceeded policy provision. Operational realities in the implementation of the programme suggest a clear and urgent need for reviewing and strengthening the guiding policy framework in order that resource productivity and beneficiary success may be realised.

Experience from the two Phases of resettlement implementation suggests the following as essential elements in improving delivery of desirable outputs without adverse social and economic effects or with maximum long term sustainability of the land resource: a set of unambiguous, realistic beneficiary selection criteria; a streamlined, transparent and accommodative implementation atmosphere as well as a suitable supportive mechanism to enhance beneficiary productivity and growth.
I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
Zimbabwe embarked on a massive land redistribution programme on the attainment of Independence in April 1980 following an armed struggle during which the black majority population fought to, among other things, regain land rights deprived by British colonialism and the subsequent entrenchment of white settler rule. The decade and half-long armed fight for Independence was a culmination of country-wide resistance by the indigenous population to the systematic dispossession and displacement suffered at the hands of the colonialists since 1890. It was also a process through which the question of access to and ownership of the land resource became the rallying point in the call for reasserting indigenous nationhood. With the attainment of nationhood, it was indeed to be expected that an Independent, majority African government would implement a land reform programme to address the near-century old contentious land dispossession and subsequent ownership structures (Moyo, 1987; 1990; Bratton, 1990; among others) and placate the high expectations of the black populace. At the same time the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the communal areas (including high population pressures on habitable lands; degraded natural resources; limited livelihood and productivity opportunities, and general poverty) provided impetus for popular demand for greater access to the land and other natural resources to ameliorate declining livelihoods.

Land redistribution in Zimbabwe has thus been implemented as a logical sequel to the demise of the colonisation process and the attainment, in political terms, of national self-determination. It has essentially been characterised by the resettlement of black smallholder farmers on land acquired by the state from former commercial farmland that historically fell under large-scale white settler ownership and operation or corporate control. The resettlement process ultimately sought to address the three major dimensions of the national land resource in the country, namely, historical inequality in distribution, optimality of use, and long term sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 1999).
The post-Independence redistribution process has variously been documented in Government of Zimbabwe policy statements and operational guidelines of the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in terms of criteria and procedures for beneficiary selection, implementation, organisation as well as provision of state support for consolidating the establishment of beneficiaries on resettled lands. Both policy outlines and empirical evidence over the first two decades of Independence show a clear transition from, initially, a rehabilitative resettlement programme reflective of post-war recovery activities to, subsequently, consolidation processes that seek to address more candidly issues of productivity, own-contribution and self-reliance on the part of beneficiaries. Where a highly centralised state implementation and management machinery was the dominant factor in programme execution and services provision in the 1980s, greater demands for resources and increasing calls for more beneficiary contribution and enhanced stakeholder participation effectively diluted the state’s capacity in terms of level and quality of services rendered in the second half of the 1990s onwards. The 1980s and the first half of the 1990s coincide with Phase One of the programme—the Intensive resettlement - phase which was characterised by elaborate planning and infrastructure provision that preceded emplacement of beneficiaries (mainly war-affected and ex-communal land households) on the land specifically purchased by the state or effectively abandoned during the War of Liberation; this was a period of land availability and relative abundance which facilitated planning for large numbers of beneficiaries in contiguous land blocks. The second half of the 1990s and beyond represents Phase Two of the programme, characterised by greater scarcity of land for resettlement, reduced resource availability on the part of government, as well as rejuvenated demand for resettlement land by communal land households and other prospective programme beneficiaries—this phase exerted greater demands on government in terms of emplacement outputs, infrastructural needs and support services. It is convenient to analyse the performance of the resettlement process in terms of the two Phases as they clearly represent the state’s varying capacities regarding the parameters that permitted effective resettlement implementation.

This paper analyses the experiences of Zimbabwe’s land redistribution programme in terms of the beneficiary selection, infrastructure development and overall support for the resettled communities to facilitate and consolidate their establishment in the new land schemes.
1.2 Objectives of Zimbabwe’s Resettlement Programme

The specific objectives of land redistribution at Independence were enunciated in the document *Intensive Resettlement: Policies and Procedures*¹ (1980) as:

a) to provide some relief of the pressure on over-populated land;

b) to extend and improve the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector through individuals and co-operatives;

c) to improve the standard of living of the largest and poorest sector of the population of Zimbabwe;

d) to ameliorate the plight of the people who have been adversely affected by the war and to rehabilitate them;

e) to provide, at the lower end of the scale, opportunities for people who have no land and who are without employment and may, therefore, be classed as destitute;

f) to bring abandoned or under-utilised land into full production as one facet of implementing an equitable policy of land redistribution;

g) to expand or improve the infrastructure and services that are needed to promote the growth of people and of economic production; and

h) to achieve national stability and progress in a country that has only recently emerged from the turmoil of war.


These policy objectives clearly represent a rehabilitative programme, targeting war-displaced communities (including former inhabitants of concentration camps (euphemistically termed “protected villages”); returning refugees (both extra-territorial and urban); demobilised war combatants, and the identified landless from the communal areas) as well as abandoned farmland that required infrastructural and productivity revival. They also portray a programme that focused on translocation resettlement, involving physical re-location of

¹ This Document was subsequently revised in 1983 and 1985 to update operational guidelines for implementing the programme as well as the criteria for providing support services and facilitating the interaction of the various participating institutions. For all intents and purposes the Document – in its various versions – remained the fundamental policy guide in operationalizing land redistribution and resettlement in the country in the two decades following Independence.
beneficiaries to take up and develop the allocated holdings on the government-acquired land. In addition to the rehabilitation focus, the programme also sought to extend “productive agriculture” and employment opportunities to the “peasant” farming sector and the destitute, as well as provide some infrastructure for social and economic development.

The programme objectives thus defined planning parameters and considerations that had to be taken into account in the process of programme implementation and service provision. For example, given the stated or intended target beneficiaries, other criteria for selecting those to be resettled became secondary, while the provision of services and infrastructure had to be made in a manner that recognised the plight and productive capacity of the stated beneficiaries. Furthermore the socio-economic background and condition of the targeted beneficiaries warranted that infrastructure and other support services be provided primarily from state resources, partly as a public responsibility and partly an expression of national priorities in sectoral development and resource allocation.

The initial objectives were slightly modified in Phase Two of the Programme, to read as follows:

a) to acquire five million hectares from the Large-Scale Commercial Farming sector for redistribution;

b) to resettle 150 000 families, youths graduating from agricultural colleges and others with demonstrable experience in a gender sensitive manner;

c) to reduce the extent and intensity of poverty among rural families and farm workers by providing them adequate land for agricultural use;

d) to increase the contribution of agriculture to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by increasing the number of commercialised small-scale farmers using formerly under-utilised land;

e) to promote the environmentally sustainable utilisation of land; and

f) to increase conditions for sustainable peace and social stability by removing imbalances in land ownership.


These modifications were introduced in order to put more focus on the question of sustainability and optimal use of the land resource. The identification and selection of
resettlement beneficiaries, together with the modalities of providing support services, were thus to be altered accordingly to reflect the changed circumstances defined by the objectives.

2. Beneficiary Selection

2.1 Background
Land reform policies were formulated to benefit selected groups of the Zimbabwean populace. The selection of beneficiaries was guided by specific criteria, which were considered by identified institutional structures following set procedures. It should, however, be noted from the onset that the selection criteria and institutions differed according to different resettlement models and during the different phases.

This section considers these criteria, institutions and procedures as they are set out in the Policies and Procedures for the first and second phases. It will analyse and critique the application of these selection criteria and procedures during the two phases and during the current fast track resettlement programme.

2.2 Selection Institutions, Criteria and Procedures as Set out in the Policies
During Phase One of the programme settler selection was the responsibility of the Department of Rural Development in full consultation with respective Rural District Councils for the Model A schemes. For Model B selection the Department was to consult with the Department of Co-operative Development (Mukora, 1984); while for the Model C it had to consult with the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA).

The following criteria were used for the selection of settlers, especially for the Model A. Successful candidates had to be:

a) effectively landless, i.e. having no or little land to support oneself and dependants;
b) unemployed (either self or the spouse);
c) poor, as the intention was to reach and cater for the rural poor;
d) married or widowed with dependants. Widowed or unmarried women with dependants were to be allocated land in resettlement schemes in their own right;
e) aged 18 to 55 years and physically fit and potentially able to make productive use of the land allocated;
f) prepared to give up all land and grazing rights in the communal area of origin;
g) a returning Zimbabwean refugee—this category received special consideration at the conclusion of the liberation war; or
h) experienced and master farmer willing to give up all land rights in the communal areas and wage employment elsewhere.

The following procedures were adopted and implemented in actual selection:

a) Resettlement registration forms were distributed to potential settlers through Rural District Councils.
b) A Resettlement Officer held meetings and travelled through the area to explain resettlement policy and assisted in the filling in of the forms.
c) The registration forms were returned to the Rural District Council through the Ward Councillors.
d) Ex-farm labourers were registered directly by the Resettlement Officer.
e) Applicants from the urban areas applied through the Rural District Council of their home area.
f) Illegal occupants were required to go back to their Rural District Council area and register, as for the law abiding citizens, unless they occupied the land prior to July 1981 when they would be registered directly by the Resettlement Officers.

During Phase Two the responsibility for beneficiary selection was expanded to include more direct participation of other stakeholders, including the traditional leadership (i.e. Chiefs, headmen and village heads); traditional assemblies at various levels; Rural District Councils, and Local Government structures at various levels - i.e. District Administrators, Provincial Administrators and Governors. These institutions were assisted by farmers’ unions at various levels, together with local non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations as locally considered appropriate.

Government also decided during this Phase to widen the catchment of candidates for resettlement to accommodate groups that were earlier not specified in its operational policy documents—including groups of poor households from over-crowded communal areas and over-populated villages, retrenched farm workers, and special categories of persons such as women, ex-combatants, agricultural graduates, master farmers, ex-mine workers and persons
of means and ability who intend to engage in agriculture in different resettlement models. The settlers in Model A1 and its variants, and three-tier models were primarily to be selected from lists established by the responsible institutions which were to be assisted by Agritex, and were expected to manage the selection process in an efficient, transparent and gender sensitive manner. The procedures for selecting beneficiaries for Model A2 and the Irrigation Model are discussed elsewhere below.

2.3 The Application of Beneficiary Selection Policies on Selected Models

It is pertinent at this point to examine the empirical application of some of the beneficiary selection policies and criteria in identified resettlement approaches. To illustrate the country’s dynamic experiences in settlement implementation, a longitudinal analysis is adopted which assesses the contemporary rationale and relevance of respective selection criteria for periods transcending the two land redistribution Phases. Three models are illustrated here, namely small-scale commercial farm settlement schemes, the medium and large-scale commercial farm settlement schemes, and villagized Model A1 and its variants.

2.3.1 Small Scale Commercial Farm Settlement Schemes

Three sub-types of this model are considered. The selection procedures for the settlers or beneficiaries of these settlement schemes are based on the small-scale commercial farming (formerly the African Purchase Areas) and the specialised Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) Models.

a) Small Scale Commercial Farms

These are pre-independence settlement schemes, which were designed and planned for master farmers. Some of them were expanded after independence.

Currently, there are 66 such schemes throughout the country in all the provinces. For selection for this model candidates had to hold Master Farmers’ Certificate, and have a track record of farming success based on the agricultural demonstrator’s recommendations. Successful candidates had to have acceptable levels of resource ownership (in terms of finance, livestock, farm implements, equipment and tools) to support their productive use of the allocated land. An interview with the District Commissioner and the District Agricultural Officer was also an integral component of the selection criteria under this model.
b) Specialised ARDA Settlement Schemes

The Agricultural and Rural Development Authority administers several commercial farm settlement schemes in different parts of the country on behalf of the Rural State Land Division of the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture. Some of these schemes are listed in Table 1. The selection of beneficiaries for these schemes was done by a Land Settlement Board of the appointees of the Minister of Lands and Agriculture chaired by the ARDA General Manager. The main consideration for settler selection was discipline and not agricultural training or experience.

c) Mukwasine Settlement Scheme

The Mukwasine Sugar Estate Consortium administers Chipiwa Co-operative Settlement Scheme in the south-eastern lowveld of Chiredzi District. The scheme was established in 1981 with 120 initial plot holders. There are now 191 settlers operating on 1,911 hectares, with an average individual plot size of 10 hectares, ranging from 8.8 hectares to 14.7 hectares. The scheme specialises in the production of sugar cane.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Settlement capacity (households)</th>
<th>Average plot size (hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle Save</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chisumbanje</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>3 to 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gowe</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3 to 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsovane</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antelope</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngwezi</td>
<td>Plus cooperative of 46 members</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0.1 to 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The selection of beneficiaries was done by a Land Settlement Board made up of representatives of the Ministry Lands and Agriculture and Mukwasine Estate. The Board was chaired by the Ministry’s appointee, normally the ARDA General Manager. Neither prior agricultural training nor experience was set as a pre-requisite for settler selection (Spear,
However, it was reported that the Board assessed candidates’ potential to operate agricultural enterprises commercially at a large-scale level, taking into account some ownership of farm machinery or implements, as well as the availability of financial resources to meet basic farm inputs.

### 2.3.2 Medium and Large Scale Commercial Farm Settlement Schemes

These commercial farm settlement schemes are the same as the Model A2 where settlers are allocated self-contained farm units for cropping, residence, grazing and woodlot establishment. Model A2 schemes are however spatially divided into small, medium, large-scale and peri-urban categories and are therefore distinguished from these settlement schemes by either plot sizes of individual settlers or the nature and period of their resettlement.

Land allocation and settlement under Model A2 are specifically intended for the indigenisation of the large-scale commercial farming sector, where beneficiaries are given a 99-year lease with option to purchase. The model is expected to achieve the following objectives:

- a) to create a cadre of black indigenous farmers;
- b) to empower black entrepreneurs in the economy of Zimbabwe; and
- c) to facilitate access to input support for commercial agriculture by indigenous farmers.

Those objectives have been used to determine the selection criteria for the beneficiaries of the Model A2 schemes. For selection for Model A2 settlement an applicant should meet the following criteria:

- i) Zimbabwean citizenship;
- ii) An acceptable minimum level of academic education or certified technical competency in agriculture;
- iii) A demonstrated capacity in farming, such as trained master farmers;
- iv) Preparedness to reside permanently on the allocated unit, or demonstrating a capacity to employ a competent manager; and
- v) Development of a financially viable and agro-ecologically suitable five-year farming programme for the unit being applied for.

The identification and selection of beneficiaries followed set procedures. Available farms were advertised widely in the national media and at all provincial and district offices in both
the vernacular languages and English. Initially, application forms were available for a fee at
the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture head office, at the provincial and district offices. Later
on, the forms became available for free at the Ministry’s head office and the provincial
offices. Originally, a national Selection Board composed of relevant Government
departments, parastatals and identified relevant organisations, chaired by ARDA General
Manager, processed the application forms and chose those who qualified.

In January 2001 the Provincial Governors managed to persuade Government to allow the
selection process to be undertaken at the provincial level. Each Province formed a Provincial
Land Identification and Resettlement Committee which is chaired by the Provincial Governor
and made up of members from the following government Ministries and/or Departments
(Government of Zimbabwe, 2001):

- Local Government, National Housing and Public Construction
- Department of Lands in the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement
- Department of Agricultural Research and Extension Services (AREX) in MLARR
- Department of Natural Resources
- District Development Fund
- Department of Veterinary Services
- Ministry of Home Affairs
- President’s Office (C.I.O)
- Ministry of Defence
- Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA)
- Ministry of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation
- Department of Physical Planning
- Forestry Commission
- The Ruling Political Party - Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-
  PF)

Provincial Committees receive completed forms from the respective Departments of Lands
provincial offices and select those applicants qualifying for land allocation on the basis of the
vetting criteria developed at the Ministry’s Head Office.
2.3.3 The Villagised Model A1 Scheme
The Model A1 scheme is the villagised and self-contained land use model, which has been implemented to decongest over-populated and/or over-stocked wards and villages for the benefit of the landless in general. Model A1 is a modification of the Model A Resettlement Schemes which were implemented during the first phase of the programme as discussed above. It is based on a village settlement concept in which 20 to 25 families constitute one village. Families share certain village facilities such as water, roads and grazing. Settlers have individual ownership of other resources such as arable and residential land, livestock and farming implements.

As already noted, the land reform and resettlement policies identify poor and landless households from the congested communal areas and over-populated villages, the displaced farm workers and the special disadvantaged categories of women, youth and ex-combatants as the target beneficiaries for Model A1. Policy also stipulates that the selection team should consist of traditional leadership structures; Local Government institutions at provincial and district levels; Ministry of Lands and Agriculture departments at both levels; Rural District Councils and farmers’ unions.

In reality the Model ended up absorbing beneficiaries of various social and economic status. It is estimated that up to 41% of the applicants who failed to qualify for the Model A2 commercial farm settlement scheme ended up being recommended for resettlement under Model A1 (Government of Zimbabwe, 2001). This renders the Governor-led Provincial Committee the de facto beneficiary selection institution for the bulk of the land redistribution programme. Under the Fast Track resettlement, however, the war veterans who spearheaded the initial farm occupations triggering subsequent acquisitions by government effectively “identified” or sanctioned the majority of Model A1 settlers. As a result the nation-wide War Veterans’ Association has been a major player in the selection process for Model A1 schemes, alongside the other institutions mentioned above.

2.4 Transparency in Beneficiary Selection
The policy statement on beneficiary selection for the resettlement programme is very clear and transparent, providing ample opportunity for the participation of a wide range of stakeholder institutions. The empirical situation however suggests a different picture, with considerable political interference in the actual process prompting many alterations to plans and decisions emanating from the stipulated policies and procedures. Numerous decisions of
respective Identification and Selection Committees have, reportedly, been ignored and/or reversed by political ‘heavy weights’ whose actions not only compromise formal planning processes, but also seriously undermine the role and effectiveness of officials responsible for implementing the programme. These experiences have been most pronounced in the selection of beneficiaries for Model A2 and Model A1 schemes.

Accountability protocol in settler selection also seems unclear and problematic. Theoretically, the lower level should be accountable to the next higher level, but this does not seem to be apply on the ground.

Some apparent disparities are noticeable in the selection of the particular groupings for resettlement—e.g. women, youth and ex-farm workers. For women the selection process appears to be seriously gender insensitive. While policy provides for joint allocation and registration for land, most male applicants do not seem inclined to implement this and the implementation process has not intervened. As for youth, the problem has been one of definition. Some authorities have defined youth by age, say between 18 and 21 years; some by marital status, while others define it by political activism or agricultural productive capacity. Because of sectional interests some committees have used one or the other of these definitions to disadvantage the youth.

Different Committees also have different views on the resettlement of foreign displaced farm workers. Some argue that foreign nationals cannot access land in terms of land reform policies in the absence of Zimbabwean citizenship, and should go back to their original homes if they cannot secure other employment; others argue that most of the ex-farm workers (including local citizens) are not interested in farming on their own and can therefore not be considered for land allocation for agricultural production—instead they may need to be allocated land for residential purposes only. It is however clear that most of the ex-farm worker community is seriously constrained by a lack of resources and the self-propelled initiative essential for meaningful productivity. For most of this community, having been workers for long durations in their lives, seeking employment with the incoming new farmers is a more realistic option than managing productive commercial land on their own.

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2 Along the lines of this argument the Mashonaland West Provincial Land Committee informed the researchers that as an operational guide, District implementation teams in the Province are instructed to allocate interested ex-farm worker households two (2) hectares each. While virtually all District
There are also reports of favouritism and/or parochial preferences in land allocation where applicants’ cases may be prejudiced or not considered altogether because they are not familiar to members of the Selection Committees, or because they originate from Districts that have no commercial farmland, such as Buhera or Chivi.

3. INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND BENEFICIARY SUPPORT

3.1 Rationale and Objectives of Infrastructural Development under Land Redistribution

The provision of infrastructure in resettled lands is prompted by the need to complement the process of emplacement of incoming communities, ensuring that the latter access within reasonable reach necessary social services, production facilities as well as pertinent physical infrastructure. It was also essential at the start of the resettlement programme in Zimbabwe to provide infrastructure items that revived the productive capacity of areas which had been devastated by war. Furthermore, resettlement invariably introduced large numbers of human population (together with domestic animals) into areas that were hitherto sparsely settled (frequently also remote and under-developed), thereby increasing the demand for physical, social and economic infrastructure and services. For the Zimbabwean case the resettlement process entailed:

- Resuscitating, establishing or developing anew altogether, water supplies for both consumption and agricultural production;

- Opening up or repairing and subsequently maintaining both through and access roads to link new settlement schemes and internal villages with major communication routes—with bridges, culverts, etc on rivers and other impassable channels and places as may be necessary;

- Establishing residential housing units and arable fields that invariably involved the use and clearing of natural vegetative resources like trees, grass and other forest products; and

- Constructing community service facilities such as schools, clinics, service centres and programme administration infrastructure

Officials talked to in the Province testified to this, it has not been possible to empirically verify the universal application of this provision on the acquired farms.
3.2 Policy Provisions for Infrastructure

3.2.1 Implementation Organisation, Infrastructure Planning and Scheme Development

During Phase One of the resettlement programme the Government of Zimbabwe sought to provide infrastructure in accordance with the professed socialist egalitarian philosophy that emphasised increasing the access of services and productive capacity to rural communities. Land redistribution was thus regarded as a major rural development thrust through which these services and developments could be realised for the hitherto disadvantaged and poor sectors of the population. Policy therefore specified infrastructure provision criteria to guide both planners and implementing agents in determining the quantities and locations of the items required. Box 1 summarises the criteria employed in providing physical infrastructure in the newly settled schemes. It is important to emphasise here that funding was provided by Government on a programme basis through Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) allocations to the then Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development (or its successors charged with the overall responsibility for programme implementation and co-ordination).\(^3\) Coordination of services was however critical among the various players to ensure timely linkages between infrastructure establishment and subsequent manpower deployment and service application by respective participating line institutions. As indicated in Box 1, various Government Ministries and Departments were expected to deploy staff to service their respective functions and responsibilities in resettlement schemes to the magnitudes specified by policy. The roles of agricultural and cooperative extension and animal health, education and health were of particular significance, given the status of the schemes and the high expectations of achievement that the areas carried—for this reason the ratios of these production support staff per number of farmers were, for example, much

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\(^3\) Within the Ministry the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) was established in 1982 as the implementation arm assigned the roles of
- demarcation and tillage of land holdings, and development of initial infrastructure through Development Teams;
- management of the resultant resettlement schemes through Resettlement Officers, and
- overall coordination and management of the programme through several Inter-institutional forums established to facilitate the participation and collaboration of various stakeholders.

DERUDE was however disbanded in 1993 and its responsibilities and personnel parcelled out and reassigned to several other Organizations, including District Development Fund (DDF), AGRITEX, ARDA, etc.
higher here than in Communal areas and small scale commercial farms (former purchase lands).⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1. Planning Criteria for providing Physical Infrastructure, Social Facilities and Support Services in Resettlement Schemes under Phase One (1980-1998)³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Physical Infrastructure</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Water Supplies (Repairs or new installations):  
  • Domestic needs—1 borehole (with a hand pump) per Village of up to 25 families  
  • Livestock needs—Surface water, otherwise borehole equipped with windmill, reservoir and troughs  
• Roads (Repairs or new construction)  
  • Through Road—Responsibility of Ministry of Roads  
• Village Access Road—Project-financed, budget depending on length  
• Fencing  
  • Scheme Boundary—Govt purchased materials, beneficiaries erected fencing  
  • Internal / Paddock lines—own contribution and self-reliance by beneficiaries  
• Dip Tanks and Cattle Handling Pens (Repair or new construction)  
  • Provision to vary with number of villages or planned livestock units, depending on Natural Region of settlement |
| **2. Social Services** |
| • Primary Schools—Project-funded at rate of 1 classroom per 20 families  
• Secondary Schools—Self-reliance by beneficiaries in consultation with Ministry of Education  
• Clinics—Project-funded at rate of 1 per 300 to 500 families: Staffing by Ministry of Health |
| **3. Production Services** |
| • Tillage—Project-funded 0.5 hectare per family for initial establishment  
• Agricultural Advice and Extension—Target: 1 Extension worker per 200 families  
• Animal Health Advice—Target: 1 Assistant per 500 families  
• Cooperative Extension—Target: 1 Assistant per 600 families  
• Cooperative Depot for grain storage and marketing—Project-financed at rate of 1 per Rural Service Centre established |
| **4. Project Administration and Management Facilities** |
| • Government staff Housing and Offices for Resettlement staff, Extension, Animal Health, Cooperative, Education and Health staff  
• Rural Service Centre layout and access roads demarcation and development  
• Scheme Telephone installation |


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⁴ Compare the ratio of 1 Extension Assistant : 200 resettled farmers to 1: over 400 obtaining in the Communal lands.

⁵ A standard Model A scheme with 500 families (averaging 15 to 20 families per village) was assumed for planning purposes in providing minimum infrastructure and services, with provisions for larger schemes pro-rated on the basis of this standard. Requirements for other Models closely matched these criteria if schemes involved were not within or contiguous to the Model A scheme which ordinarily received the primary provisions.
The Department of Rural Development undertook the implementation of the programme through its Development and Resettlement Management teams that were responsible for translating all project plans into provisions on the ground. While Development teams were responsible for the delivery of physical infrastructure and related services (either directly through their own effort or by contract elsewhere), the Resettlement Officers as Project Managers interacted more directly with beneficiaries during such processes as beneficiary selection (see Section 2.2 above); settler mobilisation for communal services general scheme development, and soliciting other agencies’ services. Because schemes were implemented (during Phase One) as distinct projects following a clearly defined project appraisal and approval process within the framework of the national programme, the Department had specific accountability for progress in both physical implementation and financial expenditure; its respective teams, therefore, necessarily had to generate and maintain comprehensive, up-to-date records and reports for both internal and external scrutiny. While this arrangement may have posed operational constraints due to centralisation and bureaucratic delays, it effectively provided for accountability and transparency. The presence (and residence) of the Resettlement Officer in the scheme also facilitated prompt trouble-shooting among settlers as well as developing a data bank that could prove invaluable in documenting the land redistribution process in the country.

An important component of Phase One resettlement is the Accelerated programme under which beneficiaries were allocated land (or effectively sanctioned to utilise the land after unauthorised initial settlement) without corresponding provision of infrastructural services. After thriving for some years without formal water supplies, access roads, scheme fencing, dip tanks, schools or clinics in close proximity, several former “squatter settlements” were either upgraded and formalised into schemes of their own or incorporated into larger contiguous other entities which were subsequently afforded infrastructure. Experience from the Accelerated programme could well be instructive in dealing with some of the outcomes of

6 This programme may be considered an earlier version of Fast Track resettlement in Phase Two, the only differences being due to scale and time of implementation, and the retrospective approach in which Government viewed the former. In response to the plight of the beneficiaries and Government’s desire to “regularize” the settlements, some Accelerated schemes were upgraded during the period 1983-87 through the financing of infrastructure and full development by the EEC and a few Non-Governmental Organizations.
Fast Track resettlement which have perhaps reproduced the earlier situation at a much more grandiose scale.

Tables 2, 3 and 4 present major developments in infrastructure for selected models at different times in Phase One of the programme. Considerable achievements were evidently registered in the physical development of services in the resettled lands (Bratton, 1994; Rukuni and Eicher, 1994; Government of Zimbabwe, 1996), ensuring that the incoming communities gained access to either their allocated land holdings or the production facilities and services to realise the full potential of their new circumstances.

While, in principle, Government funded infrastructural development through either budgetary allocations or provision of personnel through line institutions, the resettled communities made significant contribution by providing labour, own resources and locally available materials in the construction of items like schools, clinics and community centres as a cost-cutting measure and a way of engendering participatory development through self-reliance. To minimise costs as well, the farmers also had to construct their own housing; it was only after 1984/85 that resettled farmers were able to benefit from the Improved Rural Housing programme which offered some housing construction credit repayable through marketed agricultural produce.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>No. of units realised</th>
<th>Units outstanding (Planned)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water supplies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Boreholes</td>
<td>1 314</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protected wells</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Network (km)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gravelled</td>
<td>875.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Through roads</td>
<td>2 489.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Village access</td>
<td>4 209.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bridges</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dip Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>323</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Clinics</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Medical staff houses</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Classrooms</td>
<td>1 474</td>
<td>(192 schools in all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Teachers’ houses</td>
<td>1 305</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Service Centres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operational</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operational Commercial business stands</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Service Industry stands</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other Govt. staff housing</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Rural housing units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• For the beneficiaries</td>
<td>2 022</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gonese (1990), unpublished, p. 10 - 11
3.3.2 Production Facilities and Support
While the programme financed physical infrastructure, functional institutions were responsible for personnel recruitment and management, and recurrent costs to service resettlement schemes. As alluded in Box 1, policy assigned agricultural production services to the Departments of Agritex (agricultural extension, land husbandry and farmer training); Veterinary Services (Animal health) and Cooperatives (collective farming and marketing services) with housing and offices accommodated at Rural Service Centres. With time, however, the role of other ancillary support agencies became increasingly important—e.g. Department of Natural Resources and Forestry Commission in terms of tree conservation and broad natural resource management.

Agricultural credit has been a critical production service in the context of land redistribution. In terms of policy, the then Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) was to provide credit to enhance farmer productivity in the newly acquired lands. Agricultural credit lending in Phase One is however fraught with varied farmer experiences of contentment and frustration as the Corporation experimented on a diversity of lending and recovery approaches and delivery mechanisms - ranging from seasonal/annual group loans to individual short to medium term support facilities (GOZ/UK Annual Joint Appraisal Reports 1981-1986). Unique organisational and operational mechanisms for servicing resettlement farmers were tried during the period 1981 and 1988 (under the names of Resettlement Loan Fund; Resettlement Credit Scheme, etc.) before they (the farmers) were incorporated into the generality of smallholder farming community.
### Table 3. Level of Infrastructural Provision under the Resettlement Programme as at September 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure Component</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Target Number</th>
<th>Actual Accomplishment</th>
<th>% Achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boreholes</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>3,238</td>
<td>2,940</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencing</td>
<td>Km</td>
<td>19,718</td>
<td>6,510</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinics</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Houses</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration Blocks</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dips</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Preparation</td>
<td>Ha.</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toilets</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>66,850</td>
<td>23,024</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Km</td>
<td>9,496</td>
<td>7,752</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Policy Paper on Land Redistribution and Resettlement in Zimbabwe, Government of Zimbabwe. September 1996 p.10

### Table 4. Three Tier Schemes: Level of Completion of Infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>% Complete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boreholes</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windmills</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water troughs</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservoirs</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piping (PVC)</td>
<td>Km</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Boundary</td>
<td>Km</td>
<td>1,649</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Paddock</td>
<td>Km</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dips</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• New</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Repair</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Policy Paper on Land Redistribution and Resettlement in Zimbabwe, Government of Zimbabwe. September 1996 p.21
Exclusive state funding of infrastructure (as was the case in Phase One) proved expensive to the fiscus—social services and physical infrastructure together accounted for over 65% of the total resettlement costs by 1987/88 (DERUDE, 1989). With the onset of the Structural Adjustment thrust of the late 1980s calling for reduced spending on social services and emphasising cost-recovery and beneficiary contribution-based development strategies, it was not surprising that Government initiated measures in beneficiary selection and service provision that in effect discriminated in favour of those with resources and means to shoulder land development costs and maximise their own productivity with little dependence on state coffers.

3.3 Empirical Observations on Scheme Development and Beneficiary Support

It was established during field visits by the research team that considerable changes have occurred in the organisation, implementation and management of resettlement as stipulated by policy documented in Phase One and outlined above. A reconfiguration of institutions and reassignment of responsibilities has relegated the programme to a mainstream activity of land allocation, agricultural production and social services provision. This has evidently had as much adverse effects on the management of infrastructure and services in existing (Phase One) schemes as it has implications for planning and implementing new resettlement activity (Phase Two).

3.3.1 Project Management and Overall Institutional Support

The Project Management role previously played by Resettlement Officers has in effect been discontinued, and seems to be filled variously (as circumstances require) by the District Administrator of the particular scheme area, the Extension worker or the District Development Fund (DDF) technician who may be currently operative in the area. As all schemes are now incorporated into the Rural District Authorities surrounding them, the streamlining of services and support to resettled farmers is no longer possible (sometimes considered not necessary) as they are invariably now administered from the District centres. The absence of the Resettlement officer also deprives the area and community of the decisive enforcement function that enabled a resident Officer to resolve inter-personal conflicts and other practical problems that the extension worker or the distantly-based District Administrator may not be able to tackle. A more critical effect of this absence, however, is the apparent dearth of records, information or data about the affairs of and developments at the schemes—particularly relating to settler emplacement status; farmers’ socio-economic
attributes, scheme production statistics; operations of various stakeholder institutions, etc.—
all very vital information for evaluating the long term performance and impact of the
programme. Some agricultural production data are maintained by locally-based Extension
workers, yet these only tell part of the full story of the programme.

The void prompted by the absence of Resettlement managers has invariably triggered
contests for influence and authority among those Government officials still operative in the
schemes as, by default, any of them may be required to be answerable for scheme
information or developments that they may not officially be conversant about. Similarly, in
the absence of a designated resident manager, beneficiaries have had to constitute
management structures of their own to attend to local needs—a development that may help to
locally democratise decision making, but may also be divisive if not properly managed or
guided. Such structures tend to be project specific to address local needs and problems and
may, where necessary, require assistance in linking up with relevant external services or
resources.

The established schemes visited confirmed receiving some back-up support and technical
services from various Government Departments. Except for Extension workers and Animal
Health Assistants whose official housing exists within the schemes, the Government agents,
however, operate from District Centres from which they also service other parts of the
Districts. The institutions most frequently listed as being functional in the schemes are AREX
(former Agritex); Veterinary Services; DDF (either Technicians attending to water (borehole)
or road maintenance problems or as representing the former Resettlement management
function), and Forestry Commission. The frequency and quality of service provided was
however difficult to ascertain, especially because of the distances officials have to travel from
their stations, and also the extensive areas under their responsibility. It is generally accepted
that the provision of services by different Government institutions has deteriorated
significantly due to depleted state resources and the de-concentration of provisions to
resettlement scheme areas. Even those officials who are able to service the schemes complain
about inadequate financial resources to satisfy their mobility and subsistence requirements as
they end up visiting the schemes less frequently than they would prefer.

3.3.2 Community Institutions
A wide array of local community structures was noted in the schemes visited, ranging from
Management Committees that undertake internal administrative functions to social groupings
acting to promote or safeguard particular farmer interests. The Committees’ operations
complement the functions of external service providers, while interest groupings are intended to enhance community cohesion, networks and linkages that consolidate the farmers’ welfare, such as relations with national farmers’ unions and Marketing Boards. While clearly diverse in terms of their unique interests or peculiar circumstances, such management structures play a vital role in engendering beneficiary participation in scheme administration, development planning and general local resource management as they provide a crucial means of interaction between schemes, Government and external non-government players.

Table 5 lists some of the community management structures operating in schemes studied, together with their respective functions.
Table 5. A classification of existing Community management structures and their respective functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Organisational Committees</th>
<th>Typical Functions and responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward / Village Development Committees (WADCO / VIDCO)</td>
<td>• Area administration and management of community affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Area Development planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Administrative and political representation at Rural District Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Settlement of disputes and other social conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Committees (IMCs) (especially in Irrigation schemes)</td>
<td>• Overseeing Water allocation and management under irrigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitoring irrigation operations and general water application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Negotiating for water pricing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and Marketing Committees</td>
<td>Oversee developments and problems in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Land preparation and cropping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tillage and equipment hire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Input supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Marketing and transport channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provision of marketing intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and Maintenance Committees</td>
<td>• Infrastructure maintenance—e.g. fencing, canal network, dip tanks, access roads, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assurance of general security of scheme area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services and Development Committees</td>
<td>• Community organisation for social services development—e.g. school, clinic, service centre, child care centre construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure smooth running of social and community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grazing / Livestock Development Committees (particularly active under Model D and Three Tier)</td>
<td>• Managing and control of grazing resources, including pastures, fencing and water facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Organising livestock loans, dipping taxes and marketing services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Control of livestock and grazing capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources / Forestry Committees</td>
<td>• Organising tree planting activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensuring general sound natural resource use and management (soil and vegetation protection and forest health)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure environmental protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from AMS field visits, January-October 2002
3.4 Infrastructure Provision and Support Services in Phase Two

As noted earlier, the mid-1990s mark the climax in Phase One of Zimbabwe’s land redistribution programme in terms of both beneficiary emplacement and infrastructural development. Thereafter, depleted land availability and competing demands for limited state financial resources in the wake of economic structural adjustment prompted a noticeable reduction in both budgetary allocations for, and physical development outputs from, the programme. While policies guiding service provision remained applicable, the means for accomplishing these dwindled significantly, forcing Government to consider complementary other ways of responding to the programme demands. A major ensuing policy response was the de-emphasis on the provision of infrastructure prior to beneficiary emplacement. In the absence of the anticipated external (donor) funding to support the Inception Phase Plan of 1999 to 2000, Government adopted the Fast Track (Accelerated) programme that sought to hasten land acquisition and maximise beneficiary emplacement without immediate provision of commensurate physical infrastructure; physical developments were to follow later in complement of the resettled communities’ immediate access to and use of the land resource. In terms of the new policy, only basic infrastructure was to be provided at the time of land allocation, covering:

- Farm and village surveys
- Pegging of arable plots and homesteads
- Opening up of access roads
- Sinking of deep wells and boreholes
- Cattle dips (repairing or construction)
- Land preparation and crop packages for half a hectare per family

(Government of Zimbabwe, 2000 p.5)

The rest of the services were to be provided

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7 These items were to be made and seen in consistency with the earlier (Phase One) policy that was more comprehensive and detailed in its coverage of provisions since the Fast Track approach “…is a component of the overall National Land Reform and Resettlement Programme….an accelerated implementation of existing Government approaches with emphasis on compulsory acquisition rather than focusing on land offered under the willing seller-willing buyer principle” (Government of Zimbabwe, 2000 p. 2).
“… in subsequent phases, through the Ministerial / Departmental recurrent budgets and PSIP allocations…including

- Tenure arrangements (certificates of occupancy, village certificates, leases and upgrades)
- Secondary infrastructure (schools, service centres, clinics, staff housing, Energy and communications)
- Extension services (including personnel from AGRITEX and the Department of Veterinary Services)
- Agricultural credit
- Marketing services
- Social support plan
- Conservation matters”

(Government of Zimbabwe 2000, p 12.)

In contrast to Phase One when the implementation process was highly centralised and streamlined, with well-defined financial resource allocation and accounting responsibilities, Fast Track in effect decentralised land allocation and infrastructure support to Provinces and Districts, allowing for a simultaneous implementation process country-wide that mobilised virtually all Government agencies to participate in the massive programme. As it allowed for greater political play and control in its execution at the local levels than the predecessor programme (Phase One), Fast Track ultimately focused more on the allocation or redistribution of the land resource and less on the infrastructure and supportive framework and services that could facilitate or complement effective agricultural productivity and consolidate community development.

4. EMERGING ISSUES FOR POLICY CONSIDERATION

The following issues have been identified to warrant policy changes in order to improve the performance of the land redistribution and resettlement programme and enhance the achievement of its objectives.
4.1 Improvement of Criteria for Beneficiary Selection

A major observation to emerge from Zimbabwe’s experience in implementing land redistribution and resettlement over the past two decades is the need for clear beneficiary selection criteria that ensure fairness, transparency and easy application and implementation. Such criteria should be guided by the objective of ensuring that the land resource is held equitably among the country’s citizens and utilised efficiently and effectively for the national benefit. It appears essential that in the process of achieving equitable redistribution, identification and selection for allocation should aim at affording access to and use of the scarce and finite resource only those with the best prospects and potentials of utilising it effectively and productively. Only competent and potentially competent farmers should be allocated land under the resettlement programme.

With potential or proven competence taken as a cardinal principle in the selection criteria, the following priority considerations should be adopted to maximise potentials for success for the redistribution process and the resettlement programme:

a) Those farmers who have demonstrated high levels of competence in terms of production and productivity in their present communal lands and whose current main constraint to increase their production is shortage of land.

b) Those people who have demonstrated competence through the management of commercial farm enterprises as employed farm managers.

c) Those persons who have undergone the required training in agriculture at certificate, diploma or degree level and have an interest in farming. Such persons should, however, undergo supervised on-farm training before they are let out loose on their own.

d) Those Zimbabwean nationals with both the private means and interest to pursue agriculture as an economic activity and who show proven willingness to invest in the activity as a chosen pre-occupation.

Given a sound and effective selection framework an appropriate support system is required that ensures agricultural productivity, economic viability of operations as well as the long-term sustainability of the land resource.

4.2 Complementary Non-state Financing

In addition to the operational demands of the massive Fast Track Programme in terms of numerous participating organizations and agents and the requisite coordination processes,
there have been overwhelming budgetary needs for affording corresponding support services to resettled communities. The scale of the programme entails resource requirements that effectively surpass state capacity and would suggest a clear need for mobilising and facilitating the participation of both private sector players and beneficiaries to cater for initial development of infrastructure and subsequent maintenance. Greater participation of non-state players in the programme reduces government’s fiscal burden and facilitates more effective priority setting and resource allocation while also instilling a sense of pride and self-reliance in the beneficiaries. Experience in both Phases of the programme has shown that considerable scope exists for the resettled communities to contribute their own labour and local materials towards the development of their areas; at the same time Phase One also abounds with empirical evidence of local and external non-governmental organizations that contributed immensely financial and material support for the development of infrastructure and services in the established schemes.

4.3 Rationalizing Fast Track through Provision of Infrastructure and Support Services

The absence of infrastructure under Fast Track not only deprives the resettled communities of access to essential infrastructure and social services, but also seriously constrains their productivity and development, ultimately retarding the desired economic growth of the affected rural areas. As with the experiences of the mid-1980s when Accelerated resettlement schemes were upgraded (see Section 3.2.1), it is as essential as it is possible to rationalise resource utilisation, services provision and infrastructural development through enhanced support in order to realise the full potential and productivity of both the settled land and beneficiaries.

4.4 Streamlining Implementation Responsibilities and Accountability

To avoid confusion in the implementation process, reduce resource wastage and facilitate cooperation as well as coordination among stakeholders, there is need for streamlining the operational framework under which the programme is executed. A clear and transparent implementation arrangement also ensures that beneficiaries are appropriately informed and are able to effectively play their expected roles, without unwarranted uncertainty or ignorance.
4.5 Emphasis on and Investment in Productive Infrastructure, Support Services, and Water Development for Irrigation Farming

The provision of social services needs to be suitably guided by considerations of productivity and long-term sustainability of not only the resettled communities and their environment, but also the national economic resources under exploitation. As an activity involving structural changes in ownership, operation and investment patterns, the process of land resettlement and redistribution needs to develop and establish a firm foundation that makes it an attractive and sustainable alternative to the preceding situation. Fast Track has, within a very short period of time, in effect enabled a wholesale transfer of high value and high potential land and water resources from the white commercial farming sector to predominantly smallholder black farmers; a correspondingly robust framework that effectively supports the new farmers and ensures their growth and viability is essential. Such a framework would necessitate the formulation or designing of a package of productive services and inputs that enhances the farmers’ effectiveness—encompassing the crucial ingredients like extension and training; credit and input services, and marketing infrastructure. Given the ecological conditions of the bulk of the areas affected by the land transfers (particularly in terms of rainfall receipt and variability), the development of water storage infrastructure for small to medium irrigation farming should be an integral component of such a package, buoyed on enhanced private sector and beneficiaries’ own resources as suggested in Section 3.4.1 above.

REFERENCES

(not complete)


